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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
International politics in 1959 and. 19&9 has in common 
certain changes in the world affecting the formulation of 
foreign policy of the United States, the Soviet Union, and the 
People's Republic of China. These changes are the basis for 
equilibrium among nation-states, and for the satisfaction of a 
balance of power reflecting the realities of political power 
among the nation-states. The writer believes the United States 
has not accepted, thus not reflected, an understanding of 
these changes in the formulation, administration, and execution 
of the containment policy of the United States.
The United States foreign policy of containment does not 
allow this nation-state to initiate an active and consistent 
participation in international politics. Instead, the policy is 
formulated to react to events. It allows the United States to 
pursue a de facto problem-solving methodology in international 
politics, which is inconsistent with the very necessary 
equilibrium of international politics among nation-states.
United States foreign policy can only gain flexibility 
when it recognizes the fallacy of applying topical solutions to 
long range organic problems. This is no less true in relation
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to Southeast Asia, than to other areas commanding attention of
united States foreign policy. In fact it is more true, for in
the under-developed third world it becomes apparent to the
conscientious observer that the fate of the world may be well
that of Asia; for in this growing, increasingly interdependent
world it seems likely there may be a common destiny for mankind.
Charles E. Merriam noted this, when he stated:
Politics cannot be extirpated because 
wherever there is interaction there is 
interdependence; and whenever there is 
interdependence there are adjustments 
to be made that implicate and affect all 
or many of those who are constitutive of 
the context.1
At this time the writer would like to introduce those 
attributes present in the international politics of 1959 
through 1962 that remain structurally strong today. These 
attributes are the predominate changes that serve as assump­
tions which were inputed into the case study of the United 
Nations presence in laos during 1959 and the neutralization of 
Laos in I962. These attributes are the predominate changes 
misinterpreted as crisis factors in 1959 and I969.
The basic characteristic of international politics from 
1959 forward was that of change. There was change as evidenced 
in a lessening in the ideological conflict between the bi-polar 
powers, the reduction in violence among the developed nation­
states, and the fragmentation of power in the world among the
1 Charles E. Merriam Political Power (New York: Collier- 
MacMillan, 1964), p. 9»
3developed nation-states and between the developed and under­
developed nation-states.
Since the Soviet Union detonated a hydrogen device in 
1951» ideology of all shapes, except nationalism, became less 
important in the inter-state relations among nation-states.
The writer suggests this was the result of the following changes 
in international politics.
First, communism became unable to lead and control a 
militant revolutionary world movement. Instead, the communist 
movement has been broken apart by the disengagement process 
starting in 1948 with Tito leading Yugoslavia in an independent 
manner, and climaxing with Mao Tse-tung breaking with the Soviet 
Union in August, i960.
Of course, fragmentation has not negated the presence of 
Communist nation-states, Communist movements, and Communist 
subversion. What is significant and sometimes forgotten by the 
formulators of United States foreign policy is that Communism 
has become more limited; it represents a method to implement 
change in the new nation-states. That is, change as it is 
related to the quest for national identification and stability 
in a newly created nation-state. Communism provides the method­
ology for organizing the society for the protracted effort 
towards nationhood, and the vision of utopia to keep the populace 
disciplined to the protracted quest for stability.
Second, ideology has lost the ability to satisfy the aims 
of nation-states interested in social change. Ideological 
formulas like the dialectic unfolding to show the historical
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development of a classless society achieve little in the way of 
rectifying problems of health, housing, and v/elfare. This is 
all too obvious to decision-makers in developed and under­
developed nation-states. Most governmental leaders have adopted 
a problem-solving approach characterized by the utilization of 
a number of approaches to satisfy the multiple nature of the 
problems in under-developed nation-states.
Third, and most important, there is the power of the 
nuclear balance of terror. The destructive power of nuclear 
devices is known to men only in terms of their potential 
capabilities. Hiroshima and Hagaski introduced nuclear weapons 
to men, and the general reaction to their use in 19^5 was that 
such devices could never be used again. Since 19^5* the develop­
ment of hydrogen devices along with awesome delivery systems has 
cemented a very strong impression in the minds of all human 
beings that it is beyond what is rationally acceptable to conduct 
warfare in a nuclear manner. The restraint reflecting this 
attitude towards nuclear weapons has introduced a new factor into 
international politics, that is; force defined in terms of 
violence has a scale of limitation. Charles E. Merriam noted 
this limitation, when he said:^
^Charles E. Merriam, loo. cit., p. 35*
5It may also prove true that the 
profession of general interest and 
responsibility is merely a verbalism 
to cover selfish exploitation. In 
any case, deference to the "common 
interest" is a tribute to the basis 
of authority. It will be paid by 
the tyrant as well as by the demagogue, 
by the patrimonial ruler who must 
care for his people as for his cattle 
as well as by the popular courtier 
who flatters and fawns as a part of 
a play for prestige and domination.
The tyrant will not admit that he is a 
tyrant, at least not an experienced one, 
or that he is arbitrary or irresponsible, 
for he is always the vicar of someone or 
something, God or the nation or the class 
or the mass or the customs of his folk.
And, indeed, however arrogant he may be, 
he finds it difficult to escape from the 
world of law which he himself and his 
system have invoked. The most arrant 
imposter may thus find himself irrevocably 
committted to a system which no longer 
allows him that untrammeled liberty of 
choice and action, which he may dearly 
love but which by virtue of his very 
power escapes him. His sense of power is 
once more reduced to the dream world 
from which it came, and its earthly shape 
eludes him. So it may be said the price 
of power is limitation. The ruler is 
ruled by his own rules.^
With the decline in importance of ideology as the factor- 
pre-emanate in conflict among nation-states there has been a 
lessening of violence among at least the developed nation-states 
of the world. This is a break from what has been the mainstream 
of political interaction between nation-states; especially 
European nation-states. Today, violence is confined to those
^Ibid.
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continental areas of residence for emerging nation-states, ffliis 
statement is qualified "by the confrontation between the bi-polar 
powers. Yet, the Cold War has reached a level of diplomacy where 
both great powers search out roads to a detente. This is es­
pecially true, since 19^6 and the adoption of peaceful co­
existence by the Soviet Union. The Kingdom of Laos in 1959 
represents and reflects a transitional phase in East-West 
relations.
Laos in 1959 is representative of the movement of inter­
national politics from being a confrontation of force between 
advanced nation-states to a conflict in terms of a political 
power display in the dimensions of scaled limitation. At the 
same time, laos reflects something new in bi-polar relations; 
detente. This was most evidenced in the late fall of 1959 and 
spring of 196I, when a bi-polar understanding was reached to 
allow intervention by the united Nations in 1959 with an armada 
of its specialized agencies to "help laos meet basic development 
n e e d s , a n d  the restoration of the international Control 
Commission in I96I.2
A fifth element of change in international politics has 
to do with the fragmentation in the relations of the developed
^United Nations, Secretariat. Tuomoja Report on Laos 
Recommends Co-Ordinated Action by United Nations for Kingdom’s 
Development (Bangkok, Thailand. April 26, 19^9), P» 3*
A report received as an enclosure to the writer from prayoon 
fânakon, Officer-in-Charge Uhited Nations Information Service, 
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East.
2See text Chapter IX pp. 155-196 and Chapter X pp. 197-237
7with the under-developed nation-states due to their different 
levels of development. The new restraint and resulting search 
for detente discussed previously as pertaining to the hi-polar 
powers is not present in Asia or in Africa. This is due to the 
fact that nationalist passions and "basic freedoms of want and 
fear have not run their course or received satisfaction. With 
such a state of development, the tendency is to react totally 
in terms of a commitment that hasn't been met by the establish­
ment in decision-making roles or towards the nation-state 
assisting in economic development.
This total reaction against a developed nation-state by 
under-developed nation-states takes on an unprecedented magni­
tude in relation to their attitude towards the United States, 
m  addition to the orientation of the American mind, another 
liability of our involvement in foreign policy pertains to the 
level of our economic development. We are a post-industrial 
nation-state. At present this characteristic sets the United 
States, Japan and Western Europe apart in a unique fashion from 
most of the world. The specific problem created for these 
affluent societies in dealing with under-developed societies is 
that their pursuit of humanistic goals of universal liberty, 
equality, and fraternity are compromised by the different levels 
of economic development and the requirement for their own 
existence to maintain a level of development that is satisfying 
to a citizenry demanding more leisure and economic well-being.
There is one final element of change important to the 
development of equilibrium. This is the twilight of the nation-
8
state in international politics. The process has a long way to 
go, but the direction is irreversible. It has come about, 
because of security interdependence and something morej people. 
People are today identifying more than ever with their regions. 
The process started with the requirements of economic develop­
ment and the technological revolution in communication.
Up to now the attention has been upon the problems of 
change, and the presence of crisis emanating from these changes. 
The writer believes the inability to recognize these changes 
stems from the fact that United States foreign policy formu­
lators have not discriminated between the types of political 
power involved. These decision-makers have categorically assumed 
that in the external foreign policies the principle of operation 
is power politics in which a nation-state negotiated from a 
position of strength defined as military might. Now this 
simplifies the interaction.
In addition to military might, political power takes the 
form of force. Force is characterized as being made up of a 
value system subject to reason, m  this form, political power 
utilizes military might for a higher purpose; a threat, 
deterrent. Here the end sought is to achieve influence defined 
as the ability to control another nation-states behavior. VJhen 
this is accomplished, a nation-state has authority over another 
nation-state's foreign policy. VJhen competing nation-states 
have acquired a sufficient amount of political power defined as 
authority, then a state of equilibrium has been attained in
9international politics. This is never realised» but the state 
of development in nuclear weaponary assures that nation-states 
will be satisfied with an approximate amount of authority as long 
as the self-preservation of the nation-state is maintained.^
Political power doesn't grow out of the barrel of a gun.^ 
Political power is fashioned in the life of human beings acting 
through social units like the family, the church, and the 
nation-state. It is these institutions that possess authority.
It is these institutions through which man in decision-making 
roles goes about the business of maintaining and enhancing the 
authority of the particular institutions by exerting influence 
in the social fabric.3 Authority and influence characterize 
political power in the fully defined sense in the domestic 
environment of the political system.^ Charles E. Merriam 
described this, when he said:
Power does not lie in the guns, or the ships,
iThe proof that political power is psychological and 
symbolic as well as real is no better illustrated than here. 
I'tost implicitly political power has become a recognition of 
symbolic strength. It qualifies the efficiency, the validity, 
and the legitimacy of a nation-state. If it does not have it, 
it does not function. The nuclear weapon only represents a 
more dramatic psychological symbol of political power. "The 
last resort" is a symbolized premise which fear of the unknown 
protects. Political power is primarily symbolic. Weaponry 
is secondary, existing only as a qualification of power.
2Mao Tse-tung, "Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung, " 
(Peking: Foreign language Press, 1966), p. 61.
3See p. 171 discussion of decision-making model and 
application with regard to Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold.
^See p. 116 discussion of the model of the political 
system and its application to the Kingdom of laos.
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or the walls of stone, or the lines of steel. 
Important as these are, the real political 
power lies in a definite common pattern of 
impulse. If the soldiers choose to disobey 
or even shoot their officers, if the guns 
are turned against the government, if the 
citizenry connives at disobedience of the 
law, and makes of it even a virtue, then 
authority is impotent and may drag its 
bearer down to doom.l
Though Merriam is speaking about political power in 
relation to the internal domestic environment (authority and 
influence), one cannot help to feel this also applies to 
international politics as might and force utilized by nation­
states in an international political system. This international 
political system is illustrated as follows ;
International Political System 
Equilibrium
Nuclear Balance /  \  Political Power
of Terror
/








For the United States the application of political power 
in international politics has taken the primary form of power
^Charles E. Merriam, o£. cit., p. 21.
11 1confined to the application of military might. For this 
reason the United states has lacked the capability to politically 
influence other nation-states. We have been structured in the 
orientation of political power to military might by the attempt 
to integrate instrumentalism with the military orientation of 
containment.2
In the Cold War, so far, technology has given the United States 
a military parity with the Soviet Union and superiority with the 
People's Republic of China, but this has not granted the Uhited States 
the ability to meet the psychological and covert qualities of 
Communism.3 The United States has been frustrated by its inability 
to free itself from a time orientation emanating from the determinism 
of a Christian foundation and instrumentalism and deal with 
Communism on a protracted basis in terms of a flexible methodology 
to meet covert as well as overt contingencies.
Therefore, since the period 1954 through 1959 in which the 
development of covert protracted war methodology took place, the 
united States has been weakened in its many attempts to project 
its traditional emphasis on a deterministic overt foreign policy 
characterized by treaties and the utilization of military might.
iOther forms of power, such as the economic element, 
have been confined as a backdrop to a military presence in the 
United States efforts to exert political power in international 
politics.
2See pp. 2?-29for discussion of instrumentalism and 
containment.
3See p.258of appendix for comparison of military 
capabilities.
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With the experience against the Japanese and French behind them, 
Communist guerrilla tacticans began the exportation of covert 
protracted war methodology to nation-states characterized as being 
under-developed.1 This development in methodology for protracted 
war gave the Communists a flexibility in the means utilized to 
acquire, maintain, and enhance political power in the era of 
nuclear weapons.
Vfnile the Communist bloc utilised covert protracted war 
methodology, the United States maintained containment to implement 
instrumentalism. Containment is somewhat non-competitive with 
protracted war as implemented, since 195^* because containment 
depends on the acceptance by competing power blocs of a status quo 
situation. Thus, containment relies on mutual acceptance of 
spheres of interest, which requires only the presence of military 
forces to maintain the accepted zones of jurisdiction. Thus, 
containment relies on political power defined as military might 
without leaving an area of flexibility for influence over those 
nation-states using the present methodology of protracted war.
Where these power blocs agree to conduct an active foreign policy, 
containment many times resorts to military might or disengagement. 
On the other hand, the covert methodology of the Communists gives 
the ability to disassociate from any one single aspect of political 
power. Cnee the cadre's influence has been acknowledged by the 
people, the cadre have the authority and then the legitimacy to
^See Chapter III for discussion of covert protracted war 
methodology.
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use force to maintain or enhance their political power. Eut this 
is only done with the implementation of the first fifteen stages 
of the covert methodology.^ With this methodology, the Communist 
tacticans fulfill the cardinal rule of political power. This rule 
is s
The functional situation out of which 
the political arises is not the demand 
for force as such, but the need for
some form of equilibrium,2
The covert nature of Communist methodology generally gives 
that power bloc the ability to exert political power in this era 
of nuclear deterrence. Containment's reliance on political 
power defined as only being military might is not sufficiently 
flexible to act or respond to covert efforts of the Communists.
The United States finds itself reacting to change, and to only
the overt manifestations of change. In conclusion, the United
States loses international political power, but in a greater 
sense the United States has, since 195^f jeopardized the 
equilibrium in international politics. This is the case, 
because the American formulators of foreign policy rely on 
political power confined many times to military might and the 
technology present to improve our nuclear weaponry. This is
methodology 
2
^See p. 50 for model of covert protracted war
Charles E. Merriam, op. cit., p. 36.
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political suicide for the United States, and the rest of the 
world.
To solve the dilemma of containment, the writer proposes 
a model of equilibrium for the formulation of United States 
foreign policy. To accomplish the development of a theory and 
model of equilibrium requires two things;
First, to conceptualize a theory and model
of equilibrium there must be answered 
the challenges presented in the below 
described equation of reality :
Equation of Reality 
interaction
Constant
1. Value s- N
a. Kind and r
Type of Values. E
b. Under­ V/Equilibrium
standing.
2. Political IPower- 0a. Authority. Nb. Influence.
c. Force. Interaction
d. Fight.
\  Variables 









 A ----- -
Second, to justify equilibrium in both 
negative and positive terms by 
exploring in depth the components 
of the equation of reality from 
195^ through 1959 to illustrate
^The challenge on the intentions side of the equation of 
reality is to have the constant elements flexible though to 
deal with the real and facts on the execution side of the 
equation.
^The overall challenge is to identify the components of 
the equation.
15the curtailment of United States 
influence and authority in 
international politics, and the 
mediating role of the great powers 
to uphold the intentions (trinity 
of beliefs and political power) the 
United States ought to be pursuing 
to assure equilibrium in the 
international political system.
Equilibrium assumes a state of stability can exist among 
nation-states, if nation-states possessing nuclear weapons 
believe their nuclear development and resulting weaponry are 
viable vis-a-vis their nuclear competitors. The writer makes a 
second assumption.
Today, and since 1952» the parity does not have to be 
completely equal given the fact that they are chiefly symbolic. 
This seems an acceptable judgment given the destructive capa­
bility of hydrogen bombs and the delivery systems present for 
these bombs as of 1959» Thus, since 1959 nuclear development 
has been prohibitive. This means "over-kill" is present. The 
result is a fixed state of equilibrium, where political power 
defined as only being military might does not assure influence 
and authority in international politics. But it does assure 
equilibrium, since nuclear war would mean the virtual loss of 
human life in a civilized world. This is unacceptable as input 
in formulation of policy for any decision-maker in the East or 
We st.
Third, equilibrium assumes man's development unfolds in a 
social situation. The social situation involves an exchange 
between participants in this environment. Basic to the exchange
l6
taking place is man acting. acting in giving up something
for a mutually acceptable object implies that equilibrium 
requires a man that is more than social. Man must be rational 
in so far as being capable of grasping concepts and forming 
them into a judgment. Tfen acting out his rational capacity does 
so in terms of power defined as the desire to influence the 
attitudes and behavior of others. This attention with power in 
man's orientation is not power for the sake of power, but rather 
to achieve goals to satisfy values defined by his individual 
personality as conditioned by his environment.
Power is natural to man, both in terms of directing man 
towards fulfillment individually and as a social being. Thus, 
man cannot exist without power. But to have power, man must be 
willing to grant a relative amount of power to his fellow 
inhabitants. This is a state of equilibrium. Equilibrium is 
thus as natural to man as power, if man wants to be.
Since the nation-state is an expression of man acting out 
his existence to define himself in a group relationship, 
equilibrium and power are to the nation-srate in its development 
what they are to man. Thus, they are as natural to the nation­
state as to man. But there is a slight difference.
Equilibrium and power can be viewed by man to be a means 
to a higher goal than mere existence. If existence was for all 
men the end desired, then equilibrium would be satisfactory as 
a goal. Man being capable of rationality sometimes sets goals 
beyond mere existence. With this orientation towards a defini­
tion of life, equilibrium would not be sufficiently satisfying.
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The nation-state differentiates itself from a man, who places 
existence in a secondary position to a higher goal. The nation­
state is the expression of a man in a political sense. This 
political sense is the political system defined as;^
that system of interactions to be found in 
all independent societies which performs 
the functions of integration and adaptation 
(both internally and vis-a-vis other societies) 
by means of the employment, or threat of 
employment, of more or less legitimate physical 
compulsion.^
The political system assures interaction for man in so 
far as man having a means to attain demand satisfaction.
Finally, the political system attains an orderly development 
of demand, interaction of constituents in groups with decision­
makers, and the authoritative allocation of satisfied needs by 
the decision-makers to those constituents making demands. This 
is a political system, because a state of equilibrium has been 
reached.
Equilibrium in the political system is a concept express­
ing the fact that the collective called society has reached a 
structural state of political development where men exchange 
for each other's demands without resorting to force. Instead, 
the exchange is confined to the utilisation of political power 
defined as using influence to attain, to maintain, and to
^Almond, Gabriel and James S. Coleman, The Politics of 
Developing Areas (Princeton, New Jersey ; Princeton University 
Press, I90O ) p7 40.
Zgee p. 116 for model of political system and its 
application to the Kingdom of Laos.
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enhance one's ability to affect the will of decision-makers 
with authority in the political system.
In conclusion, what is to he sought in the formulation of 
a nation-state's foreign policy is a state of equilibrium much 
like that in a nation-state, where nation-states exchange 
demands without resort to military might. Rather, the nation-states 
confine their interaction to gaining influence and achieving 
authority by means of diplomacy confined to non-violent means.
With this accomplished, the nation-state is operating in the inter­
national political system, because the nation-state is exchanging 
something with another nation-state in order for a demand being 
satisfied. At this point influence has been exerted by the 
nation-state. With this influence the nation-state attains 
control, and with control authority is achieved. Like man in 
his political system, equilibrium is accomplished in the inter­
national political system when an exchange has been made without 
resorting to military might.
PART I
Causes Behind Our Inability to Achieve Orderly Change
Tv'̂ turity : among other 
things - not to hide 
one's strength out of 
fear and consequently, 
live below one’s best.l
Part I concentrates on the elements necessary for the 
achievement of an equilibrium in the international political 
system. This means the basis of the nation-state's demand for 
political power and the satisfaction of self-preservation.2 
Our concern is with the equation of reality as far as values 
inputed as intentions into the realities of the international 
political system.3
The values inputed as intentions into the equation of 
reality are the American and Asian outlook. These outlooks 
structure and direct a third outlook present in the inter­
national political system, namely; the protracted outlook. The 
protracted outlook is the methodology utilized by Asian nation­
states, because it reflects a lack of determinism present in the
^Dag Hammarskjold, Markings (New York; Alfred A. lüiopf,
1965), p. 89.
2See p. 10 for model of international political system. 
^See p. 14 for model of equation of reality.
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Asian outlook. The United States policy of containment is a 
reaction to the protracted outlook, and a reflection of the 
determinism present in the American outlook.
In Chapter I (The American Outlook) will he described as 
being based on a trinity of beliefs, structured by a success 
story of political and economic achievement, and frustrated by 
the inability to make the world safe for democracy. The writer 
suggests that these three areas develop the determinism in the 
American outlook.
Chapter II (I3ie Asian Outlook) delves into the lack of 
determinism present in the Asian outlook. This discussion will 
be orientated by the cycle theory of time concept basic to all 
Asian thinking. The writer concludes that the lack of a time 
orientation present in the Asian mind is due to the cycle theory 
of time.
Chapter III (The Protracted Outlook) concentrates on the 
methodology presented by East and West to satisfy the demand for 
political power in the international political system. The 
protracted outlook described in Chapter III is a reflection of 
the Asian orientation against a time basis for progress. This 
outlook is very important in 1959 and I969, because our com­
petitors for political power in the international political 
system utilize it as their methodology, and the response of the 
West led by the united States has been a deterministic methodol­
ogy called containment. Thus, Chapter III will bring into the 
equation of reality the ideology of East and West, and the 
methodology (protracted war and containment) utilized by the
21




Humanity with all its fears,
With all the hopes of future years.
Is hanging "breathless on thy fate.l
The American Outlook was based on the trinity of beliefs. 
The principles of the American Outlook expressed in the trinity 
of beliefs were the acceptance of a fundamental moral order in 
life that constrains life by law, the acknowledgment in society 
of the primary importance of free and responsible individuals, 
and the mission of the United States to bring to fruition 
democracy, liberty, and freedom within the law.
Vihat did these precepts mean, and what were their impli­
cations for United States foreign policy?
First, the acceptance of a fundamental moral order in life, 
At the essence of the American outlook has been a belief in a 
fundamental law or an eternal moral order underlying the flux 
of custom and habit. Since this belief reflected an acceptance 
of supernatural revelation and natural law emanating from God, 
Americans submitted themselves to an objective standard of
^Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, "The Building of the Sliip, " 
quoted in The Oxford Dictionary of Quotations (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1955)» p. 316.
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right and wrong by which human conduct was to be measured.
This was the fountain of justice from which our love of free­
dom grew out of a sense of moral responsibility in politics.
This was the foundation for social order. Human beings could 
no more violate this objective morality than the law of gravity.
Second, a belief in the free and responsible individual.
This belief had its foundation in the religious heritage
expressed in Puritanism, which held that all men are earthly
citizens of the divine kingdom and are subjects immediately
responsible to its King. Here, each person was to consider
himself a significant, if sinful unit, to whom God had given
a particular place and duty. Of this Puritan influence,
Samuel Eliot Horison stated;
Puritanism was essentially and primarily 
a religious movement; attempts to prove it 
to have been a mask for politics or money­
making are false as well as unhistorical.
In the broadest sense Puritanism was a passion 
for righteousness; the desire to know and do 
God's will. Similar movements have occurred in 
every branch of Christianity, as well as in 
Judaism. Puritanism was responsible for the 
settlement of Nev/ England; and as the 
Congregational, Presbyterian, Kethodist,
Baptist, Unitarian, Quaker, and other 
Protestant sects of the United States are 
offshoots of seventeenth-century English and 
Scottish Puritanism, it is not surprising 
that Puritan ways of thinking and doing have 
had a vast effect on the American mind and 
character, precursors of what is commonly 
called the Protestant Ethic.^
But this was accepted without acknowledging the Calvinist
^Samuel Eliot yorison. The Oxford History of The American 
People (New York: Oxford university Press, 19^5)* P- 61.
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doctrine of an avenging God who commits multitudes of His 
creatures to eternal damnation. Instead, the American people 
substituted the Protestant idea that salvation v/as a matter of 
free choice, not a matter of predestination.^
Thus religion, insisting on the ultimate worth of each 
soul, helped support the political doctrine of the free indi­
vidual. This political doctrine, in emphasizing individualism, 
taught that ultimate political authority rested with the sum of 
individuals. It thus resulted in political democracy. Econom­
ically, belief in the free and responsible individual rested on 
the classical notion of the eighteenth century. Tnis taught 
that the total social harmony and social effectiveness of the 
national community resulted from each individual pursuing his 
own economic interest.2 ¥an was to "lead the New Testament life, 
yet make a living."3
Third, a belief in the national mission of the United 
States. This involved the conviction that the United States 
was chosen by God as the place in which democracy, liberty, 
and responsible freedom were to come to fruition and then move 
out to prevail among the nation-states in the international 
political system. In essence, this belief considered it a duty 
of the United States to hold before the world the ideal of a
^Alpheus T. Mason Free Government in the Making (New 
Yorkj Oxford University Press, 1956), pp. 52-54 and pp. 57-60.
^Frederick M. Watkins The Age of Ideolo^ (Englewood 
Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965), p. 18.
3Samuel Eliot Morison, op. cit., p. 65.
25free and self-governing individual.
The foregoing trinity of beliefs were principles governing 
the way America related power, prosperity, and freedom to each 
other in the first century of development as a political system. 
This was the century, Edmund S. Morgan states, in which 
"America's leading intellectuals were clergymen and thought . 
about theology.
In an essay titled "America Presents the Confused I m a g e ,
Max Ways notes that the continuing thread in our history has
been a peculiar way of relating the idea of order to the idea
of freedom. This way was the first two precepts of the trinity
of beliefs. Vsjc Ways statesj
Men are bound, in a sense, by the order
established by their Creator, the laws of
Nature and of Ifeture's God. But men are 
also free to search for meaning and 
applications of those laws and are even 
free to disregard them - at their peril.
Out of this paradox of bound and free comes 
an idea of morality that applies to government 
as well as to individuals.3
At the end of World War II the United States stood alone 
in terms of economic power, and political stability- With
United states Allies stripped of economic viability, and subject
to the political and military pressures of totalitarian
^Edmund S. Morgan, "The American Revolution Considered as 
an Intellectual Movement," quoted in Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. 
and Morton VAiite (ed. ) Paths of American Thought (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1963)# P« H *
Ways, "America Presents the Confused Image," Life, 
XXXXVII (October 5, 1959). P» 157.
3 Ibid.
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communism, the United States concluded that more must he done 
than to hold before the world the ideal of a free and self- 
governing individual. The United States activated the belief 
of a "mission" to further the cause of democratic liberty 
throughout the world. The United States foreign policy was 
going to try to build, throughout the world, situations of order 
and freedom around the idea that government should be constrained 
by morality and limited by law.
President Harry S. Truman activated the missionary belief
central to the American outlook, when he stated to the Congress
of the united States ;
I believe that it must be the policy of the 
United States to support free people who are 
resisting attempted subjugation by armed 
minorities or by outside pressure.^
We went forth in 19^7 to export the trinity of beliefs
through the vehicle of an economic and military assistance
program.2 This was our role; this was our missionary duty.
We were going to rebuild nation-states to reflect the United States
political system. With the poet Henry V/adsworth Longfellow the
American people assumed that the people of the world agreed ;
Humanity with all its fears.
With all the hopes of future years.
Is hanging breathless on thy fate
^President Harry S. Truman, Years of Trial and Hope :
Uemoirs II (New York: Doubleday Co., 1955)* P* 111*
2See appendix p. 258 for breakdown of the United States 
economic and military assistance programs for the years 1947-1968*
3Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, op. cit = ; p= 316.
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with the means of relating power, prosperity and freedom to 
each other, the United States was unprepared. The trinity of 
beliefs had been lost. Ihey were replaced by instrumentalism 
after the Civil Vfer.
Instrumentalism is the doctrine "that ideas are instru­
ments of response and adaptation, and that their truth is to be 
judged in terms of their effectiveness.John Dewey believed
man "must be faithful to the earth.
The modern era will begin when the 
naturalist point of view shall be adopted 
in every field. This does not mean that
mind is reduced to matter, but only that
mind and life are to be understood not in 
theological but in biological terms, as an 
organ or an organism in an environment, 
acted upon and reacting, moulded and moulding.
We must study not states of consciousness but 
modes of response. The brain is primarily an 
organ of a certain kind of behavior, not of 
knowing the world.3
Instrumentalism negated the trinity of beliefs as far as 
framing and directing the activity of the American political 
system in the formulation of domestic and foreign policy in 
this century. Instrumentalism advocated expediency like
^’.Vill Durant Ihe Story of Philosophy (New York : Simon 
& Schuster, Inc., 1926), p. 496.
^John Dewey Ihe Influence of Darwin in Philosophy (New 
York t G. P. Putnam, 1910), p. 8.
^John Dewey Creative Intelligence (New York ; Simon & 
Schuster, 1917), p. 36.
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pragmatism with the added fact of the emphasis on workability.
Henry Steele Commager described instrumentalism as follows:
It was as practical as the patent office - or 
the Declaration of Independence. Its expediency 
was individual; it came, increasingly to be 
social, to require that men work together to 
establish the truth of their hopes.1
Whatever promised to increase wealth was 
automatically regarded as good, and the 
American was tolerant, therefore, of 
speculation, advertising, deforestation, 
and the exploitation of natural resources, 
and bore patiently with the worst manifestations 
of industrialism.2
All this tended to give a quantitative cast 
to his thinking and inclined him to place 
a quantitative valuation upon almost everything.
Vben he asked what was a man worth, he meant 
material worth, and he was impatient of any but 
the normal yardstick. His solution for most 
problems was therefore quantitative - and 
education, democracy, and war all yielded 
to the soverign remedy of numbers.3
Instrumentalism unchained America from the shackles of 
a traditional national conscience: the trinity of beliefs.
And with this accomplishment, America lacked a public philoso­
phy with which to relate power, prosperity and freedom with each 
other. All that was present in terms of direction was expediency 
and the workable as evidenced in American technology and manage­
ment. As a result, the United States entered upon international
1 Henry Steele Commager The American r/Iind (New Haven, 
Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1950), p. 95*
2Ibid. , p. /.
3ibid.
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responsibilities with an advanced technology to be implemented 
by the specialized experts in computers, v/ho deal with means 
and know the most about everything involving systems - except 
what a society ought to do.
Without a link to relate the elements of power, prosperity 
and freedom to each other, the United States does not comprehend 
how to build, throughout the world, situations of order and free­
dom around the idea that government should be constrained by 
morality and limited by law. (Hie l^iited States has fumbled 
and stumbled : The political power of the United States has
been wasted in so far as political power defined as influence.
The united States has gone on a month by month basis in the 
conduct of foreign policy moving from crisis to crisis.
Yalta, Potsdam, Czechoslovakia, the Berlin blockade, and 
the fall of China, and today, Vietnam, China, Berlin, and 
Czechoslovakia. All the same! All because each crisis has 
been viewed as a total effort to carry out the methodology of 
containment, but without an approach to direct the method. In 
1959 and I969, the American people view international politics 
as a stranger within our gate I With Rudyard Kipling, they 
exclaim :
The Stranger within my gate 
He may be true or kind.
But he does not talk my talk- 
I cannot feel his mind.
I see the face and the eyes and the mouth,
But not the soul behind.
The men of my own stock
They may do ill or well,
But they tell the lies I am wanted to.
They are used to the lies I tell;
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And we do not need interpreters 
Wlien we go to buy and sell.
The Stranger within my gates,
He may be evil or good,
But I cannot tell what powers control -«
VAiat reasons sway his mood;
Nor when the Gods of his far-off land 
Nay repossess his blood.^
United States foreign policy not only suffers from a 
vacuum emanating from a lack of basic direction, but from the 
fact that this nation-state is a post-industrial country.
This affects outlook in terms of emphasis in public policy. 
Computers and communications have brought forth new perspectives 
and attitudes. With this electronic revolution has also come 
new social dilemmas such as leisure* automation, and an aware­
ness of the immediate nature of domestic and foreign problems.
This post-industrial status of the United States is a 
success story, when measured in terms of quantity produced by 
American industry. But instrumentalism has not prepared this 
country with the means to relate the idea of freedom to the 
idea of order. Second, the new state of the society has left 
this country without a basis of communication with a world 
suffering through industrial development, or coping with the 
problems of the industrial process. Third, the United states 
suffers in a state of frustration by being the most powerful 
nation-state since nineteenth-century England. For this, we are 
unpopular, Jacques Barzun noted;
^Rudyard Kipling, "The Stranger," Letters of Travel and 
Song V (Toronto; The MacMillan Company, 1908), p. 30.
31As a nation whose citizens seek popularity 
more than any other kind of success, it is 
galling that we, the United States, are so 
extensively unpopular. We periodically send 
out envoys of various plumage to find the 
cause of this failure, and the little doves 
come back with a surprised look and no olive 
branch, even when they have been personally 
well-received.1
In a speech to the Minneapolis Rotary Club, John Cowles,
the publisher of the Minneapolis Star and Tribune, asked the
question: "Will America Survive in Freedom in Coming New World
Order?"2 Cowles answered his question with an illustration
pinpointing why the United States cannot communicate clearly
with the world, and finds itself unpopular. lûr. Cowles stated :3
I recently studied some estimates of 
world income broken down by nations, 
with the population of each. If one 
assumes that $100 a year per person 
is required for food, clothing and 
shelter - about 2? cents per day for 
sustenance and all living expenses 
of every kind - and if one then 
computes the amount of excess annual 
income above $100 a year per person 
that each country has, the figures 
are staggering.
The United States alone has 4? per cent, 
or almost half, of the total excess 
world income above $100 per person.
If one adds together the excess 
income, that is the amount above 
$100 per inhabitant, of Canada,
Great Britain, Japan, Australia and
^Jacques Barzun, "The Rfen in The American ?&sk," Foreign 
Affairs XXXXIII (April, 1965), P* 25.
2John Cowles, "Will America Survive in Freedom in Coming 
New World Order?" The Minneapolis Star, November 50, 1959, P» 3-0.
3lbid.
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the European countries including 
Russia, that total is only slightly 
greater than that of the United States 
alone.
These countries that I have mentioned, 
including the United States, therefore 
have between them more than 95 per cent 
of the world's total income above $100 
per person.
In other words, the rest of the world - 
Asia, Africa, Central America and 
South America combined - has less than 
5 per cent of the world's total income 
above $100 per person.^
Finally, the determinism present in the American outlook 
is frustrated by an inability to make the world safe for 
democracy. This frustration is a manifestation of an inability 
to rekindle the trinity of beliefs as the standard for judging 
the acceptability of United States involvement. This country 
has progressed so far economically guided by instrumentalism 
that the call in 1955 hy Walter Lippmann for a return to the 
public philosophy was not accepted.2 ye will compete in the 
world with numbers; that is, quantity produced by our vast techno­
logically sophisticated industrial establishment. Joseph Kraft 
caught this emphasis in our outlook in an editorial titled 
"Richness and Bigness [purchased at the High Cost of Empty lives.
1 John Cowles, Ibid.
2Walter Lippmann Essays in The Public Philosophy (Boston: 
Little, Brown, and Company, 1955 )•
3Joseph Kraft, "Richness and Bigness Purchased at the High 
Cost of Empty Lives," The Minneapolis Tribune, July 3» 1957, 
p. 4.
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The speech made by the President (Johnson) 
the other day to the Junior Chamber of Commerce 
in Baltimore v/as full of those qualities in the 
national character which assure that this country 
will attain the Great Society. It was also 
pregnant with national characteristics apt to put 
beyond reach something still more precious - a 
modest society.
The President spoke in the old Independence Bay 
tradition, and as grandfathers will to young men 
on the make. He celebrated American progress and 
scorned doubters and critics. He piled number on 
top of number in a dizzying structure of achieve­
ment.
The United States had an educational system 
"second to none;" prosperity "second to none;" 
a "standard of living second to none;" "a 
third of the world's railroad track;" "two- 
thirds of the world's automobiles," "half of the 
trucks;" "half of all the radios;" "a third of 
all the electricity;" "a fourth of all the steel."
The trouble with all this, of course, is not 
that it is false. The United States is the 
richest and most powerful country in the world. 
Visible preeminence is a fact central to much 
of our national experience.
But richness and bigness purchased at the high 
cost of empty lives.1
^Joseph Kraft, Ibid., p. 4.
CHAPTER II 
THE ASIAN OUTLOOK
One is in the muck of the world, but not of it.^
The Asian outlook is defined by his physical environment. 
Life has meaning to the Asian when he yields to the unfolding of 
his environment. The nature of his physical environment is to 
unfold in a cyclical fashion, fân, as a product of his envi­
ronment, retains only the right in life to the cyclical way in 
which his life unfolds. This is harmony for man. To do less 
would make man's gift to his physical environment nothing and 
in vain.
Nature is basic to the Asian outlook. This is consistent 
with the peasant base in Asia. The Asian's life has always been 
challenged by the task of satisfying his diet of rice. Producing 
rice has required water to assure a level of production satisfy­
ing more than a subsistence living.2 Water is expressed to the
l'’The Ehagavad Gita," quoted by P. S. C. Northrop Meeting of 
East and West (New York; The MacMillan Company, 19^7 )» P» 3^°»
2Reference to rice production is to wet rice. In Asia, 
peasants living in the highlands carry on what is called dry 
rice or slash-and-burn rice production. In this form, land is 
cleared, rice is planted, and the production depends primarily 
on the fertility of the soil.
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35peasant through the monsoon. The monsoon is the most basic 
evidence of control by nature over the peasant. Through the 
cyclical manner in which the monsoon season takes place the 
Asian is made aware that Asia is a land with a people,- rather 
than a people with a land.
Nature directs man. Qy. what nature is to man, it discloses 
the direction in which man can find meaning to life. And this 
is the cyclical theory of time concept. In nature, the cycle 
is evidenced in the sequence of a day. The day begins in an 
all-embracing darkness and ends in the brightness of a day. 
Endless moves the cycle of a day ! So too does man experience 
with his senses the fact of a cycle from childhood to death. 
Cycles, he concludes, are everywhere.
This evidence of cycles in what man experiences directly 
has left the Asian with two conclusions. First, he must live 
in nature. Second, there is a harmony in nature. This is the 
determinism in the Asian outlook.
V/hereas the determinism of the American outlook emanated 
from what he rationally concluded, namely; the trinity of 
beliefs and instrumentalism; the Asian emphasizes flexibility 
in all matters beyond harmony with nature. This harmony with 
nature is something the Asian has experienced with his senses.
Nature expressed by the monsoons governs the good earth. 
Life here hinges on a sufficient rainfall, but no more. Such a 
life is precarious, yet it must be lived. An Asian lives by 
yielding in a dignified manner to nature, in doing this*
36man wins. I&n has created a balance with nature. The 
determinism is in living with nature, but there is flexibility. 
It is in man yielding to the demands of everyday life. This is 
expressed by the symbol of water. The Chinese pacifist I2.0 Tze 
expressed this flexibility, when he said;
The best of men is like water;
Water benefits all things 
And does not compete with them.
It dwells in (the lowly) places that all disdain - 
V/herein it comes near to the Tao.
In his dwelling (the Sage) loves the (lowly) earth;
In his heart, he loves what is profound;
In his relations with others, he loves kindness;
In his words, he loves sincerity;
In government, he loves peace;
In business affairs, he loves ability;
In his actions, he loves choosing the right time.
It is because he does not contend 
That he is without reproach.!
Water illustrates the graceful yielding man must dedicate 
his life to in order to live with nature. To achieve this
yielding is to be strong, because man attains a balance with
nature. This is different from the Western orientation, where 
the end sought is to control nature and conquer outer-space. 
V/hile an American finds harmony in himself when he seeks better­
ment of his environment, the Asian yields to the dictates of 
nature.
This Asian emphasis on yielding to nature has a basic 
effect on human relations. Since nature is the standard for 
judging good and bad or right and wrong, there is no objective
^Lin Yutang (ed. ) The Wisdom of Lao Tze (New York * 
Random House, 1948), p. 7SI
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morality conceived by man for his perfection. Harmony demands
pacific relations between human beings. These human relations
should be free of alienation, competition, and friction. Face
saving is the end, and courtesy is the medium by which face
saving is accomplished, and thus nature is satisfied. F. S. C.
Northrop digested the Asian's concern for harmony, and the
resulting willingness to yield to whatever is present in the
human and earthly conditions of life, when he said:
Now we can understand how it is that in the 
very heart of Hindu India's most sacred 
temples at Benares the sacred cows and priests, 
both indifferently cleaned, walk, squat and 
meditate unperturbed amidst the muck and filth 
of this very earthworld. The Hindu blandly 
accepts the ugliness of the world around him 
and airs merely to attain spiritual equanimity 
within it. • If the nature of things is such that 
everything runs in a cycle, coming back at some 
later date to precisely where it is now, what is 
the point in trying to change the present state 
of affairs? One rarely hastens, if this be 
possible, the time when tomorrow becomes today.^
VThat the Asian's devotion to living within the dictates 
of nature means in the conduct of foreign policy is explained 
in the classical epic poem of Hindu culture, the Bhagavad Gita.^ 
Arjuna is faced on the field of battle with the task of killing 
off members of his clan, who have fought with the enemy.
Arjuna is depressed. His Hindu religion denies him the right 
to kill all forms of animal life. The God Krishna appears
Ip. S. C. Northrop, op. cit., p. 377»
^The Ghagavad Gita is a story in the great epic poem of 
Hindu culture, the Mahabharata.
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"before Arjuna.-^ Krishna advised Arjuna that what is good requires
of Arjuna to dedicate himself to the indeterminate, all-embracing
immediacy which is Brahman and to forgo determinate desires and
actions, viewing them as worldly and transitory things which they
are. Krishna continues»
But man is in part transitory and determinate 
as well as in part the indeterminate, unlimited 
formlessness which is his true self or Brahman.
Thus man on earth must acquiesce in the transitory, 
determinate earthly state of affairs as well as 
the timeless, divine formlessness.2
Thus, Krishna advises Arjuna to kill. But when killing,
Arjuna must act on the following basis. He must act;
So as to accept the world, cherishing the 
victory of battle or regretting the defeat 
which it may bring, is evil. This is to 
turn the relative and the transitory into 
the absolute and the timeless.3
Arjuna*s action is justified, Krishna suggests, only if he kills
with nonattachment. In other words, Arjuna must accept the
determinate, earthly deeds and facts of life for whatever they
may be, ugly or beautiful, with indifference or nonattachment.
One is in the muck of the world, but not of it.^
^Krishna is Brahman the supreme soul of the universe. 
Hindus of both high and low degree do not believe that God, 
or the Supreme Source of life, has made only one appearance 
among men. It is therefore held possible for Hindu dieties - 
all reflections of Brahman in one way or another -• to assume 
different names and forms to meet various challenges and crisis 
in the world of men and gods.




This expresses the confidence basic to the non-attachment
with which the Asian views life. In terms of morality, the
Asian views any law structured from the deterministic foundation
of a commitment to be transitory. It has implications only to
the present defined in terras of persons and circumstances
involved in a treaty or settlement. As a result, any regulation
reflecting determinate meanings, whether a law for society or
church, isn't binding for all times on all men under different
conditions. F.S.C. Northrop concludes:
The Far Eastern Asian concludes, therefore, that 
to use determinate rules to settle disputes 
between men regardless of time, place, person or 
circumstance is to act immorally. V/hat is moral 
for tomorrow depends on tomorrow’s facts and 
circumstances and these we will not know until 
tomorrow comes. . . . Determinate rules are 
relative to persons, circumstances and occasions. 
Moreover they are built out of meanings derived 
from determinate facts which are transitory.
Hence they are things to be compromised through 
mediation between the disputants.^
What are the implications of the Asian outlook in the 
East and West competition for political power in the inter­
national political system?
First, the Asian accepts timelessness as integral to what­
ever he might do in life. Life without a time orientation 
relieves man from frustrations he might exhibit when a day or a 
year hasn't been successful. Success means to accept the muck 
of life, because one is not of it. A man is an expression of the 
cyclical release of nature.
^Ibid.
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Second, man has a responsibility to follow out the cyclical
sequence in which nature around him and his own life unfolds.
This determinism to abide by the dictates of nature inculcates
the Asian with the importance of equilibrium. Equilibrium
meaning to create a balance with nature and to identify even
with nature's terrible aspects. A Time essay noted;
India's mother goddess, giver of life, is
also black and bloody Kali, the bringer
of death and destruction. The West divides
good and evil, and thinks evil can be
destroyed - St. George killing the dragon,
the Virgin crushing the serpent beneath
her heel. The Hindus revere the serpent as
the symbol of all nature, good and vile
together. Asians generally are capable of
believing that something is simultaneously
good and bad, right and wrong, black and
white - in a manner that drives the Western
Aristotelian, either-or-mentality to distraction.^
Third, the cyclical theory of time attached to the Asian 
views of life impresses him not only with the balance he must 
attain with nature, but also the protracted manner in which 
life is maintained. He senses life prolonged through a great 
deal of muck, which he does not understand, but accepts without 
judgment. To put it simply, this is the way it is! Some scholars 
have concluded the Asian is fatalistic in his acceptance of life 
and its inevitable outcome.2 This is not the case.
To be fatalistic implies a negative acceptance of an 
eventual outcome. The Asian is an optimist! He believes in
^"On Understanding Asia,'* Time, July 1, 1966, p. 35*
2Nancy Wilson Ross Three Ways of Asian Wisdom (New York; 
Simon and Schuster, I966), p. 55»
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reward. It is Brahman, Nirvana, the Tao, or jen: the supreme 
soul of the universe. We can think of it as the ocean of being 
in which the transitory part of man is a wave. The wave comes 
and goes, but the ocean which is the immortal part of man never 
ceases to be. A man lives and dies, but the supreme soul of the 
universe, his true self, is formless and timeless. The Biagavad- 
Gita describes the supreme soul 2̂
V/ho sees his Lord 
V/ithin every creature 
Deathlessly dwelling 
Amidst the mortal :
That man sees truly.
V/ho sees the separate 
Lives of all creatures 
United in Brahman 
Brought forth from Brahman,
Himself finds Brahman.
Fourth, the Asian has acquired patience with nature and 
his environment. There is little man can do about the unyielding 
way nature moves in a cyclical fashion. Nature passes through 
shades of dark and light or wet and dry, but so also does man.
Thus, there is little use in Asia for losing oneself in human 
relations requiring commitments that will pass as man passes on 
his way to the supreme soul of the universe. What is lasting is 
the equilibrium in the balance with nature that Brahman requires 
of man. This is deterministic, yet the man with patience will find 
the way along the protracted existence of life to the life beyond 
the muck of this world. To put it simply, this is the way it is I




Enemy advances, we retreat; enemy halts, 
we harass; enemy tires, we attack; enemy 
retreats, we pursue.^
The protracted outlook is the expression of an ideology, 
which is understood through a technique of conflict dedicated 
to the revolutionary overthrow of political systems unv/illing to 
accept the guidance of Harxism-Leninism, and the leadership of 
the Communist Party of China and the soviet Union. Containment 
is the methodology utilized by the United States to respond to 
Communist movements led by Communist China and the Soviet Union.
Basic to the protracted outlook is the acceptance of war 
as the prevailing state of relations among nation-states in the 
international political system. War is a historical fact having 
its foundation with the establishment of the social unit called 
society. "The history of all hitherto existing society is the 
history of class struggles. I\!̂ rx was speaking in 1848 of a
Ijvlao Tse-tung, "On Protracted War, " Selected Works of Mao 
'Tse-tung II (London: lawrance & Wishart, 1954), p. 188.
^Karl ','arx, "K&nifesto of the Communist^ Party," Great 
Books of the Western World (Chicago: Encylopedia Britannica, 
inc. , 1952), L, p. 419.
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spectre haunting Europe. Lioeralism had failed to bring an 
immediate and universal improvement in the material condition 
of life through the free market. Instead, free competition 
resulted in economic inequality. Liberty, equality, and 
fraternity were restricted to the new industrial rich and enter­
prising bankers and market speculators. In a poem titled "Fan 
with a Hoe," Edwin yarkham expressed both society's fear and 
responsibility in 1899 with the twelve-hour day and seven-day 
week life of the urban worker.^ &arkham wrote;
Through this dread shape humanity betrayed. 
Plundered, profaned and disinherited,
Cries protest to the Judges of the V/orld,
A Protest that is also prophecy, . . .
How will the Future reckon with this iVan?
How answer his brute question in that hour 
\{nen whirlwinds and rebellion shake the world?
How will it be with the kingdoms and the kings- 
With those who shaped him to the thing he is- 
hhen this dumb terror shall reply to God 
After the silence of the centuries?^
The reply of the proletariat to his disinheritance from 
liberalism had already come in the form of an ideology, when 
Karl yarx wrote the Manifesto of the Communist Party in 1848.3 
Harx wrote : "A spectre is haunting Europe - the spectre of
1 Edwin Farkham, "Fan with the Hoe," quoted in Barbara W. 
Tuchman's The Proud Tower (New York; The FacMillan Company,
1966), p. 4ÔÏÏT
Edwin Farkham took the title of his poem from Fdllet's 
painting "Fan with the Hoe."
Zjbid.
3%arl r/arx wrote the manifesto with Friedrich Engels.
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Communism."! Communism was the ideology suggested by tîarx to 
give hope to a working class characterized as being a factory 
hand, a property-less, destitute member of society, dependent 
for his livelihood on the capitalist who owned the means of 
production. The class struggle, wrote Barbara W. Tuchman, comes 
about when:
Through the capitalist's accumulation of profits 
derived from the surplus value of the worker's 
product, the exploiters were becoming richer and 
the exploited poorer. The process could only end 
in the violent collapse of the existing order.
Trained in class consciousness and prepared for 
this event, the working class would, at the 
moment of ripeness, rise in revolution to usher 
in the new order.
This &'fe.rxian doctrine of Veralendung (pauperization, 
or increasing misery) and Zusammenbruch (collapse) 
was the religious formula of Socialism, equivalent 
to "God is One" of another religion.2
k*arx supplied the ideology for the revolutionary outlook. 
Vladimir Ilyich Lenin and IV'ao Tse-tung made the revolutionary 
outlook protracted with a technique of organization and conflict.3 
Lenin's totalitarian party and I;lao Tse-tung's protracted conflict 
cannot be separated from the Marxian ideology in structuring the 
protracted outlook.
Lenin's views on party contributed to the outlook by 
supplying the very necessary cadre element to train the
iKarl yarx, "I,Manifesto of the Communist Party," op. cit., 
p. 419.
2Barbara W. Tuchman The Proud Tov/er op. cit., p. 410.
3Reference here is to Lenin's V/hat Is to be Done and 
î.îao Tse-tung's "On Protracted War," cited on p. 42.
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proletariat in class consciousness. Frederick M. Watkins noted
the significance of Lenin's advancement of IV^rxism, when he said;
Instead of trying to include all and sundry, 
the Communist party should be rigorously 
exclusive. It should consist of a hard core 
of professional revolutionaries, undeviating 
in their loyalty to the party program, and 
prepared, like a well-trained army, to render 
unquestioning obedience to the commands of 
their superior officers. The function of this 
well-disciplined elite would be to infiltrate 
and gain positions of leadership in more 
popular organizations, using them as 
"transmission belts" for the exercise of power.
In this way a small nucleus of party members 
would be able to control the activities of a 
vastly large number of outsiders, and use them 
for revolutionary purposes.^
From the caves of Yenan to the hills of Laos, J&o Tse-tung's 
People Liberation Army of Communist China and the Pathet lao of 
Laos have depended on the cadre as a yeast in the leavening of 
purpose.2 The cadre is responsible not only for morale, 
political indoctrination, and propaganda, but he must also 
arrange for assistance to soldier's families, since the preserv­
ation of the family - including care of the parents in their old 
age - is of paramount importance."3
^Frederick M. Watkins, op. cit., p. 86.
2The Pathet lao refers to the Communist movement in 
laos. See Chapters VI and VII.
^Richard C. Kriegel, "Vietnamese Attitudes and Behavior," 
Karine Corps Gazette LIII (August, I969), p. 26.
LtCol Kriegel's article is based on his experience in 
several USAID billets in Vietnam, including that of Assistant 
Regional Director for military coordination in II Corps.
Recently awarded the AID Meritorious Honor Award Medal, he holds 
five Vietnamese decorations.
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In an article titled, "The Guerrilla and His World,"
Howard R. Simpson noted: "In Vietnam, the political officer has 
heen the backbone of the revolution.Simpson recalls that the 
French in the Indo-China War recognized the cadre's importance.
He states :
The famous "Commando Vandenberghe" that spread 
fear and insecurity deep into Vietminh territory 
during the Indochina war made it a practice of 
seeking out these open air exhortation meetings 
of the enemy. This elite group would then hold 
their fire until the political officer rose and 
exposed his identity by going into his harangue.
The first burst of fire was designed to silence 
him forever.2 3
Lenin developed the foundation for direction and control 
of the Communist movement based on the leadership of a highly 
motivated and competent Communist cadre. This would seem to 
assure that the ideology would not be left to the self-motivation 
of the workers of the world to understand, interpret, and direct 
the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat. But
^Howard R. Simpson, "The Guerrilla and His V/orld,"
United States Naval Proceedings LXXXXV (August, 1969), P* 4?.
Lk*» Simpson is currently faculty advisor and consultant 
(USIA) at the Naval War College.
^Ibid., p. 49.
3ivir. Simpson's conclusion regarding the importance of the 
cadre has been acknowledged by many students of guerrilla warfare 
in the West. See, for example, the writings on this topic by : 
Evans F. Carlson The Chinese Army ; Its Organization and Military 
Efficiency (New York: Institute of pacific Relations, 1939), 
pT 2SZ "^ch unit of the army (8th Route Army) has a political 
commissar whose authority is equal to that of the military 
commander. The commander and the commissar keep themselves 
informed of each other's professional activities, and they consult 
with each other before major decisions are made." (Evans F. 
Carlson was a major in the United States I.&rine Corps at the time 
he wrote this book. He was attached to the United States Embassy 
in China, and observed L'!ao Tse-tung's forces in Northern China.)
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ideology and cadre required an additional ingredient to bring 
decisive direction and control to a Communist movement, namely; 
a technique of conflict. This is Mao Tse-tung*s major contri­
bution to the revolutionary movement of Communism. This 
technique of conflict provided the ideology with a protracted 
outlook.
Mao Tse-tung suggests the revolutionary movement is with­
out a rudder, if it is left to human capacity to be motivated by 
self, disciplined by an ideology, and directed by a cadre 
structured only by their interpretation of marxism-Leninism.
Mao Tse-tung was sceptical of relying on Communist ideology, 
because it was confronting the status quo of a nation-state 
with change through revolutionary ideology and methodology.
The status quo in any society had an acceptance or at least the 
appearance of stability in the presence of social institutions, 
cultural mores, and an elite willing to uphold the institutions 
and culture.4 In addition, the elite might have the economic 
and military assistance of the imperialistic forces of 
capitalism. Mao Tse-tung advocates protracted conflict. 
Protracted conflict is a strategy of warfare, where the final 
decisive battle is postponed until the balance of power has 
shifted in favor of the revolutionary forces of Communism.^ 
Protracted conflict is characterized as ;
îYao Tse-tung, "On Protracted War," op. cit., p. 188. 
^Mao Tse-tung, op. cit., p. 180.
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The total objective, the carefully controlled 
methods and the constant shifting of the 
battleground, weapons systems and operational 
tactics for the purpose of confusing the 
opponent, keeping him off balance and wearing 
him down. The doctrine of protracted conflict 
prescribes a strategy for annihilating the 
opponent over a period of time by limited 
operations, by feints and maneuvers, 
psychological manipulations and diverse forms 
of violence. But the strategy should not be 
mistaken for one of limited war in the style 
of European warfare in the eighteenth century.
It does not rule out the final and total 
knockout punch. In Communist theory, various 
techniques of political warfare and graduated 
violence are so co-ordinated as to form a 
spectrum that reaches all the v/ay from the 
clandestine distribution of subversive 
literature to the annihilating blow delivered 
with every weapon available.!
yao Tse-tung suggests protracted conflict is the technique 
to accomplish the following goals toward building a protracted 
outlook.
First, protracted conflict achieves an identification of 
the revolutionary with the ideology by providing a systematic 
way of attaining the establishment of a socialistic society 
without divorcing the revolutionary from his conception of 
nationalism. In fact, m o  Tse-tung concludes a common identi­
fication of the people with an agreed upon cause is basic to a 
revolutionary movement and the establishment of a socialistic 
nation-state. Without the presence of a people's base express­
ing frustration with the society's way of handling economic and
^Robert Strasz-Hupe et al. Protracted Conflict (New 
York ; Harper and Row, I963), p. 2.
49 -political affairs, a revolutionary movement is impossible.^ 
See illustration on following page of steps and stages in 
building a revolutionary movement.^
^The Vice Chairman of the People's Republic of China,
Lin Piao, emphasized the importance of a nationalistic people's 
base in order to achieve victory in revolutionary war, when he 
quoted Vao Tse-tung: "We hope for foreign aid but cannot be
dependent on it; we depend on our own efforts, on the creative 
power of the whole army and the entire people." Lin Piao 
Long Live The Victory of People's War (Peking: Foreign Language 
Press, 1968), p. 8?.
^Illustration is the result of the writer's own efforts.
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Building: a Revolutionary Movement
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with the mental discipline to project his thinking in a protracted 
fashion. The cadre and revolutionary follower's training provides 
a protracted orientation from studying the classics of Communist 
ideology, where the historical record of man as interpreted by 
Iv'arx and others leaves no doubt of the progress the proletariat 
has made in class identification, but requires of the workers a 
great deal of faith in the eventual establishment of a classless 
Communist society.
Third, the revolutionary views things in a protracted 
manner through the steps and stages required to reach a socialist 
nation-state. He knows each step must be fulfilled, before 
going on to the next step, but he accepts this fact of life for 
many reasons. Cne reason being the very success of this 
technique of conflict in the Chinese Revolution (1921-1949). A 
second factor that is important for its acceptance has to do 
with its nationalistic base. Third, the movement is grounded 
on social, economic, and political problems, which are immediate 
and thus understandable to the frustrated worker or peasant 
willing to join the revolutionary movement.
Fourth, protracted conflict assures the revolutionary that 
what he is involved in is a total society's commitment to social, 
economic, and political change, protracted conflict is not 
merely the expression of the enlightened intellectuals. It is 
an involvement of a total people defined in terms of all groups 
performing the functions of political socialization, interest
52̂aggregation, and decision-making.t
Fifth, protracted conflict satisfies the necessity of a 
revolutionary movement to curtail the showdown with the 
capitalist nation-states until there has come about a decisive 
shift in balance of power in favor of the revolutionary movement 
of Communism. This curtailment of a showdown is attained by the 
necessity to pass through a covert stage of sixteen steps before 
proceeding to carry on overt warfare with the imperialistic forces 
of capitalism. The overt stage of conflict is not acceptable, 
until the revolutionary forces can operate like fish in the sea of 
a people's base. In other words, the overt stage can be under­
taken when the cadre and leadership of the revolutionary movement 
are satisfied that the political power has been denied the status 
quo government and the main line forces of the movement have the 
mobility to move throughout the countryside. In one famous 
passage of sixteen words î.'ao Tse-tung stated the essence of the 
flexibility present in the protracted outlook, when he said;
Enemy advances, we retreat; enemy halts, we 
harass; enemy tires, we attack; enemy retreats, 
we pursue.3
Reference here is to the functions found in every 
political system. See p. Il6 of text for a description of the 
political system and its application to the Kingdom of Laos.
2yain line forces refers to the conventional military 
forces utilized in the overt stage of the revolutionary movement.
Îvîao Tse-tung, op. cit., p. l64.
PART II
United States Foreign Policy in Southeast Asia
1945-1960
Somebody placed the shuttle in your 
hands; somebody who had already 
arranged the threads.1
Part II continues to concentrate on the inputs to the 
equation of reality described on page 14 of the introduction. 
Whereas Part I was concerned with the values important in the 
formulation of a foreign policy, Part II will concentrate on the 
components of political power and the variables in the equation of 
reality. This will be done through a historical approach 
supplemented by a legal and philosophical approach.
In Part II the overall emphasis will be to describe the 
United States foreign policy in Southeast Asia 1945-1960. This 
review of United states foreign policy is undertaken with the 
following objectives in mind. First, to acquire sufficient data 
in order to understand containment as a methodology for implementing 
the American outlook discussed in Chapter I. Second, to measure the 
extent of political power the United States had in Southeast Asia 
in a period of United States presence. Third, to understand the 
extent to which the United States presence in Southeast Asia
^Dag Hammarskjold, op. cit., p. I4l.
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5^reflected the variables present in the international politics 
between 19^5 and i960. Fourth, to answer the following question.
To what extent did United States foreign policy in Southeast Asia 
enhance international equilibrium and grant the United States 
political power in terms of authority vis-a-vis its competition 
in the international political system? Fifth, what was there about 
the United States foreign policy in Southeast Asia that required a 
United Nations presence in the fall of 1959 and a neutralization 
by the Great Powers in 1962 in order to assure the maintenance of 
international equilibrium.
Chapter IV (Cause Behind the Effect) deals with the 19^5-195^ 
period of mited States foreign policy in Southeast Asia, when the 
identification of the United States with the European colonial 
powers was cemented. Up to DS.y, 1950 the revolutionary forces in 
Southeast Asia were reluctant to step av/ay from being friends with 
the United States, but the willingness of the Truman Administration 
to aid the French in Kay, 1950 broke any possible tie of the 
revolutionary forces with the United States.
In Chapter V (Looking Backward) attention is on the 
diplomatic efforts of the United States to legalize the political 
involvement in Southeast Asia, primary emphasis will be on the 
Geneva Accord of 19j4, the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization of 
195^» and the Geneva Agreement of 1956. This period of United States 
foreign policy brought to conclusion the view that we supported 
those elements within these societies wishing to maintain the 
status quo, and thus against change. This view held by the
55revolutionary forces had its foundation in a memorandum and petition 
from Nguyen Ai Quae (Ho Chi iiinh) and the Annamese people to the 
American Secretary of State Robert lansing at the 1919 Versailles 
Peace Conference.
Nguyen Ai Quae stated the Annamite people "count on your
great kindness to honor our appeal" for self-determination.^ The
Petition stated ;
Claims of the Annamite people. Since the victory 
of the Allies, all the subject peoples are frantic 
with hope at the prospect of an era of right and 
justice which should begin for them by virtue of the 
formal and solemn engagements, made before the whole 
world by the various powers of the Entente (Allies) 
in the struggle of civilization against barbarism.
Vibile waiting for the principle of national self 
determination to pass from ideal to reality through 
the effective recognition of the sacred right of all 
peoples to decide their own destiny, the inhabitants 
of the ancient Empire of Annam, at the present time 
Erench Indochina, present to the noble Governments 
of the Entente in general and in particular to the 
honorable French Government the following humble 
claims :
1) General Amnesty for all the native people v/ho 
have been condemned for political activity.
2) Reform of Indochinese justice by granting to the 
native population the same judicial guarantees 
as the Europeans have, and the total suppression 
of the special courts which are the instruments 
of terrorization and oppression against the most 
responsible elements of the Annamite people.
3) Freedom of press and speech.
4) Freedom of association and assembly.
5) Freedom to emigrate and to travel abroad.
6) Freedom of education, and creation in every
province of technical and professional schools 
for the native population.
7) Replacement of the regime of arbitrary decrees by 
a regime of law.
IHo Chi Nânh quoted by Chalmers N. Roberts, "Archives 
Shows Ho's Note," The Washington Post (September 14, I969), 
p. A25.
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8 ) A permanent delegation of native people elected 
to attend the French parliament in order to keep 
the latter informed of their needs.
The Annamite people, in presenting these claims, count 
on the world-wide justice of all the Powers, and rely 
in particular on the good will of the noble French 
people who hold our destiny in their hands and who, 
as France is a republic, have taken us under their 
protection. In requesting the protection of the 
French people, the people of Annam, far from feeling 
humiliated, on the contrary consider themselves 
honored, because they know that the French people 
stand for liberty and justice and will never renounce 
their sublime ideal of universal brotherhood. 
Consequently, in giving heed to the voice of the 
oppressed, the French people will be doing their duty 
to France and to humanity, m  the name of the Group 
of Annamite Patriots: Nguyen Ai Quac.l
The memorandum and petition were ignored. Fguyen Ai Quae 
turned to international Communism for support. Nguyen Ai Quae 
became Ho Chi Minh, the enlightened one.
^The memorandum and petition were received by the writer 
from the Smithsonian Institute.
CHAPTER IV
CAUSE BEHIND THE EFFECT
We are not permitted to choose 
the Frame for our destiny, ^ t  
what we put into it is ours.
United States national strategy in Asia is controlled hy 
the national goal of preventing an overt attack upon the United 
States.2 This national strategy means the United States 
assumes a preference to initiate a defense of this nation­
state as close as possible to an enemy's mainland, and thus as 
far away as possible from the United States. This is the 
essential meaning of containment. George F. Kennan described 
this method of implementing the national strategy, when he said:
A policy of firm containment, defined to 
confront the Russians with unalterable 
counter-force at every point where they
^Dag Hammarskjold, op. cit., p. 55*
^National strategy is the art and science of developing 
and using the political, economic, and psychological powers of 
a nation-state, together with its armed forces, during peace and 
war, to secure national goals.
National goal is an expression, normally in qualitative 
terms, of highly desirable conditions toward which the nation­
state should direct its efforts.
"Curricular Theme," The Development of a U.S. National 
Strategy and A Supporting Military Program (Carlisle, 
Pennsylvania : U . S*. Army War College, I968 ), p. 19»
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show signs of encroaching upon the interests 
of a peaceful and stable world.^
The "intellectual framework for the nev/ American (and
Western) foreign p o l i c y has remained as the basic method for
implementing the national strategy of the United States.
Kennan’s thesis is evident in the State of the Union address by
President Eisenhower dated January 9, 1959* The President
stated: "to achieve peace we seek to prevent war at any place and
in any dimension. "3 President Richard M. Nixon concurred with
the method in a speech to the Nation November 4, 1969:
Let us understand that the question before us 
is not whether some Americans are for peace 
and some against it.
The question is : How can we win America's peace?^
President Nixon believed America's peace could be won by
the continuation of the national strategy conceptualized in the
methodology developed in 19^7» The President said;
Fifteen years ago North Vietnam, with the 
logistical support of Communist China and 
the Soviet Union, launched a campaign to 
impose a Communist government on South Vietnam
^George P. Kennan (rr. X), "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," 
Foreign Affairs XXV (July, 19^7), p. 581.
Zpavid Rees The Age of Containment (London: St. partin's 
press, 1968), p. 23.
^President Dv/ight David Eisenhower, "The State of the 
Union iJessage January 9, 1959, " Department of State Publication 
6763 (January, 1959), p. 4.
^President Richard M. Nixon, "Vietnam," quoted in "Nixon 
on Vietnam: I Want Peace," The Washington Post (November 4, 1969), 
p . A8 .
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In response to the request of the government 
of South Vietnam, President Eisenhower sent 
economic aid and military equipment to assist 
the people of South Vietnam in their efforts 
to prevent a Communist takeover. Seven years 
ago. President Kennedy sent 16,000 military 
personnel to Vietnam as combat advisors.
Four years ago, President Johnson sent 
American combat forces to South Vietnam.
In January I could only conclude that the 
precipitate withdrawal of all American forces 
from Vietnam would be a disaster not only 
for South Vietnam but for the United states 
and for the cause of peace.
Let historians not record that when America 
was the most powerful nation in the world 
we passed on the other side of the road and 
allowed the last hopes for peace and freedom 
of millions of people on earth to be suffocated 
by the forces of totalitarianism.^
Besides a preference to initiate defense of this nation­
state as close as possible to an enemy’s mainland, the united States 
national strategy moves away from a defensive posture by accepting 
defense only for that period of time necessary to blunt aggression. 
Thus, the best strategic defense of the United States is to be 
achieved by the presence of a military capacity to assume the 
strategic offense soon after the initial attack by an enemy upon 
United States or Allied installations near the aggressor's mainland.
This national goal of national strategy did not have its 
foundation in the Cold War, which began in 19^7* Instead, it was 
in the events climaxing with Pearl Harbor that national security
^Ibid., p. a8.
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became the primary element of consideration in defining national 
interest. It was in the time period preceding Pearl Harbor that 
American military planners, such as Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, 
Commander W.S. Pye, and General John A. LeJeune, evolved a national 
strategy which emphasized the national security aspect of national 
interest.1 And it was in the period prior to Pearl Harbor that the 
first concepts and organization were formulated to have the national 
goal achieved via a national military strategy that was basically 
offensive in nature.2
United States foreign policy prior to Pearl Harbor can be 
safely viewed in terms of national interest somewhat free of 
considerations of the national security question.3 This conclusion 
seems acceptable to the writer for the following reasons.
^Captain (later Admiral) Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840-1914), 
President of the Naval War College, Commander of the Atlantic 
Fleet, and author of several books and articles on sea power 
such as The Interest of America in Sea Power (1897).
Commander V/. S. Pye was the outspoken member of the Plans 
Division of the Office of I\aval Operations in 1920, who developed 
the carrier task force strategy based on Mahan's offensive 
strategy. (See Ray L. Bowers article "The Twentieth Century 
Penchant for the Offensive," United states Naval Proceedings 
(September, 19^7), pp. 58-69. Excellent discussion of Mahan's 
offensive strategy utilized by the United States in V/orld V/ar II).
General John A. Le Jeune was Commandant of the Marine 
Corps during the 1920's, when the techniques of amphibious war­
fare were developed to implement Mahan's strategy.
^Reference here is to the development of a strong navy- 
beginning in 1890, when the battleships Oregon, Indiana, and 
Massachusetts were authorized by Congress, and to the development 
of the concepts and organization related to amphibious warfare, 
the carrier task force, strategic bombing, long-range submarine 
warfare, and tank (armored) warfare.
3The writer used the phrase "somewhat free of consideration
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First, the splendid geographical isolation of the 
United States from the turmoil of Europe during this country's 
development. "Few nations in modern history - and no great power 
except perhaps Russia - have been so favorably situated,'
H. Bradford Westerfield noted, 'as the United States to effectuate 
the inclination to live apart from alien influences."^ It was 
on the foundation of this geographical isolation that president 
George Washington laid the foundation of United States national 
strategy for one hundred and fifty years, president Washington
stated
Europe has a set of primary interests which 
to us have none or a very remote relation. 
Hence she must be engaged in frequent 
controversies, the causes of which are 
essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, 
therefore, it must be unwise in us to 
implicate ourselves by artificial ties in 
the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics 
or the ordinary combinations and collisions 
of her friendships or enmities. Our detached 
and distant situation invites and enables us 
to pursue a different course. If we remain 
one people, under an efficient government,
of the national security question," because of the reasons stated. 
Nevertheless, national security was of some importance to the 
Founding Fathers (Federalist III), and the initial Administrations 
of the Republic, but it was more a question of removing the Indians 
and allowing the problems of Europe to dictate that the British and 
French would have to forget about an empire in America.
For example, John Jay writes in Federalist III that "among 
the many objects to which a wise and free people find it 
necessary to direct their attention, that of providing for their 
safety seems to be the first." John Jay, "Federalist III," 
appearing in Great Books of the Western World XXXXIII (Chicago : 
Ehryclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 1952), p. 33*
^H. Bradford Westerfield The Instruments of America's 
Foreign policy (New York : Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1963), p. I3.
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the period is not far off when we may defy 
material injury from external annoyance. . . . 
why forego the advantages of so peculiar a 
situation?!
This isolation did not mean a complete rupture from
European life. Washington suggested the maintenance of suitable
establishments to assure the defense of the shores and merchant
fleet, and commercial relations with any country. Finally, ■
Washington believed our greatest contribution to mankind would
be an example of free government. Washington stated;
It will be worthy of a free, enlightened, 
and at no distant period a great nation 
to give mankind the magnanimous and too 
novel example of a people always guided 
by an exalted justice and benevolence.^
Second, the main problem confronting America involved the 
consolidation of the national government's authority throughout 
the continental limits of the United States. This was accomplished 
constitutionally, when Arizona was admitted to the Union
^President George Washington, "Farewell Address," appearing 
in Ruhl J. Bartlett (ed, ) The Record of American Diplomacy 
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1952), p. 86.
^Ibid.
^As to when the consolidation process was completed is 
open to dispute. The writer has used 1912, since it was then 
that the continental limits of this country were solidified 
order one government, and it is the year marking the assumption 
by the United States of an international role through dollar 
diplomacy and a naval fleet to implement the sea power thesis 
of Nahan. Other dates that could be used would be I789 (United States 
under one constitution supreme throughout the land), I865 (Civil 
War ends), or I89O (The last armed conflict between Indians and 
whites took place at Wounded Knee Creek).
1 63February 1^, 1912.-^
Third, United States national security was underwritten 
by the British Grand Fleet through World War I. V/ith the 
Northern victory in the Civil V/ar, the British accepted the 
viability of the United States. From I865 forward, British 
sea power was the primary force implementing the Monroe Doctrine, 
and guaranteed United States' commercial trade with the Far 
East.
V/orld War I marks a watershed in United States foreign 
policy. In the events leading up to the War, the United States 
began to see the necessity for giving primary consideration to 
national security as the most important component of national 
interest.2 ï^e primary event in the American awakening involved 
the removal of the British fleet from the Pacific theater to the 
waters surrounding Germany. This occurred when Great Britain 
renewed a 1902 alliance with Japan in 1905* Of this event,
Peter lyon notes :
1905 the Pax Britiannica v/as contracting: 
the new terms of the Anglo-Japanese alliance 
involved the withdrawal of the British 
Far Eastern naval squadron from Hong Kong, 
and an agreement by Japan either *to hold the
^As states, Hawaii and Alaska came much later as part of 
the extension of United States commercial interests and sea power 
in the Pacific. Thus, the writer suggests these states are but 
the reflection of an already existing United States presence in 
Asia.
^The events alone did not dictate a change in the American 
attitude. Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan's writings and the acquire­
ment of Hawaii and the Philippines turned America outward and 
interested in national security.
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ring' or to intervene on Britain's side in 
the event of an attack on India. Japan thus 
underpinned what was left of the Pax Britannica 
in the Orient.1
The United States viewed the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 
1905 with great alarm, since the Japanese were frustrating 
American attempts to achieve an economic sphere of influence in 
China.2 In addition, Japan had shown its viability in defeat­
ing a European power, Imperial Russia. Finally, the 1919 
Versailles Treaty transferred to the Japanese control of the 
Marshall, Marianas, and Caroline Islands. This decision 
threatened the United States ability to defend the Philippines 
and protect the commercial interests of the United States in 
China.3
From Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan through the Pye's and 
Le jeune's of the inter-war period (1920-1941), the request was 
made for the United States to protect its territorial integrity 
against the coming confrontation with Japan. The Harding, 
Coolidge, and Hoover Administrations bought rime through a
1 Peter lyon War and Peace in South-East Asia (London i 
Oxford University Press, I969), P» 19»
^Reference here is to the attempts by Wall Street financiers 
(Harriman, Loeb etc. ) to utilize the United States government in 
the period 1904-1913 to establish an American dominance over the 
loans granted China and a railroad and mining interest in 
Manchuria (The Chinchow-Aigun railroad). See A. Whitney Griswold 
The Rhr Eastern Policy of the United States (New York ; Hareourt, 
Brace and Company, 19*38), Chapter IV. "Dollar Diplomacy."
pp. 133-175.
3Julius W. Pratt A History of United States Foreign Policy 
(Englewood Cliffs, Nev/ Jersey : Prentic e-Hall, Inc., 1955), 
p. 542.
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series of treaties designed to limit Japanese naval power in the 
pacific, and thus maintain an open door for United states 
commercial interests in Asia.^ Time was "bought by these 
Administrations, but at a price. The cost involved several 
things. These were;
First, the creditability of the United States in the Asian
world. Walter LaFeber summarizes this problem with reference
to the very first evidence of a gap in the lansing-Ishii notes
dated November 2, 191?.
The lansing-Ishii Notes heralded a 15 year 
period of United States-Japanese cooperation 
on the problem of handling China. Differences 
did appear, particularly when the Japanese 
insisted at the Paris Peace Conference that 
they must retain the former German possessions 
in Shantung, which the Chinese claimed as part 
of their own ancient empire. The Japanese 
position particularly compromised President 
Wilson's widely publicized policy of self- 
determination, and the President's failure to 
force Japan to return Shantung in 1919 was one 
reason why the United States Senate then 
rejected the Wilsonian settlement.% 3
^The treaties referred to are : The Washington Naval 
Conference 1921-1922; the Five-Power Treaty dated February 6,
1922; the Nine-Power Treaty dated February 6, 1928; the Four- 
Pov/er 'Treaty dated December 13* 1922; the London Naval 
Conference of 1930=
^Walter laFeber, "Before Pearl Iferbor, " Current History 
LVII (August, 1969), p. 68.
3The Lansing-Ishii Notes dated November 2, I9I7 signed by 
Secretary of State Robert lansing and Viscount Kikujiro Ishii, 
a special envoy of the Japanese government. Julius W. Pratt 
concludes; The Notes gave Japan "a reasonably free hand in 
China." Pratt believes this is a reasonable view in that the 
notes state; "The Governments of the United States and Japan 
recognize that territorial propinquity creates special relations 
betv/een countries, and consequently the Governments of the United 
States recognizes that Japan has special interests in China, 
particularly in the part to which her possessions are contiguous." 
Julius W. Pratt, op. cit., p. 5^1.
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The Lansing-Ishii Notes were not the decisive element in 
creating a creditability gap in Asia for the United States.
This would come in the contradiction between the promises of 
the Fourteen Points and the stipulations of the Versailles 
Treaty.
On January 8, I9I8 President Woodrow Wilson addressed a
joint session of Congress. Sun Yat-sen, Nguyen Ai Quae, and
the other revolutionary leaders in Asia could forget the
implications of the lansing-Ishii Notes, when president Wilson
included among his Fourteen Pointss
A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial 
adjustment of all colonial claims, based 
upon a strict observance of the principle 
that in determining all such questions of 
sovereignty the interests of the populations 
concerned must have equal weight with the
equitable claims of the government whose
title is to be determined.1
President Woodrow Wilson arrived in Paris December I3» 1918. 
The Paris Peace Conference began January 12, 1919 with the 
Republic of China represented as an associated power of the
Allies. Nguyen Ai Quae appeared at the Conference with a memorandum
addressed to the American Secretary of State Robert Lansing.
Nguyen Ai Quae's memorandum stated the Annamite people "count 
on your great kindness to honor our a p p e a l f o r  self-determination. 
The memorandum was ignored.3 France remained in
^P^esident Woodrow Wilson, "The Fourteen Points," appearing 
in Ruhl J. Bartlett, op. cit., p. 460.
2Nguyen Ai Quae (Ko Chi r.îinh) quoted by Chalmers M. Roberts, 
op. cit., p. A25.
3 Ibid.
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Indochina, and Japan was granted a sphere of interest over
Shantung Province by the Treaty of Versailles. Ray Stannard Bake:
saw President Wilson soon after the Allies granted a political
interest in China to Japan. Baker writes:
Anything he might do was v/rong. He said the 
settlement v/as the best that could be had 
out of a dirty past. . . .The only hope was 
to keep the world together, get the League 
of Nations with Japan in it and then try to 
secure justice for the Chinese not only as 
regarding Japan, but England, France, Russia, 
all of whom had concessions in China. He 
knew his decision would be unpopular in 
America, that the Chinese would be bitterly 
disappointed, that the Japanese would feel 
triumphant, that he would be accused of 
violating his own principles, but, nevertheless, 
he must work for world order and organization 
against anarchy and a return to the old 
militarism.!
The Treaty of Versailles, states Franklin W. Houn, 
produced "profound disillusionment''^ in china, and was the 
event which made "several leading intellectuals, including 
klao Tse-tung and Chou En-Lai . . . increasingly interested in 
the revolutionary experience of the Bolsheviks in Russia."3 
It is safe to assume that Nguyen Ai Quae agreed with the 
Chinese revolutionary leaders, because the Annamese leader 
joined with the Chinese in the 1920's to develop their Republic 
and Communist Barty.^
iRay S. Baker VJbodrow Wilson and World Settlement II 
(Garden City, New York; Harper, 1922), p. 266.
^Franklin V/. Houn A Short History of Chinese Communism 
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey ; Prentice-Hall, Inc., 19o? ), p. 32.
3 Ibid.
^Bernard B. Fall wrote in the preface to Ho Chi Ulinh on
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V,Il île the revolutionary leaders in China and Indo-China 
were turning to Russia for concepts, organization, and aid, the 
United States "revived the old habit - possibly to ease a guilty 
conscience - of signing arbitration treaties qualified by 
conditions that made them worthless, and concluded a new series 
of cooling off treaties"^ climaxing with the Kellogg-Briand 
Treaty dated August 2?, 1928. This treaty to end war as a means 
to satisfy the national interest demands of nation-states was 
signed by most nation-states including Japan and China. Article
Revolution ; "Certain great political figures in history are 
remembered for their talents both as writers and as leaders of 
men. The names of Julius Caesar, Kapolean I, V/inston Churchill, 
and Charles de Gaulle come readily to mind. There are others 
whose impact on history is likely to be no less great and, for 
ill or for good, may be even longer lasting than that of the 
men in the first category. These are men who have the ability 
to organize, to work with a wide variety of people, and to 
achieve results through personal contact rather than through 
the persuasiveness of their writings and their thinking. Louis 
XIV, Marshall Tito, and of course lyndon B. Johnson fall into 
this category of men whose deeds will endure but whose writings 
are unlikely material for literary anthologies. Ho Chi Ivlinh 
falls into the latter group." Bernard B. Fall Ho Chi liinh on 
Revolution (New York : Frederick A. Fraeger, 196?), p. 5*
Ho Chi Minh (Nguyen Ai Quae-Nguyen "Loves His Country) 
was born May 18, I89O in Central Viet Nam. At thirteen, Ho was 
expelled from the French school for anti-French nationalist 
activities. Ho left France for work as a mess boy aboard a 
French liner and in London. After his failure to persuade 
Secretary of State lansing to consider self-determination for the 
Annamese people at the Paris Conference ending V/orld V/ar I, Ho 
Chi I.hnh became a member of the Communist Party. He served as a 
Comintern agent in France and China. After the establishment of 
the V/ampoa Academy in China (May, 1924) Ho Chi Minh served as a 
lecturer under Chou En-Lai. (M.. Herzog, "The V/hampoa Academy,"
United States Naval Proceedings April, I968, pp. 47-53)* V/ith 
Chinese Communist assistance, Ho Chi r.îinh began the development 
of a Vietnamese revolutionary force in Yunnan. This effort 
climaxed in the presence in Vietnam of a nationalist movement 
as of 1941.
^Julius V/. Pratt, op. cit., p. 534.
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The High Contracting parties solemnly declare 
in the names of their respective peoples that
they condemn recourse to war for the solution
of international controversies, and renounce 
it as an instrument of national policy in their 
relations with each other.1
The United States Senate ratified the Treaty January 15» 1929. 
On the same day, Julius W. Pratt notes, "the Senate turned to the
next item of business - the appropriation of $270,000,000 for
fifteen 10,000 ton cruisers for the United States N a v y . On 
September 18, 1931 Japan invaded Kdnchuria. The Chinese Government 
requested that the United States "take such steps as will insure 
the preservation of peace in the Par East. "3 Secretary of State 
Henry L. Stimson responded to the Chinese request by informing the 
Chinese that the League of Nations has "formulated conclusions and 
outlined a course of action.
A second problem related to United States national 
strategy that developed in the inter-war period (1920-19^1) 
concerned what Hahan's disciples were saying. Fi'̂e, Mitchell, 
LeJuene and other military planners presented the same theme; 
namely, the United States must begin to look outward to Asia and 
protect the United States from Japanese imperialism. But the 
warnings of these military planners was lost in the perverted 
form of isolationism practiced by the administrations of Harding,
1 "The Kellogg-Briand Pact," Ruhl J. Bartlett, op. cit.,
p. 520.
2Julius V/. Pratt, p. 539.
3"The Invasion of Manchuria," Ruhl J. Bartlett, p. 528. 
4Ibid., p. 530.
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Coolidge, and Hoover. All the military planners could accomplish 
in this period of non-existing defense budgets was to develop 
nev; concepts of warfare and organization to implement these 
concepts.
The concepts and organization were not sufficient to stop 
Pearl Harbor. But a very dramatic change took place in the 
orientation of the American people and its political leaders 
regarding national goals and national strategy.
December 7, 1941 taught the American people the following 
lessons regarding national goals and national strategy. First, 
there is no more basic national goal than national interest 
defined in terms of the national security of the United States.
\Vhat is important here is that the American people started to 
think about self-preservation (national security) as the battle­
ship navy came to rest at the bottom of Pearl Harbor.
Second, the formulators of United States foreign policy 
reflected the American people's concern for national security 
by listening to the military planners of the 1920's. These 
formulators didn't actually listen. Reflecting the instrumentalism 
in the American outlook, the President and Congress v/itnessed the 
results of the technology implementing the concepts and organization 
developed in the 1920's. Ey August, 1942, six months after Pearl 
Harbor, the United States was bombing German installations in 
Europe and making their first amphibious landing in the Pacific.
The results were coming in; the concepts and organization 
developed in the 1920's which found realization in the form of 
aircraft carriers, amphibious craft, and bombers could
71not be disputed. World War II was won by a new strategic doctrine 
that structured the weaponary developed by American technology 
and industrial management.
Third, the national strategy of defending the United States 
by maintaining an American military presence near the enemy's 
mainland achieved acceptance. This would assure no Pearl Harbor
To accomplish the goal of preventing another overt attack 
on the United States, the national strategy that evolved included 
the development of concepts, organization, and weaponary which 
was to be offensive in nature. Thus, what pye, Lejuene and 
others had suggested in the 1920's v/as to continue. The 
United States would defend this nation-state with an offensive 
capability near the enemy's mainland. V/hen the enemy attacked a 
united States or Allied installation, united States military forces 
would initiate defense followed almost simultaneously by the 
utilization of the offensive component of the national strategy.
The concepts, organization, and weaponary that won V/orld War 
II formed the nucleus of the national policy in the Cold War.
Another Pearl Harbor would be prevented by assuring that there would 
be no reoetition of the events surrounding December 7» 19^1.1
Reference here is to the continued emphasis on offensive 
weaponary such as mobile forces with the capacity to carry the 
attack via helicopter envelopment or an amphibious landing. The 
tactical thinking behind this kind of methodology is extremely 
hard to apply in a limited protracted war such as Korea and 
Vi e tnam.
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The justification for the United States presence in Asia 
suggested by Pearl Harbor, was not evident to the United States 
in the period 194^-1954. This post-war period of United States 
foreign policy is best characterized by a policy of liquidating 
political and military involvement in Asia.. Containment was 
generally confined to Europe.
The liquidation of the United States presence in Asia
began soon after the Japanese Emperor informed his people that
Japan was surrendering August 14, 1945» This did not mean the
immediate liquidation of United States involvement, yjhat it did
mean is that the occupation of Japan and South Korea by military
forces of the Uiited States would be maintained only for the
period necessary for these nation-states to go it alone. In
addition, the United States presence in China at this time was
to mediate the political crisis between the Nationalist and
Communist leaders. But at no time did the Truman Administration
consider military intervention into Chinese political affairs.
William C. Johnstone notes;
Our traditional policy of no intervention without 
invitation dictated a disengagement from any 
direct embroilment in the Chinese civil war. Our 
efforts were primarily mediatory.^
Why did the United States attempt to conduct a foreign 
policy of liquidation in Asia from 1945 to 1953* when it was 
quite obvious China was going Communist by the summer of
^William C. Johnstone, "United States Policy in Southern 
Asia," Current History XXXXVI (February, 1964), p. 66.
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United States, the American people desired normalcy characterized
by reliance on the united nations in international politics and
a quest for the personal and material life which they had been
deprived in the War. Samuel Eliot Korison describes the period
very well, when he said:
No sooner was the war over than a popular 
clamor arose to send the boys home. The
army planned to discharge 5*5 million by
July 1, 1946, but this was too slow to 
suit the voters, and congressional pressure forced 
the army to speed it up. Jy the spring of 1950 
it was down to 600,000 men and there were only 
ten divisions even partially ready for action - 
fewer than in Belgium and Holland.
To offset this impression of weakness,
America confounded all the Marxist 
prophets by remaining prosperous. There 
was an enormous unsatisfied demand for 
consumer goods, which did not want 
purchasers, as almost every class in the 
community had money to spend. The new cars 
were attractive, although double the prices 
of 1941 models. Television, now nation-wide, 
dishwashing machines, and electric stoves 
absorbed millions of dollars. Erices went up, 
too, especially after Congress in 1946 removed 
most of the restrictions, but incomes went up 
even more. Even the farmers continued to benefit 
from higher v/ar prices for their cattle, grains, 
and cotton because of the demand in Europe, and the 
federal government's willingness to extend credit 
so that Europeans could buy them.
President Harry S. Truman did not have a mandate from the 
American people or the Congress to compromise their quest for
Ey the summer of 194?, attempts of George Marshall to 
affect a coalition government between the Communists and 
nationalists all failed. Marshall had returned to Washington, 
and the Communists were on the offensive.
^Samuel Eliot Korison, op. cit., 10?6.
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normalcy during the period April 12, 19^5 to Novemher, 1948.
The policy of liquidation was the only course to follow, until 
the people or events gave President Truman a different 
mandate.
The mandate for change in United States foreign policy
came in the form of events. "An iron curtain descended across
the Continent"4 of Europe starting with Poland in 1945 and
climaxing with Czechoslovakia in February, 1948. Churchill's
description of history in the making, which was spoken so
eloquently at Fulton, Missouri on Iferch 5» 1946, reminded the
American people and their Congress of the national goal of
national security, \Vhen the protracted conflict of the Soviet Union
against Turkey and Greece brought from President Truman a request
for economic and military assistance, the American people began
to renew their awareness of national security. President Truman
climaxed the process of bringing the American people out of
normalcy into the realities of post-world War II international
politics with an address before a joint session of Congress
March 12, 194?. The President stated;
The gravity of the situation which confronts 
the world today necessitates my appearance 
before a joint session of the Congress. The 
foreign policy and the national security of 
this country are involved.
The very existence of the Greek state is today 
threatened by the terrorists activities of 
several thousand armed men, led by Communists,
^Winston Churchill quoted in David Rees, op. cit.,
p. 19.
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number of points, particularly along the 
northern border.
Greece must have assistance if it is to become 
a self-supporting and self-respecting democracy. 
The United States must supply that assistance*
I believe that it must be the policy of the 
United States to support free peoples who 
are resisting attempted subjugation by armed 
minorities or by outside pressure.
Great responsibilities have been placed upon us 
by the swift movement of events. I am confident 
that the Congress will face these responsibilities 
squarely.1
Congress did.2 The educational process begun by the events in 
Europe removed the unreality of normalcy prevailing among the 
American people.
President Truman's request for United States assistance to 
Greece and Turkey commenced the activation of the containment 
policy of the United States in Europe. This policy reached a 
point of climatic conclusion, when the United States entered 
into the first peacetime military alliance on April 4, 19^9*
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is significant not only 
for the departure of the United States from the traditional 
policy of no entangling alliances in peacetime, but also for the
l"The Truman Doctrine," Ruhl J. Bartlett, op. cit., 
pp. 725-729.
Zgee appendix p.258 for breakdown of economic and 
military assistance provided by the United States 19^5-1960.
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nature of the United States military commitment in Europe.
Article 5 of the NAtO Treaty stated;
The Parties agree that an armed attack against
one or more of them in Europe or North America
shall he considered an attack against them all; 
and consequently they agree that, if such an 
armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise 
of the right of individual or collective self- 
defense recognized hy Article 51 of the Charter 
of the United Nations, will assist the Party or 
Parties so attacked hy taking forthwith, 
individually and in concert with the other Parties, 
such action as it deems necessary, including 
the use of armed force, to restore and maintain 
the security of the North Atlantic area.l
The North Atlantic Treaty brought the United States hack
to an emphasis upon national security in foreign policy. The
Treaty was an expression of the conclusion George P. Kennan
articulated on hehalf of the Truman Administration, namely,
"in these circumstances it is clear that the main element of
any United States policy towards the Soviet Union must he that
of a long-term patient hut firm and vigilant containment of
Russian expansive tendencies."2 3
But NATO, the Truman Doctrine, and Kennan's containment
thesis were conceived to assure the viability of Western Europe,
l"The North Atlantic Treaty," Ruhl J. Bartlett, op. cit., 
p. 738.
2George P. Kennan, op. cit., p. 581.
3During the course of the Vietnam hearings before the 
Senate Poreign Relations Committee in pehruary, 1966, George 
p. Kennan applied the same assumption for containment with 
regard to China that he applied to the Soviet Union, when he 
said: "I don't doubt that the Chinese Communists would love to 
unleash the bloodiest sort of revolutions in every country 
that they can think of that is not Communist." George P. Kennan 
quoted in Akira Iriye (ed. ) U.S. Policy Toward China (Boston: 
Little, Brown and Company, 1966), p. 1?.
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and not Asia. in the Pacific theater of United States foreign 
policy, the liquidation of United States involvement left China 
to Communism and Japan a viable nation-state. The Philippine 
Islands achieved independence in 1948, and Indochina was left 
to French colonialism.
February 8, 1950 marks a dramatic change in United States
foreign policy in Asia. In a press conference. Secretary of
State Dean Acheson divorced the United States from its policy
of liquidation and began to apply a world view of containment
to the Asian landscape. Secretary of State Acheson stated;
V.hat we have observed over the last few years 
is that the Soviet government is highly 
realistic and we have seen time after time 
that it can adjust itself to facts when facts 
exist. vVe have also seen that agreements 
reached with the Soviet government are useful 
when these agreements recognize facts or a 
situation which exists, and that they are not 
useful when they are merely agreements which 
do not register existing facts. . . .  So it 
has been our basic policy to build situations 
which will extend the area of possible agreement; 
that is to create strength instead of weakness 
which exists in many quarters. . . . These are ways 
in which in various parts of the world we are 
trying to extend the area of possible agreement 
with the Soviet Union by creating situations so 
strong they can be recognized, and out of them 
can grow agreement. . . I don't need to go over 
with you again the fact that, growing out of the 
last war, and other conditions before the war 
and between the wars, there have been created 
all over the world those positions of weakness. 
Fvery time one of those situations exists, and 
they exist in Asia and they exist in Europe, it 
is not only an invitation but an irresistible 
invitation to the Soviet government to fish in 
these troubled waters. To ask them not to fish, 
and to say we will have an agreement that you won't 
fish is like trying to deal with a force of nature. 
You can't argue with a river, it is going to flow. 
You can dam it up, you can put it to useful
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purposes, you can deflect it, but you can't 
argue with it. Therefore v/e go to work . . .  to 
change those situations of weakness so that they 
won't create opportunities for fishing and 
opportunities for trouble.^
During the course of his testimony with regard to the Senate
hearings involving the firing of General Douglas Iv]acArthur,
Secretary of State Dean Acheson concluded;
Vhat we must do is to create situations of 
strength. . . V/ith that change there comes a 
difference in the negotiating position of 
the various parties, and out of that I
should hope that there would be a willingness
on the side of the ICremlin to recognize the 
facts.2
Secretary of State Dean Acheson revised the methodology 
of containment formulated and executed by the Truman Adminis­
tration. Now, there was interjected into the policy a willingness
to negotiate with the Soviet Union based upon situations of 
strength created by a multilateral military capacility and 
alliance system in addition to an economic and military assist­
ance program. In other words, Acheson was trying to break the 
United States from a passive posture in containing the Soviet 
military presence in Europe. Eut Acheson failed to see the 
revitalization of containment during the Truman Administration.
The Korean War would seem to have been the catalyst for 
Acheson's thesis to become the reality around which to utilize 
American resources. Such was not the case. Instead of
^Secretary of State Dean Acheson, "Press Conference 
February 8, 1950," Department of State Bulletin XXII (February 20, 
1950), p. 213.
2Secretary of State Dean Acheson quoted in David Rees, 
op. cit., p. 39.
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methodology in administering and executing United States foreign 
policy, Truman and Acheson came to the close of their public 
service cast as being soft on Communism. The Korean War had left 
the impression that the United States was unwilling to achieve 
victory in war and containment was the primary intellectual 
concept limiting the United States in attaining peace with 
justice under law.
This negative impression about the Korean War in particular
and the Truman Administration in general was developed by the
Republican Party in the 1952 presidential political campaign.
The issue of being "soft on Communism" had been supplied by
Senator Joseph McCarthy of Wisconsin. As Samuel Eliot Morison
noted: "McCarthy supplied the issue, but v/ho would lead the
procession?"! Morison continues:
General MacArthur might have ridden the 
elephant. Willing enough, he was invited 
to give the keynote address to the 
Republican nominating convention at 
Chicago in July. It was received with 
slight enthusiasm, since the politicans 
knew that the General had no grass-roots 
support; he had failed as a avowed 
candidate in 1948 - eleven votes on the 
first ballot, none of the third - and 
veterans did not like him. Thus the most 
logical candidate was Senator Taft - 
"Mir. Republican" as he v/as often called.
None more deserved to be President, for 
Taft had integrity, a deep knowledge of 
the governmental structure, and political 
courage. As in the case of Henry Clay, 
courage lost Taft the nomination; he had 
made too many enemies, notably the labor 
union leaders, owing to the Taft-Hartley
^Samuel Eliot Korison, op. cit., p. 10?6.
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Act. Tom Dewey, twice defeated, did not 
care to try again, but he marshaled delegates 
to win the nomination for a really glamorous 
candidate - General Eisenhower. "Ike" had 
no more political experience than î/îacArthur, 
but he was well liked by the G.I«s; and his 
achievements in Europe, which included 
running two international coalitions, suggested 
that he had a flair for politics. He received 
845 votes for the nomination. . . Senator 
Richard Nixon of California received second 
place on the ticket as a reward for having 
uncovered the former communist connections of 
Alger Hiss, when a member of the Un-American 
Activities Committee. He had no other 
qualifications; it was a case similar to Coolidge's 
winning the vice presidential nomination for a 
few strong words about the Boston police strike.^
{Die election of Bvight David Eisenhower as President of
the United States in November, 1952 brought to a close the
implementation of the forward strategy conceptualized by the
Truman Administration in 1950 through 1952. Biis is most evident
pin the death of National Security Council paper No. 68. The 
United States formulated, administered, and executed foreign 
policy from 1953 through 1959 within the framework of contain­
ment conceived by President Truman and George P. Kennan in the 
period 194? through the implementation of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization in August, 1949. This meant that United 
States foreign policy would have the following characteristics:
First, the assumption of the existence of a monolithic world
^Samuel Eliot Morison, p. 1076.
^During the early months of 1950, the National Security 
Council issued a paper recommending the development of a multi­
lateral conventional capability for the United States in addition 
to our already developing nuclear weaponary. This is what 
Secretary of State Dean Acheson was referring to in his press 
conference dated February 8, 1950.
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wide conspiracy identified with the foreign policy of Communist 
Russia and China.
Second, "a policy of firm containment'-'^ meant a continuation 
of our identification with the European community of nation­
states under the collective defense arrangement of NATO.
Third, the United States would premise its role in the 
world on an identification with its European Allies. This was 
the hub of stability from which United States political power 
could best generate stability in the world and contain the 
expansion of the Soviet Union and Communist China.
Fourth, since the threats to world peace emanate from the 
Soviet Union and Communist China reliance on an overt capability 
to meet expansion would be the decisive instruments of United 
States national security policy. This would not only satisfy 
meeting the threat, but also would assure no future Pearl 
Harbors. With this in mind, the Eisenhower Administration 
expanded our offensive nuclear capability.^
Fifth, the nuclear capability of the United States and the 
Soviet Union created a balance of terror, which required caution 
in foreign policy, and thus the foreign policy of the United 
States must do what it thought necessary to keep the status quo 
and limit initiatives in foreign policy beyond the Western sphere 
of interest to the exportation of the "spiritual vitality of the
^George P. Kennan, op. cit., p. 581*
^See appendix p. 258 for breakdown of the military budget 
of the United states 19^5-1960.
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United States."-^
Sixth, and finally, the Eisenhower Administration began 
its eight years by blaming the entire instability in the inter­
national political system on a Communist conspiracy and ended 
the 1950's by noting "we, on our part, know that we seek only 
a just peace for all, with aggressive designs against no one."2 
Communism had placed the shuttle in our hands to bring peace 
with justice to the world: "somebody who had already arranged 
the threads."3
V/hat the Eisenhower Administration accomplished v/as to 
free the American conscience from the "no victory" policy of 
two Democratic Administrations, which was reflected in the Yalta 
Agreements and the Korean War. With the Eisenhower Administration 
the United States was going to restore its traditional role of 
voicing an image of a nation-state against Communism, and relying 
on alliances that would not bind us like NATO does to immediate 
military action. ]h Europe alone, the Eisenhower Administration 
would show a willingness to serve the national interests of 
Great Britain and the Continent by a willingness to go to the 
brink with massive retaliation.
In conclusion, the Eisenhower years established once again 
the natural tendency of the American people to have no part in
^George F. Kennan, op. cit., p. 581*
^President Dwight D. Eisenhower, op. cit., p. 2.
3Secretary-C-eneral Dag Hamraarskjold, op. cit., p. 32.
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national politics was created in the first few years of the 
Eisenhower Administration by the nuclear capability of the United 
States. Vdien the Soviet Union placed a satellite in orbit in 
October, 1957» the image of normalcy was maintained by the 
internal problems of Communism between the Soviet Union and 
Communist China, and the instability within Eastern Europe.
Finally, the Eisenhower Administration's greatest achieve­
ment was in securing within the American mind an impression 
that a period of normalcy was present. Of course, this impression 
received little competition from either the Soviet Union and 
Communist China, since massive retaliation or any conventional 
retaliation was limited to an overt attack upon Western Europe, 
Formosa, Japan, and etc. Thus, what we had from 1953 to i960 
was a period of looking backward to the bygone days of normalcy 
enjoyed by the United States during the 1920*s and 1930*s, and 
for two years after World War II. Containment meant the preserva­
tion of the United States and Western Europe through the 
collective security arrangement of NATO, and the application of 
United States political power elsewhere only within the limita­
tions of what the NATO partners would accept in so far as direct 




Between experiences and having experienced - 
the moment when the experience yields its 
last secrets. A moment we only discover is 
already past when cracks and stains appear, 
the gilding flakes off, and we wonder what 
it was that once so attracted us.l
Tv/o general themes dominate the international politics 
between 1953 s.nd i960. On the one hand, the United States 
foreign policy v/as controlled by an inflexible attitude toward 
Communism, the experience of the Korean V/ar, and a quest for 
normalcy on the part of the American people. In other words, 
the United States policy in this period was looking backward 
to what had happened, and judging international politics between 
1953 a.nd i960 by this experience.
At the same time that United States foreign policy v/as 
looking backward, another major theme of the 1953-1960 period was 
a relaxation of tension. This relief from the Cold V/ar was due 
to the following factors. First, the death of Joseph Stalin on 
r.'arch 5» 1953, resulted in an internal power struggle among the 
Soviet Communist Party elite. Second, the achievement of nuclear 
parity by the bi-polar powers permitted the Soviet Union to turn
^Dag Hammarsk jold, op. cit., p. ■̂7.
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to different tactics in the protracted conflict with the West; 
namely, peaceful co-existence with the United States and its 
Allies. Third, the presence of several well-defined factors in 
the international politics of the 1950's and 1960's that began 
exposing themselves in the immediate post-war period. These 
factors were ;
First, a reduction occurred in the role played by ideology 
in the competition among nation-states. Ideology tended to 
diminish in importance as evidence mounted that there existed 
fragmentation within the Communist community of nation-states. 
Communist nation-states, Communist subversion, and Communist 
movements were present throughout the 1950's and today. But 
tension was evident among the European Communist nation-states 
starting with Tito being expelled from the Cominform in June,
1948, and the East German uprising in June, 1953* This tension 
was replaced by an open rupture in the Communist movement follow­
ing Premier Nikita Khrushchev's 'secret speech' condemning 
Stalin on February 25, 1956. The Polish and Hungarian revolutions 
in the summer and fall of 1956, and the evident displeasure of 
the Chinese Communists with the negation of Stalin left little 
doubt that the Communist movement v/as without a center of power.^
Another factor in the diminishing role played by ideology 
had to do with the achievement of nuclear parity by the United 
States and the Soviet Union. VJhen the soviet Union exploded a
4Donald S. Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict (New York : 
Princeton University Press, 1964), p. 343*
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hydrogen ‘bomb in August, 1953» the necessity for restraint 
became an obvious thing to discuss. And when Sputnik was placed 
in orbit on October 4, 1957» there was for man no alternative 
but restraint I Now there was little possibility to calculate 
the cost and potential advantage of war.
Second, there v/as the departure of violence from the 
relationships of developed nation-states to the third world of 
emerging nation-states. Throughout the 1 9 5 0 * 3 and today, 
conflicts have taken the form of a confrontation between a 
developed nation-state and an emerging nation-state, or the very 
instability within the new nation-states is of itself an element 
causing tension within the international political system.
This new stage in the format of violence was due to the 
inability of the bi-polar powers in particular to pursue the 
satisfaction for political power by means of overt all-out war. 
This nuclear balance of terror called for new tactical strategy 
as well as a new method to meet national security and other 
national interest requirements. Nhat this strategy and method 
would be began to emerge in the immediate post-war period as 
evidenced in the "people's v/ars" conducted in the Philippines, 
Nalaya, Greece, and indo-China, and the policy of peaceful co­
existence adopted by the Soviet Union in 1956.
Third, the third world emerged from the status of being 
colonial possessions. This process began prior to V/orld V/ar II 
as we shall see regarding the Lao Issara movement in Laos.3-
Isee p. 108 for discussion of the Lao Issara movement.
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And the process continued to gain momentum during World War II 
as the Japanese caused a loss of face to the French and the 
other colonial powers. Yet, while this was happening, the
development of a new power bloc was not realized by the Western
and Eastern nation-states, until the emerging nation-states 
expressed their self-sufficiency within the confines of the 
United Nations.
At the time of the foundation of the United Nations, the 
membership was fifty in number. Norman L. Hill noted: "Hy the
end of 1 9 5 0 » a. total of nine states had been admitted, but many
others had been rejected either by a Russian-applied veto in the 
Security Council or enough negative votes by the noncommunist 
states to prevent the affirmative vote of seven required. The 
deadlock persisted despite every effort to dissolve it until 
1 9 5 5 * when sixteen states, four communist and twelve noncommunist, 
were voted on in one package and a d m i t t e d . S i n c e  1955 the 
membership has increased so that by 1960 there was a growing 
concern among the bi-polar powers for the third worlds vote.2
bNorman L. Hill International Politics (New York; Harper & 
Row, 1963), p. 36?.
^Russia has declared at the U.N. its objective of putting 
the organization into a shape and in a direction which will 
better reflect the Communist view. The West - led by President 
Eisenhower and the United States - is fighting to retain the 
present character of the U.N., seeing the Russian proposal as 
a clear threat to the free world.
Whether or not Russia succeeds in this will depend to a 
big extent upon what the nev/ nations do. Theirs is a growing 
and increasingly influential group, with one vote in the assembly 
on a par with the big powers.
The last previous time the General Assembly met there 
were 29 nations in the traditional neutralist grouping, 20 Asian
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Of all the elements of change involved in the post-war 
period that contributed to the relaxation of tension there was 
none more important than the change in Soviet leadership. From 
the death of Stalin, until Sputnik on October 4, 1957* the 
Communist world moved with hesitation in international politics. 
First, there was the game of internal power politics among 
Iv'alenkov, Molotov, and others with Nikita Khrushchev. This 
competition ended in June, 1957» when the 'anti-Party group' of 
Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich and Shepilov were eliminated from
and nine African. Today there are 23 African members alone - 
extending the bloc's voting strength well into the 40s.
In one day at this assembly session the role v/as swelled 
by Cameroon (formerly the French Cameroons), Togo (formerly 
French Togoland), Malagasy (formerly French Madagascar), Somalia 
(formerly Italian and British Somaliland), the Congo (formerly 
the Belgian Congo), Dahomey (formerly French), Niger (formerly 
French), Republic of the Upper Volta (formerly French), Republic 
of the Ivory Coast (formerly French), Congo Republic (formerly 
French Fouatorial Africa), Republic of Chad (formerly French), 
Central African Republic (formerly French) and Cyprus, formerly 
British.
Sixteen nations have come into being since last January; 
today there are 2? sovereign African states where 10 years ago 
there were only four. And the tide of freedom still is rolling. 
Nigeria, Africa's biggest territory with 35 million people in a 
continent of 240 million is the latest to join the ranks of new 
nations. "UN Grows— Vbich Direction?" The Minneapolis Star 
April 2, i960, p. lb.
^A comparison of the Stalin period of foreign policy with 
Soviet action from 1953 to 1957 leaves the impression that the 
detente sought with the West as evidenced in the Austrian Treaty 
of 1955» the overtures to Yugoslavia, and the 'summit' Conference 
at Geneva were gestures resulting from expediency than a desire 
for peace. The same is true of the action by the Soviet Union 
under Khrushchev climaxing in the Cuban crisis of I962.
See Coral Bell Negotiation from Strength (London: Chatto & 
Windus, 1962), Chapters I-III, and Cyril Black Communism and 
Revolution ; The Strategic uses of Political Violence (New York : 
Princeton University Press, 1964).
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Soviet leadership.-^ Second, the Sino-Soviet conflict began 
soon after Nikita Khrushchev's famous 'secret speech' in 
February, 1958, in which Stalin was erased from the history of 
international communism. 2
October 4, 1957 brought forth a strange sound from space.
The "bleep-bleep-bleep" of Sputnik settled for the time being 
the leadership in the missile competition. Kore important,
Sputnik concluded the period of relaxation of tensions in the 
Cold V,'ar. The Soviet Union was now to undertake the diplomatic, 
political, and military offensive in competition with the 
United States. The methodology would be that of peaceful 
co-existence, diplomatic threats regarding the status of Berlin, 
supporting wars of liberation, and climaxing with the Cuban missile 
deployment in the fall of 1962. The significance of this period 
was outlined by Zbigniew Brsezinski, while he was a member of the 
Department of State's Policy Planning Council. Brzezinski 
stated t3
The first postwar era-19^5-50- v-'as essentially 
a polycentric era. The United States was 
largely disarmed. It had a nuclear monopoly, 
to be sure, but its nuclear power was essentially 
apocalyptic ; it v/as not applicable - it was only
-Some students have suggested that it wasn't so much the 
succession struggle as the necessity to undo the control of the 
State Security Service after Beria was removed in June, 1953 
and later executed.
2:{laus hehnert Peking and ho scow (Nev/ York; G. ?. Putnam 
and Sons, 1963), p. 3^9. Chapter XIII titled "After Stalin's 
Second Death," is excellent on the effects of Khrushchev's 
speech.
3zbigniew Brzezinski, op. cit., p. 3*
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■beginning to be involved in Europe, hardly 
involved in Asia - and there were still two major 
empires on the scene, the French and British.
The Russians were asserting their regional 
control over Central Europe, but they weren't 
yet involved in Asia. Asia itself was in turmoil.
This truly was the polycentric era.
It gave way to the era of bipolarity, of dichotomic 
confrontation, if you will, between two alliances - 
one led by the Soviet Union, one led by the 
United States. The Soviet Union during this time 
acquired nuclear capacity, and under Khrushchev 
it misjudged its nuclear power and attempted 
to pursue between 1953 and 1 9 6 2 a policy 
designed to assert Soviet global supremacy.
These years were dominated by the Soviet effort 
to throw the West out of Berlin, to put missiles 
in Cuba and to force a showdown. However,
Khrushchev discovered in I962 that the Soviet 
Union still had only apocalyptic power. Its 
nuclear power was not relevant when faced with 
U.S. power, which by then had become much more 
complex and more usuable in a far greater 
diversity of situations.-
VJhat was true by I9 6 2 as far as United States capabilities 
of flexible response in national security policy did not begin 
during the Eisenhower Administration. With Sputnik on October 4, 1957* 
the United States was placed in the position of re-evaluating its 
reliance upon a European orientated collective defense arrange­
ment and massive retaliation. This was the case, since the 
United States was now in the position of catching up to Soviet 
technology. The United States Strategic Air Command had maintained 
the image of dominance and a viable deterrent system through the 
explosion of a Soviet atomic bomb (19^9) and thermonuclear device 
(1 9 5 3 )* but Sputnik changed everything. To the American people
^Zbigniew Brzezinski, ibid., p. 3.
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and our Western Allies, SAC was not a reliable deterrent system 
now and American technology had to prove itself the leader in the 
world. In other words, the United States was on the defensive 
psychologically and in terms of being a reliable counter-force 
to Soviet threats.
Finally, Sputnik brought about a temporary lull in the 
Sino-Soviet conflict. At the conference of the Communist leaders 
in yoscow in November, 1957» with Ysio Tse-tung in attendance, the 
Chinese were subdued. Harry Gelman noted* "V.bereas in 195&
Peking had stressed autonomy and inveighed against "great power 
chauvinism, " its representatives nov; urged unity and deference 
to the leading role of the Soviet U n i o n . P e k i n g  agreed with 
eleven other Communist nation-states to conduct an offensive 
strategy against the West through the third world of under­
developed nation-states under the banner of peaceful coexist­
ence. In the China Youth February l6 , i9 6 0, Sung Tu replied to 
questions of readers under the title "Answers to Readers' Queries 
on War and Peace. In this statement, the Chinese point out the 
respect they held for Soviet technology and its relationship to 
Soviet leadership in the international communist movement.
lyarry Gelman, "The Sino-Soviet Conflict; A Survey," 
quoted in Franz Schurmann and Orville Schell's (ed. ) Tne China 
Reader: Communist China (New York; Random House, 196? ), p. 26?'.
^Dan N. Jacobs and Hans H. Baerwald (ed. ) Chinese Communism 
(New York; Harper & Row, I9 6 3 ), p. ?.
^Sung Tu, "Ansv/ers to Readers' Queries on War and Peace," 
quoted in Dan N. Jacobs and Hans H. Baerwald, ibid., pp. I5 8-
1 6 7 .
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Sung Tu said ;
Question : At the present time, the force of 
socialism is unprecedentedly strong and the 
international situation has eased to a 
certain extent. Could v;e say that the 
imperialists would find it still more 
difficult to start a world war?
Answer ; Yes, it is unquestionably so. The 
current international situation is characterized 
by the ever more solidification and expansion 
of the socialist camp. In Asia, Africa, and 
Latin America the tide of nationalist, 
democratic movement is on the flow whereas the 
imperialist camp is splitting into many factions 
and facing myriads of difficulties. The East 
wind prevails over the West wind, and the forces 
of peace with the socialist camp as their nucleus 
have far surpassed the forces of war of the 
imperialists. As all the people yearn for peace, 
even the imperialists cannot but use peace as 
their signboard. We have every reason to believe 
that the imperialists would find it more and 
more difficult to start a world war.
Question : \fnen you say that the forces of peace 
with the socialist camp as their nucleus have far 
surpassed the forces of war of the imperialists, 
do you chiefly mean that the Soviet Union is far 
superior to the United States in the technique of 
rockets and guided missiles?
Answer : When I say this I mean the comparison of 
total strength, militarily, economically, as well 
as politically. As to the decisive factor, I would 
rather say political force than military strength.
For what decides a war is, after all, the will of 
the people.
Judged from the current situation, that the imperial­
ists dare not start a war is of course true, to a 
very large extent, because the Soviet Union is over­
whelmingly superior in the field of rockets and 
guided missiles.1
V/hile the international communist movement suffered through 
a period of internal conflict, until October 4, 1957» the United 
States proceeded to construct a state of normalcy by way of 
projecting an image of effective security through more collective
Ifung Tu, ibid., pp. 159-l60.
93security arrangements and reliance upon massive retaliation and 
brinkmanship.! This direction of United States national 
security policy was a reflection, and also a reaction to several 
realities.
First, the presidential campaign of the Republican Party 
had been orientated towards a political victory through a 
negation of the entire containment policy of the Truman Adminis­
tration. hhile this general orientation in the 1952 campaign 
v/as an important factor in Elsenhower's victory, it also gave 
him a Congress dominated by the right-wing of the Republican 
Party from 1953 to 1955*2 The Congress would have nothing to do 
with the implementation of the Acheson thesis contained in the 
National Security Council paper No. 68.3 ^ Of course, it must 
be noted the Republican Congress wasn't completely at fault in 
this matter. President Eisenhower stressed the necessity of a 
balanced budget as primary to the national security of the United 
States in his appeals to the Congress. "Under the leadership of 
the President, Secretary Humphrey, Secretary of Defense Wilson,
! Reference here is to Southeast Asian Treaty Organization, 
the United States-Korea Rîutual Defense Treaty, the United States- 
China Kutual Defense Treaty, and the continued United States 
efforts to maintain a viable North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
2Samuel Eliot Morison, op. cit., p. 10?7*
3seymour Harris, "Military Security or a Balanced Budget," 
Current History XXXVIII (April, 19o0), p. 201. This drrent 
History issue titled "U.S. Military Policy and World Security," 
v/as utilized throughout this chapter.
^Refer to p. 80 of text for reference to National Security 
Council paper No. 68.
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and Budget Director Dodge large cuts were made in the military
budget in 1953 to 1955-  ̂ "Even in 1959 when asked by a
reporter at a press conference whether it was not true that the
Administration "put a balanced budget ahead of national security,'
the president replied ;"3
But I do not - I’m just tired even of talking 
about the idea of a balanced budget against 
national security - I don't see where this 
thing ever comes into it.
I say that a balanced budget in the long run
is a vital part of national security.^ b
The stress on economics in structuring the United States 
national security policy from 1953 to 19&0 left the Secretary 
of state with few choices in contesting the Communists throughout 
the world. What the Eisenhower Administration did have as a
^Seymour Harris, ibid., p. 201.
“See apoendix p. 258 for breakdown of military budget 
1 9 4 5 to 1 9 6 0 !̂
^Seymour Harris, ibid.
^ Ibid.
3 In the article by Seymour Harris, the author stated;
"One of the most surprising aspects of the large cuts in 1953 
was that the chiefs of staff were not even consulted. Defense 
Secretary Wilson on r&y 20, 1953, spoke as follows: When I came 
back (from a NATO Conference) I found some figures (on a proposed 
defense cut) I went over them quickly - after v/e got the things 
together we added them up. kîuch to (my) surprise . . . most of 
the cuts somehow seemed to show up in the Air Force Program." 
Seymour Harris, ibid.
James Shepley in an article "Hov; Dulles Averted War, " 
quoted the Secretary of State : "After taking a look at the defense 
budget,’ the Secretary announced, 'in a speech January 14, 1954 
that as the defense burden of guarding the free-world perimeter 
was so great, in future U.S. strategy would depend primarily upon 
a great capacity to retaliate instantly, by means and places of 
our own choosing." James Shepley, "How Dulles Averted War," Life 
XZXX January 16, 1956, p. ?1.
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national security policy was a nuclear threat tied to brinkman­
ship and collective security arrangements.^
In an interview with James shepley of Life magazine, 
Secretary of state Dulles was quoted as saying on January 16,
1 9 5 6 that the nuclear threat of the United states "had been used to 
end the Korean V/ar in July 1953» '̂ o underwrite the partition of 
Indo-China agreed upon at the 195^ Geneva Conference, and to 
prevent a Chinese Communist invasion of the offshore islands of 
Quemoy-r.'latsu in the winter of 195^-1955* Dulles continued;
The ability to get to the verge without 
getting into the war is the necessary art.
If you cannot master it, you inevitably get 
into war. If you try to run away from it, if 
you are scared to go to the brink, you are lost.^
V/ith massive retaliation and brinkmanship, the Eisenhower
Administration returned to the pre-Korean national security
policy of the Truman Administration. It had taken the limited
war in Korea to convince president Truman and Secretary of State
Acheson of the necessity to- have a flexible response. But to the
Eisenhower Administration, the Korean V/ar had been communicated
to the American people as the wrong war.^ In an article titled
"The Eisenhower Era in Asia," Alvin J. Contrell notes:
Any discussion of the administration's
Ijohn Foster Dulles, "Challenge and Response in United 
States Policy," Foreign Affairs XXXVI (October, 1957), P* 29.
2James Shepley, op. cit., p. 22.
3 Ibid.
^Samuel Eliot Morison, op. cit., p. 107?•
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military commitments in Asia should 
logically begin with the Korean War.
Popular support for that war had dwindled 
as the conflict dragged on. D.vight D.
Eisenhower had campaigned for the 
presidency while the United States was 
still heavily involved in Korea. Ke had 
made this commitment a major issue of his
campaign, promised that if elected he
’would go to Korea.’ In office, he 
exploited his overwhelming electoral 
victory to settle the increasingly 
unpopular conflict at the 3 8th parallel.^
Second, while the Eisenhower Administration was limited in 
the scope of its national security policy "by economics and 'that 
war,' international politics dictated a United States presence in 
Europe and Asia. The European role was accepted without hesi­
tation in terms of containing Soviet imperialism, but Asia 
wasn't for there was the unacceptable fact of a colonial presence
in Indo-China, and the unforgiveable experience of a lost China
and limited war without victory.
Southeast Asia became a part of the American life out of 
a tragedy. The foundation for the tragedy began with the return 
of the French to Indo-China at the end of World War II, Tragedy 
continued to characterize Southeast Asia as the French were 
maintained militarily and economically by the United States, until 
the tragedy of Dien Bien Phu in Iv&y, 195^*^ This United States 
support for French colonialism in Southeast Asia was described by
l;j.vin J. Contrell, "The Eisenhower Era in Asia," Current 
History CVII (August, I9 6 9 ), p. 84.
^see appendix p. 2 58 for breakdown of United States military 
and economic assistance to France and the nation-states of 
Southeast Asia from 1950 to 1 9 6O.
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Senator James William Fulbright as the "first mistake"! of United
States foreign policy in Southeast Asia. Of this period in
United States national security policy, V/illiam P. Bundy notes
VJhen the French had returned, we stood aside.
In the critical year 19^6; and over the next 
3 or 4 years, the French first made the 
Fontainebleau agreement and then broke it, so 
that major conflict started. It has often 
been argued by Shaplen among others, that we 
could have exerted greater pressure, perhaps 
even effective pressure, on the French to go 
through with the Fontainebleau agreement and 
to set Viet-Nam on the path to early independence. 
The failure to exert such pressure may thus be 
construed as a negative policy decision on our 
part.3
The former Assistant Secretary for East Asia and Pacific 
Affairs continued:
I myself am skeptical that we could conceivably 
have affected the unfortunate course that the 
French followed in this period. If it is 
argued that our overwhelming Iv^rshall Plan 
aid to France should have given us leverage, then 
it must be pointed out at the same time that 
the Farshall plan became operative only early 
in 19^3 and that by then the die was largely 
cast. Moreover, I doubt very much if the 
proud and bruised French nation would have 
responded even if we had tried to act to end 
the*colonial era, as we did to a major extent 
with the Dutch in Indonesia.
In a very real sense, the tragedy of Viet-Nam 
derives from the fall of France in 19^0 and 
all the understandable emotions aroused by 
that event among French leaders, including
!Senator James William Fulbright quoted in Eric Sevareid, 
"V/hy Our Foreign Policy is Failing: An Fkclusive Interview With 
Senator FUlbright, " Look XXX (my 3, 1966), p. 25.
^William P. Bundy, "The Path To Viet-Nam, " Department of 
State Publication 8295 (September, 196? ), pp. 1-2.
3Reference is to Robert Shaplen's The Lost Revolution.
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notably De Gaulle himself. Restored control 
in Indochina was a badge, however mistaken, 
for a France that meant to be once again a 
world power. Although it may be argued that 
we should at least have tried, I doubt if this 
deep French attitude could have been shaken 
by anything v;e did or said and least of all 
by anything said or done in connection with 
the wise and right policy of helping France 
to get back on her feet.l
The issue in Indo-China, during the post-war period presents 
another example of one of the major problems of United States 
foreign policy: the frequent conflict of national security 
between our major military alliance - the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization - and our general policy in favor of independence 
and self-determination for colonial peoples. The conflict 
arose, primarily, because three of the major NATO powers - 
Britain, France, and Belgium - were also colonial powers.
This conflict becomes particularly embarrassing when the 
Soviet Union or the Peoples Republic of China take advantage of 
it and attempt either to weaken the alliance or to discredit 
the United States in the eyes of the newly emerging Asian and 
African nation-states, or to do both. And this they did from 
the time the French signed and broke the Fontainebleu agreement 
in 19^6 to today.2
Today, as well as in I96O or 1950, the United States foreign
^William P. Bundy, op. cit., p. 2.
^Charles Bailey, "Abstaining on Colonialism Vote Kurt U.S. 
Prestige," The Minneapolis Star, (December 25, I960), p. 2.
United States refusal to support a United Nations resolution 
calling for “immediate steps' toward complete independence for 
colonial areas continues to be a source of controversy here.
The state department has refused to confirm or deny
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policy in Southeast Asia has oeen a tragedy. This tragedy began 
during the Truman Administration, when in the context of the 
Korean War, we saw the "French stand in Indochina as part of a 
global attempt to repel Communist military adventures."- V.hile 
the Eisenhower Administration tried to disengage from Asia in 
1 9 5 3 » France could not be sacrificed as a partner within NATO.
persistent reports that the United states abstained from voting 
on the resolution - which passed, 89 to 0 - because of a personal 
appeal from British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan to President 
Eisenhower. State department spokesman Lincoln White would not 
go beyond saying that the reasons for the U.S. action were 
spelled out by our U.N. ambassador, James V/adsworth.
The only other nations that did not vote for the resolution 
were Britain, France, Belgium, Portugal, Australia, Spain, the 
Dominican Republic and South Africa.
passage of the measure produced dramatic evidence of a 
split in the U.S. delegation. When the vote adopting the 
resolution was announced, Mrs. Zelma Watson George, lone Negro 
on the U.S. delegation, stood and applauded. 'I wanted to crawl 
under the table when we abstained, but I decided to just stand 
and applaud instead,' she said.
In addition, by its abstention the United States wound up 
on what in effect was the short end of an 8 9 to 9 vote. Russia, 
of course, was on the 'winning' side, the same side as the Afro- 
Asian nations.
This point is raised by some critics here who recall the 
argument, advanced during the election campaign debate on 
American 'prestige' that a good way to measure our prestige in 
the world was to look at the consistent majority we have received 
in U.N. voting.
"Before the resolution came up for a vote in its final 
form, the U.N. general assembly three times knocked down Soviet 
resolutions that would have so sharpened the wording of the 
resolution as to make it all but impossible for us to support it.
By a L? to 29 vote, with 22 abstentions, the assembly defeated 
a Soviet proposal to write a I9 6I deadline for independence of 
all colonial and trust territories into the measure. Then, on a 
35 to 32 vote, with 30 abstentions, the assembly knocked out 
another Soviet proposal calling for independence 'forthwith.' 
Finally, by a A3 to 25 vote, with 29 abstentions, the assembly 
killed the rest of the Soviet draft resolution^ which generally 
followed the line of Premier Khrushchev's bitter U.N. speech on 
colonialism last September."
^William P. Bundy, op. cit., p. 2.
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In this context, the military and economic assistance program to 
the French as of 1950 was continued through the disaster of Dien 
Bien Phu in Kay, 195^»
Dien Bien Phu was a defeat for Prance in terms of ending 
forever a colonial presence in Asia. Dien Bien Phu was also 
the second tragic mistake in our Asian policy, because the United 
States not only lost France in terms of NATO, but the acceptability 
of the United States among the revolutionary forces of Southeast 
Asia. This conclusion seems valid for the following reasons:
First, Ho Chi Ivlinh was reminded once again in the Indo­
china War 1950-1954 that the United States could not accept 
change in the international political system, where such change 
affected the international politics between the European powers 
and the United States. In other words, the United States v;as a 
European orientated power, and viewed international politics 
from the perspective of maintaining a power ratio in the world 
through the interests of the North Atlantic Treaty partner being 
satisfied.
Second, the Southeast Asian Treaty organisation was a 
reflection of the United States emphasis upon a status quo in 
which Europe has the predominate influence in maintaining Western 
political power in Asia.l
On September 8, 1954, the United states joined with its 
NATO allies Great Britain and France in sponsoring a collective
^See Chapter VII (Laos and Containment vs. Protracted War) 
for detailed discussion of SEATO as it applied to the Laotian 
crisis of 1959»
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security arrangement to cover the loss of face suffered in the 
French defeat. Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines became 
Treaty partners reflecting their relationship to the NATO powers. 
Pakistan and Thailand added their names to the Treaty to give 
SEATO an Asian presence. But India and the other newly independent 
Asian nation-states stayed clear of what seemed to be a return to 
colonialism.
Third, the United States began to activate the containment 
policy in late 195^ that President Truman sponsored in March,
19^7; namely. United States support for any people trying to 
resist "attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside 
pressure."^ president Eisenhower's decision to support Truman's 
containment thesis by backing non-Communist leaders like Diem of 
South Vietnam can be viewed in terms of a United States willing­
ness to make the containment of Communism work in Asia, and at 
the same time allow the possibility of working with the revo­
lutionary forces in Southeast Asia die. With president 
Eisenhower's letter to President Diem in October, 195^» the 
direction of United States national security policy in Asia was 
set ; the United States was going to stop the further penetration 
of Communism into the underbelly of Asia. And the United States 
was going to do with or without the activation of the SEATO 
Treaty. This was a dramatic change from what the Eisenhower 
Administration accepted as the United States role in the inter­
national political system in January, 1953* From the fall of
-President Harry S. Truman, op. cit.
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195^ we were going forward to a full overt military presence in 
the fall of 1 9 6 5 by looking backward to the stalemate in Korea 
and tragedy at Dien Bien Phu.
Southeast Asia was going to teach the United States a
lesson in international politics although the French experience and
the revolutionary forces for change after World War II should have
yielded sufficient data to enable this great nation-state to be
above and ahead of the lesson contained in the words of the late
Secretary-General of the United Nations Dag Kamrriarskjold :
Between experiences and having experienced - 
the moment when the experience yields its 
last secrets. A moment we only discover is 
already past when cracks and stains appear, 
the gilding flakes off, and we wonder what 
it was that once so attracted us.^
The laotian crisis of 1959 is a case study of the applica­
tion of containment to Southeast Asia. In the laotian conflict, 
the cracks and strains in the nature of the United States commit­
ment, SEATO, and the containment policy from 1953 to i960 are 
well established. By 1959, when the United Nations substituted 
its presence for containment, we did wonder what it was that once 
so attracted us to Southeast Asia. But by I960, Communism led by 
the Soviet Union was on the offensive, and preparing the way for 
the Cuban missile crisis of I962. In this context, containment 
seemed necessary, so another six years of tragedy had to be 
witnessed in Southeast Asia, before it came time once again to 
reflect on what Hammarskjold had said in Parkings,
^Dag Hammarskjold, op. cit., p. 4?.
?À?Æ III
THE KINGDCH 0? LAOS AND POWER POLITICS
The crack in the jug?^ Then you 
have let it get coldi^
Part III brings together the constants and variables in 
the equation of reality discussed in part I and II. This will 
be accomplished in a case study of the Kingdom of Laos from its 
initial independence in 19^9 through the turmoil leading to a 
United Nations presence in Laos in the fall of 1959*
Among the more specific goals to be accomplished in 
Part III is a specific application of the equation of reality in 
an environment reflecting the variables present in international 
politics from 1953 through 1959‘ These variables were the 
competition between the advocates of containment and protracted 
conflict against a background of an international political system 
dominated by change; that is, the change in the importance of 
ideology, and the effects of nuclear weapons upon the methods 
utilized in international politics.
Chapter VI (The laotian Political System) provides the 
necessary background of a "crack in the jug" of viable nation­
states through which there was presented an environment conducive
^Dag Hammarskjold, op. cit., p. 99*
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to the application of political power by the contending alliance 
systems in the Cold War. This chapter will be primarily concerned 
with measuring the viability of Laos in accordance with the model 
of the political system. In the development of the equilibrium 
approach, this model of the political system provides the political 
analyst with a means to decide whether or not Laos or any other 
society is more than a cultural unit; namely, a political system 
where political demands are being satisfied to such an extent 
that there is going on political socialization, political recruit­
ment, interest articulation, and interest aggregation.
In Chapter VII (laos and Containment vs. Protracted War) 
the equation of reality is applied to the Laotian political system. 
In this case study of the Kingdom of Laos in the Cold War, the 
writer will attempt to illustrate by the application of the 
equilibrium approach the ineffectiveness of containment in 
competition with the methodology of protracted conflict. The 
conclusions of the writer will be developed in summary form in 
Chapter VIII : (A political Power Vacuum. ).
CHAPTER VI 
THE LAOTIAN POLITICAL SYSTEM
The water drops, the ants 
eat the fish. The water 
rises, the fish eat the 
ants. So it is Letter to 
love than to hate.^
"The Kingdom of laos; land of Enchantment in Southeast
Asia"2 is the title of a brochure issued by the Royal Embassy
of laos in Washington, D. C. The brochure goes on to quote from
the lao national anthem:
Our lao race had once known in Asia a great 
reputation.
lao people were united and loved each other 
then.3
The Kingdom of Laos was once a united Kingdom and was 
called Ian Xang. But this was from the mid-fourteenth until 
the end of the seventeenth century, when the Ian Xang empire was 
left alone by her more aggressive neighbors, Thailand and Vietnam.
^An ancient laotian adage quoted in Thomas E. Ennis, "Laos 
Pawn in Power politics," Current History XXXVII (February, I9 6 O), 
p. 7^.
2"'The Kingdom of Laos: land of Enchantment in Southeast 
Asia," edited by the Royal Embassy of laos, Washington, D. C.,
May, 1961.
3 Ibid., p. 2 .
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Beginning in the eighteenth century Ie.n Xang was subjected to 
periodic invasions and external attempts at domination, particu­
larly from Thailand and Vietnam. It is from the eighteenth 
century that Laos started to establish "a long tradition of 
fighting against the imperialists."1
In the eighteenth century, however, laos was divided into 
three rival kingdoms of Luang Frabang, Vientiane and Champasselc. 
While there were efforts on the part of Luang Prabang to bring 
Vientiane away from Thailand's political dominance, and Champassek 
back from Vietnam's political control, these attempts by what 
remained of the Xan lang empire were unsuccessful.2 until 19^9» 
laos was subjected' to foreign dominance.
The Kingdom of Laos was granted independence by France 
within the French Union in 19^9»3 This event brought to a climax 
the development of an independent Laos by a combination of French 
mistakes and Japanese decisions.
France entered laos by way of a power struggle with Thailand 
from her political base in Vietnam. This conflict ended in 1893 
when the Thai abandoned their claims to laos due to a French 
naval threat from the Gulf of Siam.^ The Franco-Siamese Treaty
p"la Revolution lao A 20 Ans," edited by the Keo lao Hak 
Sat party (I963), p. 10. This periodical was received by the 
writer as an enclosure to a letter from Kuot Sambata, permanent 
Representative of Cambodia at the United Nations, dated June 15, 1966.
“Joel M. Halpern Government, Politics, and Social Structure 
in Laos (New Haven, Conn. : Yale University Fress; 1969- ), p. 2.
3Ibid., p. 3*
4John F. Cady Southeast Asia.- Its Historical Development 
( New York ; He Craw- Hill Book Company, 1964), p . 42o.
Filmed as received 
without page(s) 107 .
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opportunity as a nation-state obviously created a situation where
France was discredited in terms of its future acceptability as a
protector and as a competitor against an Asian power. At the
same time that France was discredited, the political vacuum
present in laos allowed for the establishment of forces for
change, in Laos, these revolutionary forces took the name of
the lao Issara movement.^
The lao Issara (Free lao) movement v/as a reflection of the
forces of change in the twentieth century. More specifically,
the lao Issara was created out of the inability to keep the
"land of Enchantment" free from foreign rule, and the mistakes
made by the French during their indirect rule for some sixty or
more years. Arthur J. Dommen writes:
It became clear to them (Prince Phetsarath,
Souvanna phouma, Souphanouvong ) that the 
French presence in Laos was not necessarily 
a permanent one, and they acquired the hope, 
faint at first but encouraged by the 
democracies' enunciation of lofty aims, that 
after the way they might govern their 
country in independence instead of under 
foreign domination.
Tiie prestige of France suffered a major blow 
when it proved incapable of protecting Laos 
from exploitation by Japan, an Asian power.
In Indochina, as in Malaya, Indonesia, and 
Burma, the Japanese occupation broke the 
myth of the white man's invincibility.
French power had been shattered by the Japanese 
coup de"main. The surrender of Japan and the 
ending of World War II less than six months 
later removed at one fell stroke the single 
remaining cohesive force in laos and Vietnam.2
^See p.118 for further discussion of the lao Issara 
movement.
2Arthur J. Dommen, Conflict in Laos (New York; Frederick 
A. praeger, 1965), PP* 21-22.
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Arthur J. Eommen suggests the lao Issara leaders saw in 
the Japanese presence during World War II "that the French 
presence in laos was not necessarily a permanent one, Ihis is 
true I But more important, France had failed to create a viable 
political system in Laos under its protectorate over Luang Prabang 
and Vientiane, or colony in Champassek. The "live-and-let-live" 
policy of the French left laos without political direction. A 
direction that had been missing since Thailand and Vietnam began 
the foreign aggression against the Xan lang empire in the late 
seventeenth century.
In laos, like Cambodia, the French followed the practice 
of dealing with change through "an indigenous elite, with the 
result that it was more gradual, more evenly balanced between 
the realms of the formal authoritative structure of government 
and the societies at large, and both government and people have 
been less intensely committed to achieving a modern way of life."2 
France was successful in Cambodia, where the population was united 
behind a common civilization, ethnic ties, and religion.3 The 
basic French mistake in laos was the lack of interest beyond 
placating the indigenous elite of Laos.
In the brochure on laos put out by the Royal Embassy of 
Laos, there is constant reference to the lao when describing the
-Arthur J. Dommen, ibid., p. 21.
^Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, op. cit., p. 99»
3cambodia's population has been united throughout its 
history as the seat of the Khmer civilization, and strong center 
of Buddhism.
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national flag, national anthem, royal emblem, and government.
Laos suffers from many problems related to being a viable nation­
state, but most basic has been the lack of social, economic, and 
political integration of the ethnic groups in laos.^ In an 
article titled "Poverty-Pressed Laos Is Headache to West, "
Robert W. Smith wrote ;
It is an unnatural political creation . . .
Its population-smaller than Minnesota's 
please note - includes about 20 different 
and often incompatible ethnic elements. It 
is estimated that no more than half of 
Laos' people are ethnic Laotians, and these 
have demonstrated something far less than 
a live and let live attitude toward native 
minority groups.2
The IMited States Embassy in laos agrees:3
The population, which lacks homogeneity being 
composed of many ethnic groups, is estimated 
to number about 2,500,000. . . About 49^ are 
lao. . . mountain tribes, also of Thai stock, 
are found in upper laos, while a number of 
other mountain tribes of Indonesian or 
proto-Ivalay background inhabit central Laos.
The lack of common origin, customs, traditions 
and beliefs among the various minorities 
poses a serious problem to the political 
unification of the kingdom.^
^Gerald Cannon Hickey and Adrienne Suddard, "Laos: Pawn 
in Power Politics," Current History XXXXI (December, 19ol), 
p. 352.
^Robert W. Smith, "poverty-pressed laos Is Headache to 
West," The Kinneanolis Star, December 25, 19^0, p. 2.
3united States Embassy in Laos, "laos," p. 1. The wrimer 
received this statement about Laos upon request for information 
regarding United States policy in Laos.
^United States Embassy in laos, "laos," ibid., p. 1.
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This population problem is illustrated as follows
Ethnic Group Breakdown
1. Kap of Ethnic groups. See p , 112.^
-Iviap is the result of the writer's efforts.
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2. Pattern of Ethnic Distribution:^
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^"Pattern of Ethnic Distribution" is the result of the 
writer's efforts.
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This lack of an integrated population and the dominance of
the lao elite has had grave repercussions for Laos in the Cold
War. Gerald C. Hickey and Adrienne Suddard noted this in an
article titled; "Laos; pawn in Power Politics?" They said;
It is difficult to say how far laos might 
have proceeded, given peace, toward the 
solution of such fundamental problems as 
the establishment of national political 
unity ; the creation of conditions for 
national economic development, and the 
extension of educational opportunity.
Within Lao society itself, the traditional 
feudal-like social organisation has persisted 
until the present. As a result, the effective 
leadership in laos has been in the hands of a 
dozen or so families who trace their ancestry 
to the ancient royal line of Luang Prabang.
Even during the Prench rule this small lao 
elite, though stripped of actual control, 
filled most important administrative positions.
5y contrast xhe majority of the lao population 
is made up of villagers - illiterate, isolated, 
and many instances of politically apathetic.
This political, cultural and economic gap 
represents a fundamental weakness in the Laos 
polity. It unfortunately is compounded by 
another chasmal social situation - between the 
lao and the ethnic minorities, most of whom are 
upland-dwelling people. The lao all too often 
approach the minorities with an air of superiority 
and there have been recent attempts to "laoize" 
highland people by bringing them down to the 
lowlands to learn the lao way of life. These attitudes 
and actions have stirred resentment among the 
minority groups; as one disgruntled elderly Kha put
it, 'All the lao are bosses.' The pathet lao have 
not ignored the opportunity to exploit this situation, 
ominously, recent reports indicate that better than 
half the Pathet lao troops are non-lao.^
In conclusion, the United States representatives noted that
"Laos has never been a national entity in the real meaning of the
^Gerald Cannon Hickey and Adrienne Suddard, op. cit.,
p. 352.
115terra, i.e., governed by a stable, effective authority. . . The 
gulf between the central government and the people in the country­
side persists today."1 The State Department's reference to 
"today" was 1962. In essence, what the State Department was 
referring to has been the historical "exploitation and oppres­
sion"^ by the Lao of the other ethnic groups, who represent 
approximately half of Laos's population.3 if it had not been the 
î^thet lao, then these groups would have found some other vehicle 
for the achievement of political integration into the laotian 
political system.
V/hether the time period referred to is 1893 or 1969, the 
Kingdom of laos does not fulfill the requirements of a political 
system. That is, "that system of interactions to be found in all 
independent societies which performs the functions of integration 
and adaptation (both internally and vis-a-vis other societies) 
by means of the employment, or threat of employment, of more or 
less legitimate physical compulsion."4
Vfnat is missing in the Kingdom of laos is "that system of 
interactions to be found in all independent societies,"3 and 
because these interactions are not present the government of
p. 7.
^United States Embassy in laos, "laos," pp. 6-7. 
^"la Revolution lao A 20 Ans," op.cit., p. 9*
3See p. 130 for breakdown of laotian ethnic groups. 
^Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, op. cit.
•^Gabriel A. Almond and James G. Coleman, ibid.
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Laos has been unable to utilize "more or less legitimate physical
compulsion"! in the achievement of a politically integrated
nation-state. The interactions present in a viable political
system are but the reflection of certain basic functions being
performed by the institutions in a political system. These
functions are illustrated in the model of the political systemi
The Political System^
(Pre-Political Stage) *
apolitical Political Interest Interest *
^Socialization Recruitment —>  Articulation—> Aggregation:  _̂_______ f :
** I Input







Rule  ̂ Rule  ̂ Rule *
r.iaking / Execution 4  Adjudication *<3̂===================gf 4================̂  *
-a if-
In summary, the functions of the model as applied to the 
Laotian political system do not exist within the confines of the 
Laotian's identification with a government. Since independence 
in 19^9* laos is still at the stage of political development 
described as political socialization. A nationally identified
llbid.
^The model illustrates a political process (_____ ) that
takes place in any nation-state. A political system not only 
includes a political process, but interactions (===) involving 
seven functions performed by an institutional fabric that may 
involve only a dictator and his army, a political party, or a 
confrontation of brothers and their movements as in Laos. Finally, 
a fully democratic political system would have a breakdown that 
included input from political pressure and interest groups 
(interest articulation) to a political party system (interest 
aggregation) to a legislative branch etc., on the output side.
117political socialization process has suffered, because the lao 
Issara movement and Communist pathet Lao have been the only 
vehicles present in laos for the formulation of attitudes, 
values, and beliefs of a political nature among all the ethnic 
groups. Kore specifically, political socialization has been 
inhibited due to the limitations of :
a. Geography. Most of the terrain of laos, 
particularly in the north, is covered by 
dense jungles and rugged mountains, many 
of which are over 9»000 feet high. Ihe 
Mekong River running the length of Laos 
has not been a factor bringing about 
political integration, because of the 
many rapids present. The jungle, 
mountains, and rugged river have been 
very important in the lack of a developed 
internal transportation system. Without 
such an internal transportation system, 
communications are limited, and thus 
political socialization becomes a 
challenge from the start of the 
establishment of a nation-state.
b. Climate. laos has a climate that is 
monsoonally rather well defined. There 
are five months of very heavy rainfall 
from Kay to September, with the rains 
tapering off by November, when there 
are five months of drought. As of 
1959» there existed no all-weather 
roads, nor does Laos have a railroad.
This situation limits the development
of government sponsored political socialization 
to approximately five months of the year. 1
c. Population. The population lacks homogeneity 
in any sense. See p. 113 for breakdown of 
ethnic groups.
d. Language. lao is the official language, but
1See p. 119 as far as the governments’ interest in
political socialization.
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French is the language of the Lao elite both 
culturally and politically. The United States 
Embassy in Laos noted:
It is estimated that not over 15?5 of the 
population is literate. Furthermore, the 
numerous ethnic groups possess their 
own languages or dialects posing one of 
the principal impediments to the development 
of national unity.1
See p. 113 for breakdown of the language factor 
among the Laotians.
e. Religion. The predominant and state religion 
of the Kingdom is Buddhism of the southern
of 'Hinayana' type. But Buddhism is in most 
cases overlayed with animist or spirit worship.2 
See p. 113 for breakdown of the religious factor.
f. Economics. Less than 10^ of the Laos population
is not engaged in agriculture. The extended family 
unit reflects the common effort required in either 
wet or dry rice farming.3 This emphasis upon 
subsistence agriculture is of primary importance 
in influencing most of the Laotian population 
to live out their lives in accordance to the 
basic tenet of the Asian .Outlook: the cyclical 
theory of time.^
g. Government. The constitutional parliamentary
monarchy in Laos is dedicated to maintaining
the Lao in power.. This can be seen in the 
wording of the Lao national anthem, and the 
experience of the non-lao Pathet lao's 
political party (Neo Lao Hak Sat) in the 1958 
elections to the National Assembly.
^United States Bnbassy in laos, op. cit., p. 2.
^Hinayana (Theravada) Buddhism is the teacher sect of 
Buddhism, where the emphasis is upon an institutional worship of 
one teacher.
3Dry rice-slash and burn-is a form of rice production 
carried on in which land is cleared, rice raised for two or three 
years, and then when land becomes incapable of production, the 
dry rice farmers move on and repeat the same process.
^See Chapter II for a discussion of the Asian Outlook.
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The lao national anthem states: "All 
together they would know how to restore 
the past glory of the lao blood and help 
each other in crucial days."1
In the 1958 elections to the National 
Assembly, the Neo Lao Hak Sat won 
of the vote, and gained control of 
the National Assembly. After this 
experience, the Government outlawed the 
Neo lao Hak Sat, until the neutralization 
of laos in 1962.2
Political socialization has been hindered by both physical 
and human barriers. If the lao elite would show some form of 
symbolic or other means of accepting the fifty-one or so percent 
of the laotian population, then laos wouldn't suffer from such 
a bad press in the United States. Laos has been called "an 
unnatural political creation,"3 and an "implausible little 
kingdom"^ because the lao elite have not seen fit to respond to
iThe Lao National Anthem Is:
Our lao race had once known in Asia a great 
reputation.
lao people were united and loved each other then.
Still nowadays they know how to love their race 
and their country and gather themselves behind their 
chiefs.
They have conserved the religion of their fore­
fathers and they know how to defend the territory 
of their ancestors.
They will not allow any nation to create unrest 
or to occupy their soil.
Whoever wants to invade their country would 
find them determined to fight till death.
All together they would know how to restore the 
past glory of the Lao blood and help each other 'Æn 
crucial days.
From the Embassy of Laos, op. cit., p. 2.
Zgee p. l36for further discussion of the 1958 National 
Assembly election.
3Robert W. Smith, op. cit.
^"Laos," Time June 26, 1964, p. 25.
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the non-Communist ties of the other ethnic groups within the 
Pathet Lao. Political socialization's lack of development is the 
main reason for foreign journalists and scholars typing Laos as 
a "mess.
"laos is a m e s s , "2 hut Laos can't escape the fact that it 
is a part of an area of the world where the Cold War has moved 
as of the development of nuclear weapons by the East and West.
For the Communist nation-states, the fact that Laos has not become 
a viable political system makes this Kingdom an ideal arena to 
utilize protracted conflict. On the other hand, the West can 
maintain a presence in Indochina only if the Kingdom of Laos can 
move to bring about political socialization among all of its 
people, and from this pre-political stage develop an input and 
output institutional fabric to fulfill the seven functions of a 
model political system.
While the functions of a viable political system have not 
been fulfilled in the Kingdom of laos by means of the initiative 
of laos's elite, this does not mean that political socialization 
or any of the other functions in the model are not present. What 
is missing up to the present is an effective government over the 
entire population and country. Instead, Laos has been the scene 
of factional politics between the Pathet Lao led by Prince 
Souphanouvong, the neutralist forces led by his half-brother Prince 
Souvanna Riouma, and a more conservative element led by a half-
^Robert W. Smith, ibid. 
2 Ibid.
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brother Phetsarath and later Katay Don Sasorith. Within these 
groups, the processes of political integration are present, v/hat 
degree of political integration Laos has achieved can not be 
concluded to the present, because Laos has been designated as a 
battleground for the Cold War. This has been Laos' state of 
affairs since it received an independent status in 19^9*
CHAPTER VII
LAOS AND CONTAINMENT VS. PROTRACTED WAR
O n l y  h e  w h o  a t  e v e r y  m o m e n t  i s  a l l  
h e  i s  c a p a b l e  o f  b e i n g  c a n  h o p e  f o r  
a  f u r l o u g h  f r o m  t h e  f r o n t i e r  b e f o r e  
h e  d i s a p p e a r s  i n t o  t h e  d a r k n e s s .
T h e  s e n t i n e l s  o f  t h e  E n e m y  d o  n o t  s l e e p . ^
T h e  C o l d  W a r  c a m e  t o  t h e  K i n g d o m  o f  l a o s  i n  t w o  d i f f e r e n t
p e r i o d s .  F r o m  t h e  G e n e v a  A c c o r d  i n  J u l y ,  1 9 5 ^  t h r o u g h  S p u t n i k  
i n  O c t o b e r ,  1 9 5 7  L a o s  w a s n ' t  d i r e c t l y  i n v o l v e d  i n  a n y  s i g n i f i c a n t  
o v e r t  m a n i f e s t a t i o n  o f  c o n t a i n m e n t  v e r s u s  p r o t r a c t e d  w a r .  m  
t h i s  p e r i o d  o f  t h e  C o l d  W a r ,  t h e  d o m i n a n t  t h e m e  w a s  t r a n s i t i o n  
r e f l e c t i n g  t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  c h a n g e  i n  S o v i e t  l e a d e r s h i p ,  a n d  t h e  
m i l i t a r y  c a p a c i t i e s  o f  E a s t  a n d  W e s t .  W i t h i n  t h i s  e n v i r o n m e n t  
o f  d r a m a t i c  c h a n g e ,  t r a n s i t i o n  r e s u l t e d  i n  a  p e r i o d  o f  " r e l a x a ­
t i o n  o f  t e n s i o n " , 2  a n d  t h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  n e w  s t r a t e g y  t o  c o n t e s t  
t h e  C o l d  W a r .
O c t o b e r  4-, 1 9 5 7  m a r k s  t h e  e n d  o f  t r a n s i t i o n  a n d  t h e  r e s u l t i n g  
r e l a x a t i o n  o f  t e n s i o n .  S p u t n i k  i l l u s t r a t e d  t o  t h e  w o r l d  t h a t  t h e
S o v i e t  u n i o n  h a d  a  n u c l e a r  c a p a b i l i t y  e q u a l  t o ,  i f  n o t
^ D a g  H a m m a r s k j o l d ,  o p .  c i t . ,  p .  9 6 .
2 P r e m i e r  N . A .  B u l g a n i n ' s  s t a t e m e n t  o f  D e c e m b e r  2 9 ,  1 9 5 5  i n  
w h i c h  t h e  S o v i e t  P r e m i e r  s t a t e d  t h a t  1 9 5 5  " w i l l  g o  d o w n  i n  h i s t o r y  
a s  a  d e f i n i t e  t u r n i n g  i n  t h e  r e l a x a t i o n  o f  w o r l d  t e n s i o n s . "  H o l l i s  
W .  B a r b e r  T h e  u n i t e d  S t a t e s  i n  W o r l d  A f f a i r s  1 9 5 5  ( N e w  Y o r k :  H h r p e r  
&  B r o t h e r s ,  1 9 5 7 ) ,  p .  1 ,
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better, than the United States. This technological achievement 
was a great psychological defeat for the United States, because 
the general consensus was that the United States technological 
supremacy didn't exist any more. In addition, there was generated 
by sputnik the belief among the members in NATO that the 
united States deterrent system wasn't to be relied upon now that 
the Soviet Union had apparently reached a parity in the nuclear 
capacity to make war. France, Great Britain, and West Germany 
began to think in terms of their own strategic and tactical 
defense systems. In other words, sputnik was an important factor 
in starting the process of reducing the effectiveness of the NATO 
alliance system that reached a climax during the Administration 
of President lyndon B. Johnson.
Within the Communist sphere of nation-states, sputnik 
restored the prestige of the Soviet Uhion after the revolutions 
in Eastern Europe during 1956. The Soviet Union's position was 
strengthened and Nikita Khrushchev's political power was enhanced, 
especially vis-a-vis China's r&o Tse-tung, Sputnik, more than 
anything else, brought to a close the growing differences between 
Communist China and the Soviet union. This situation lasted 
through 1959.^
Finally, in this second period of the Cold War, the 
confrontation between the united States and Communist nation­
states moved to the third world of underdeveloped nation-states.
1 In i960, the Sino-Soviet conflict was renewed with a 
great deal of vigor as evidenced in the removal of Soviet economic 
assistance to Communist China in July and August.
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From 1957 to today, the Kingdom of laos has been a most obvious 
battlefield in the application of containment and the new 
Communist strategy» protracted war with a guerrilla methodology.^ 
In laos, a "war of national liberation"^ has been conducted in 
its guerrilla form without let-up, except for the united Nations 
presence in Laos in the fall of 1959» and spring of 1960.3
^Yes, the confrontation in laos is present today. In fact, 
the conflict there might have moved to a new level as described 
in Time under an article titled» "The Chinese Highwaymen." The 
article stated» "in the shadowy war between Laotian government 
forces and Communist Pathet lao guerrillas, China has so far 
stayed clear of the actual fighting. Peking, however, has 
launched a different sort of invasion against its diminutive 
neighbor to the south - one that may prove to be every bit as 
troublesome. last year some 3,000 Chinese road builders moved 
across the border of China's Yunnan province into northern laos.
By the time the monsoon rains began last spring, the Chinese had 
pushed a gravel-topped all-weather road 55 miles south as far as 
Ivhong Sai. . . Then last September, as the rains ended, the 
coolies moved on - this time southwestward through the Beng 
Valley toward the Mekong River and the border of Thailand. The 
presence of the Chinese highwaymen along with two infantry 
battalions equipped with anti-aircraft guns who came along to 
protect the work crews has alarmed Laotian Premier Prince 
Souvanna Phouma, who has always treated his northern neighbor 
cautiously. Fearful of a violent reaction from Peking should he 
protest, the Prince at first ignored the road builders, rational­
izing a route as far as Muong Sai after all. But the new spur 
into the Eeng Valley, he told Time, was 'another affair.' V/hen 
the government asked the Chinese to explain, Peking flatly denied 
that it was involved in laos at all. Another sort of reply came 
recently when Souvanna Phouma's commander in chief flew over the 
Beng Valley road in a Royal laotian plane - and was chased away 
by a burst of Chinese anti-aircraft fire."
"The Chinese Highwaymen," Time XCIIII (December 5» 1969)» P* 63.
^Premier Nikita Khrushchev, quoted in Richard P. Stebbins 
United States in World Affairs 195o (New York » Harper and Brothers, 
1957 ). p. 48.
^See pp. 47-52 text for discussion of protracted war with 
its guerrilla methodology.
125B e f o r e  t h e  u n i t e d  N a t i o n s  b e g a n  t o  m a n i f e s t  a n  i n t e r e s t  i n  
L a o s  d u r i n g  t h e  s p r i n g  o f  1 9 5 9 »  t h e  K i n g d o m  w a s  d e a l t  w i t h  i n  t w o  
w a y s  r e f l e c t i n g  t h e  t w o  p e r i o d s  o f  t h e  C o l d  W a r  d i s c u s s e d  e a r l i e r .  
F r o m  1950 t h r o u g h  1 9 5 6 »  L a o s  w a s  l i k e  a  p a w n  i n  a  c h e s s  g a m e ,  a n d  
t h e n  a s  t h e  C o l d  W a r  m o v e d  t o  a  n e w  l e v e l  o f  t e n s i o n  i n  1 9 5 8 »  t h e  
K i n g d o m  b e c a m e  a  v e r y  i m p o r t a n t  " d o m i n o "  t o  t h e  W e s t  l e d  b y  t h e  
u n i t e d  s t a t e s .  T h i s  " p a w n "  a n d  " d o m i n o "  d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  L a o s ' s  
s t a t u s  r e f l e c t  n o t  o n l y  t h e  o v e r - a l l  d e v e l o p m e n t s  o f  t h e  C o l d  W a r ,  
b u t  t h e  s p e c i f i c  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  S E A T O  ( S o u t h e a s t  A s i a  T r e a t y  
O r g a n i z a t i o n )  i n  S e p t e m b e r ,  1 9 5 4 .
P r i o r  t o  S E A T O ,  L a o s  w a s  a  p a w n  i n  a n  u n d e c l a r e d  c o v e r t  
w a r  i n v o l v i n g  t h e  F r e n c h  a g a i n s t  a  c o m b i n a t i o n  o f  l a o  n a t i o n a l i s t s  
a n d  t h e  C o m m u n i s t  P a t h e t  l a o .  I n  t h i s  p e r i o d ,  t h e  u n i t e d  S t a t e s  
w a s  a i d i n g  t h e  F r e n c h  w i t h  t h e  l i m i t e d  v i e w  t h a t  " t h e  F r e n c h  
s t a n d  i n  m d o c h i n a '  w a s  ' p a r t  o f  a  g l o b a l  a t t e m p t  t o  r e p e l  
C o m m u n i s t  m i l i t a r y  a d v e n t u r e s . " ^
W i t h  S E A T O ,  l a o s  r e m a i n e d  a  " p a w n "  f o r  t h e  P a t h e t  L a o  a n d  
N o r t h  V i e t n a m e s e  f o r  a  p e r i o d  o f  f o u r  y e a r s ,  u n t i l  H o  C h i  M i n h  
e s t a b l i s h e d  t h e  V i e t  M i n h  t h r o u g h o u t  N b r t h  V i e t n a m ,  a n d  t h e  S o v i e t  
a n d  C h i n e s e  C o m m u n i s t s  m o v e d  f r o m  a  p o s s i b l e  o p e n  r u p t u r e  t o  a  
t e m p o r a r y  a l l i a n c e  i n  1 9 5 7 »  C n  t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  t h e  u n i t e d  S t a t e s  
c o n f i n e d  i t s  p r e s e n c e  i n  I n d o c h i n a  t o  a n  a s s i s t a n c e  p r o g r a m ,  
s i n c e  t h e r e  d i d n ' t  s e e m  t o  b e  a  g r e a t  d e a l  o f  o v e r t  m i l i t a r y  
a c t i v i t y  g o i n g  o n  i n  I n d o c h i n a .  M a s s i v e  r e t a l i a t i o n  i m p l e m e n t e d  
b y  b r i n k m e n s h i p  s e e m e d  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  t h e  E i s e n h o w e r  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n .
William p. Bundy, op. cit., p. 2.
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The year 1958 ends for four years a basic relaxation of 
tension between East and West. In Laos, there was a series of 
direct confrontations between the Western orientated Royal laotian 
government forces, and the pathet Lao. In Laos, the trails leading 
southward into South Vietnam started to become famous in providing 
transportation routes to a new organization called the Viet Cong.^ 
In Laos, the Communist became so strong that the Pathet Lao won 
a majority to the National Assembly. It is in the context of 
these circumstances that Laos became a "domino" instead of a "pawn" 
for the United States. It is in the time period, since 1957, that 
laos has become a central battleground in the new Gold War tactics 
of the East and West.
Laos, as a central battleground in the Cold War, began in 
the seemingly unrelated event of the government of Laos at Luang 
Prabang declaring the Kingdom independent of the French in 
September, 19^5» On October 12, 19^5 the King was dethroned by 
a provisional government formed by the lao Issara on the grounds 
of his basic loyalty to France.  ̂ "But the French imperialists 
were not ready to abandon their conquered lands. "3 in I-̂ y, 19^6 
the French troops reoccupied all of Laos driving the Lao Issara 
into exile in Thailand.^ By October, 1953 the French were finding
Isee p. 139 of text for a discussion of the role of laos 
in the Communist effort in South Vietnam.
^Lao Issara (Free lao) movement began in World War II under 
leadership of Prince Phetsarath, his half-brother Souvanna Phouma, 
and Phoui sananikone. lao Issara dissolved in 19^9*
3"la Revolution lao A 20 Ans," op. cit., p. 11.
^"laos," united States Einbassy in Laos op. cit., p. 4.
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t h e  g u e r r i l l a  w a r  a g a i n s t  t h e  r e v o l u t i o n a r y  f o r c e s  o f  H o  C h i  Ptlinh
t o  b e  m o r e  t h a n  t h e y  c o u l d  h a n d l e ,  s o  t h e  F r e n c h  s u g g e s t e d  t o  t h e
l a o  I s s a r a  t h e  i d e a  o f  a n  i n d e p e n d e n t  l a o s  w i t h i n  t h e  F r e n c h
U n i o n . l  ( T h i s  d i d  n o t  s a t i s f y  P r i n c e  P h e t s a r a t h  a n d  t h e  L a o
I s s a r a .  T h e y  w a n t e d  i n d e p e n d e n c e .  T h i s  w a s  a c h i e v e d  a t  t h e
c l i m a t i c  b a t t l e  a t  D i e n  B i e n  P h u  i n  ^ y ,  1 9 5 ^ »  E r e d  G r e e n e  n o t e s  i
I n d o c h i n a ,  a  l a n d  t h a t  b e a r s  t h e  n a m e  o f  t w o  
g r e a t  A s i a n  s t a t e s ,  w a s  a  c e n t e r  o f  v i o l e n c e  
f o r  a l m o s t  a  d e c a d e  a f t e r  1 9 ^ 5 »  H e r e  i n t e n s e  
n a t i o n a l i s m  c a m e  u n d e r  c o m m u n i s t  d o m i n a t i o n  
a s  t h e  F r e n c h  i m p e r i a l  r u l e r s  w a g e d  a  d e s p e r a t e  
w a r  t o  r e t a i n  t h e i r  power.2
W i t h  t h e  r t e n c h  d e f e a t  a t  D i e n  B i e n  P h u ,  t h e  e n d  w a s  a t  
h a n d  f o r  a  F r e n c h  p r e s e n c e  i n  S o u t h e a s t  A s i a .  T h i s  w a s  i m p o r t a n t .  
B u t  e v e n  m o r e  s i g n i f i c a n t ,  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  f o u n d  i t s e l f  i n  
1954  t i e d  t o  t h e  f o r c e s  o f  r e a c t i o n  a n d  t h e  s t a t u s  q u o .  I n  t h e  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  s t a t e s  t o  t h e  F r e n c h  c a u s e ,  t h e  
p o s s i b i l i t y  w a s  r e m o t e  f o r  t h e  u n i t e d  S t a t e s  t o  b r e a k  t h e  t h r e a d  
b i n d i n g  t h e  n a t i o n a l i s m  d i s p l a y e d  b y  t h e  L a o  I s s a r a  t o  t h e  
C o m m u n i s t  P a t h e t  L a o  a n d  V i e t  M i n h .  T h i s  t o g e t h e r n e s s  w a s  d i s p l a y e d  
a t  D i e n  B i e n  P h u .  I n  a  p e r i o d i c a l  t i t l e d  " l a  R e v o l u t i o n  L a o  A  2 0  
A n s , "  t h e  P a t h e t  L a o  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t y  ( N e o  L a o  H a k  s a t )  n o t e d  t h e  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  o f  c o m m u n i s m  t o  n a t i o n a l i s m  i n  d e s c r i b i n g  t h e  r o l e  o f  
L a o s  i n  t h e  b a t t l e  o f  D i e n  B i e n  B i u . ^  T h e  N e o  L a o  I f e k  S a t  s t a t e d  i
I f b i d .
2F r e d  G r e e n e ,  o p .  c i t . ,  p .  4 4 1 .
^ S e e  p .  126 o f  t e x t  r e g a r d i n g  t h e  r a t i o n a l  A s s e m b l y  e l e c t i o n  
o f  1958 i n  w h i c h  t h e  P a t h e t  L a o  p a r t y  ( N e o  L a o  } f e k  S a t )  w o n  t h e  
m a j o r i t y  o f  s e a t s .
128
During the "battle of Dien Bien Phu, Laos was 
an important hase for supply and regroupment 
of the colonial forces. But many of the 
colonial reinforcements, were intercepted hy 
the armies of the Pathet Lao and their 
guerrillas.^
Dien Bien Phu brought to an end the first Indochina War. 
Within the context of the Prench defeat, hostilities ended in 
Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. On JUly 21, 1954, a final declara­
tion was issued at the Geneva Conference by which Indochina was 
formally removed from the Cold War. According to the Declaration, 
no more foreign aid or foreign troops were to enter Indochina.^ 
Finally, the Geneva Accord established the independence of the 
Lidochinese nation-states. The Accord statedi
In their relations with Cambodia, Laos and 
Vietnam, each member of the Geneva Conference 
undertakes to respect the sovereignty, 
the independence, the unity and the territorial 
integrity of the above-mentioned States, and 
to refrain from any interference in their 
internal affairs.3
Because Prance was militarily and politically defeated in
I n d o c h i n a ,  t h e  u n i t e d  S t a t e s  p l a y e d  a t  m o s t  a  b a c k s t a g e  r o l e
a t  G e n e v a .  W i l l i a m  P .  B u n d y  n o t e s  »
We maintained the possibility of military 
intervention, which many observers at the 
time believe played a crucial part in 
inducing the Soviets and the Communist Chinese 
alike to urge Ifenoi to settle for a temporary 
division of Vietnam at the l?th parallel and 
for an independent Cambodia and Laos. And we 
began to lay the groundwork for SEATO, as part
l"La Revolution Lao A 20 Ans," op. cit., p. 12. 
^Arthur J. Dommen, op. cit., p. 308.
3Ibid.
129o f  t h e  e f f o r t  t o  s h o w  s t r e n g t h  a n d  t o  c o n v i n c e  
C o m m u n i s t  C h i n a  t h a t  i t  w o u l d  n o t  h a v e  a  f r e e  
h a n d  i n  S o u t h e a s t  A s i a .
Y e t  w e  w e r e  u n w i l l i n g  t o  p a r t i c i p a t e  f u l l y  i n  
t h e  f r a m i n g  i n  t h e  G e n e v a  a c c o r d s .  . . . 
b e c a u s e  o u r  p o l i c y m a k e r s  d i d  n o t  w i s h  t o  a s s o c i a t e  
t h e m s e l v e s  i n  a n y  w a y  w i t h  a  l o s s  o f  t e r r i t o r y  
t o  C o m m u n i s t  c o n t r o l .  S o  t h e  G e n e v a  a c c o r d s  w e r e  
f r a m e d  l a r g e l y  b e t w e e n  I f e n o i ,  C o m m u n i s t  C h i n a ,  
a n d  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n  o n  t h e  o n e  s i d e  a n d  t h e  
F r e n c h ,  w h o  w e r e  u n d e r  t h e  u r g e n t  p r e s s u r e  o f  
t h e i r  d o m e s t i c  p o l i t i c s ,  o n  t h e  o t h e r .  I n  t h e  
e n d  w e  c o n f i n e d  o u r s e l v e s  t o  s a y i n g  t w o  t h i n g s i
( a )  I h a t  w e  w o u l d  v i e w  a n y  a g g r e s s i o n  i n  
v i o l a t i o n  o f  t h e  a c c o r d s  w i t h  g r a v e  c o n c e r n  a n d  
a s  s e r i o u s l y  t h r e a t e n i n g  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p e a c e  
a n d  s e c u r i t y .
( b )  T h a t  v / e  t o o k  t h e  s a m e  p o s i t i o n  o n  t h e  
r e u n i f i c a t i o n  o f  V i e t n a m  t h a t  w e  t o o k  i n  o t h e r  
" n a t i o n s  n o w  d i v i d e d  a g a i n s t  t h e i r  w i l l "  -  
m e a n i n g ,  t h e n  a n d  n o w ,  G e r m a n y  a n d  K o r e a  -  a n d  
t h a t  w e  w o u l d  c o n t i n u e  t o  s e e k  u n i t y  t h r o u g h  
f r e e  e l e c t i o n s  s u p e r v i s e d  b y  t h e  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s .
I n  e f f e c t ,  w e  t h u s  i n t e r p r e t e d  t h e  e l e c t i o n  
p r o v i s i o n  a s  p r o v i d i n g  f o r  a  f r e e  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  
b y  t h e  p e o p l e  o f  V i e t n a m  a s  t o  w h e t h e r  t h e y  
w i s h e d  r e u n i f i c a t i o n  a n d  i n  t h a t  s e n s e  e n d o r s e d  
i t  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  t h e  s i m i l a r  p o s i t i o n s  w e  h a d  
t a k e n  i n  G e r m a n y  a n d  K o r e a . 1
F o r m e r  A m b a s s a d o r  t o  T h a i l a n d ,  E d w i n  P .  S t a n t o n ,  f i n d s  t h e  
g r a n t i n g  o f  i n d e p e n d e n c e  t o  L a o s  a n d  t h e  o t h e r  I n d o c h i n a  n a t i o n ­
s t a t e s  i n  1954  a s  c o m i n g  a t  " t h e  e l e v e n t h  h o u r , " 2  b e c a u s e  H o  C h i  M i n h  
w a s  w e l l - e s t a b l i s h e d  t h r o u g h o u t  t h e  a r e a .  T h i s  w a s  m o s t  c e r t a i n l y  
t r u e  i n  L a o s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  w h e n  t h e  F r e n c h  t r o o p s  d e p a r t e d  i n  
N o v e m b e r ,  1 9 5 ^ *
W i t h i n  L a o s  i t s e l f ,  t h e r e  w a s  a n d  s t i l l  i s  t h e  l a o  e l i t e
^ W i l l i a m  P .  B u n d y ,  o p .  c i t . ,  p p .  2 - 3 *
^ E d w i n  P .  S t a n t o n  B r i e f  A u t h o r i t y  ( N e w  Y o r k *  H a r p e r  a n d  
B r o t h e r s ,  1 9 5 6 ) ,  p .  2 3 6 .
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w h i c h  w a s  n u r t u r e d  u n d e r  F r e n c h  r u l e  a n d  w i t h o u t  s t r o n g  p o l i t i c a l ,  
c u l t u r a l ,  a n d  e c o n o m i c  t i e s  w i t h  t h e  m a j o r i t y  o f  p e a s a n t  l a o  a n d  
t h e  o t h e r  e t h n i c  g r o u p s . ^  A  s e c o n d  i n t e r n a l  p r o b l e m  i n  l a o s  w a s  
t h e  c h a s m a l  s o c i a l  s i t u a t i o n  o f  l a o  a g a i n s t  t h e  o t h e r  m i n o r i t y  
g r o u p s  a s  i l l u s t r a t e d  b y  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  o v e r  " h a l f  o f  t h e  P a t h e t  
l a o  t r o o p s  a r e  non-Lao.”2 ^  t h i r d  f a c t o r  i n  195^  a n d  t o d a y  w a s
t h e  p r e s e n c e  o f  c o r r u p t i o n  a m o n g  t h e  r u l i n g  e l i t e  a s  b e s t  
e v i d e n c e d  i n  t h e  u s e  o f  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  c o m m o d i t y  i m p o r t s , 3
O f  a l l  t h e  d i v i s i v e  f a c t o r s  i n  l a o s  o f  i m m e d i a t e  i m p o r t a n c e  
i n  t h e  p e r i o d  f o l l o w i n g  t h e  G e n e v a  A c c o r d ,  t h e  m o s t  i m p o r t a n t  i n  
c r e a t i n g  a  v a c u u m  f o r  s t a b l e  p r o g r e s s  w a s  o f  c o u r s e  t h e  c h a o t i c  
h a s t e  w i t h  w h i c h  t h e  F r e n c h  A r m y  d e p a r t e d .  W h a t  t h e y  l e f t  t o  
d e f e n d  t h e  K i n g d o m  a g a i n s t  t h e  P a t h e t  l a o  a n d  N o r t h  V i e t n a m e s e  w a s  
b u t  a  n a t i v e  m i l i t a . ^  T h i s  r e s e m b l a n c e  o f  a n  A r m y  w a s  t r a i n e d  
b y  t h e  f e w  F r e n c h  m i l i t a r y  p e r s o n n e l  a l l o w e d  u n d e r  t h e  G e n e v a  
a g r e e m e n t  w i t h  U h i t e d  S t a t e s  " d i r e c t " 5  f i n a n c i a l  a s s i s t a n c e  u n d e r
^ S e e  p .  1 1 4  o f  t e x t .
^ G e r a l d  C .  H i c k e y  a n d  A d r i e n n e  S u d d a r d ,  o p ;  c i t . ,  p .  3 5 1 .
^ S e e  f o r m e r  e m p l o y e e  o f  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  C o o p e r a t i o n  A d m i n i s ­
t r a t i o n  H a y n e s  M i l l e r ' s  a c c o u n t  " A  B u l w a r k  B u i l t  o n  S a n d , "  T h e  
R e p o r t e r  X V I V  ( N o v e m b e r  1 3 ,  1 9 5 8 ) ,  p p .  1 1 - 1 6 .
^ B e r n a r d  B .  F a l l ,  " R e a p p r a i s a l  i n  L a o s , "  C u r r e n t  H i s t o r y  
I I  ( J a n u a r y ,  1 9 6 2 ) ,  p .  9 »
^ I b i d .
131 . .t h e  " a b l e  "  d i r e c t i o n  o f  H o w e l l  a n d  C o m p a n y . ^
W i t h  t h e  l o s s  o f  F r e n c h  l e a d e r s h i p  i n  t h e  L a o t i a n  A r r a y ,  
t h e  w e a k n e s s e s  o f  t h e  G e n e v a  A g r e e m e n t  o f  J u l y  2 1 ,  1 9 5 ^  b e c a m e  
m o r e  a p p a r e n t .  I n  t h e  r o s y  t e r m s  o f  t h i s  a g r e e m e n t  s i g n e d  b y  
t h e  C o m m a n d e r  i n  C h i e f  o f  t h e  F r e n c h  U n i o n  t r o o p s  a n d  h i s  p e e r  i n  
t h e  P a t h e t  l a o  a n d  R e p u b l i c  o f  N o r t h  V i e t n a m ' s  P e o p l e  A r r a y ,  t h e  
f o l l o w i n g  p r o v i s i o n s  p e r t a i n  t o  Laos»3
1 .  T h e  P a t h e t  l a o  A r m y  w a s  t o  b e c o m e  a  p a r t  o f  t h e  
R o y a l  L a o t i a n  A r m y .
2 ,  A l l  V i e t m i n h  m i l i t a r y  f o r c e s  w e r e  t o  w i t h d r a w  f r o m  
L a o s  i n  o n e  h u n d r e d  a n d  t w e n t y  d a y s .
3 *  T h e  p r o v i n c e s  o f  S a m  N e u a  a n d  P h o n g  S a l y  w e r e  t o  
b e  r e t u r n e d  t o  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  c o n t r o l  o f  t h e  R o y a l  
L a o t i a n  g o v e r n m e n t .
A m e r i c a n  a i d  t o  L a o s  w a s  g u i d e d  b y  a  W a s h i n g t o n  f i r m  
H o w e l l  a n d  C o . ,  w h i c h  a d v i s e d  t h e  S t a t e  D e p a r t m e n t  t h a t  t h e  c o u n t r y  
c o u l d  a b s o r b  a  m a x i m u m  o f  2 4  m i l l i o n  d o l l a r s  a  y e a r .  S i n c e  
J a n u a r y  1 ,  1 9 5 5  t h i s  a i d  h a d  t o t a l e d  2 2 5  m i l l i o n  t h r o u g h  i 960 . 
F i v e - s i x t h s  o f  t h i s  t o t a l  h a d  g o n e  t o  e q u i p i n g ,  t r a i n i n g ,  a n d  
s u p p o r t i n g  t h e  2 5 , 0 0 0  m a n  l a o t i a n  A r m y .  F o r  e x a m p l e ,  o f  t h e  
$ 3 4 .2  m i l l i o n  s p e n t  b y  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  i n  i 960 , o n l y  $ 5 9 0 , 7 5 0  
w e n t  t o  a g r i c u l t u r e .  I n  t h e  y e a r s  1 9 5 9  a n d  i 960 , t h e  c o s t  t o  
t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  w a s  $ 2 , 2 0 0 , 0 0 0  p e r  m o n t h .  A s  o f  1 9 5 9  t h e r e  
w e r e  7 I  m i l i t a r y  a i d s  t o  s u p e r v i s e  t h e  u s e  o f  w e a p o n s  a n d  l o g i s t i c a l  
s u p p o r t .  A l s o  p r e s e n t  w e r e  1 0 0  t e c h n i c i a n s  t o  i n s t r u c t  i n  t h e  u s e  
a n d  m a i n t e n a n c e  o f  w e a p o n s  a n d  e q u i p m e n t .
T h o m a s  E .  E n n i s ,  " O p e r a t i o n  S u r v i v a l  i n  l a o s , "  C u r r e n t  H i s t o r y  
X X X X  ( m r c h ,  1 9 6 1 ), p .  1 5 3 .
^French aid since the Geneva agreement consisted of a force 
of 1500 officers and non-commissioned officers, plus a garrison 
of 3500 men at the Seno airport. With the Algerian war, France 
reduced the force at Seno to a property guard and withdrew all 
officers from the training command. This left a total force of 
600 French military personnel in laos. French financial aid, 
through the year 1959, amounted to approximately eight million 
dollars. Thomas E. Ennis, ibid.
3"Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in laos,"
Documents of American Foreign Relations 1 9 5 4  (New Yorki Harper 
and Brothers, 1 9 5 5 ) ,  P P »  3 0 3 »  3 0 ? .
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4 .  W i t h  t h e  e x c e p t i o n  o f  15O O  o f f i c e r s  a n d  n o n ­
c o m m i s s i o n e d  o f f i c e r s  t o  t r a i n  t h e  R o y a l  A r m y  a n d  
a  c o n t i n g e n t  o f  3500 a t  t w o  p o s t s ,  a l l  o t h e r  
F r e n c h  t r o o p s  w e r e  t o  b e  w i t h d r a w n .
5 »  N o  n a t i o n ,  u n d e r  t h e  A g r e e m e n t ,  w a s  t o  i n t r o d u c e  
a n y  n e w  m i l i t a r y  s t a f f s ,  a r m s ,  t r o o p s  o r  m u n i t i o n s .
6 . U n t i l  a  p o l i t i c a l  s e t t l e m e n t  c o u l d  b e  c o m p l e t e d  
b e t w e e n  t h e  P a t h e t  l a o  l e a d e r s  a n d  t h e i r  p e e r s  
i n  t h e  R o y a l  g o v e r n m e n t  a t  V i e n t i a n e ,  t h e  P a t h e t  
l a o  f o r c e s  w e r e  t o  b e  w i t h d r a w n  t o  P h o n g  S a l y  
a n d  S a m  N e u a .
7 . A n  i n t e r i m  c o m m i s s i o n  ( C a n a d a ,  I n d i a ,  P o l a n d )  
u n d e r  t h e  l e a d e r s h i p  o f  I n d i a  w a s  t o  c o n t r o l
a n d  s u p e r v i s e  t h e  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  o f  t h i s  a g r e e m e n t .
I n  g e n e r a l ,  t h e  m o t i v a t i o n  f o r  t h e  A g r e e m e n t  a n d  t h e  I n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  C o n t r o l  C o m m i s s i o n  w a s  t h e  w i s h  o f  t h e  b i g  p o w e r s  t o  
r e m o v e  t h e  b i - p o l a r  c o n f l i c t  f r o m  t h i s  r e g i o n .  T h e  u n i t e d  S t a t e s  
w a s  e s p e c i a l l y  e n t h u s i a s t i c ,  b e c a u s e  W a s h i n g t o n  s a w  i n  t h e  v a c u u m  
c r e a t e d  b y  t h e  F r e n c h  w i t h d r a w a l  a n  i m p o s s i b l e  e n v i r o n m e n t  u p o n  
w h i c h  t o  c o n s t r u c t  a  v i a b l e  e c o n o m i c  a n d  p o l i t i c a l  s t r u c t u r e  i n  
m d o c h i n a .  S i s o u k  îfâ. G h a m p a s s a k  t o o k  a  d i f f e r e n t  v i e w  o f  t h e  
A g r e e m e n t .  I t  w a s  *
U S S R  a n d  G r e a t  B r i t a i n  s a w  i n  t h e  C o n t r o l  
C o m m i s s i o n  a  m e a n s  o f  f i n a l l y  h a v i n g  t h e i r  
s a y  i n  t h e  a f f a i r s  o f  m d o c h i n a ,  f r o m  w h i c h  
t h e y  h a d  a l w a y s  b e e n  i s o l a t e d  b u t  w h i c h  
w e r e  b e g i n n i n g  t o  i n t e r e s t  t h e m  m o r e  a n d  
m o r e .  C h i n a  a n d  t h e  D R V  o n  o n e  s i d e ,  a n d  
F r a n c e  a n d  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  o n  t h e  o t h e r ,  
a l l  t e n d e d  t o  c o n s i d e r  m d o c h i n a  a s  a  s a f e  
p l a c e  i n  w h i c h  t o  e x i s t  t h e i r  i n f l u e n c e . 1
V/hatever view is correct regarding the interests of the bi­
polar powers in mdochina, the united States took the initiative
^Sisouk Na Ghampassak Storm Over Laos (New York* Frederick 
A. Praeger, 196 I ) ,  p .  3 5 »
133i n  f i l l i n g  t h e  v a c u u m  c r e a t e d  b y  t h e  d e p a r t u r e  o f  t h e  F r e n c h  
f o r c e s .  R e f e r e n c e  h a s  a l r e a d y  b e e n  m a d e  t o  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  
m i l i t a r y  a n d  e c o n o m i c  a s s i s t a n c e  p r o g r a m  t o  l a o s .  m  a d d i t i o n ,  
t h e r e  w a s  t h e  S o u t h e a s t  A s i a n  T r e a t y  O r g a n i z a t i o n . ]-
A s s i s t a n t  S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  f o r  E a s t  A s i a n  a n d  p a c i f i c  
A f f a i r s  W i l l i a m  P .  B u n d y  n o t e d  t h a t  S E A T O  w a s  " p a r t  o f  t h e  e f f o r t  
t o  s h o w  s t r e n g t h  a n d  t o  c o n v i n c e  C o m m u n i s t  C h i n a  t h a t  i t  w o u l d  
n o t  h a v e  a  f r e e  h a n d  i n  S o u t h e a s t  A s i a .  " 2  m  o t h e r  w o r d s ,  S E A T O  
a s s u m e d  a t  l e a s t  t h e  a g g r e s s i v e  t e n d e n c i e s  o f  C o m m u n i s t  C h i n a  i n  
a n  e n v i r o n m e n t  t h a t  h a d  e x p e r i e n c e d  i n  m o d e r n  t i m e s  o n l y  t h e  f a c t  
o f  a  c o l o n i a l  p r e s e n c e  b y  F r a n c e .  C h i n a  m a y  h a v e  b e e n  a n  a g g r e s s o r  
i n  t h e  r e c e n t  K o r e a n  W a r ?  b u t  t h a t  i s  e v e n  o p e n  t o  d i s p u t e  t o d a y  
g i v e n  t h e  p r o x i m i t y  o f  K o r e a  t o  t h e  h e a r t l a n d  o f  C h i n a ' s  i n d u s t r i a l  
b a s e  i n  M a n c h u r i a .  W h a t  S E A T O  d i d  r e p r e s e n t  i n  t h e  m i n d s  o f  t h e  
S o u t h e a s t  A s i a n  i s  t h e  m a i n t e n a n c e  o f  a  c o l o n i a l  d o m i n a t i o n .
J o h n  F .  C a d y  s u g g e s t s  j t h e  S o u t h e a s t  A s i a n  T r e a t y  O r g a n i z a t i o n  
" d i d  n o t  f u l l y  m e e t  t h e  r e q u i r e m e n t s '  o f  r e l i e v i n g  t h e  A s i a n  f r o m  
t h e  t h o u g h t  ' o f  r e v i v a l  o f  i m p e r i a l i s t  c o n t r o l . " 3  I m p o r t a n t  h e r e  
i s  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  S E A T O  d i d  n o t  p r o v i d e  a n  a n s w e r  t o  t h e  b a s i c  
q u e s t i o n  c o n f r o n t i n g  t h e  l e a d e r s  o f  S o u t h e a s t  A s i a  a s  o f  1 9 5 ^ ;  
n a m e l y ,  w h a t  i s  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  f u t u r e  o f  S o u t h e a s t  A s i a ?
^The Southeast Asian Treaty was signed on September 8, 195^ 
at Manila by the United States, Gceat Britain, France, Australia, 
New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, and Pakistan. It became 
fully operative in February, 1955»
^William P. Bundy, op. cit., p. 2,
3John F. Cady, op. cit., p. 602.
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J o h n  F .  C a d y  s u m m a r i z e s  v e r y  w e l l  t h e  v a l u e s  u p p e r m o s t  i n
i m p o r t a n c e  t o  t h e  l e a d e r s  l i k e  P h e t s a r a t h  o f  t h e  L a o  I s s a r a ,  a n d
w h y  t h e  U h i t e d  S t a t e s  h a d  a n  e m e r g i n g  p r o b l e m  i n  1 9 5 4  t h a t  h a s
v e x e d  o u r  p r e s e n c e  t h e r e  e v e n  t o d a y .  C a d y  s t a t e s
V i h e t h e r  d e m o c r a t i c  g o v e r n m e n t  c a n  t a k e  r o o t  
a n d  s u r v i v e  i n  S o u t h e a s t  A s i a  i s  a  m o o t  
q u e s t i o n .  A  h e l p f u l  c a r r y - o v e r  f r o m  t h e  
c o l o n i a l  p e r i o d  w a s  t h e  i d e a  t h a t  p r o g r e s s  
t o w a r d  s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t  a n d  i n d e p e n d e n c e  w a s  t o  
b e  m e a s u r e d  i n  t e r m s  o f  i n c r e a s e d  p o p u l a r  
p a r t i c i p a t i o n  a n d  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  i n  e l e c t i v e  
a s s e m b l i e s .  B u t  n a t i o n a l i s m ,  o n c e  i n  c o n t r o l ,  
w a s  m o r e  l i k e l y  t o  e x p r e s s  i t s e l f  i n  t r a d i t i o n a l  
t h a n  i n  a l i e n  p a t t e r n s  o f  g o v e r n m e n t .  B e c a u s e  n o  
p o p u l a r  d e m a n d  f o r  d e m o c r a t i c  l i b e r t i e s  
e x i s t e d .  . . c o n s t i t u t i o n s  a n d  e l e c t i o n s  
p r o v i d e d  l i t t l e  m o r e  t h a n  a n  e m p t y  f a c a d e ,  
a  p r e t e n s e  f o r  m o d e r n i z a t i o n .
I n  m a n y  a r e a s  w h e r e  t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  b a s i s  o f  
r u l e  b y  h e r e d i t a r y  c h i e f s  a n d  d i v i n e  r u l e r s  
h a d  w o r n  t h i n ,  s i n g l e - p a r t y  r u l e  a n d  d i c t a t o r s h i p  
b e c a m e  l i k e l y  a l t e r n a t i v e s  t o  a  d e m o c r a c y  w h i c h  
c o m m a n d e d  l i t t l e  p o p u l a r  c o n f i d e n c e .  I n  s i t u a t i o n s  
w h e r e  t h e  W e s t e r n  e l i t e  w e r e  l a r g e l y  a b s o r b e d  
i n t o  t h e  b u r e a u c r a c y ,  t h e  g a p  b e t w e e n  t h e  g o v e r n o r s  
a n d  t h e  g o v e r n e d  w a s  l i k e l y  t o  r e m a i n  u n b r i d g e d .
U n t i l  a  p o l i t i c a l l y  a c t i v e  m i d d l e  c l a s s  s h o u l d  
a p p e a r ,  p o s s e s s e d  o f  a r t i c u l a t e  i d e a s  a s  t o  w h a t  
c o u l d  a n d  o u g h t  t o  b e  d o n e ,  t h e  c a u s e  o f  p o l i t i c a l  
l i b e r t y  a n d  f r e e d o m  o f  s p e e c h ,  p r e s s ,  a n d  r e l i g i o n  
w o u l d  h a r d l y  s u r v i v e  t o  c o n s t i t u t e  a n  u r g e n t  
o b j e c t i v e  o f  p o l i t i c a l  a s p i r a t i o n s .
P h c e d  w i t h  t h e  p o s t w a r  t h r e a t  o f  C o m m u n i s t  i n t r u s i o n  
i n t o  S o u t h e a s t  A s i a ,  V f e s t e r n  g o v e r n m e n t s  t e n d e d  
t o  f o l l o w  t h e  n e g a t i v e  t a c t i c s  o f  s u p p o r t i n g  t h e  
t r a d i t i o n a l i s t  e n e m i e s  o f  t h e  C o m m u n i s t  s y s t e m .  S u c h  
a  p o l i c y  o f t e n  i g n o r e d  t h e  n e e d  f o r  c o n s t r u c t i v e  a d j u s t ­
m e n t s  b e t w e e n  t h e  o l d  o r d e r  a n d  t h e  n e w  t h r o u g h  t h e  
s e l e c t i v e  a p p r o p r i a t i o n  o f  u s e f u l  e l e m e n t s  o f  V/e s t e r n  
c u l t u r e .  I f  s u c h  e s s e n t i a l  a d j u s t m e n t s  w e r e  b l o c k e d  
b y  t r a d i t i o n a l i s t  b a r r i e r s ,  t h e  p r o p o n e n t s  o f  a  r a d i c a l  
v e r s i o n  o f  m o d e r n i z a t i o n  w o u l d  i n e v i t a b l y  u n d e r t a k e  
t o  s w e e p  s u c h  h i n d r a n c e s  a s i d e .
^Ibid., p. 601.
135r ^ ' i a r x i s m  c o m m e n d e d  i t s e l f  t o  m a n y  p r o g r e s s i v e l y  
m i n d e d  p e r s o n s  i n  S o u t h e a s t  A s i a  a s  a n  u l t r a m o d e r n  
s h o r t  c u t  t o  i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n .  T h e  c e n t u r i e s - o l d  
l i b e r a l  B r i t i s h ,  A m e r i c a n ,  a n d  F r e n c h  s y s t e m s  
s e e m e d  o l d - f a s h i o n e d  b y  c o m p a r i s o n .  T h e  U . S . S . R .  
a c c o m p l i s h e d  a n  i m p r e s s i v e  e c o n o m i c  t r a n s f o r m a t i o n  
w i t h i n  a  g e n e r a t i o n ;  d e m o c r a c y  a n d  p r i v a t e  c a p i t a l i s m ,  
b y  c o n t r a s t ,  s e e m e d  t o  l a c k  p o s i t i v e  d i r e c t i o n  a n d  
a l s o  l e f t  t r a d i t i o n a l i s m  u n d i s t u r b e d .  T h e  m o r e  r a p i d  
C o m m u n i s t  t e c h n i q u e s  o f  e c o n o m i c  a n d  p o l i t i c a l  
r e g i m e n t a t i o n  c o u l d  p r e s u m a b l y  a v o i d  t h e  c o m p r o m i s e s  
i n h e r e n t  i n  t h e  m o r e  g r a d u a l  p r o c e s s e s  o f  d e m o c r a t i c  
a d j u s t m e n t . !
A n  e f f e c t i v e  r e g i o n a l  p a t t e r n  o f  i n t e g r a t i o n  
c o v e r i n g  b o t h  e c o n o m i c  a n d  s e c u r i t y  n e e d s  
m i g h t  c o n c e i v a b l y  p r o v i d e  a  f r a m e w o r k  f o r  
u t i l i z i n g  m u c h - n e e d e d  o u t s i d e  a s s i s t a n c e  f r e e  
o f  t h e  d a n g e r s  o f  r e v i v a l  o f  i m p e r i a l i s t  c o n t r o l .
T h e  S o u t h e a s t  A s i a  T r e a t y  O r g a n i z a t i o n  ( S E A T O ) .  
w h i c h  w a s  s p o n s o r e d  b y  W e s t e r n  g o v e r n m e n t s  a n d  
i n c l u d e d  o n l y  t w o  c o u n t r i e s  o f  S o u t h e a s t  A s i a ,  
d i d  n o t  f u l l y  m e e t  t h i s  r e q u i r e m e n t . %
V J h i l e  t h e  S E A T O  a l l i a n c e  s y s t e m  d i d  n o t  g e n e r a t e  a n y
s t a b i l i t y  i n  I n d o c h i n a ,  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  C o n t r o l  C o m m i s s i o n
e s t a b l i s h e d  b y  t h e  G e n e v a  A g r e e m e n t  d i d  e s t a b l i s h  a  p r e s e n c e  t o
a t t e m p t  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  o f  t h e  G e n e v a  A c c o r d .  T h i s  p r e s e n c e  b e g a n
i n  A u g u s t ,  1 9 5 ^ *
T h r o u g h  t h e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  C o n t r o l  C o m m i s s i o n  t h e  R o y a l
L a o t i a n  g o v e r n m e n t  c o n c l u d e d  a n  a g r e e m e n t  w i t h  t h e  P a t h e t  l a o ,  o n
A u g u s t  1 0 ,  1 9 5 6 , w h e r e b y  b o t h  a g r e e d  t o  s t r i v e  f o r  a  l a s t i n g  p e a c e
b u i l t  o n  t h e  f o u n d a t i o n s  o f  a  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  o f  n e u t r a l i t y  f o r
Laos.3  T h e  e n d  r e s u l t  o f  t h e s e  n e g o t i a t i o n s  w a s  t h e  f o r m a t i o n  o f
I j o h n  F .  C a d y ,  i b i d . ,  p .  6 O I .
^ J o h n  p .  C a d y ,  i b i d . ,  p .  6 0 2 .
3prank M .  L e  B a r  a n d  A d r i e n n e  S u d d a r d ,  L a o s  ( N e w  H a v e n ,  
C o n n e c t i c u t ;  H r a f  P r e s s ,  i 9 6 0 ), p .  1 4 0 .
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a coalition government called the National union in which the
P a t h e t  L a o  w o u l d  p a r t i c i p a t e  u n d e r  t h e  t i t l e  o f  t h e  N a t i o n a l
Political Front (Neo Lao Hak Sat). The Pathet Lao leader,
P r i n c e  S o u p h a n o u v o n g ,  v / a s  t o  b e  t h e  M i n i s t e r  o f  F i n a n c e  a n d
P l a n n i n g  i n  t h e  c o a l i t i o n  g o v e r n m e n t . ^
O n  N o v e m b e r  2 ,  1 9 5 7  P r i n c e  S o u p h a n o u v o n g  a s s u m e d  t h e
p o s i t i o n  o f  M i n i s t e r  o f  F i n a n c e  a n d  P l a n n i n g  i n  t h e  c o a l i t i o n
g o v e r n m e n t ,  p y  N o v e m b e r  1 8 ,  1 9 5 7  t h e  t w o  P a t h e t  L a o  h e l d
p r o v i n c e s  o f  P h o n g  S a l y  a n d  S a m  N e u a  w e r e  s y m b o l i c a l l y  r e t u r n e d
t o  t h e  c e n t r a l  g o v e r n m e n t .  A c c o r d i n g  t o  L a o s *  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s '
representative lOiamphon Panya:
T h e  V i e t i a n e  A g r e e m e n t s  u n q u e s t i o n a b l y  
b r o u g h t  a b o u t  a  r e l a x a t i o n  o f  t e n s i o n .
T h e  I C C ,  a  b o d y  e s t a b l i s h e d  b y  t h e  
G e n e v a  C o n f e r e n c e  o f  1 9 5 4 ,  s a w  t h a t  i t  
n o  l o n g e r  s e r v e d  a n y  p u r p o s e  a n d  c o n s i d e r i n g  
i t s  t a s k  h a d  b e e n  c o m p l e t e d  l e f t  l a o s  
J u l y  1 9 ,  1 9 5 8 . 2
B e f o r e  t h e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  C o n t r o l  C o m m i s s i o n  l e f t  l a o s ,
t h e  c o a l i t i o n  g o v e r n m e n t  w a s  f a l l i n g  a p a r t .  I n  t h e  J f a y ,  1 9 5 8
e l e c t i o n  t o  s e a t  t w e n t y - o n e  l e g i s l a t o r s  i n  t h e  N a t i o n a l  A s s e m b l y ,
t h e  P a t h e t  L a o  ( N e o  l a o  H d k  S a t )  w o n  t h i r t e e n  s e a t s . 3  ^
S o m e  o f  t h e  C o m m u n i s t  s u c c e s s  c a n  b e  a t t r i b u t e d  t o  t h e  u s u a l
t a c t i c s  o f  t e r r o r  e t c . ,  b u t  t h e r e  w a s  m u c h  m o r e .  T h e r e  i s  f i r s t
^ I b i d . ,  p. 147.
2Khampon Panya, "General Debate," The united NËitions Review 
V I  (November, 1 9 5 9 ) ,  p. 6 3 .
3joel M .  Halpern, op. c i t . ,  p. 1 3 .
^ N e o  L a o  H a k  S a t ' s  m a r g i n  w a s  200,000 t o  712,000 f o r  t h e  
n o n - C o m m u n i s t  p a r t i e s .
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of all the background of the Communist identification with the 
nationalistic endeavors of the lao issara. Also important was 
the identification of the Pathet lao with the non-lao ethnic 
groups, which made up approximately half of the population. 
Finally, there was the blatant fact of "corruption present among 
the pro-Western candidates."!
In order to offset the Communist expansion in the Phtional 
Assembly, the three government factions formed the laotian 
People's Rally (RPL), under the leadership of Prince Souvanna 
îhouma.2 3 The RPL was a step in the direction for a unified 
effort against the Pathet lao, but to the Army this government 
coalition did not contain a sufficient amount of aggressiveness. 
Ih the context of this type of thinking there was formed the
1  H a y n e s  r . î i l l e r ,  " A  B u l w a r k  B u i l t  o n  S a n d , "  o p .  c i t . ,  p .  1 1 .
H a y n e s  J l i l l e r ' s  a c c o u n t  o f  c o r r u p t i o n  w a s  a c c e p t e d  b y  
P r i n c e  S i s o u k  m  G h a m p a s s a k i  " C o r r u p t i o n  a n d  e x t o r t i o n  i n  t h e  
c u s t o m s ,  b a n k i n g ,  f o r e i g n  t r a d e ,  p o l i c e ,  a n d  o t h e r  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  
d e p a r t m e n t s .  B l a c k  m a r k e t  d e a l s  i n  A m e r i c a n  a i d  d o l l a r s  r e a c h e d  
s u c h  p r o p o r t i o n s  t h a t  t h e  p a t h e t  L a o  n e e d e d  n o  p r o p a g a n d a  t o  t u r n  
t h e  r u r a l  p o p u l a t i o n  a g a i n s t  t h e  t o w n s p e o p l e .  T h e  C h i n e s e  o f  
H o n g k o n g  a n d  B a n g k o k  a n d  a  f e w  l a o  o f f i c i a l s  p r o f i t e d  f r o m  t h e  
A m e r i c a n  a i d ,  w h i l e  t h e  p o o r  l a o  f o r  w h o m  i t  w a s  i n t e n d e d  s t o o d  
b y  h e l p l e s s l y . "  S i s o u k  N a  G h a m p a s s a k ,  o p .  c i t . ,  p .  6 4 .
I n  a n  i n t e r v i e w  g i v e n  t o  t h e  l a o  P r e s s e  i n  1 9 5 7 »  V i c e o r y  
T i a o  P h e t s a r a t h  s t a t e d ;  " O u r  g r e a t e s t  d a n g e r  o f  C o m m u n i s t  s u b ­
v e r s i o n  a r i s e s  f r o m  t h e  b a d  u s e  o f  f o r e i g n  a i d  w e  r e c e i v e .  « . . 
I t  e n r i c h e s  a  m i n o r i t y  o u t r a g e o u s l y  w h i l e  t h e  m a s s  o f  t h e  p o p u ­
l a t i o n  r e m a i n s  a s  p o o r  a s  e v e r . "  H a y n e s  M i l l e r ,  I b i d .
^  F r a n k  M .  L e  B a r  a n d  A d r i e n n e  S u d d a r d ,  o p .  c i t . ,  p p .  1 1 0 -
111.
3 T h e  t h r e e  g o v e r n m e n t  f a c t i o n s  i n c l u d e d  F o r e i g n  M i n i s t e r  
P h o u i  S a n a i k o n e ' s  I n d e p e n d e n t s ,  M i n i s t e r  o f  I n t e r i o r  K h t a y  D o n  
S a s o r i t h * s  N a t i o n a l i s t s ,  a n d  t h e  f o l l o w e r s  o f  S o u v a n n a  P h o u m a .
138C o m m i t t e e  f o r  t h e  D e f e n s e  o f  t h e  N a t i o n a l  I n t e r e s t , ^  H e r e  a g a i n
t h e  " b a s i c  i n g r e d i e n t  f o r  d i s s e n s i o n  f r o m  " b a c k i n g  t h e  L a o  e l i t e
w a s  t h e  " c o r r u p t i o n  a n d  g l a r i n g  m i s t a k e s  o f  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t ,  a n d
t h e  s u d d e n  f o r t u n e s  d u b i o u s l y  a c q u i r e d  b y  p a r t i c u l a r  m i n i s t e r s
a n d  h i g h  officials. "2 T h e  C o m m i t t e e  f o r  t h e  D e f e n s e  o f  t h e  N a t i o n a l
I n t e r e s t  s a w  t h a t  a s  l o n g  a s  c e r t a i n  f a m i l i e s  t
c o n t i n u e d  t o  d i v i d e  t i t l e s  a n d  p r e r o g a t i v e s  
a m o n g  t h e m s e l v e s ,  a s  l o n g  a s  m i n i s t e r i a l  
p o s t s  e i t h e r  c l o a k e d  t h e  m o s t  d i s g r a c e f u l  
t r a f f i c k i n g  o r  w e r e  t r a d e d  a b o u t  l i k e  c u r r e n c y ,  
a s  l o n g  a s  t h e  w e a l t h y  i n  V i e n t i a n e  f l a u n t e d  
t h e i r  l u x u r i e s  b e f o r e  t h e  e y e s  o f  a n  a s t o u n d e d  
p o p u l a c e ,  a n y  a n t i - c o m m u n i s t  c a m p a i g n  w o u l d  b e  
p o i n t l e s s .  T h e s e  p u b l i c  s c a n d a l s  w e r e  b e t t e r  
C o m m u n i s t  p r o p a g a n d a  t h a n  t o n s  o f  n e w s p a p e r s  a n d  
p a m p h l e t s . 3
W h a t  w e  t h e n  h a v e  i n  t h e  C D N I  i s  n o t  a  b r e a k  w i t h  t h e  R P L
p o l i t i c a l  p r o g r a m  o f  t a k i n g  t h e  i n i t i a t i v e  a g a i n s t  t h e  C o m m u n i s t s ,
b u t  r a t h e r  a  g r o u p  o f  " y o u n g  T u r k s "  d e s i r i n g  t o  d i s a s s o c i a t e
t h e m s e l v e s  w i t h  t h e  p a s t .  A s  e v i d e n c e  o f  t h i s  d i s a s s o c i a t i o n ,
t h e  C D N I  f e l t  i t  n e c e s s a r y  t o  b r e a k  o f f  t h e i r  t i e s  w i t h  t h o s e  w h o
h a d  b e e n  d i r e c t l y  s p o i l e d  b y  t w o  g e n e r a t i o n s  o f  F r e n c h  r u l e .  T h e
c o m m o n  p u r p o s e  o f  t h e  C D N I  w a s  i
t o  b r i n g  a  f r e s h  l o o k  t o  a  n a t i o n  g o v e r n e d  
f r o m  i t s  i n c e p t i o n  b y  r e m n a n t s  o f  t h e  
d e f u n c t  c o l o n i a l  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n .  T h e i r  l o v e  
o f  c o m f o r t ,  t h e i r  t a s t e  f o r  p r o f i t ,  a n d  t h e i r  
i n d i f f e r e n c e  h a d  d e g r a d e d  t h i s  y o u n g  d e m o c r a c y  
u n t i l  i t  w a s  v i r t u a l l y  m e a n i n g l e s s .  O n e  o f  t h e  
f i r s t  r e s o l u t i o n s  a d o p t e d  b y  t h e  C D N I  d e c l a r e d
1  A m o n g  t h e  m e m b e r s  o f  t h e  CDNI w e r e  n o t  o n l y  A r m y  o f f i c e r s ,  
b u t  a l s o  d i p l o m a t s  l i k e  K h a m p h a n  P a n y a  a n d  G h a m p a s s a k .
^ S i s o u k  Na G h a m p a s s a k ,  o p .  c i t . ,  p .  6 3 »
3 Ibid.
139w a r  o n  c o r r u p t i o n  t h r o u g h  a  g e n e r a l  g o v e r n m e n t  
c l e a n u p  a n d  v o w e d  a  f i g h t  a g a i n s t  C o m m u n i s t  
s u b v e r s i o n  w i t h i n  t h e  K i n g d o m . 1
m  A u g u s t ,  1958 t h e  C D N I  l e a d e r  P h o u i  S a n a n i k o n e  a s s u m e d  
t h e  P r i m e  M i n i s t r y  r e p l a c i n g  S o u v a n n a  P h o u m a .  A s  a  m e a s u r e  o f  
i t s  p r o - A m e r i c a n  s t a t u s ,  d i p l o m a t i c  r e l a t i o n s  w e r e  e s t a b l i s h e d  
w i t h  t h e  N a t i o n a l i s t  C h i n e s e  g o v e r n m e n t  o n  T a i w a n ,  a n d  a l l  
C o m m u n i s t  s y m p a t h i z e r s  a n d  f e l l o w  t r a v e l e r s  w e r e  d i s m i s s e d  f r o m  
t h e  G o v e r n m e n t  a n d  r e p l a c e d  b y  a n t i - n e u t r a l i s t s . %
C o m m u n i s t  r e a c t i o n  t o  t h e  C D N I  g o v e r n m e n t  i n  V i e n t i a n e  t o o k  
t h e  f o r m  o f  a  V i e t  M i n h  i n v a s i o n  o f  s o u t h e r n  l a o s  i n  J a n u a r y ,  
1959 » w h i l e  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  o f  N o r t h  V i e t n a m  H o  C h i  M i n h  w a s  
v a c a t i o n i n g  i n  J t o s c o w  a n d  Peking.3 T h i s  i n v a s i o n .  P r i m e  M i n i s t e r  
P h o u i  S a n a n i k o n e  a n n o u n c e d  F e b r u a r y  1 1 ,  1 9 5 9 *  c a l l e d  f o r  a c t i o n  
b y  t h e  w o r l d  c o m m u n i t y  i n  t h e  f o r m  o f  U n i t e d  N a t i o n ' s  a s s i s t a n c e .  
O n  I > î a r c h  9 »  1 9 5 9  S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l  D a g  H a m m a r s k j o l d  v i s i t e d  l a o s .  
A t  t h i s  t i m e  h e  d i d  n o t  f i n d  a n y  n e e d  f o r  f u r t h e r  u n i t e d  N a t i o n ' s  
c o n c e r n ,  s i n c e  t h e  G o v e r n m e n t  w a s  i n  c o n t r o l  a n d  t h e r e  w a s  n o  
o b v i o u s  b r e a c h  o f  t h e  G e n e v a  A c c o r d  o f  1 9 5 ^ .
T h e  s w i f t n e s s  o f  t h e  S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l ' s  v i s i t  w a s  m a t c h e d  
o n l y  b y  t h e  s p e e d  w i t h  w h i c h  t h e  C o m m u n i s t s  r e s t o r e d  f i g h t i n g .  
B a s i c  t o  t h e  r e n e w e d  f i g h t i n g  o n  t h e  P l a i n e  d e  J a r r e s  w a s  t h e
1Sisouk Nà Champassak, ibid.
^Frank M .  L e  Bar and Adrienne Suddard, op. cit., p .  2 3 .
3 " T h e  O r d e a l  o f  L a o s , "  T h e  U h i t e d  S t a t e s  i n  W o r l d  A f f a i r s  
1959 , e d .  R i c h a r d  P .  S t e b b i n s  ( N e w  Y o r k »  H a r p e r  a n d  B r o t h e r s ,  
1^ ) ,  p .  308 .
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a t t e m p t e d  d e m o b i l i z a t i o n  o f  t h e  P a t h e t  l a o  f o r c e s .  S i n c e  t h e  
1 9 5 7  I C C  a g r e e m e n t  f o r  a  c o a l i t i o n  g o v e r n m e n t ,  a l l  t h e  P a t h e t  
l a o  f o r c e s  h a d  b e e n  d e m o b i l i z e d ,  e x c e p t  t w o  b a t t a l i o n s  t o t a l i n g  
f i f t e e n  h u n d r e d  t r o o p s , 1
I n  o r d e r  t o  i n t e g r a t e  t h e s e  t w o  b a t t a l i o n s  o f  P a t h e t  l a o ,  
t h e  R o y a l  l a o t i a n  g o v e r n m e n t  p r o m o t e d  o n e  o f  t h e  P a t h e t  l a o  
o f f i c e r s ,  S i n g k a p o .  B u t  S i n g k a p o  d i d  n o t  a g r e e  t o  a c c e p t  a  
c o m m i s s i o n  a s  c o l o n e l  i n  t h e  R o y a l  A r m y  w i t h o u t  t h e  o t h e r  P a t h e t  
l a o  o f f i c e r s  b e i n g  g i v e n  t h e  s a m e  t r e a t m e n t .  D u r i n g  t h e  n e g o t i ­
a t i o n s  t o  i n t e g r a t e  t h e  P a t h e t  L a o  f o r c e s ,  a  b a t t a l i o n  o f  P a t h e t  
l a o  u n d e r  C h a m  N i  e n  l e f t  c a m p  o n  Way 1 9 »  1 9 5 9 » ^  A c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  
R o y a l  L a o t i a n  d e l e g a t e  t o  t h e  U n i t e d  r a t i o n s ,  K h a m p h a n  P a n y a ,  t h e  
s t a b l e  s i t u a t i o n  i n  l a o s  c r e a t e d  b y  t h e  1 9 5 7  I C C  a g r e e m e n t  e n d e d  
i n  M a y ,  1 9 5 9  " w h e n  t h e  s e c o n d  P a t h e t  l a o  b a t t a l i o n ,  i n s t e a d  o f  
b e c o m i n g  i n t e g r a t e d  i n t o  t h e  n a t i o n a l  a r m y  a s  a g r e e d ,  d e l i b e r a t e l y  
c h o s e  t h e  c a u s e  o f  r e b e l l i o n  a n d  f l i g h t . " 3
T h e  f l i g h t  o f  t h e  P a t h e t  L a o  b a t t a l i o n  u n d e r  t h e  c o m m a n d  o f  
C h a m  N i  e n  b e c a m e  a  c a n c e r  t o  l a o s  d u r i n g  t h e  s u m m e r  o f  1 9 5 9 . ^
^Sisouk Na Champassak, op. cit., p. 7 9 .
2Ibid., p. 80.
3 Khamphan Panya, op. cit., p. 63 .
^Of note is the fact that the Pathet Lao leader, 
Souphannouvoiig, was under house confinement in Vientiane, since
I f e y  15 t h .
Souphanouvong played an interesting side role during his 
house confinement. Sisouk Na Champassak states that the confined 
Pathet lao leader requested permission to "personally intercede 
with the rebels to induce them to come back. " This offer was 
turned down by I'feim Chien. Champassak believes Souphanouvong had 
lost control of the Pathet lao to Nam Chien. See Sisouk Na 
Champassak, op. cit., p. 8 4 .
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With reinforcements from North Vietnam, Cham Ni en recaptured 
1,000 square miles of Sam Neua province hy August 1, 1959»^ On 
August 4, 1959 the Government appealed to the United Nations.
T h e  l a o t i a n  g o v e r n m e n t  b e l i e v e d  t h e  v e r y  s u r v i v a l  o f  t h e  n a t i o n ­
s t a t e  w a s  i n v o l v e d ,  m  o t h e r  w o r d s ,  L a o s  w a s  n o t  " c a p a b l e  o f  
b e i n g ,  " 2  b e c a u s e  t h e  " s e n t i n e l s  o f  t h e  E n e m y '  i n  1 9 5 9  w e r e  ' n o t  
s l e e p i n g . " 3
^Thomas E. Ennis, op. cit., p. 72. 
^Dag Hammarskjold. op. cit.. p. 96.
3 i b i d .
CHAPTER VIII 
A POLITICAL POWER VACUUM
The crack in the jug?
Then you have let it get cold»^
A p o l i t i c a l  p o w e r  v a c u u m  e x i s t e d  i n  t h e  K i n g d o m  o f  l a o s  b y  
t h e  f a l l  o f  1 9 5 9 »  T h i s  p o w e r  v a c u u m  w a s  d u e  t o  s e v e r a l  i n t e r ­
r e l a t e d  i n t e r n a l  f a c t o r s  a n d  t h e  c o n t a i n m e n t  p o l i c y  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  
S t a t e s .  T h e  i n t e r n a l  f a c t o r s  h a d  t o  d o  w i t h  t h e  i n a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  
l a o  e l i t e  t o  b r o a d e n  t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  b a s e  d u e  t o  a n  e s t a b l i s h e d  
P a t h e t  l a o  a m o n g  t h e  n o n - l a o  e t h n i c  g r o u p s ,  a n d  t h e  l i a b i l i t i e s  
t o  p o l i t i c a l  s o c i a l i z a t i o n  e m a n a t i n g  f r o m  g e o g r a p h y  a n d  e t h n i c  
c o n f l i c t s .
The containment policy of the united States added to the 
dimensions of the political power vacuum by applying to the 
Kingdom of Laos certain assumptions and methodology that did not 
pertain to the realities of international politics in the 1950*s 
or to Laos, m  other words, the containment policy of the United 
States created an arbitrary stratification of political power 
that did not reflect the constants and variables present in Laos 
from 1950 through 1 9 5 9 »  One evidence of this arbitrary stratifi­
cation of political power was the backing of a pro-western
^Dag Hammarskjold, op. cit., p .  9 8 .
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g o v e r n m e n t  i n  J u n e ,  1 9 5 8  t h a t  d i d  n o t  h a v e  a  n a t i o n a l  p o l i t i c a l  
b a s e  a s  e v i d e n c e d  i n  t h e  N a t i o n a l  A s s e m b l y  e l e c t i o n  i n  I.Tay, 1 9 5 8 .
C o n t a i n m e n t  i s  a  m e t h o d o l o g y  f o r  t h e  c o n d u c t  o f  f o r e i g n
p o l i c y .  I t  i s  a  m e t h o d o l o g y  r e f l e c t i n g  a  v i e w  o f  C o m m u n i s m ,
w h i c h  b e c a m e  o u t d a t e d  w i t h  t h e  a d v e n t  o f  t h e  C o m m u n i s t  t e c h n i q u e
o f  p e a c e f u l  c o - e x i s t e n c e ,  a n d  t h e  b i - p o l a r  n u c l e a r  b a l a n c e  o f
t e r r o r .  F o r  t h e  E i s e n h o w e r  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  c o n t a i n m e n t  m e a n t
t h e  c o n t i n u a t i o n  o f  t h e  a s s u m p t i o n  t h a t  t h e r e  w a s  r e q u i r e d  a
c o n s t a n t  f o r c e  i n  o r d e r  t o  h o l d  b a c k  t h e  a s s u m e d  a g g r e s s i o n  o f
t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n ,  C o m m u n i s t  C h i n a ,  o r  t h e  P a t h e t  L a o .  J o h n  F o s t e r
D u l l e s  s u g g e s t e d  t h i s  o r i e n t a t i o n  t o  t h e  d i r e c t i o n  o f  c o n t a i n m e n t ,
w h e n  h e  s t a t e d  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  s u m m a r y  o f  t h e  C o l d  W a r  b e f o r e  t h e
H o u s e  F o r e i g n  A f f a i r s  C o m m i t t e e  o n  J a n u a r y  2 9 ,  1 9 5 9 *  T h e
S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  s a i d  *
B u t  w h a t  h a s n ' t  c h a n g e d  i s  t h e  p o l i c y  o f  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c o m m u n i s m .
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  C o m m u n i s m  b e l i e v e s  t h a t  t h e r e  
w i l l  n o t  b e  p e a c e  o r  m a x i m u m  p r o d u c t i v i t y  
u n l e s s  h u m a n  b e i n g s  a r e  f o r c e d  i n t o  a  p a t t e r n  
o f  c o n f o r m i t y  -  c o n f o r m i t y  o f  a c t i o n ,  t h i n k i n g ,  
a n d  b e l i e f  -  e s t a b l i s h e d  b y  t h e  p a r t y .  I t  
b e l i e v e s  t h a t  t o  a c h i e v e  t h i s  r e s u l t  o n  a  
w o r l d w i d e  b a s i s  i s  s o  e s s e n t i a l  t o  p e a c e  a n d  
w e l l - b e i n g  t h a t  a n y  m e a n s  a r e  j u s t i f i e d  t o  
p r o d u c e  t h i s  e n d ,  w h e t h e r  t h o s e  m e a n s  b e  
p r o p a g a n d a ,  v i o l e n t  s u b v e r s i o n ,  f r a u d s ,  b r e a c h e s  
o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  a g r e e m e n t s ,  o r  t h e  t h r e a t  o f  
w a r  i t s e l f .  T h e r e i n  l i e s  t h e  c o l d ,  w a r . l
A c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e ,  t h e  C o l d  W a r  w a s  d u e  
t o  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  n a t u r e  o f  t h e  C o m m u n i s t  m o v e m e n t .  R e m e m b e r ,
^ S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  J o h n  P o s t e r  D u l l e s .  A  s t a t e m e n t  b e f o r e  
t h e  H o u s e  F o r e i g n  A f f a i r s  C o m m i t t e e  d a t e d  J a n u a r y  2 8 ,  1 9 5 9  p u b l i s h e d  
b y  t h e  P u b l i c  S e r v i c e s  D i v i s i o n ,  B u r e a u  o f  P u b l i c  A f f a i r s ,  D e p a r t ­
m e n t  o f  S t a t e ,  N o .  ? 8 , W a s h i n g t o n ,  D . C .  1 9 & 0 ,  p .  1 .
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t h i s  w a s  s t a t e d  i n  1959 a f t e r  a  s e r i e s  o f  e v e n t s  s t a r t i n g  w i t h  
T i t o ' s  b r e a k  i n  1 9 4 8  a n d  c l i m a x i n g  w i t h  S t a l i n ' s  p o l i t i c a l  d e a t h  
i n  F e b r u a r y ,  1 9 j 6 .  W h a t  D u l l e s  b e l i e v e d  t w o  m o n t h s  b e f o r e  h i s  
d e a t h  i n  M a r c h ,  1 9 5 9  w a s  s h a r e d  b y  h i s  P r e s i d e n t .  " W e  h a v e  n o  
c o n f i d e n c e  i n  a n y  t r e a t y  t o  w h i c h  C o m m u n i s t s  a r e  a  p a r t y " !  
c o n c l u d e d  P r e s i d e n t  E i s e n h o w e r  i n  t h e  S t a t e  o f  t h e  U n i o n  m e s s a g e  
d e l i v e r e d  J a n u a r y  9 ,  1 9 5 9 *
E i s e n h o w e r  a g r e e d  w i t h  h i s  S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  t h a t  t h e  
C o m m u n i s t  t h r e a t  w a s  s u c h  a  f o r c e  t h a t  h e  c o n t i n u e d  t h e  a d v o c a t i o n  
o f  m a s s i v e  r e t a l i a t i o n  b y  a d v o c a t i n g  t h e  " m a i n t e n a n c e  o f  f o r c e s  
o f  g r e a t  power". 2  p p r  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s ,  m a s s i v e  r e t a l i a t i o n  a s  
i m p l e m e n t e d  t h r o u g h  b r i n k m a n s h i p  w a s  a c c e p t a b l e ,  b e c a u s e  " w e ,  o n  
o u r  p a r t ,  k n o w  t h a t  w e  s e e k  o n l y  a  j u s t  p e a c e  f o r  a l l ,  w i t h  
a g g r e s s i v e  d e s i g n s  a g a i n s t  n o  one."3
W h a t  P r e s i d e n t  E i s e n h o w e r  a n d  S e c r e t a r y  I X i l l e s  s u g g e s t e d  
r e g a r d i n g  C o m m u n i s m  w a s  c e r t a i n l y  t r u e  w i t h  r e g a r d  t o  t h e  p e r ­
s i s t e n c e  o f  C o m m u n i s t  s u b v e r s i o n ,  C o m m u n i s t  m o v e m e n t s ,  a n d  t h e  
p r e s e n c e  o f  C o m m u n i s t  n a t i o n - s t a t e s .  B u t  w h a t  w a s  o p e n  t o  q u e s t i o n  
t h e n  a n d  e v e n  t o d a y  h a s  t o  d o  w i t h  t h e  r e s u l t s  o f  c o n d u c t i n g  
f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  o n  t h e  b a s i s  o f  a  p u r e l y  a n t i - C o m m u n i s t  o u t l o o k ,  
w h i c h  i s  i m p l e m e n t e d  t h r o u g h  a  m e t h o d o l o g y  l i k e  c o n t a i n m e n t  t h a t
^ P r e s i d e n t  D w i g h t  D a v i d  E i s e n h o w e r ,  " T h e  s t a t e  o f  t h e  U n i o n  
M e s s a g e  J a n u a r y  9 ,  1 9 5 9 , "  p u b l i s h e d  b y  t h e  D e p a r t m e n t  o f  S t a t e ,  
D e p a r t m e n t  o f  S t a t e  P u b l i c a t i o n  67 6 3 , S e r i e s  1 3 5 »  J a n u a r y ,  1 9 5 9 ,  
p .  3 *
2 I b i d . , p .  4 .
3Ibid., p. 2.
1^5i s  r e a c t i v e  i n  n a t u r e .
m  1 9 5 9  a n d ,  t o d a y ,  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  a s s u m e s  f o r  i t s e l f
t h e  p o s t u r e  o f  s t a n d i n g  f o r  w h a t  i s  g o o d ,  w h i l e  t h e  C o m m u n i s t s
a r e  b a d ,  i n  a n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p o l i t i c a l  s y s t e m  t h a t  i s  s t i l l  m a d e
u p  o f  n a t i o n - s t a t e s  w i t h  v a r y i n g  n a t i o n a l  i n t e r e s t s  t h a t  n e e d
s a t i s f y i n g . 1  T h i s  p o s t u r e  i n t e r j e c t e d  i n t o  t h e  c o n t a i n m e n t  .
p o l i c y  a n  i n f l e x i b l e  a t t i t u d e  t o w a r d  a l l  C o m m u n i s t  n a t i o n - s t a t e s
w i t h o u t  a n y  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  o b j e c t i v e  e v i d e n c e  t h a t  w o u l d  l e a d
t o  s u c h  a  c o n c l u s i o n  a s  C o m m u n i s t  n a t i o n - s t a t e s  h a v e  a  d i v e r s i t y
o f  n a t i o n a l  i n t e r e s t s  t h a t  d e m a n d  s a t i s f a c t i o n .  A r t h u r  J .  D o m m e n
e x c u s e d  t h e  E i s e n h o w e r  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  f o r  i t s  p o s i t i o n  r e g a r d i n g
C o m m u n i s m  w i t h  a  h i s t o r i c a l  t r u t h  t h a t  w a s  r e l e v a n t  i n  1 9 5 3 »
b e f o r e  S t a l i n ' s  d e a t h .  D o m m e n  s t a t e s i
T h e  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  o f  w h i c h  D u l l e s  w a s  a  k e y  
f i g u r e  h a d  b e e n  v o t e d  i n t o  o f f i c e  b a r e l y  
t w o  y e a r s  b e f o r e  ( s p e a k i n g  i n  1 9 5 5 ) o n  a  
f o r e i g n - p o l i c y  p l a t f o r m  t h a t  c o n d e m n e d  t h e  
D e m o c r a t i c  p a r t y  f o r  i t s  h a n d l i n g  o f  t h e  
C h i n a  i s s u e  -  s p e c i f i c a l l y  a c c u s i n g  i t  o f
h a v i n g  ^ f e n i e d  t h e  m i l i t a r y  a i d  t h a t  h a d
b e e n  a u t h o r i z e d  b y  C o n g r e s s  a n d  w h i c h  w a s  
c r u c i a l l y  n e e d e d  i f  C h i n a  w e r e  t o  b e  s a v e d . '
N o w ,  i f  t h e  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  h a d  d e n i e d  m i l i t a r y  
a i d  t o  t h e  F r e n c h  i n  I n d o c h i n a ,  i t  w o u l d  s t a n d  
a c c u s e d  o f  l e t t i n g  a n o t h e r  A s i a n  c o u n t r y  f a l l ,  
b y  d e f a u l t ,  t o  t h e  C o m m u n i s t s .  M o r e o v e r ,  t h e r e  
w a s  e a r t h y  i s m ,  w i t h  i t s  i m p u t a t i o n s  o f
" s o f t n e s s *  o n  t h e  i s s u e  o f  t h e  C o m m u n i s t  t h r e a t  
t o  A m e r i c a n  s e c u r i t y .  I t s  f a v o r i t e  t a r g e t  w a s ,  
o f  c o u r s e ,  t h e  s t a t e  D e p a r t m e n t .  T h e s e  i m p u t a t i o n s  
s e r v e d  t o  r e d u c e  f u r t h e r  t h e  a l r e a d y  n a r r o w  f i e l d  
o f  m a n e u v e r  o n  w h i c h  t h e  s t a t e  d e p a r t m e n t  
n o r m a l l y  o p e r a t e s  i n  d e a l i n g  w i t h  f o r e i g n  c o u n t r i e s . %
^ R e f e r e n c e  t o  " t o d a y "  m i g h t  h a v e  s t o p p e d  a s  o f  P r e s i d e n t  
J o h n s o n ' s  M a r c h  3 1 »  1 9 6 8  a d d r e s s  t o  t h e  n a t i o n .
2Arthur J. Dommen, op. cit., p. 46.
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W h i l e  t h e  E i s e n h o w e r  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  c o u l d  h e  e x c u s e d  f o r  
u t i l i z i n g  a  h a r d  l i n e  a g a i n s t  C o m m u n i s m  i n  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  c a m p a i g n  
o f  1952 , t h e  y e a r  1 9 5 3  b r o u g h t  a b o u t  c e r t a i n  d r a m a t i c  c h a n g e s  i n  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p o l i t i c s  t h a t  s h o u l d  h a v e  b r o u g h t  a b o u t  a n  
i n v e s t i g a t i o n  o f  t h e  a s s u m p t i o n  w i t h  w h i c h  t h e  u n i t e d  s t a t e s  
c o n d u c t e d  i t s  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y ,  m  t e r m s  o f  c h a n g e  i n  1 9 5 3 i r e f e r e n c e  
h a s  t o  b e  m a d e  o n c e  a g a i n  t o  S t a l i n *  s  d e a t h  a n d  t h e  E a s t  G e r m a n  
r e v o l u t i o n  t o  d r a m a t i z e  t h e  f a c t  o f  c h a n g e  w i t h i n  t h e  C o m m u n i s t  
m o v e m e n t .  T h e s e  e v e n t s  c o u p l e d  t o  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  K o r e a n  W a r  
w a s  s e t t l e d  b y  t h e  E i s e n h o w e r  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  s h o u l d  h a v e  l e f t  t h e  
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  w i t h  s u f f i c i e n t  f l e x i b i l i t y  t o  a d j u s t  i t s  p o l i c y  
t o  t h e  r e a l i t i e s  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p o l i t i c s  i n  t h e  1950*s .  T h i s  
w a s n ' t  d o n e !
T h u s ,  t h e  c o n t a i n m e n t  p o l i c y  o f  t h e  E i s e n h o w e r  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  
w a s  e x e c u t e d  a t  a  t i m e ,  w h e n  t h e  f o r c e s  o f  c h a n g e  d o m i n a t e d  t h e  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p o l i t i c a l  s y s t e m .  A m o n g  t h e s e  f o r c e s  o f  c h a n g e  
p r e s e n t  a t  t h e  t i m e  E i s e n h o w e r  a s s u m e d  t h e  P r e s i d e n c y  w e r e  t h e  
e m e r g e n c e  o f  a  t h i r d  w o r l d  o f  u n d e r d e v e l o p e d  n a t i o n - s t a t e s ,  t h e  
c l e a r  p r e s e n c e  o f  a  S o v i e t  n u c l e a r  c a p a c i t y ,  a n d  t h e  f r a c t i o n -  
a l i z a t i o n  o f  t h e  C o m m u n i s t  m o v e m e n t .  R e f e r e n c e  h a s  a l r e a d y  b e e n  
m a d e  t o  t h e  b r e a k - u p  o f  t h e  C o m m u n i s t  w o r l d  s y s t e m .  J f c r e  i m m e d i a t e  
t o  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  u n d e r  d i s c u s s i o n  w e r e  t h e  c h a n g e s  w i t h  r e g a r d  t o  
t h e  t h i r d  w o r l d  a n d  n u c l e a r  w e a p o n s .
% . s s i v e  r e t a l i a t i o n  i m p l e m e n t e d  t h r o u g h  b r i n k m a n s h i p  l e f t  
t h e  E i s e n h o w e r  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  w i t h  o n l y  t w o  a l t e r n a t i v e s  i n  t h e
^Arthur J. Dommen, op. cit., p. 46.
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a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  d i r e c t  f o r c e  b y  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s i e i t h e r  t o t a l l y
r e m o v e  t h e  e n e m y  o r  d o  n o t h i n g .  B e r n a r d  B r o d i e  s u g g e s t s :
O n e  n o t i c e s  . . . t h a t  t h i s  s p e e c h  o n  
m a s s i v e  r e t a l i a t i o n ,  p r e s e n t e d  o n l y  a  
h a l f - y e a r  a f t e r  t h e  a r m i s t i c e  w h i c h  e n d e d  
t h e  K o r e a n  V f a r ,  w a s  a  r e j e c t i o n ,  o n  t a c t i c a l  
a n d  s t r a t e g i c  g r o u n d s ,  o f  o u r  e n t i r e  
s t r a t e g y  i n  t h a t  w a r .  T h e  w a r  h a d  b e e n  l i m i t e d  
w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  w e a p o n s  a n d  g e o g r a p h y  a n d ,  a s  
a  l i m i t e d  w a r ,  i t  h a d  t o  b e  w a g e d  a t  a  p l a c e
d e t e r m i n e d  b y  t h e  e n e m y  a n d  p e r i p h e r a l  t o  t h e
s o u r c e s  o f  h i s  p o w e r . ^
m  o t h e r  w o r d s .  S e c r e t a r y  D u l l e s  w a s  s u g g e s t i n g  t h a t  f r o m
J a n u a r y  1 2 ,  1 9 5 4  f o r w a r d ,  i f  t h e  e n e m y  -  t h e  C h i n e s e  C o m m u n i s t s
f o r  e x a m p l e  -  a t t a c k e d  s o m e  p o i n t  o n  t h e  p e r i p h e r y  o f  A s i a ,  t h e
u n i t e d  S t a t e s  m i g h t  r e s p o n d  n o t  b y  m e e t i n g  t h e m  o n  a  b a t t l e f i e l d
f a v o r i n g  t h e m  b u t ,  i n s t e a d ,  b y  i n v o k i n g  i t s  m a s s i v e  r e t a l i a t o r y
p o w e r .  B r o d i e  c o n c l u d e d :
T h u s  t h e  S e c r e t a r y  f a i r l y  e x p l i c i t l y  c o n d e m n e d  
t h e  s c o p e  a n d  m e t h o d s  o f  K o r e a  a s  i n t o l e r a b l y  
w a s t e f u l  a n d  u n s a t i s f a c t o r y  . . . m  f a c t ,  t h e  
s p e e c h  m a k e s  n o  s e n s e ,  e x c e p t  a s  a  r e j e c t i o n  
o f  K o r e a ,  b e c a u s e  o t h e r w i s e  i t s  t i m i n g  -  f o u r  
y e a r s  a f t e r  t h e  f i r s t  S o v i e t  U n i o n  a t o m i c  b o m b  
a n d  s o m e  m o n t h s  a f t e r  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n  h a d  a l r e a d y  
e x p l o d e d  a  t h e r m o n u c l e a r  w e a p o n  -  i s  a  l i t t l e  
b i z a r r e . 2
B e r n a r d  B r o d i e ' s  s u g g e s t i o n  t h a t  t h e  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  w a s  
l i m i t i n g  i t s e l f  b y  n e g a t i n g  t h e  l i m i t e d  w a r  t h e s i s  o f  K o r e a  i s  
m o s t  e v i d e n t  i n  D u l l e s ' s  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  t h e  U h i t e d  S t a t e s  r o l e  
i n  S E A T O .  B e f o r e  t h e  S e n a t e  C o m m i t t e e  o n  F o r e i g n  R e l a t i o n s ,  t h e  
S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  s t a t e d  :
^ B e r n a r d  B r o d i e  S t r a t e g y  i n  t h e  i v i i s s i l e  A g e  ( P r i n c e t o n ,  
N e w  J e r s e y :  P r i n c e t o n  U n i v e r s i t y  P r e s s ,  1 9 5 9 ) ;  P *  2 5 0 .
2Ibid., p. 251.
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I t  i s  n o t  t h e  p o l i c y  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  
t o  a t t e m p t  t o  d e t e r  a t t a c k  i n  t h i s  a r e a  b y  
b u i l d i n g  u p  a  l o c a l  f o r c e  c a p a b l e  i t s e l f  o f  
d e f e n s e  a g a i n s t  a n  a l l - o u t  a t t a c k  b y  t h e  
C o m m u n i s t s ,  i f  i t  s h o u l d  o c c u r .  W e  d o  n o t  
e x p e c t  t o  d u p l i c a t e  i n  t h i s  a r e a  t h e  p a t t e r n  
o f  t h e  N o r t h  A t l a n t i c  T r e a t y  O r g a n i z a t i o n  a n d  
i t s  s i g n i f i c a n t  s t a n d i n g  f o r c e s .  T h a t  w o u l d  
r e q u i r e  a  d i v e r s i o n  a n d  c o m m i t m e n t  o f  s t r e n g t h  
w h i c h  w e  d o  n o t  t h i n k  i s  e i t h e r  p r a c t i c a l  o r  
d e s i r a b l e  o r  n e c e s s a r y  f r o m  t h e  s t a n d p o i n t  o f  
t h e  u n i t e d  S t a t e s .
W e  b e l i e v e  t h a t  o u r  p o s t u r e  i n  t h a t  a r e a  s h o u l d  
b e  o n e  o f  h a v i n g  m o b i l e  s t r i k i n g  p o w e r ,  a n d  t h e  
a b i l i t y  t o  u s e  t h a t  a g a i n s t  t h e  s o u r c e s  o f  
a g g r e s s i o n  i f  i t  o c c u r s .  W e  b e l i e v e  t h a t  i s  m o r e  
e f f e c t i v e  t h a n  i f  w e  t r i e d  t o  p i n  d o w n  A m e r i c a n  
f o r c e s  a t  t h e  m a n y  p o i n t s  a r o u n d  t h e  c i r c u m f e r e n c e  
o f  t h e  C o m m u n i s t  w o r l d  i n  t h a t  a r e a .
I t  m a y  b e  t h a t  o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s  o f  t h e  a r e a  w i l l  
w a n t  t o  d e d i c a t e  p a r t i c u l a r  f o r c e s  f o r  t h e  
p r o t e c t i o n  o f  t h e  a r e a  u n d e r  t h i s  t r e a t y .  B u t  w e  
m a d e  c l e a r  a t  I V & n i l a  t h a t  i t  w a s  n o t  t h e  i n t e n t i o n  
o f  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  t o  b u i l d  u p  a  l a r g e  l o c a l  
f o r c e  i n c l u d i n g ,  f o r  e x a m p l e .  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  g r o u n d  
t r o o p s  f o r  t h a t  a r e a ,  b u t  t h a t  w e  r e l y  u p o n  t h e  
d e t e r r e n t  p o w e r  o f  o u r  m o b i l e  s t r i k i n g  f o r c e . 1
C o n t a i n m e n t  i m p l e m e n t e d  b y  m e a n s  o f  a  r e a d i n e s s  t o  t h r e a t e n  
w i t h  n u c l e a r  w a r f a r e  c r e a t e d  a  m o s t  o b v i o u s  p o w e r  v a c u u m  f o r  t h e  
E i s e n h o w e r  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y .  H i r o s h i m a  a n d  N a g a s k i  
i n t r o d u c e d  n u c l e a r  w e a p o n s  t o  m a n ,  a n d  t h e  g e n e r a l  r e a c t i o n  o f  
m o s t  p e o p l e  t o  t h e i r  u s e  i n  1 9 4 5  w a s  t h a t  a t o m i c  w e a p o n s  s h o u l d  
n e v e r  b e  u s e d  a g a i n .  T h e  r e s t r a i n t  r e f l e c t e d  i n  t h e  a t t i t u d e  o f  
m o s t  p e o p l e  t o w a r d s  t h e s e  w e a p o n s  i n t r o d u c e d  a  n e w  f a c t o r  i n t o  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p o l i t i c s  t h a t  w a s  n o t  h e e d e d  b y  t h e  E i s e n h o w e r
^ S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  J o h n  F o s t e r  D u l l e s  q u o t e d  i n  t h e  "Report 
o f  t h e  C o m m i t t e e  o n  F o r e i g n  R e l a t i o n s  o n  E x e c u t i v e  K ,  "  U . S .
S e n a t e ,  8 ] r d  C o n g r e s s ,  2 d  s e s s i o n  ( W a s h i n g t o n : G o v e r n m e n t  P r i n t i n g  
P r e s s ,  1 9 5 4 ) ,  p .  1 3 .
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A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ;  t h a t  i s ,  m i l i t a r y  m i g h t  h a s  a  s c a l e  o f  l i m i t a t i o n .
C h a r l e s  E .  M e r r i a m  n o t e d  t h i s  l i m i t a t i o n ,  w h e n  h e  s a i d i ^
I t  m a y  a l s o  p r o v e  t r u e  t h a t  t h e  p r o f e s s i o n  
o f  g e n e r a l  i n t e r e s t  a n d  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  i s  
m e r e l y  a  v e r b a l i s m  t o  c o v e r  s e l f i s h  
e x p l o i t a t i o n .  I n  a n y  c a s e ,  d e f e r e n c e  t o  t h e  
" c o m m o n  i n t e r e s t "  i s  a  t r i b u t e  t o  t h e  b a s i s  
o f  a u t h o r i t y .  I t  w i l l  b e  p a i d  b y  t h e  t y r a n t  
a s  w e l l  a s  b y  t h e  d e m a g o g u e ,  b y  t h e  p a t r i m o n i a l - 
r u l e r  w h o  m u s t  c a r e  f o r  h i s  p e o p l e  a s  f o r  h i s  
c a t t l e  a s  w e l l  a s  b y  t h e  p o p u l a r  c o u r t i e r  w h o  
f l a t t e r s  a n d  f a w n s  a s  a  p a r t  o f  a  p l a y  f o r  
p r e s t i g e  a n d  d o m i n a t i o n .  I h e  t y r a n t  w i l l  n o t  
a d m i t  t h a t  h e  i s  a  t y r a n t ,  a t  l e a s t  n o t  a n  
e x p e r i e n c e d  o n e ,  o r  t h a t  h e  i s  a r b i t r a r y  o r  
i r r e s p o n s i b l e ,  f o r  h e  i s  a l w a y s  t h e  v i c a r  o f  
s o m e o n e  o r  s o m e t h i n g ,  G o d  o r  t h e  n a t i o n  o r  
t h e  c l a s s  o r  t h e  m a s s  o r  t h e  c u s t o m s  o f  h i s  
f o l k .  A n d ,  i n d e e d ,  h o w e v e r  a r r o g a n t  h e  m a y  b e ,  
h e  f i n d s  i t  d i f f i c u l t  t o  e s c a p e  f r o m  t h a t  w o r l d  
o f  l a w  w h i c h  h e  h i m s e l f  a n d  h i s  s y s t e m  h a v e  
i n v o k e d .  T h e  m o s t  i m p o r t a n t  m a y  t h u s  f i n d  
h i m s e l f  i r r e v o c a b l y  c o m m i t t e d  t o  a  s y s t e m  w h i c h  
n o  l o n g e r  a l l o w s  h i m  t h a t  u n t r a m m e l e d  l i b e r t y  
o f  c h o i c e  a n d  a c t i o n ,  w h i c h  h e  m a y  d e a r l y  l o v e  
b u t  w h i c h  b y  v i r t u e  o f  h i s  v e r y  p o w e r  e s c a p e s  
h i m .  H i s  s e n s e  o f  p o w e r  i s  o n c e  m o r e  r e d u c e d  
t o  t h e  d r e a m  w o r l d  f r o m  w h i c h  i t  c a m e ,  a n d  
i t s  e a r t h l y  s h a p e  e l u d e s  h i m .  S o  i t  m a y  b e  
s a i d  t h e  p r i c e  o f  p o w e r  i s  l i m i t a t i o n .  T h e  
r u l e r  i s  r u l e d  b y  h i s  o w n  rules.2
W i t h  t h e  d e c l i n e  i n  i m p o r t a n c e  o f  a l l - o u t  w a r  a s  a  f a c t o r  
d o m i n a t i n g  c o n f l i c t  a m o n g  n a t i o n - s t a t e s  t h e r e  h a s  b e e n  a  s c a l e  
o f  l i m i t a t i o n  i n t r o d u c e d  i n t o  t h e  v i o l e n c e  p o s s i b l e  a m o n g  t h e  
d e v e l o p e d  n a t i o n - s t a t e s  o f  t h e  w o r l d .  T h i s  i s  a  b r e a k  f r o m  
w h a t  h a s  b e e n  t h e  m a i n s t r e a m  o f  p o l i t i c a l  i n t e r a c t i o n  b e t w e e n  
n a t i o n - s t a t e s ;  e s p e c i a l l y  t h e  u n i t e d  S t a t e s ,  t h e  S o v i e t  U h i o n  a n d
1  C h a r l e s  E .  M e r r i a m ,  op. c i t . ,  p. 35»
2Charles E. Merriam, ibid., p. 35»
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m  1953 a n d  t o d a y ,  v i o l e n c e  i s  c o n f i n e d  t o  t h o s e  c o n t i n e n t a l  
a r e a s  o f  r e s i d e n c e  f o r  e m e r g i n g  n a t i o n - s t a t e s .  T h e  c o n f r o n t a t i o n  
o f  t h e  E a s t  a n d  W e s t  i n  L a o s  i s  a n  e x a m p l e  o f  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  
c o n t a i n m e n t  v s .  p r o t r a c t e d  w a r  w i t h i n  t h e  s c a l e  o f  l i m i t a t i o n  
i n t r o d u c e d  h y  t h e  n u c l e a r  b a l a n c e  o f  t e r r o r .
I i ' ^ . s s i v e  r e t a l i a t i o n  i m p l e m e n t e d  t h r o u g h  b r i n k m a n s h i p  w a s  
o n e  i m p o r t a n t  f a c t o r  i n  c r e a t i n g  a  p o l i t i c a l  p o w e r  v a c u u m  i n  t h e  
a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  c o n t a i n m e n t  p o l i c y .  A  s e c o n d  f a c t o r  l i m i t i n g  
c o n t a i n m e n t  c o n c e r n s  t h e  c o n t i n u e d  b a c k i n g  o f  t h e  F r e n c h  p r e s e n c e  
i n  I n d o c h i n a  d u r i n g  1 9 5 3  b y  t h e  E i s e n h o w e r  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n .  T h i s  
d e c i s i o n  a s s u r e d  t h a t  t h e  L a o  I s s a r a  l e a d e r s h i p  w o u l d  h a v e  t o  f i n d  
a n o t h e r  c h a n n e l  t h a n  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  i n  o r d e r  t o  e s t a b l i s h  a n  
i n d e p e n d e n t  l a o s .  T h e  V i e t  M i n h  v i c t o r y  o v e r  t h e  F r e n c h  a t  D i e n  
B i e n  T h u  w a s  a  d e c l a r a t i o n  o f  i n d e p e n d e n c e  f o r  V i e t n a m  a n d  l a o s .  
T h i s  w a s  b o u n d  t o  g i v e  t h e  C o m m u n i s t  P a t h e t  L a o  a  d e c i s i v e  
p o l i t i c a l  p r e s e n c e  i n  l a o s .  A n d  i t  d i d  a s  e v i d e n c e d  i n  t h e  1 9 5 8  
e l e c t i o n .
T h e  1958 N a t i o n a l  A s s e m b l y  e l e c t i o n  w a s  a n  e x p r e s s i o n  o f  
t h e  f a c t  t h a t  a m o n g  t h e  n o n - I a o  b a c k i n g  t h e  P a t h e t  L a o ,  a n d  m a n y  
l a o  l i k e  P r i n c e  S o u p h a n o u v o n g ,  C o m m u n i s m  w a s  a n  a c c e p t a b l e  
m e t h o d o l o g y  f o r  e f f e c t i n g  c h a n g e  i n  L a o s .  B u t  t h i s  w a s  n e v e r  
r e c o g n i z e d  o r  a c c e p t e d  b y  t h e  E i s e n h o w e r  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n .  A s  
J o h n  F .  C a d y  p o i n t e d  o u t  r e g a r d i n g  S E A T O ;  i t  w a s  a n  e x p r e s s i o n  o f  
f o r m e r  c o l o n i a l  p o w e r s  t o  " r e v i v e  i m p e r i a l i s t  c o n t r o l . T o  t h e
Ijohn F. Cady, op. cit., p. 602.
151A s i a n s ,  c o n t a i n m e n t  a s  e x p r e s s e d  i n  S E A T O  l e f t  t h e i r  e n v i r o n m e n t  
w i t h  a  c o n t i n u a t i o n  o f  c o l o n i a l i s m ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  b e i n g  a  g u a r a n t e e  
o f  s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n  f o r  t h e s e  n e w  n a t i o n - s t a t e s ,  m  o t h e r  
w o r d s ,  c o n t a i n m e n t  a s s u r e d  t h e  s t a t u s  q u o  w i t h  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  
f u l f i l l i n g  t h e  d e c i s i v e  r o l e  o f  m a i n t a i n i n g  a n  i n d i r e c t  c o l o n i a l  
p r e s e n c e  i n  A s i a ,  t h r o u g h  e c o n o m i c  a n d  m i l i t a r y  a s s i s t a n c e  t o  
g o v e r n m e n t s  t r y i n g  t o  k e e p  a n  e l i t e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  i n  p o w e r  s u c h  
a s  t h e  L a o  e l i t e  u n d e r  P h o u i  S a n a n i k o n e  i n  A u g u s t ,  1 9 5 8 *
A  t h i r d  f a c t o r  i n  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  p o w e r  v a c u u m  t h a t  c a n  b e  
a t t r i b u t e d  t o  t h e  c o n t a i n m e n t  p o l i c y  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  h a s  t o  
d o  w i t h  a  c r e d i t a b i l i t y  g a p .  T h i s  i s  t h e  m o s t  i m p o r t a n t  r e s u l t  
o f  t h e  E i s e n h o w e r  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s  c o n t a i n m e n t  p o l i c y ,  a n d  i t s  
a f f e c t s  a r e  w i t h  u s  e v e n  t o d a y .  T h e  c r e d i t a b i l i t y  g a p  b e g i n s  w i t h  
t h e  w a y  t h e  u n i t e d  s t a t e s  a p p r o a c h e d  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  i n  t h e  1950 ' s  
a n d  t o d a y ,  m  t h e  S t a t e  o f  t h e  U n i o n  a d d r e s s .  P r e s i d e n t  E i s e n h o w e r  
e x c u s e d  t h e  t h e s i s  o f  m a s s i v e  r e t a l i a t i o n  w i t h  " w e ,  o n  o u r  p a r t ,  
k n o w  t h a t  w e  s e e k  o n l y  a  j u s t  p e a c e  f o r  a l l ,  w i t h  a g g r e s s i v e  
d e s i g n s  a g a i n s t  n o  o n e .
P e a c e  a s  a n  e n d  m e a n s  w h a t  i n  t e r m s  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p o l i t i c s ?  
I f  p e a c e  i s  m e a s u r e d  b y  t h e  c o n d u c t  o f  t h e  u n i t e d  S t a t e s  i n  
f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  d u r i n g  t h e  1 9 5 0 ' s ,  t h e n  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  f a i l e d  
t h e  t e s t  a s  e v i d e n c e d  i n  t h e  o v e r - a l l  e m p h a s i s  u p o n  m a s s i v e  
r e t a l i a t i o n  a t  a  t i m e  i n  h i s t o r y  w h e n  t h e  S o v i e t  u n i o n  w a s  t r y i n g
^ P r e s i d e n t  D w i g h t  D a v i d  E i s e n h o w e r ,  " T h e  S t a t e  o f  t h e  U n i o n  
y e s s a g e  J a n u a r y  9 ,  1 9 5 9 » ”  o p .  c i t . ,  p .  3 .
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t o  s o l i d i f y  i t s  p o l i t i c a l  l e a d e r s h i p  a n d  r e l a t i o n s h i p  w i t h  o t h e r  
C o m m u n i s t  n a t i o n - s t a t e s .  A l s o ,  i t  s h o u l d  b e  a d d e d  t h e  a c c e p t a n c e  
o f  b r i n k m a n s h i p  m a d e  l i t t l e  s e n s e  i n  a  t i m e  p e r i o d  w h e r e  t h e r e  
h a d  b e e n  r e a c h e d  a  b i - p o l a r  c a p a c i t y  t o  c o n d u c t  n u c l e a r  w a r .
P e a c e  a s  a  g o a l  d e s i r e d  b y  t h e  u n i t e d  S t a t e s  w a s  n o t  a c c e p t e d  
b y  t h e  n e w l y  e m e r g i n g  n a t i o n - s t a t e s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  i n  A s i a  d u r i n g  
t h e  1950 ' s .  F o r  e x a m p l e ,  i f  S E A T O  w a s  s u c h  a  g o o d  w a y  t o  m a i n t a i n  
s t a b i l i t y  i n  S o u t h e a s t  A s i a ,  t h e n  w h y  d i d n ' t  I n d i a ,  B u r m a ,  a n d  t h e  
o t h e r  A s i a n  n a t i o n - s t a t e s  j o i n  T h a i l a n d  i n  t h e  m u l t i l a t e r a l  m u t u a l  
s e c u r i t y  t r e a t y .  S E A T O  r e p r e s e n t e d  a  r e t u r n  t o  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  
s i t u a t i o n  p r e s e n t  i n  S o u t h e a s t  A s i a  p r i o r  t o  D i e n  B i e n  P h u ;  n a m e l y ,  
c o l o n i a l  d o m i n a t i o n  i n  m o s t  o f  t h e  s o c i e t i e s  i n  t h e  a r e a .
F i n a l l y ,  p e a c e  a s  a  q u e s t  b y  t h e  E i s e n h o w e r  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  
p i n p o i n t s  t h e  b a s i c  p r o b l e m  i n  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y ,  t h e n  
a n d  n o w .  T h a t  i s ,  t h e  u n i t e d  S t a t e s  a s s u m e s  t o o  m u c h  r e g a r d i n g  
t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  e n v i r o n m e n t ,  m  p a r t i c u l a r ,  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  
a s s u m e s  t h a t  o t h e r  n a t i o n - s t a t e s ,  w h i c h  h a v e  n o t  a c h i e v e d  t h e  
s t a t u s  o f  a  p o s t - i n d u s t r i a l  n a t i o n - s t a t e ,  d e s i r e  t o  s e e  a  s t a t e  
o f  h a r m o n y  o r  t r a n q u i l i t y  a m o n g  n a t i o n - s t a t e s  t h a t  i s  o f  a  l a s t i n g  
d u r a t i o n .  T h i s  i s  i m p o s s i b l e  !
F i r s t ,  m o s t  o f  t h e  n a t i o n - s t a t e s  i n  t h e  w o r l d  d o  n o t  e v e n  
a p p r o a c h  t h e  u n i t e d  S t a t e s  i n  t h e  l e v e l  o f  e c o n o m i c  a n d  s o c i a l  
w e l l - b e i n g  n o r  d o  w e  f i n d  i n  t h e  w o r l d  t h e  d e g r e e  o f  p o l i t i c a l  
i n t e g r a t i o n  p r e s e n t  i n  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s .  H e r e ,  r e f e r e n c e  i s  t o  
t h e  d e g r e e  o f  i n t e r e s t  a r t i c u l a t i o n  a n d  m a s s  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  p r e s e n t  
i n  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s .
153S e c o n d ,  a n d  m o r e  b a s i c ,  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p o l i t i c s  i s  d o m i n a t e d  
b y  t h e  i n t e r a c t i o n  a m o n g  n a t i o n - s t a t e s  t r y i n g  t o  s a t i s f y  t h e  
d e m a n d s  o f  t h e i r  p e o p l e s '  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  w h a t  i s  t h e  n a t i o n a l  
i n t e r e s t .  H e r e ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  t h e  n a t i o n a l  i n t e r e s t  r e q u i r e d  t o  b e  
s a t i s f i e d  f i r s t  i s  t h a t  o f  n a t i o n a l  s e c u r i t y .  S i n c e  t h e  q u e s t  
f o r  a  s t a t e  o f  n a t i o n a l  s e c u r i t y  a s s u r i n g  t h e  p r e s e r v a t i o n  o f  t h e  
n a t i o n - s t a t e  c a n  n e v e r  b e  a c h i e v e d  i n  t h e  c o m p e t i t i v e  e n v i r o n m e n t  
o f  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  i n t e r a c t i o n s  a m o n g  n a t i o n - s t a t e s ,  t h e r e  i s  a  
n a t u r a l  t e n d e n c y  o f  a  n a t i o n - s t a t e  t o  r e m a i n  c o n c e r n e d  w i t h  h a v i n g  
a  b e t t e r  s i t u a t i o n  i n  t e r m s  o f  s e c u r i t y  v i s - a - v i s  a  d e f i n e d  
c o m p e t i t o r ,  ü î i i s  m e a n s  t h e  s t a t e  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p o l i t i c s  i s  
a l w a y s  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  a s  b e i n g  i n  w h a t  m i g h t  b e  c a l l e d  t h e  f l u x  o f  
c h a n g e .  W h a t  t h i s  s u g g e s t s  i s  t h a t  c h a n g e  i s  t h e  o n e  c o n s t a n t  
f a c t o r  i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p o l i t i c s ,  a n d  a  n a t i o n - s t a t e  t h a t  i s  t o  
r e m a i n  c o m p e t i t i v e  i n  t e r m s  o f  p o l i t i c a l  p o w e r  a n d  p r o v i d i n g  f o r  
i t s  n a t i o n a l  s e c u r i t y  m u s t  h a v e  t h e  a v a i l a b l e  m e a n s  t o  m e a s u r e  
t h a t  c h a n g e ,  w h i c h  i s  p r e s e n t  i n  a  g i v e n  t i m e  p e r i o d  o f  i n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  p o l i t i c s .  T h e  a l t e r n a t i v e  t o  t h i s  s u g g e s t i o n  i s  t o  h a v e  
a  p r e s e n c e  o f  m i l i t a r y  m i g h t  b e y o n d  t h e  r e a c h  o f  c o m p e t i n g  n a t i o n ­
s t a t e s ,  s u c h  a s '  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  h a d ,  u n t i l  t h e  f a l l  o f  1 9 5 7 »
T h e  o t h e r  a l t e r n a t i v e  i s  t o  p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
p o l i t i c s  l i k e  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  h a s  d o n e  t h r o u g h o u t  m o s t  o f  i t s  
h i s t o r y .  T h a t  i s ,  a s  a  n o n - p a r t i c i p a t i n g  n a t i o n - s t a t e  f o l l o w i n g  
o u t  a  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  o f  i s o l a t i o n i s m .  B u t  t h i s  i s  i m p o s s i b l e ,  
b e c a u s e  t h e  B r i t i s h  G r a n d  F l e e t  i s  n o  m o r e ,  a n d  s i n c e  1 9 ^ 7  t h e  
U n i t e d  S t a t e s  h a s  m a r r i e d  i t s e l f  t o  a n  o r i e n t a t i o n  t o w a r d s  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p o l i t i c s  t h a t  w i l l  n o t  a l l o w  a  d i v o r c e m e n t  f r o m  t h e
15^
t h e s i s  o f  p r o t e c t i n g  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  b y  m a i n t a i n i n g  a  p r e s e n c e  
o f  p o l i t i c a l  p o w e r  c l o s e  t o  a  c o m p e t i t o r ' s  n a t i o n a l  t e r r i t o r y .
P e a r l  H a r b o r  w a s  a  w a t e r s h e d  i n  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  n a t i o n a l  s e c u r i t y  
p o l i c y .  I s o l a t i o n i s m  w a s  p u t  t o  r e s t  a l o n g  w i t h  t h e  b a t t l e s h i p  
n a v y  o n  D e c e m b e r  7 ,  1 9 4 1 .
T h e  c o n t a i n m e n t  p o l i c y  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  h a s  f a i l e d  t o  
d e a l  w i t h  t h e  c o n s t a n t s  a n d  v a r i a b l e s  p r e s e n t  i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
p o l i t i c s .  I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  c o n t a i n m e n t  h a s  n o t  m e t  t h e  r e q u i r e ­
m e n t s  o f  a  n a t i o n a l  s e c u r i t y  p o l i c y  t h a t  w i l l  a s s u r e  a  h i g h  l e v e l  
o f  p o l i t i c a l  p o w e r  f o r  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  i n  a  t i m e  p e r i o d  w h e r e  
w a r  h a s  a  s c a l e  o f  l i m i t a t i o n  e m a n a t i n g  f r o m  t h e  d e s t r u c t i v e  
c a p a c i t y  o f  n u c l e a r  w e a p o n s .  T h i s  c o n s t a n t  f a c t o r  i n  i n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  p o l i t i c s  w a s  n o t  a c k n o w l e d g e d  i n  t h e  m a s s i v e  r e t a l i a t i o n  
t h e s i s  a c c e p t e d  b y  t h e  E i s e n h o w e r  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  
t h e r e  a r e  t h e  v a r i a b l e s  p r e s e n t  i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p o l i t i c s ,  s u c h  
a s  t h e  p r e s e n c e  o f  v i o l e n c e  i n  t h e  t h i r d  w o r l d  o f  u n d e r d e v e l o p e d  
n a t i o n - s t a t e s .
T o  f i n d  a n  a l t e r n a t i v e  t o  t h e  c o n t a i n m e n t  p o l i c y  o f  t h e  
u n i t e d  S t a t e s ,  t h e  w r i t e r  t u r n e d  t o  t h e  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s .  I n  t h e  
U n i t e d  N a t i o n s  p r e s e n c e  i n  L a o s ,  a n  e x a m p l e  w i l l  b e  p r e s e n t e d  o f  
t h e  w o r l d  o r g a n i z a t i o n  s t a b i l i z i n g  t h e  C o l d  W a r  i n  L a o s  s t r i p p e d  
o f  a n y  p o l i t i c a l  p o w e r  e l e m e n t ,  e x c e p t  t h e  i n f l u e n c e  a n d  a u t h o r i t y  
a c q u i r e d  b y  t h e  S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l  f r o m  t h e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l  t o  
i n q u i r e  i n t o  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  t h e  c o n f l i c t .  O n  t h i s  b a s i s ,  a  
U n i t e d  N a t i o n s  p r e s e n c e  w a s  e s t a b l i s h e d .  T h i s  p r e s e n c e  w a s  
a c c e p t e d ,  b e c a u s e  t h e  b i - p o l a r  p o w e r s  w e r e  w i l l i n g  t o  a l l o w  a  s t a t e  
o f  e q u i l i b r i u m  b e t w e e n  t h e  P a t h e t  L a o  a n d  t h e  R o y a l  L a o t i a n  g o v e r n m e n t .
CHAPTER IX
T H E  U N I T E D  N A T I O N S  P R E S E N C E
T h e  d e v i l s  e n t e r  u n i n v i t e d  w h e n  t h e  h o u s e  
s t a n d s  e m p t y .  F o r  o t h e r  k i n d s  o f  g u e s t s ,  
y o u  h a v e  f i r s t  t o  o p e n  t h e  d o o r . l
I n  t h e  S e p t e m b e r  2 ? ,  1 9 5 9  i s s u e  o f  T h e  N e w  Y o r k  T i m e s
M a g a z i n e  L e s t e r  B .  P e a r s o n  a s k e d  t
I s  t h e  w o r l d  o r g a n i z a t i o n  d o o m e d  t o  t h e  f a t e  
o f  f r u s t r a t i o n ,  d i s s e n s i o n  a n d  d i s a p p e a r a n c e  t h a t  
b e f e l l  i t s  G e n e v a  p r e d e c e s s o r ,  t h e  L e a g u e  o f  
l o t i o n s ?  . . . W i l l  t h e  U h i t e d  N a t i o n s  d e t e r i o r a t e  
i n  t h e  s a m e  w a y  w i t h o u t  t h e  b a n g ?2
T o  a n s w e r  h i s  o w n  q u e s t i o n ,  t h e  C a n a d i a n  P r i m e  r . î i n i s t e r  
a d m i t t e d  t h a t  “ i n  s o  f a r  a s  s u b s t a n t i a l  a c t i o n s  t o  k e e p  t h e  p e a c e  
a r e  c o n c e r n e d ,  ' t h e  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s  h a s  b e e n '  f r o z e n  i n  f u t i l i t y  
a n d  d i v i d e d  b y  d i s s e n s i o n .  " 3  Y e t ,  t h e  C a n a d i a n  P r i m e  I / I i n i s t e r  
h a d  h o p e  f o r  t h e  u n i t e d  N a t i o n s .  " C a n ,  ' a s k s  P e a r s o n , '  t h e  
U n i t e d  N a t i o n s  b y  i t s  d i p l o m a t i c  a c t i v i t i e s ,  b e  t h e  i n s t r u m e n t  
o f ,  c a n  i t  a t  l e a s t  f a c i l i t a t e ,  a n  e a s i n g  o f  t e n s i o n  i n  t h e
^ S o v i e t  P r e m i e r  N i k i t a  K h r u s h c h e v ,  “ R o l e  a n d  P l a c e  o f  t h e  
U N  E x e c u t i v e  B o d y , "  V i t a l  S p e e c h e s  X X V I I  ( N o v e m b e r  1 ,  i 9 6 0 ),
p .  4 9 .
2 L e s t e r  B .  P e a r s o n ,  " W h a t  F u t u r e  f o r  t h e  u n i t e d  N & t i o n s , "
\e N e w  Y o r k  T i m e s  N h g a z i n e  ( S e p t e m b e r  2 7 ,  1959)» P »  1 4 .
3 l b i d .
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i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p o l i t i c s  b e t w e e n  t h e  C o m m u n i s t  a n d  n o n - C o m m u n i s t
b l o c s ? " !  " Y e s , " 2  c o n c l u d e d  P e a r s o n .
T h e  u n i t e d  N a t i o n s  p r e s e n c e  i n  L a o s  d u r i n g  t h e  f a l l  o f
1959  a n d  t h r o u g h  t h e  s p r i n g  o f  i 960 i s  a n  e x a m p l e  o f  t h e  w o r l d
o r g a n i z a t i o n  p e r f o r m i n g  i t s  p e a c e - k e e p i n g  r o l e  b y  e a s i n g  t e n s i o n s .
T h i s  r o l e  b e g a n  o n  S e p t e m b e r  5 ,  1 9 5 9 »  w h e n  t h e  K i n g d o m  o f  l a o s
c a l l e d  u p o n  t h e  u n i t e d  N a t i o n s  t o  e a s e  t h e  t e n s i o n  b e t w e e n  t h e
C o m m u n i s t  a n d  n o n - C o m m u n i s t  m i l i t a r y  f o r c e s .  T h e  N o t e  s t a t e d ;
" S i n c e  J u l y  I 6 , 1 9 5 9 »  f o r e i g n  t r o o p s  h a v e  b e e n  c r o s s i n g  t h e
f r o n t i e r  a n d  e n g a g i n g  i n  m i l i t a r y  a c t i o n  a g a i n s t  g a r r i s o n  u n i t s
o f  t h e  R o y a l  A r m y  s t a t i o n e d  a l o n g  t h e  n o r t h e a s t e r n  f r o n t i e r  o f
Laos. " 3  T h e  P e r m a n e n t  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e  o f  t h e  K i n g d o m  o f  l a o s  t o
t h e  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s ,  K h a m p h a n  P a n y a ,  c o n t i n u e d ;
m  t h e  f a c e  o f  t h i s  f l a g r a n t  a g g r e s s i o n ,  f u l l  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  w h i c h  r e s t s  w i t h  t h e  
D e m o c r a t i c  R e p u b l i c  o f  V i e t  N a m ,  l a o s  r e q u e s t s
l l e s t e r  B .  P e a r s o n ,  i b i d . ,  p .  6 2 .
f e l l o w  s u b j e c t  o f  t h e  B r i t i s h  B n p i r e ,  S i r  A n t h o n y  
W e d g e w o o d - B e n n  c o n c l u d e d  t h e  u n i t e d  N a t i o n s  " m u s t  b e  e m p o w e r e d  
t o  d e c i d e  t h e  d e s t i n y  o f  t h e  w o r l d . "  H i s  c o n c l u s i o n  i s  b a s e d  o n  
t h e  f a c t  t h a t  " I  d o n ' t  b e l i e v e  t h e  y o u n g e r  g e n e r a t i o n  h a s  a n y  
s e n s e  o f  n a t i o n a l  s o v e r e i g n t y .  T h i s  g e n e r a t i o n  d i d n ' t  g r o w  u p  
w i t h  t h e  i d e a  t h a t  t h i s  i s  o u r s ,  a n d  i t ' s  b e t t e r . "  W i t h  m a s s  
c o m m u n i c a t i o n  " f o r m i n g  a  w o r l d  c o u r t  o f  o p i n i o n '  B e n n  b e l i e v e d  
i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t '  f o r  t h e  d i p l o m a t s  a n d  p r o f e s s o r s  t o  k e e p  t h e  
p e o p l e ' s  d e s t i n y  i n  t h e i r  o w n  ' e x c l u s i v e '  g a r d e n .  S i r  A n t h o n y  
V / e d g e w o o d - B e n n  q u o t e d  i n  a  s p e e c h  d e l i v e r e d  a t  t h e  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  
r / I i n n e s o t a  J a n u a r y  2 ? ,  i 960 e n t i t l e d  " i s  T h e r e  A  W o r l d  O p i n i o n , "  
a p p e a r i n g  i n  T h e  M i n n e s o t a  D a i l y  I X  ( J a n u a r y  2 ? ,  i 9 6 0 ) ,  p .  1  
a n d  1 2 .  S e e  a l s o  Z b i g n i e w  B r a e z i n s k i ,  " T h e  I m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  
C h a n g e  f o r  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  F o r e i g n  P o l i c y , "  D e p a r t m e n t  o f  
s t a t e  p u b l i c a t i o n  826 I  ( J u l y ,  1 9 6 ? ) .
3 " N o t e  o f  S e p t e m b e r  4 ,  1 9 5 9  t o  t h e  S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l  
f r o m  t h e  P e r m a n e n t  M i s s i o n  o f  l a o s , "  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s  S e c u r i t y  
C o u n c i l  S . 4 2 1 2  d a t e d  S e p t e m b e r  5 »  1 9 5 9 »
157t h e  a s s i s t a n c e  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s ,  o f  w h i c h  
i t  i s  a  M e m b e r .  . . .  I n  P a r t i c u l a r ,  t h e  R o y a l  
G o v e r n m e n t  r e q u e s t s  t h a t  a n  e m e r g e n c y  f o r c e  
s h o u l d  h e  d i s p a t c h e d  a t  a  v e r y  e a r l y  d a t e  i n  
o r d e r  t o  h a l t  t h e  a g g r e s s i o n  a n d  p r e v e n t  t h e  
s p r e a d  o f  a g g r e s s i o n . 1
T h i s  a p p e a l  f r o m  t h e  K i n g d o m  o f  l a o s  t o  t h e  S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l
o f  t h e  U h i t e d  N a t i o n s  s t a r t e d  t h e  d i s p a t c h  o f  a  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s
p r e s e n c e  i n  L a o s .  T h e  V f o r l d  O r g a n i z a t i o n  w a s  b e i n g  c a l l e d  u p o n
t o  d i m i n i s h  a n  a l r e a d y  e x p a n d i n g  c o n v e n t i o n a l  w a r  i n  I n d o c h i n a
b y  d i s p a t c h i n g  a  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s  e m e r g e n c y  f o r c e  t o  L a o s .  I n  a n
e d i t o r i a l  t i t l e d  " T h e  U . N .  -  V i t a l  F o r c e  i n  t h e  Q u e s t  f o r  P e a c e , "
T h e  T i l i n n e a p o l i s  S t a r  n o t e d  j
N a t i o n s  c o n t i n u e  t o  c o n d u c t  m u c h  o f  t h e i r  
r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  o t h e r  n a t i o n s  d i r e c t l y ,  b u t  
i n c r e a s i n g l y ,  w h e r e  t h i s  b u s i n e s s  h a s  t o  d o  
w i t h  w o r l d  p e a c e ,  t h e  u n i t e d  i f e t i o n s  
b e c o m e s  a  p a r t i c i p a n t .
T h u s  t h e  U . N .  f i n d s  i t s e l f  d e a l i n g  w i t h  t h e  
c r i s i s  i n  l a o s ,  t i n y  k i n g d o m  i n  S o u t h e a s t  A s i a ,  
l a o s ,  r e p o r t i n g  i t  w a s  t h r e a t e n e d  f r o m  C o m m u n i s t  
N o r t h  V i e t  N a m ,  a p p e a l e d  t o  t h e  U . N .  f o r  m i l i t a r y  
h e l p .
T h e  p l e a  p u t  t h e  U . N .  o n  t h e  s p o t .  I t  r a i s e d  
t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  a  w i d e n i n g  c o n f l i c t  i n  l a o s ,  
i f  U . N .  t r o o p s  w e r e  s e n t .  A t  t h e  s a m e  t i m e ,  
i t  p r e s e n t e d  t h e  r i s k  o f  s e r i o u s  d a m a g e  t o  U . N .  
p r e s t i g e  a n d  u s e f u l l n e s s  i f  a  l e g i t i m a t e  c a l l  
f o r  h e l p  f r o m  a  s m a l l  n a t i o n  w e r e  i g n o r e d . %
On September 5» 1959, Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold 
dispatched a letter to the President of the Security Council, 
r/r. Egidio Ortona of Italy. The Secretary-General recommended
l"Note of September 4, 1959 to the Secretary-General from 
the Permanent lûssion of laos," Ibid.
2 " T h e  U . N .  -  V i t a l  F o r c e  i n  t h e  Q u e s t  f o r  P e a c e , "  T h e  
M i n n e a p o l i s  S t a r , ( O c t o b e r  5 »  1 9 5 9 ) ,  P »  l a «
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t h a t  t h e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l  b e  c o n v e n e d  " f o r  t h e  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f
a n  i t e m  e n t i t l e d  ' R e p o r t  b y  t h e  S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l  o n  t h e  l e t t e r
r e c e i v e d  f r o m  t h e  M i n i s t e r  f o r  F o r e i g n  A f f a i r s  o f  t h e  R o y a l
G o v e r n m e n t  o f  l a o s »  t r a n s m i t t e d  o n  S e p t e m b e r  4 ,  1 9 5 9  b y  a  n o t e
f r o m  t h e  P e r m a n e n t  M i s s i o n  o f  L a o s  t o  t h e  u n i t e d  r a t i o n s . " 1
T h e  8 4 ? t h  s e s s i o n  o f  t h e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l  b e g a n
S e p t e m b e r  ? ,  1 9 5 9  i n  a n  a t m o s p h e r e  o f  a  p e n d i n g  v i s i t  o f  S o v i e t
P r e m i e r  K h r u s h c h e v  t o  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  o n  S e p t e m b e r  1 5 t h . ^  T h e
P r e s i d e n t  o f  t h e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l ,  M r .  % i d i o  O r t o n a ,  b e g a n  t h e
s e s s i o n  b y  d e t a i l i n g  t h e  r e a s o n  f o r  t h e  m e e t i n g .  " H e ,  ' O r t o n a
s a i d ,  ' h a d  c o n v e n e d  t h e  m e e t i n g  u n d e r  t h e  p r o v i s i o n a l  r u l e s  o f
p r o c e d u r e  o f  t h e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l  w h i c h  e n a b l e s  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  t o
u n d e r t a k e  s u c h  a  s t e p  a t  a n y  t i m e  h e  d e e m s  n e c e s s a r y . " 3
I^ïr. O r t o n a  b e l i e v e d  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  f a c t s  w a r r a n t e d  s u c h  a  m e e t i n g :
T h e r e  w a s  f i r s t  a  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  a d d r e s s e d  
t o  h i m ,  o n  b e h a l f  o f  t h e  S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l , 
c o n t a i n i n g  t h e  s u g g e s t i o n  t o  i n i t i a t e  
c o n s u l t a t i o n s  w i t h  C o u n c i l  m e m b e r s  o n  a  
m e s s a g e  d a t e d  S e p t e m b e r  4 ,  a d d r e s s e d  t o  t h e  
S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l  b y  t h e  F o r e i g n  M i n i s t e r  o f
1 " Letter dated September 5 »  1 9 5 9  from the Secretary-General 
addressed to the President of the Security Council," united Nations 
Security Council s / 4 2 1 3  dated September 6 ,  1 9 5 9 »
2Soviet Premier Khrushchev visited the United States from 
September 15th through the 2?th. This visit was a climax to a 
series of diplomatic moves by the Premier to relax tensions 
through a summit conference of the great powers to discuss Berlin, 
disarmament, etc. See text p. 192 for further discussion of the 
international environment in which the UN presence was developed.
^President Egidio Ortona quoted in " T h e  Procedural Debate 
on laos," United Nations Review V I  (October, 1 9 5 9 ) *  P» 5 4 .
159L a o s ,  r e g a r d i n g  d e v e l o p m e n t s  i n  t h a t  c o u n t r y
a n d  c a l l i n g  f o r  p r o m p t  a c t i o n  b y  t h e  U n i t e d  I f e t i o n s . ^  ^
A f t e r  c o n s u l t a t i o n s  w i t h  t h e  o t h e r  m e m b e r s  o f  t h e  
S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l ,  p r e s i d e n t  O r t o n a  c o n c l u d e d ,  a n  " o v e r w h e l m i n g  
m a j o r i t y "  w e r e  f o r  s u c h  a  m e e t i n g .  W i t h  t h i s  e x p l a n a t i o n ,  t h e  
P r e s i d e n t  g a v e  t h e  f l o o r  t o  t h e  S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l  f o r  a  s t a t e m e n t  
o f  a n  " e x p l a n a t o r y  n a ture."3
A  p r e s e n t a t i o n  o f  t h e  f a c t s  i n  a  d i s p u t e  b y  t h e  
S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l  i s  c e r t a i n l y  m o s t  r e v e a l i n g  a b o u t  t h e  o p e r a t i o n s  
o f  t h e  U n i t e d  l o t i o n s  i n  t h e  p e a c e k e e p i n g  f i e l d .  E y  h i s  v e r y  
p r e s e n t a t i o n  t h e  S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l  m a y  s t r u c t u r e  t h e  d i r e c t i o n  
o f  s e c u r i t y  p o l i c y  b y  t h e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l .  T h i s  i s  s i g n i f i c a n t  
w h e n  i t  i s  u n d e r s t o o d  t h a t  t h e  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s  w a s  d e s i g n e d  t o  
o p e r a t e  i n  t h e  p e a c e k e e p i n g  f i e l d  w i t h i n  t h e  f r a m e w o r k  o f  a g r e e m e n t  
t o  a c t  o n  t h e  p a r t  o f  t h e  p e r m a n e n t  m e m b e r s .
H e r e  t h r e e  f a c t o r s  w e r e  v e r y  i m p o r t a n t  * f i r s t ,  t h e  
p o l i t i c a l  a t m o s p h e r e  o f  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p o l i t i c a l  s y s t e m  i n
1 P r e s i d e n t  E g i d i o  O r t o n a ,  i b i d .
^On September 6, 1959 President Ortona received a letter 
from the Prime Minister of the Government of the Democratic 
Republic of Viet Nam, Eh am Van Dong. Mr. Van Dong requested:
" I n  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  p e a c e  a n d  s e c u r i t y  i n  t h e  c o u n t r i e s  o f  
S o u t h e a s t  A s i a  a n d  t h r o u g h o u t  t h e  w o r l d ,  i n  t h e  n a m e  o f  t h e  n o b l e  
p u r p o s e s  o f  t h e  I k i i t e d  N a t i o n s  C h a r t e r ,  a n d  i n  v i e w  o f  t h e  n e e d  
t o  r e s p e c t  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  a g r e e m e n t s ,  t h e  G o v e r n m e n t  o f  t h e  
D e m o c r a t i c  R e p u b l i c  o f  V i e t  N a m  c o n s i d e r s  t h a t  t h e  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s  
s h o u l d  p u r e l y  a n d  s i m p l y  r e j e c t  t h e  s l a n d e r o u s  a n d  f a b r i c a t e d  
s t a t e m e n t s  a n d  t h e  s e n s e l e s s  r e q u e s t  m a d e  b y  t h e  P h o u i  S a n a n i k o n e  
G o v e r n m e n t . "  M e s s a g e  d a t e d  S e p t e m b e r  6, 1959 f r o m  t h e  P r i m e  
M i n i s t e r  o f  t h e  G o v e r n m e n t  o f  t h e  D e m o c r a t i c  R e p u b l i c  o f  V i e t  N a m  
a d d r e s s e d  t o  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  o f  t h e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l "  U h i t e d  n a t i o n s  
S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l  A n n e x  II d a t e d  N o v e m b e r  5» 1959»
3"(Die Procedural Debate on Laos," op. cit., p. 5^»
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1 9 5 9 ;  s e c o n d ,  t h e  p e r s o n a l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  D a g  H a m m a r s k j o l d  
a s  a  d e c i s i o n - m a k e r ;  t h i r d ,  t h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  a  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s  
p r e s e n c e  o n  t h e  b a s i s  o f  a  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l  m a j o r i t y  a n d  t h e  
u t i l i z a t i o n  b y  t h e  w o r l d  o r g a n i z a t i o n  o f  a  p r o c e d u r a l  d e v i c e  t o  
i m p l e m e n t  i t s  p r e s e n c e .
First, the political atmosphere of the international 
political system in 1 9 5 9 *  Whereas the year 1 9 5 9  began on the 
theme of a threat by the Soviet Uhion towards Berlin, the year 
ended on a note of hope generated by an agreement between 
President Eisenhower and Premier Khrushchev to hold a summit 
conference in the spring of I960.I This dramatic change in the 
political atmosphere, which was induced by the “spirit of Camp 
D a v i d , “2 was the effect of the Soviet Union and the United States 
revising or modifying their priorities in domestic and foreign 
policy in light of a general fragmentation of political power
^ O n  N o v e m b e r  2 ? »  1 9 5 8 »  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n  n o t i f i e d  t h e  
U n i t e d  S t a t e s ,  F r a n c e ,  a n d  G r e a t  B r i t a i n  t h a t  n e g o t i a t i o n s  m u s t  
b e g i n  w i t h i n  s i x  m o n t h s  o n  t h e  B e r l i n  p r o b l e m ,  o r  t h e  S o v i e t  u n i o n  
w o u l d  s e t t l e  t h e  m a t t e r  i n  a  u n i l a t e r a l  f a s h i o n  w i t h  t h e  G o v e r n m e n t  
o f  E a s t  G e r m a n y .  " S o v i e t  N o t e ,  N o v e m b e r  2 ? ,  1 9 5 8 ,  " D e p a r t m e n t  o f  
S t a t e  B u l l e t i n  X X X X  ( J a n u a r y  1 9 »  1 9 5 8 ) ,  p p .  I 8I - I 89 .
^ R e f e r e n c e  i s  t o  t h e  d i s c u s s i o n s  h e l d  b e t w e e n  P r e s i d e n t  
E i s e n h o w e r  a n d  P r e m i e r  K h r u s h c h e v  f r o m  S e p t e m b e r  2 5 t h  t h r o u g h  t h e  
27t h  a t  t h e  P r e s i d e n t ' s  r e t r e a t  i n  I V & . r y l a n d  c a l l e d  C a m p  D a v i d .
H e r e ,  K h r u s h c h e v  a g r e e d  t h a t  n o  t i m e  l i m i t  c o u l d  b e  s e t  i n  t h e  
n e g o t i a t e d  s e t t l e m e n t  o f  t h e  B e r l i n  p r o b l e m ,  a n d  t h u s  t h e r e  w a s  
r e m o v e d  t h e  o n l y  m a j o r  l i m i t a t i o n  t o  a  s u m m i t  c o n f e r e n c e  d e s i r e d  
b y  K h r u s h c h e v .  I n  a d d i t i o n  t o  t h e  B e r l i n  " s e t t l e m e n t , "
K h r u s h c h e v  a g r e e d  t o  t h e  r e s u m p t i o n  o f  n e g o t i a t i o n s  o n  t h e  s e t t l e ­
m e n t  o f  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n ' s  l e n d - l e a s e  d e b t .  W i t h  t h i s  d o n e .  
P r e s i d e n t  E i s e n h o w e r  a g r e e d  t o  b e g i n  n e g o t i a t i o n s  f o r  t h e  e x p a n s i o n  
o f  A m e r i c a n - S o v i e t  t r a d e ,  a n d  t h e  f u r t h e r  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  c u l t u r a l  
a n d  t e c h n i c a l  e x c h a n g e s ;  s p e c i f i c a l l y ,  t h e  m e d i c a l  a n d  a t o m s - f o r -  
p e a c e  p r o g r a m s .  R i c h a r d  P .  S t e b b i n s  T h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  i n  W o r l d  
A f f a i r s  1 9 5 9  ( N e w  York : H a r p e r  &  B r o t h e r s ,  I 9 6 0 ) ,  p .  3 2 .
I6l
into several power blocs, the aggressive tendencies of Communist 
China, and concern for the domestic well-being by Eisenhower and 
Khrushchev.
Ever since the Soviet Union's space achievement in 
October, 1 9 5 7 »  Khrushchev was at a diplomatic advantage with 
Eisenhower. This continued to be the case under the administration 
of President John F. Kennedy, until the neutralization of Laos in 
July, 1 9 6 2 , and the climatic missile crisis in October, I9 6 2 .
I n  p a r t ,  t h i s  w a s  a  r e f l e c t i o n  o f  a  t r a n s i t i o n  o f  l e a d e r s h i p  
w i t h i n  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  d u r i n g  1 9 5 9  a s  f a r  a s  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  
i s  c o n c e r n e d ,  a n d  t h e  r e c l u s e  r o l e  p e r f o r m e d  b y  t h e  U n i t e d  s t a t e s  
i n  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  d u r i n g  t h e  E i s e n h o w e r  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n .
T h e  y e a r  1 9 5 9  b e g a n  w i t h  t h e  s p o t l i g h t  o f  w o r l d  a t t e n t i o n  
o n  t h e  T w e n t y - F i r s t  C o n g r e s s  o f  t h e  C o m m u n i s t  P a r t y  o f  t h e  
S o v i e t  U n i o n .  E i g h t e e n  d a y s  p r i o r  t o  t h e  C o n g r e s s ,  t h e  S t a t e  o f  
t h e  U n i o n  a d d r e s s  w a s  d e l i v e r e d  b y  P r e s i d e n t  E i s e n h o w e r .
President Eisenhower's State of the Union message reflected 
his concern with the domestic problems of recovering from a 
recession, and the apparent aggressiveness of the Soviet Union 
exemplified in Soviet space technology and the threat regarding 
Berlin. While Anastas I. Mikoyan was in the fifth day of a visit 
to the United States stressing the diplomatic settlement of the 
differences between the Uhited States and the Soviet Union, 
President Eisenhower was suggesting that the most important 
problem facing the united States in 1959 was to "promote strength
162
a n d  s e c u r i t y  s i d e  b y  s i d e  w i t h  l i b e r t y  a n d  o p p o r t u n i t y .
\ V h i l e  M i k o y a n  s p o k e  a b o u t  t h e  n e e d  f o r  d i s a r m a m e n t  i n  t h e
u n i t e d  S t a t e s ,  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  t h e  m o s t  i m p o r t a n t
q u e s t i o n  c o n f r o n t i n g  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  w a s :
C a n  G o v e r n m e n t  b a s e d  u p o n  l i b e r t y  a n d  t h e  
G o d - g i v e n  r i g h t s  o f  m e n ,  p e r m a n e n t l y  e n d u r e  
w h e n  c e a s e l e s s l y  c h a l l e n g e d  b y  a  d i c t a t o r s h i p ,  • 
h o s t i l e  t o  o u r  m o d e  o f  l i f e ,  a n d  c o n t r o l l i n g  
a n  e c o n o m i c  a n d  m i l i t a r y  s t r e n g t h  o f  g r e a t  a n d  
g r o w i n g  p o w e r ? 2
T h e  P r e s i d e n t ' s  s p e e c h  w a s  d e l i v e r e d  J a n u a r y  9 s  1 9 5 9 »  O n
J a n u a r y  2 ? t h ,  S o v i e t  P r e m i e r  K h r u s h c h e v  o p e n e d  t h e  T w e n t y - F i r s t
C o n g r e s s  o f  t h e  S o v i e t  U h i o n .  K h r u s h c h e v ' s  t h e s i s  r e g a r d i n g
f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  t o o k  t h e  f o r m  o f  a  q u e s t i o n  a d d r e s s e d  t o  t h e
U n i t e d  S t a t e s  a n d  i t s  E u r o p e a n  a l l i e s .  K h r u s h c h e v  a s k e d :
W o u l d  i t  n o t  b e  b e t t e r  f o r  t h e  h e a d s  o f  s t a t e s  
w i t h  d i f f e r e n t  s o c i a l  s y s t e m s  t o  c o n c l u d e ,  a n d  
t o  d o  s o  a s  s o o n  a s  p o s s i b l e ,  t h a t ,  s i n c e  w e  
s h a r e  o n e  p l a n e t ,  a n d  n o t  t o o  l a r g e  a  p l a n e t  
b y  t o d a y ' s  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  s t a n d a r d s ,  i t  i s  b e t t e r  
t o  l i v e  o n  i t  w i t h o u t  e l b o w i n g  o n e  a n o t h e r  a n d  
n o t  t o  t h r e a t e n  o n e  a n o t h e r  c o n s t a n t l y  b y  s h a k i n g  
f i s t s  i n  t h e  f o r m  o f  a t o m i c  o r  h y d r o g e n  b o m b s ? 3
A n d  t h e n  K h r u s h c h e v  a d d e d :  " w e  m u s t  l e a m  t o  s e t t l e  d i s p u t e s  
b y  p e a c e f u l  n e g o t i a t i o n s .
Message of the President on the state of the union,
J a n u a r y  9 ,  1 9 5 9 » "  H o u s e  D o c u m e n t  I ,  8 6 t h  C o n g r e s s ,  1 s t  S e s s i o n ,  p .  1 .  
A n a s t a s  I .  M i k o y a n ,  a  f i r s t  D e p u t y  P r e m i e r  o f  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n ,  
v i s i t e d  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  f r o m  J a n u a r y  4  t h r o u g h  2 6 .
2Doc. cit.
3Premier Nikita Khrushchev "Address by the First Secretary 
before the Twenty-First Congress of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union, January 2 1 ,  1 9 5 9 » "  The Current Digest of the Soviet 
Press X I  (March 1 1 ,  1 9 5 9 ) »  p .  2 4 .
^Ibid.
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P r e m i e r  K h r u s h c h e v ' s  q u e s t  f o r  a  r e l a x a t i o n  o f  t e n s i o n  
b e t w e e n  t h e  U h i t e d  S t a t e s  a n d  t h e  S o v i e t  U h i o n  m i g h t  h a v e  b e e n  
v i e w e d  w i t h  h e s i t a t i o n  i n  l i g h t  o f  t h e  N o v e m b e r ,  1 9 5 8  S o v i e t  
n o t e  t o  s e t t l e  t h e  B e r l i n  q u e s t i o n  w i t h i n  s i x  m o n t h s .  B u t  t h i s  
c a n  b e  v i e w e d  a s  m e r e  s p e c u l a t i o n  i n  l i g h t  o f  t h e  c o n d u c t  o f  
S o v i e t  d i p l o m a c y  i n  1 9 5 9 » ^  T h e  y e a r  1 9 5 9  b e g a n  w i t h  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n  
i l l u s t r a t i n g  i t s  a c h i e v e m e n t s  i n  t e c h n o l o g y  a n d  a t  t h e  s a m e  t i m e  
b u i l d i n g  a  b a s i s  f o r  r e l a x i n g  t e n s i o n s  b e t w e e n  t h e  g r e a t  p o w e r s .
O n  J a n u a r y  2 ,  1 9 5 9  t h e  c o s m i c  r o c k e t  L u n i k  b e g a n  t h e  f i r s t  
i n t e r p l a n e t a r y  f l i g h t  o n l y  t o  f a i l  i n  o r b i t i n g  t h e  m o o n . 2  T h i s  
s c i e n t i f i c  a c h i e v e m e n t  w a s  v i e w e d  b y  K h r u s h c h e v  a s  a n  e x a m p l e  o f  
t h e  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  s k i l l  o f  t h e  S o v i e t  p e o p l e .  T o  K h r u s h c h e v ,  t h e  
s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  s u c h  a c h i e v e m e n t s  s h o u l d  b e  u n d e r s t o o d  i n  t e r m s  
o f  t h e  r e a l i z a t i o n  o f  a  s e v e n - y e a r  p l a n  o f  e c o n o m i c  d e v e l o p m e n t .
F o r  K h r u s h c h e v ,  t h i s  e c o n o m i c  d e v e l o p m e n t  w a s  b o t h  a  c h a l l e n g e  
a n d  a n  o p p o r t u n i t y .  " T h e  f u n d a m e n t a l  p r o b l e m  o f  t h e  c o m i n g  s e v e n  
y e a r s  i s  t o  m a k e  t h e  u t m o s t  t i m e  g a i n  i n  s o c i a l i s m ' s  p e a c e f u l
I v / h i l e  t h e  g e n e r a l  t o n e  o f  U n i t e d  s t a t e s  p o l i c y  i n  1 9 5 9  
v / a s  t o  m o v e  w i t h  r e l u c t a n c e  t o  t h e  c o n f e r e n c e  t a b l e  w i t h  t h e  
S o v i e t  U n i o n ,  K h r u s h c h e v ' s  c a l l  f o r  n e g o t i a t e d  s e t t l e m e n t  t o  t h e  
p r o b l e m s  b e t w e e n  E a s t  a n d  V / e s t  d i d  l e a v e  t h e  i m p r e s s i o n  w i t h i n  t h e  
S t a t e  D e p a r t m e n t  t h a t  t h e  B e r l i n  t h r e a t  w a s  n o t  t o  b e  t a k e n  t o o  
s e r i o u s l y .  F o r  e x a m p l e ,  D e p u t y  U n d e r - S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  
R o b e r t  T v î u r p h y  s t a t e d  o n  A p r i l  1 3 ,  1 9 5 9 »  " I  s t a r t  f r o m  t h e  p r e m i s e  
t h a t  t h e  S o v i e t  l e a d e r s h i p  d o e s  n o t  w a n t  w a r ,  a n d  w e  k n o w  t h a t  w e  
d o  n o t  w a n t  i t .  I  j u s t  d o n ' t  b e l i e v e  t h a t  a n  a l l - o u t  n u c l e a r  w a r  
i s  g o i n g  t o  h a p p e n  b y  s h e e r  a c c i d e n t .  T h e r e f o r e ,  w e  d o  n o t  
a p p r o a c h  t h e s e  n e g o t i a t i o n s  ( o n  B e r l i n )  w e i g h e d  d o w n  b y  f e a r  a n d _  
a p p r e h e n s i o n  o f  m u t u a l  d e s t r u c t i o n . " D e p a r t m e n t  o f  S t a t e  B u l l e t i n  
X X X X I  ( M a y  4 ,  1 9 5 9 ) ,  p .  6 3 1 .
2 i n n i k  w a s  t h e  f i r s t  o f  a  s e r i e s  o f  S o v i e t  s u c c e s s e s  i n  
s p a c e  d u r i n g  1 9 5 9 ®  I n  S e p t e m b e r ,  a  S o v i e t  s a t e l l i t e  m a d e  d i r e c t  
c o n t a c t  w i t h  t h e  m o o n ,  a n d  i n  O c t o b e r ,  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n  p u t  t h e  
f i r s t  r o c k e t  i n t o  l u n a r  o r b i t .
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e c o n o m i c  c o m p e t i t i o n  w i t h  c a p i t a l i s m .
K h r u s h c h e v ' s  p r e s c r i p t i o n  f o r  t h e  t i m e  p e r i o d  1 9 5 9  t h r o u g h  
1965 w a s  e m p h a s i z e d  i n  s e v e r a l  w a y s .  I n  t h e  b a c k g r o u n d  t o  
K h r u s h c h e v ' s  s p e e c h  w a s  t h e  v i s i t  o f  M i k o y a n  t o  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s .
I t  i s  s i g n i f i c a n t  f o r  t h e  t o n e  K h r u s h c h e v  d e s i r e d  t o  s e t  f o r  t h e  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p o l i t i c s  i n  1 9 5 9  t h a t  M i k o y a n  v i s i t e d  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  
a n d  h i s  r e t u r n  t o  t h e  S o v i e t  U h i o n  c o i n c i d e d  w i t h  K h r u s h c h e v ' s  
s p e e c h  o n  J a n u a r y  2 ? t h .
I n  t h e  a d d r e s s  t o  t h e  C o n g r e s s ,  K h r u s h c h e v  e s t a b l i s h e d  a  
m o d e r a t e  t o n e  t o  t h e  S o v i e t  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  b y  o p e n i n g  h i s  
c o m m e n t s  o n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p o l i t i c s  w i t h  a  r e f e r e n c e  t o  t h e  
n e c e s s i t y  o f  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n  c o m p l e t i n g  t h e  s e v e n - y e a r  p l a n .
T h i s  s e v e n - y e a r  p l a n  c o u l d  n o t  b e  c o m p l e t e d ,  K h r u s h c h e v  b e l i e v e d ,  
u n l e s s  t h e r e  w a s  " a  b r e a k  t o  t h e  i m p a s s e  o n  t h e  d i s a r m a m e n t  
i s s u e . "  K h r u s h c h e v  c o n c l u d e d  t h i s  w a s  " t h e  t a s k  o f  t a s k s  t o d a y .
I h  a d d i t i o n ,  K h r u s h c h e v  s t r e s s e d  t h e  e c o n o m i c  s u c c e s s  o f  t h e  
S o v i e t  U n i o n  c o m p a r e d  w i t h  p r e r e v o l u t i o n a r y  days.3  H i s  a t t e n t i o n  
t o  a  s e t  o f  s t a t i s t i c s  t h a t  w o u l d  s e e m  t o  b e  s t r i c t l y  a n  i n t e r n a l  
m a t t e r  w a s  d e s i g n e d  t o  i n f o r m  t h e  w o r l d  a n d  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l
^Premier Nikita Khrushchev, op. cit.
^Khrushchev stated; "The seven-year plan is a fresh 
expression of the Leninist peaceful policy of the Soviet Union. 
Fulfillment of this plan will play a tremendous role in solving 
the fundamental problem of our time - the preservation of world 
peace." Ibid.
3  Ex amples of this comparison of the past with 1 9 5 9  were: 
"V/e nov/ produce more steel and oil in a single month than in the 
whole of 1913. And as much electric power is generated in three 
days as was generated in pre-revolutionary Russia in a year. " 
Premier Nikita Khrushchev, ibid.
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C o m m u n i s t  m o v e m e n t  t h a t  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n  w a s  n o t  g o i n g  t o  
s a c r i f i c e  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  b e i n g  t h e  g r e a t  e c o n o m i c  p o w e r  i n  
t h e  w o r l d ,  w h e n  t h i s  f o r m  o f  s u c c e s s  w a s  s o  n e a r  a n d  t h e  r e a l  
b a s i s  f o r  a l l  o t h e r  f o r m s  o f  p o l i t i c a l  p o w e r . ^  A  s t a t e m e n t  o f  
t h i s  n a t u r e  a t  t h i s  t i m e  w a s  v e r y  s i g n i f i c a n t .  O n  t h e  o n e  h a n d ,  
t h e  p r o p a g a n d a  a f f e c t  w a s  i m m e d i a t e .
V / h i l e  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n  w a s  s t r e s s i n g  s u c c e s s  b y  w o r d  a n d  
d e e d ,  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  w a s  r e c o v e r i n g  f r o m  a  r e c e s s i o n ,  a n d  
a t t e m p t i n g  t o  a c h i e v e  e c o n o m i c  v i a b i l i t y  b y  c o n f i n i n g  m i l i t a r y  
e x p e n d i t u r e s  a n d  s e a r c h i n g  f o r  w a y s  t o  r e s t o r e  t h e  b a l a n c e  o f  
p a y m e n t s  i n  f a v o r  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s .  I n  t h e  S t a t e  o f  t h e  
u n i o n  m e s s a g e .  P r e s i d e n t  E i s e n h o w e r  e m p h a s i z e d  t h e  n e e d  t o  
" p r o m o t e  s t r e n g t h "  o f  t h i s  c o u n t r y  i n  m a t t e r s  o f  e c o n o m i c s ,  
s i n c e  t h i s  w a s  t h e  b a s i s  o f  " s e c u r i t y  a n d  o p p o r t u n i t y "  f o r  t h e  
U n i t e d  S t a t e s . 2
C o m m u n i s t  C h i n a  s h a r e d  w i t h  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  a  b a s i c  
c o n c e r n  f o r  i n t e r n a l  p r o b l e m s  d u r i n g  1 9 5 9 *  T h e  G r e a t  I ^ a p  F o r w a r d
^ K h r u s h c h e v  s t a t e d :  " T h e r e  i s  n o t  t h e  s l i g h t e s t  d o u b t  
t h a t  t h e  8 . 6 ^  a v e r a g e  a n n u a l  g r o w t h  o f  i n d u s t r i a l  o u t p u t  
d e s i g n a t e d  i n  t h e  s e v e n - y e a r  p l a n  w i l l  n o t  o n l y  b e  r e a c h e d ,  b u t  
e x c e e d e d .  E v i d e n t l y  t h e  c a p i t a l i s t  c o u n t r i e s ,  t o o ,  w i l l  n o t  
s t a n d  s t i l l .  I t  m a y  b e  p r e s u m e d  t h a t  i n  t h e  n e x t  f e w  y e a r s  U . S .  
i n d u s t r i a l  o u t p u t  w i l l  g r o w  a b o u t  Z% a n n u a l l y .  T h a t  h a s  b e e n  t h e  
r a t e  o f  d e v e l o p m e n t  i n  A m e r i c a n  i n d u s t r y  i n  r e c e n t  y e a r s . "  H e  
c o n t i n u e d :  " T h e  p o p u l a t i o n  i n  t h e  U S S R  e v i d e n t l y  w i l l  b e  a b o u t  
15 ^  t o  2 0 ^  l a r g e r  t h a n  i n  t h e  U . S . A .  H e n c e ,  i n  p e r  c a p i t a  
r e c k o n i n g ,  i t  w i l l  p r o b a b l y  t a k e  u s  a n o t h e r  f i v e  y e a r s  a f t e r  
c o m p l e t i n g  t h e  s e v e n - y e a r  p l a n  t o  o v e r t a k e  a n d  s u r p a s s  t h e  
U n i t e d  S t a t e s  i n  i n d u s t r i a l  o u t p u t . "  I b i d .
2President Dwight D. Eisenhower, op. cit., p. 1.
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w a s  f a i l i n g . 1  O n  A u g u s t  26, 1959* t h e  C e n t r a l  C o m m i t t e e  o f  t h e  
C o m m u n i s t  P a r t y  p u b l i c l y  a d m i t t e d  t h e  p r o d u c t i o n  f i g u r e s  a n n o u n c e d  
f o r  1958 h a d  b e e n  e x a g g e r a t e d  a n d  t h e r e  w a s  a  n e e d  t o  r e d u c e  t h e  
e c o n o m i c  g o a l s  f o r  1 9 5 9 » ^  B e f o r e  A u g u s t ,  t h e r e  w a s  e v i d e n c e  
C h i n a ' s  s t a b i l i t y  w a s  o p e n  t o  q u e s t i o n .  T h e r e  i s  l i t t l e  d o u b t  
t h a t  K h r u s h c h e v  e n j o y e d  t h e  i n a b i l i t y  o f  C h i n a  t o  p a s s  b y  t h e  
S o v i e t  U n i o n  a n d  a t t a i n  t h e  c o m m u n i s t  s t a t e  w i t h  i t s  c o m m u n e  
system. 3  H e  m i g h t  h a v e  h a d  t h i s  i n  m i n d  i n  h i s  s p e e c h ,  w h e n  h e  
s t a t e d  I " w h e n  t h e  U . S . S . R .  b e c o m e s  t h e  w o r l d ' s  l e a d i n g  i n d u s t r i a l  
p o w e r , '  a n d  ' w h e n  t h e  C h i n e s e  P e o p l e ' s  R e p u b l i c  b e c o m e s  a  m i g h t y  
i n d u s t r i a l  p o w e r . P r e m i e r  C h o u  E n - l a i  l e d  t h e  C h i n e s e  d e l e g a t i o n  
t o  t h e  C o n g r e s s .  K h r u s h c h e v ' s  r e f e r e n c e  t o  t h e  s e c o n d  p l a c e  
p o s i t i o n  o f  C h i n a  i n  t h e  f u t u r e  m u s t  h a v e  b e e n  v e r y  h a r d  f o r  
C h o u  E n - L a i  t o  a c c e p t .  Y e t ,  h e  d i d .  N o t  o n l y  d i d  t h e  C h i n e s e  
P r e m i e r  e n d o r s e  K h r u s h c h e v ' s  a d d r e s s  t o  t h e  C o n g r e s s ,  b u t  C h o u  E n - l a i
^ T h e  G r e a t  L e a p  F o r w a r d  m s  a n  e c o n o m i c  p r o g r a m  c o n c e i v e d  
b y  1.̂ 0 T s e - t u n g  " t o  f u r t h e r  a c c e l e r a t e  C h i n a ' s  e c o n o m i c  d e v e l o p ­
m e n t  o n  t h e  h e e l s  o f  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n b  o r b i t i n g  o f  S p u t n i k  i n  
O c t o b e r ,  1 9 5 7 * "  T h e  p r o g r a m  b e g a n  i n  # r c h ,  1 9 5 8  w i t h  t h e  f i r s t  
c o m m u n e  e s t a b l i s h e d  c a l l e d  S p u t n i k  i n  H o n a n  P r o v i n c e .
Franklin W. Houn, op. cit., p. I65.
2 P r e m i e r  C h o u  E n - l a i ,  " G r e a t  L e a p  F o r w a r d , "  P e k i n g  R e v i e w  I I I  
S e p t e m b e r  1 ,  1 9 5 9 ,  p p .  5 - 1 9 »  O f  a l l  t h e  f a c t o r s  b r i n g i n g  a b o u t  t h e  
f a i l u r e  o f  t h e  G r e a t  L e a p  F o r w a r d ,  t h e  c o n s e n s u s  s e e m s  t o  b e  t h a t  
t h e  c o m m u n e  m o v e m e n t  a n d  t h e  e m p h a s i s  u p o n  h e a v y  i n d u s t r y  w e r e  t h e  
p r i m a r y  f a c t o r s .  S e e  F r a n k l i n  W .  H o u n ,  l o c .  c i t . ,  p p .  1 8 1 - 1 8 3 *
3 E v e r  s i n c e  t h e  a n n o u n c e m e n t  o f  t h e  c o m m u n e  s y s t e m  i n  
N a r c h ,  19 5 8 , K h r u s h c h e v  h a d  t a k e n  t h e  o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  b e l i t t l e  t h e  
s y s t e m .  I n  h i s  v i s i t  t o  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s ,  M i k o y a n  h a d  s t a t e d  
" t h e  U . S . S . R .  h a d  a l r e a d y  t r i e d  o u t  t h e  i d e a  a n d  d r o p p e d  i t  a s  
i m p r a c t i c a l . "  N e w  Y o r k  T i m e s  J a n u a r y  2 5 ,  1 9 5 9 *
^Premier Nikita Khrushchev, op. cit., p. 20.
167r e m a i n e d  i n  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n  a f t e r  t h e  C o n g r e s s  a n d  n e g o t i a t e d  
a n  a g r e e m e n t  f o r  i n d u s t r i a l  a s s i s t a n c e . ^  T h i s  w a s  v e r y  
s i g n i f i c a n t  i n  s u g g e s t i n g  t h a t  C h i n a ' s  e c o n o m i c  p r o g r a m  w a s n ' t  
w o r k i n g  f o r  i t  h a d  b e e n  n o  o n e  l e s s  t h a n  Bfe.o T s e - t u n g ,  w h o  
c o n c l u d e d :  " C h i n a  c a n  n e v e r  w i n  g e n u i n e  i n d e p e n d e n c e  a n d  e q u a l i t y  
b y  r e l y i n g  u p o n  f o r e i g n  a i d .
Chou En-3ai's assistance agreement with Khrushchev disclosed 
the inability of China to go its own way in an economic develop­
ment program. It did something else for China. During 1959 
there were signs of problems within the leadership ranks of 
China. O n  April 2?th, the National People's Congress elected 
Liu Shao-chi to a four year term as Chairman of the Chinese 
People's Republic, succeeding Bfe,o Tse-tung, who continued as 
Chairman of the Communist Party.3 This signified the triumph 
for the moment of Liu Shao-chi*s more pragmatic approach to 
economic development and international politics.^ At the same 
Congress, Peng Teh-huai was re-elected as Defense Minister. (Diis 
decision reflected the strength of Liu Shao-chi's more pragmatic
^ R i c h a r d  P .  S t e b b i n s ,  o p .  c i t . ,  p .  3 2 4 .
^ M a o  T s e - t u n g ,  " W e  M a s t  L e a r n  T o  D o  E c o n o m i c  W o r k ,  "
S e l e c t e d  W o r k s  I I I ,  o p .  c i t . ,  p .  3 0 7 »
3 F r a n k l i n  W .  H o u n ,  op. cit., p. 95»
^ L i u  S h a o - c h i  h a d  n e v e r  t a k e n  a  p o s i t i o n  a g a i n s t  f o r e i g n  
a i d ,  a n d  h a d  b e e n  k n o w n  t o  f a v o r  a  c e r t a i n  a m o u n t  o f  c a p i t a l i s m  i n  
C h i n a .  A t  t h e  C h e n g t u  c o n f e r e n c e  o f  p a r t y  l e a d e r s  i n  M a r c h ,  1958, 
w h e r e  t h e  g r e a t  l e a p  f o r w a r d  w a s  f o r m a l i z e d ,  L i u  S h a o - c h i  h a d  l e d  
t h e  o p p o s i t i o n  t o  t h e  p r o g r a m  o f  t h e  c o m m u n e .  " F i g h t  f o r  t h e  
T h o r o u g h  C r i t i c i s m  a n d  R e p u d i a t i o n  o f  t h e  T o p  p a r t y  P e r s o n  i n  
A u t h o r i t y  T a k i n g  t h e  C a p i t a l i s t  R o a d , ” l i b e r a t i o n  A r m y  D a i l y  
XVI ( A p r i l  14, 1967), p. 8.
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a p p r o a c h  t o  p o l i c y .  B u t  t h i s  w o u l d  a l l  e n d  o f  S e p t e m b e r  1 7 t h ,  
w h e n  M a o  T s e - t u n g  b e g a n  a  s e r i e s  o f  p o l i t i c a l  m o v e s  a g a i n s t  
L i u  S h a o - c h i .  I n  t h i s  c a s e ,  P e n g  T e h - h u a i  w a s  r e p l a c e d  b y  
M a r s h a l l  L i n  P i a i o  a s  M i n i s t e r  o f  D e f e n s e . ^  I t  i s  f r o m  t h i s  
d a t e  f o r w a r d  t h a t  t h e  b a s i s  f o r  t h e  C u l t u r a l  R e v o l u t i o n  s t a r t e d .  
T h u s ,  t h e  R e v o l u t i o n  w a s  a  v e r y  i m p o r t a n t  p a r t  o f  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e s  
b e t w e e n  IVëlo T s e - t u n g  a n d  L i u  S h a o - c h i . %
C o m m u n i s t  C h i n a  w a s  e x p e r i e n c i n g  a n  i n t e r n a l  t u r m o i l  
r e g a r d i n g  l e a d e r s h i p  a n d  p o l i c y  f r o m  M a r c h ,  1 9 5 8  t h r o u g h  t h e  
e l e v a t i o n  o f  L i n  P i a i o  a s  IVË.0 T s e - t u n g ' s  s u c c e s s o r  o n  
A p r i l  1 4 ,  1 9 6 9 .3  B u t  t h i s  w a s  n o t  a l l  C h i n a  w a s  s u f f e r i n g  f r o m  
i n  t h e  i960*s .  I n  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y .  C o m m u n i s t  C h i n a  b e g a n  t o  l o s e  
a n  e f f e c t i v e  v o i c e  i n  h e r  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  t h e  u n d e r d e v e l o p e d  
n a t i o n - s t a t e s .
O n  A u g u s t  2 8 ,  1 9 5 9 »  I n d i a ' s  P r i m e  M i n i s t e r  J a w a h a r l a l  N e h r u  
d i s c l o s e d  t h a t  C o m m u n i s t  C h i n a  h a d  c o n d u c t e d  a  s e r i e s  o f  o f f e n s i v e  
m i l i t a r y  o p e r a t i o n s  f r o m  T i b e t  i n t o  I n d i a n  t e r r i t o r y . ^  N e h r u  
n o t e d  t h a t  t h e  a g g r e s s i v e  p a t t e r n  o f  t h e  C h i n e s e  b e g a n  i n  J a n u a r y ,  
w h e n  P e k i n g  h a d  s e n t  a  f o r m a l  d i p l o m a t i c  n o t e  t o  N e h r u  i n  w h i c h  
t h e  C h i n e s e  d e n i e d  t h e  a c c e p t a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  b o u n d a r y  l i n e  b e t w e e n
^ F r a n k l i n  W .  H o u n ,  o p .  c i t . ,  p .  9 5 »
^ A .  D o a k  B a r n e t t ,  " Q h e  C h a n g i n g  C o u r s e  o f  R e v o l u t i o n  i n  
C o m m u n i s t  C h i n a , "  A n  A d d r e s s  d e l i v e r e d  a t  G u s t a v u s  A d o l p h u s  
C o l l e g e ,  S t .  P e t e r ,  M i n n e s o t a  o n  J a n u a r y  2 2 ,  I968.
3 • ' C o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  C o m m u n i s t  P a r t y  o f  C h i n a , ”  C u r r e n t  
H i s t o r y  L  ( S e p t e m b e r ,  1 9 6 9 ) , p .  I 7 6 .
^Richard P. stebbins, op. cit., p. 299.
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T i b e t  a n d  I n d i a .  T h r o u g h o u t  1 9 5 9  P e k i n g  t h r e a t e n e d  t h e  b o u n d a r y  
b e t w e e n  T i b e t  a n d  I n d i a  w i t h  n o t  o n l y  w o r d s ,  b u t  d e e d s ,  m  1 9 5 9 »  
C o m m u n i s t  C h i n a  c a r r i e d  o u t  t h r e e  m i l i t a r y  o p e r a t i o n s  i n  t h e  
l a d a k h  r e g i o n .  T h i s  a c t i o n  c o u p l e d  w i t h  t h e  s u p p r e s s i o n  o f  a  
n a t i o n a l i s t i c  m o v e m e n t  i n  T i b e t  l e f t  P e k i n g  w i t h  l i t t l e  r e s e r v e  
o f  f r i e n d s h i p  f r o m  h e r  n e i g h b o r s  o r  p e e r s  i n  t h e  t h i r d  w o r l d  
b l o c .
W h i l e  C o m m u n i s t  C h i n a  w a s  p u r s u i n g  a  v e r y  m i l i t a n t  a g g r e s s i v e  
s t a n c e  i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p o l i t i c s ,  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n  p u r s u e d  a  
r e l a x a t i o n  o f  t e n s i o n  b e t w e e n  t h e  b i - p o l a r  p o w e r s  a n d  a t  t h e  
s a m e  t i m e  e s t a b l i s h e d  h e r s e l f  a s  a  f r i e n d  o f  I n d i a  a n d  t h e  r e s t  
o f  t h e  t h i r d  w o r l d .  T h i s  p o s t u r e  f o r  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n  b e c a m e  
c l e a r  i n  K h r u s h c h e v ' s  a d d r e s s  t o  t h e  T w e n t y - F i r s t  C o n g r e s s .
I n s t e a d  o f  t h r e a t e n i n g  I n d i a  a n d  t h e  r e s t  o f  t h e  t h i r d  w o r l d ,  
K h r u s h c h e v  a p p e a l e d  " t h a t  t h e  e c o n o m y  i s  t h e  c h i e f  f i e l d  i n  w h i c h  
t h e  p e a c e f u l  c o m p e t i t i o n  b e t w e e n  s o c i a l i s m  a n d  c a p i t a l i s m  i s  
u n f o l d i n g . " !  T h i s  h a d  g r e a t  a p p e a l  i n  t h e  u n d e r d e v e l o p e d  w o r l d .
C n  t h e  o n e  h a n d ,  i t s  a p p e a l  e m a n a t e d  f r o m  t h e i r  q u e s t  f o r  e c o n o m i c  
d e v e l o p m e n t .  A t  t h e  s a m e  t i m e ,  t h i s  e m p h a s i s  i n  t h e  d i r e c t i o n  o f  
S o v i e t  p o l i c y  w a s  r e c e i v e d  i n  a  m o s t  p o s i t i v e  m a n n e r ,  b e c a u s e  o f  
t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  i n w a r d  l o o k i n g  o r i e n t a t i o n  t o  p o l i c y  a n d  t h e  
e v i d e n c e  o f  a g g r e s s i o n  o n  t h e  p a r t  o f  C o m m u n i s t  C h i n a  t o w a r d  
I n d i a  a n d  T i b e t .
I n  s u m m a r y ,  t h e  y e a r  1 9 5 9  w a s  t h e  p r a g m a t i c  e v i d e n c e  o f  
w h a t  P r e m i e r  K h r u s h c h e v  h a d  m e a n t  b y  t h e  p o l i c y  o f  p e a c e f u l
^Premier Nikita Khrushchev, op. cit., p. 1?.
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c o e x i s t e n c e  i n  h i s  a d d r e s s  t o  t h e  T w e n t i e t h  P a r t y  C o n g r e s s  i n  
F e b r u a r y ,  1 9 5 6 .  m  1 9 5 9 ,  K h r u s h c h e v  w a n t e d  a  s u m m i t  c o n f e r e n c e  
i n  o r d e r  t o  a c h i e v e  a  d e t e n t e  w i t h  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  o n  t h e  
p r o b l e m s  o f  B e r l i n  a n d  d i s a r m a m e n t .  T h i s  w a s  i n  p a r t  a  t a c t i c a l  
m o v e  b y  K h r u s h c h e v  t o  g i v e  t h e  S o v i e t  u n i o n  t h e  n e c e s s a r y  
t i m e  t o  d e a l  w i t h  C o m m u n i s t  b l o c  p r o b l e m s  t h a t  w e r e  t e m p o r a r i l y  
s u b m e r g e d  u n d e r  t h e  e c o n o m i c  a n d  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  a c h i e v e m e n t s  o f  
t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n .  K h r u s h c h e v  c o u l d  u n d e r s t a n d a b l y  c o n c l u d e  t h a t  
1 9 5 9  w a s  t h e  t i m e  t o  c o n s o l i d a t e  t h e  S o v i e t  U h i o n  v i s - a - v i s  t h e  
g o v e r n m e n t  i n  P e k i n g . ,  a n d  t h e  U h i t e d  S t a t e s .
T h e  s e c o n d  f a c t o r  t h a t  w a s  i m p o r t a n t  i n  t h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  
o f  t h e  u n i t e d  N a t i o n s  p r e s e n c e  w a s  t h e  p e r s o n a l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  
o f  D a g  i W m a r s k j o l d  a s  a  d e c i s i o n - m a k e r .
O n  S e p t e m b e r  2 3 ,  I 9 6 0 ,  S o v i e t  P r e m i e r  N i k i t a  S .  K h r u s h c h e v ,
h e a d i n g  t h e  S o v i e t  d e l e g a t i o n  t o  t h e  o p e n i n g  o f  t h e  f i f t e e n t h
s e s s i o n  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s  G e n e r a l  A s s e m b l y ,  a d d r e s s e d  t h e
m e m b e r  n a t i o n - s t a t e s .  A m o n g  t h e  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  p u t  f o r t h  b y
t h e  S o v i e t  P r e m i e r  w a s  t h e  s u g g e s t i o n  t h a t  t h e  S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l
b e  r e p l a c e d  b y  a  t r i u m v i r a t e . ^  K h r u s h c h e v  b e l i e v e d  t h i s  c h a n g e
w a s  n e e d e d ,  b e c a u s e :
T o d a y  o n l y  o n e  m a n  i s  t h e  i n t e r p r e t e r  a n d  t h e  
e x e c u t o r  o f  a l l  t h e  d e c i s i o n s  o f  t h e  A s s e m b l y  
a n d  t h e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l . 2
^ T r i u m v i r a t e  m e a n t  t h e  " e x e c u t i v e  b o d y  s h o u l d  r e p r e s e n t  
t h e  s t a t e s  p a r t i e s  t o  t h e  m i l i t a r y  b l o c s  o f  t h e  W e s t e r n  p o w e r s ,  
t h e  s o c i a l i s t  s t a t e s ,  a n d  t h e  n e u t r a l i s t  s t a t e s . "  P r e m i e r  
N i k i t a  S .  K h r u s h c h e v  q u o t e d  i n  " K h r u s h c h e v  S p e a k s  A t  T h e  
U n i t e d  N a t i o n s ,  S e p t e m b e r ,  I 9 6 0 , "  C u r r e n t  H i s t o r y  X X X I X  
( N o v e m b e r ,  i 9 6 0 ),  p .  3 0 ^ .
2 P r e m i e r  N i k i t a  S .  K h r u s h c h e v ,  " R o l e  a n d  P l a c e  o f  t h e  U N  
E x e c u t i v e  B o d y , "  V i t a l  S p e e c h e s  X X V I I  ( N o v e m b e r  1 ,  I 96 O ) ,  p .  4 9 <
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w i t h  a  r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  t h e  c o n s t a n t s  c o n t r o l l i n g  t h e  i m p l e m e n t ­
a t i o n  o f  t h e  p r o v i s i o n s  i n  t h e  C h a r t e r  r e l a t e d  t o  p e a c e k e e p i n g .
T h e  k e y  c o n s t a n t  w a s  t h e  r e c o g n i t i o n  t h a t  t h e  u n i t e d  N a t i o n s  
w a s  a  c r e a t i o n  o f  t h e  n a t i o n - s t a t e s ,  a n d  t h u s  m u s t  r e f l e c t  w h a t  
t h e s e  n a t i o n - s t a t e s  w o u l d  a l l o w  i n  t e r m s  o f  i n f l u e n c e  a n d  
a u t h o r i t y  f o r  t h e  w o r l d  o r g a n i z a t i o n  t o  s e t t l e  a  d i s p u t e .
W i t h  t h i s  k e y  c o n s t a n t  e l e m e n t ,  i n  m i n d ,  d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  
f o r  t h e  S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l  b e g a n  w i t h  a  r e c o g n i t i o n  t h a t  h i s  
c o m p e t e n c e  t o  i n f l u e n c e  d i s p u t i n g  n a t i o n - s t a t e s  s t a r t e d  w i t h  h i s  
n e u t r a l  p o s i t i o n  d u r i n g  t h e  f o r m u l a t i o n  o f  a  m a n d a t e  b y  t h e  
n a t i o n - s t a t e s  f o r  t h e  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s  t o  a c t . ^  H e  c a n  r e p o r t ,  
a s  H a m m a r s k j o l d  d i d ,  t h e  r e q u e s t  o f  a  n a t i o n - s t a t e  l i k e  l a o s  f o r  
U n i t e d  l o t i o n s ' s  a s s i s t a n c e .  A f t e r  t h e  r e p o r t i n g  s t e p ,  i t  i s  t h e  
n a t i o n - s t a t e ' s  d e c i s i o n  i n  t h e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l  t h a t  w i l l  d i c t a t e  
w h a t  t y p e  o f  i n i t i a l  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s ' s  p r e s e n c e  w i l l  b e  e s t a b l i s h e d .
S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l  D a g  H ^ m m a r s k j o l d  w a s  a n  i d e a l  d e c i s i o n ­
m a k e r  f o r  t h e  U h i t e d  N a t i o n s ,  b e c a u s e  h e  u n d e r s t o o d  t h e  n e c e s s i t y  
o f  s e e k i n g  o u t  a n  e q u i l i b r i u m  a m o n g  t h e  n a t i o n - s t a t e s ,  b e f o r e  
t h e  p e a c e f u l  p r e s s u r e  o f  t h e  U h i t e d  N a t i o n s  c o u l d  b e  applied.2
i T h e  d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  a p p r o a c h  u t i l i z e d  i n  t h e  a n a l y s i s  
o f  D a g  H a m m a r s k j o l d  w a s  o b t a i n e d  f r o m  R o b e r t  E .  C e c i l e ' s  s t u d y  
" A  F r a m e  o f  R e f e r e n c e  f o r  t h e  S t u d y  o f  A m e r i c a n  F o r e i g n  P o l i c y -  
N & k i n g ,  •' a p p e a r i n g  i n  t h e  M i n n e s o t a  A c a d e m y  o f  S c i e n c e  X X X I V
(1 9 6 7 ), p p .  131 - 137 .
2  T h e  w r i t e r ' s  c o n c l u s i o n s  r e g a r d i n g  D a g  H a m m a r s k  j o l d  
w e r e  o b t a i n e d  f r o m  D a g  H a m m a r s k  j o l d  b t o k i n g s  ( N e w  Y o r k *  A l f r e d  
A .  K n o p f ,  1 9 6 5 ) ;  B n e r y  K e l e n  H a m m a r s k . j o l d  ( N e w  Y o r k *  G. P .  P u t n a m ,  
1966), J o h n  L i n d b e r g ,  " T h e  S e c r e t  L i f e  o f  D a g  H a m m a r s k jo l d , "
L o o k  ( J u n e  3 0 , 1 9 6 4 ) ,  p p .  6 6 - 7 1 . »  a n d  s e v e r a l  o t h e r  a r t i c l e s .
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H e  w a s  t r a i n e d  t o  b e  n e u t r a l  i n  t h e  f o r m u l a t i o n  o f  p o l i c y  d u r i n g  
t h e  t w e n t y  y e a r s  o f  e x p e r i e n c e  i n  t h e  S w e d i s h  g o v e r n m e n t .  A s  
a  f i n a n c e  a n d  f o r e i g n  m i n i s t e r ,  H a n m i a r s k j o l d  b e c a m e  a c q u a i n t e d  
w i t h  t h e  n e c e s s i t y  t o  " t r a n s f o r m  h i m s e l f  i n t o  a  t o o l  o f  t h e  p o w e r s  
t h a t  b e " ^  w i t h o u t  c o m p r o m i s i n g  i n d i v i d u a l  c o n v i c t i o n s .
T h i s  d i r e c t i o n  t o  H a m m a r s k j o l d ' s  c o m p e t e n c e  a s  a n  
a d m i n i s t r a t o r  w a s  m a i n t a i n e d  i n  t h e  S e c r e t a r i a t  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s .  
H a m m a r s k j o l d  a r t i c u l a t e d  t h i s  d i m e n s i o n  t o  h i s  d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  
s k i l l s  s t a t i n g :2
F r o m  g e n e r a t i o n s  o f  s o l d i e r s  a n d  g o v e r n m e n t  
o f f i c i a l s  o n  m y  f a t h e r ' s  s i d e  I  i n h e r i t e d  
a  b e l i e f  t h a t  n o  l i f e  w a s  m o r e  s a t i s f a c t o r y  
t h a n  o n e  o f  s e l f l e s s  s e r v i c e  t o  y o u r  c o u n t r y -  
o r  h u m a n i t y .  T h i s  s e r v i c e  r e q u i r e d  a  s a c r i f i c e  
o f  a l l  p e r s o n a l  i n t e r e s t s ,  b u t  l i k e w i s e  t h e  
c o u r a g e  t o  s t a n d  u p  u n f l i n c h i n g l y  f o r  y o u r  
c o n v i c t i o n s .
F r o m  s c h o l a r s  a n d  c l e r g y m e n  o n  m y  m o t h e r ' s  
s i d e  I  i n h e r i t e d  a  b e l i e f  t h a t ,  i n  t h e  v e r y  
r a d i c a l  s e n s e  o f  t h e  G o s p e l s ,  a l l  m e n  w e r e  
e q u a l s  a s  c h i l d r e n  o f  G o d ,  a n d  s h o u l d  b e  m e t  
a n d  t r e a t e d  b y  u s  a s  o u r  m a s t e r s .
F a i t h  i s  a  s t a t e  o f  t h e  m i n d  a n d  s o u l .  « . ,
T h e  l a n g u a g e  o f  r e l i g i o n  i s  a  s e t  o f  f o r m u l a s  
w h i c h  r e g i s t e r  a  b a s i c  s p i r i t u a l  e x p e r i e n c e .
I t  m u s t  n o t  b e  r e g a r d e d  a s  d e s c r i b i n g  i n  t e r m s  
t o  b e  d e f i n e d  b y  p h i l o s o p h y ,  t h e  r e a l i t y  w h i c h  
i s  a c c e s s i b l e  t o  o u r  s e n s e s  a n d  w h i c h  w e  c a n  
a n a l y z e  w i t h  t h e  t o o l s  o f  l o g i c .  I  w a s  l a t e  i n  
u n d e r s t a n d i n g  w h a t  t h i s  m e a n t .  V J h e n  I  f i n a l l y  
r e a c h e d  t h a t  p o i n t ,  t h e  b e l i e f s  i n  w h i c h  I  w a s  
o n c e  b r o u g h t  u p  a n d  w h i c h ,  i n  f a c t ,  h a d  g i v e n  
m y  l i f e  d i r e c t i o n  e v e n  w h i l e  m y  i n t e l l e c t  s t i l l  
c h a l l e n g e d  t h e i r  v a l i d i t y ,  w e r e  r e c o g n i z e d  
b y  m e  a s  m i n e  i n  t h e i r  o w n  r i g h t  a n d  b y  m y  f r e e
I j b h n  L i n d b e r g ,  " T h e  S e c r e t  L i f e  o f  D a g  H a m m a r s k j o l d , "  
L o o k  ( J u n e  6 , 1 9 6 4 ) ,  p .  6 ? .
^Dag Hammarskjold, op. cit., vii and viii.
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l i v e  a  l i f e  o f  a c t i v e  s o c i a l  s e r v i c e  i n  f u l l  
h a r m o n y  w i t h  h i m s e l f  a s  a  m e m b e r  o f  t h e  
c o m m u n i t y  o f  t h e  s p i r i t ,  I  f o u n d  i n  t h e  w r i t i n g s  
o f  t h o s e  g r e a t  m e d i e v a l  m y s t i c s  f o r  w h o m  
" s e l f - s u r r e n d e r "  h a d  b e e n  t h e  w a y  t o  s e l f -  
r e a l i z a t i o n ,  a n d  w h o  i n  " s i n g l e n e s s  o f  m i n d "  
a n d  " i n w a r d n e s s "  h a d  f o u n d  s t r e n g t h  t o  s a y  
y e s  t o  e v e r y  d e m a n d  w h i c h  t h e  n e e d s  o f  t h e i r  
n e i g h b o r s  m a d e  t h e m  f a c e ,  a n d  t o  s a y  y e s  a l s o  
t o  e v e r y  f a t e  l i f e  h a d  i n  s t o r e  f o r  t h e m  . . .
L o v e  —  t h a t  m u c h  m i s u s e d  a n d  m i s i n t e r p r e t e d  w o r d  - 
f o r  t h e m  m e a n t  s i m p l y  a n  o v e r f l o v / i n g  o f  t h e  
s t r e n g t h  w i t h  w h i c h  t h e y  f e l t  t h e m s e l v e s  f i l l e d  
w h e n  l i v i n g  i n  t r u e  s e l f - o b l i v i o n .  A n d  t h i s  l o v e  
f o u n d  n a t u r a l  e x p r e s s i o n  i n  a n  u n h e s i t a n t  f u l f i l l ­
m e n t  o f  d u t y  a n d  a n  u n r e s e r v e d  a c c e p t a n c e  o f  
l i f e ,  w h a t e v e r  i t  b r o u g h t  t h e m  p e r s o n a l l y  o f  
t o i l ,  s u f f e r i n g  —  o r  h a p p i n e s s . 1
D a g  H a m m a r s k j o l d ' s  " s e l f - s u r r e n d e r *  a s  t h e  w a y  t o  ' s e l f -  
r e a l i z a t i o n "2 w a s  i n  p a r t  a c t e d  o u t  b a s e d  u p o n  c h i l d h o o d  
e x p e r i e n c e s .  T w o  e x p e r i e n c e s  d o m i n a t e d  H a m m a r s k j o l d * s  l i f e .
T h e  f i r s t  h a d  t o  d o  w i t h  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  h e  w a s  t h e  y o u n g e s t  o f  
f o u r  b o y s  i n  a  f a m i l y  w i t h  a  m o t h e r  w i s h i n g  t o  h a v e  a  g i r l .  
A g n e s  H a m m a r s k j o l d  d i d  n o t  t r y  t o  t u r n  D a g  i n t o  a  g i r l  a s  s o m e  
a u t h o r s  h a v e  s u g g e s t e d ,  b u t  t h e r e  w a s  a  v e r y  i n t i m a t e  r e l a t i o n ­
s h i p .  B n e r y  K e l e n  n o t e s  i
B u t  n o t h i n g  h a s  a  m o r e  l a s t i n g  e f f e c t  u p o n  t h e  
p e r s o n a l i t y  t h a n  t h e  p l a c e  a  c h i l d  o c c u p i e s  
i n  t h e  f a m i l y  h i e r a r c h y .  T h r o u g h o u t  h i s  l i f e ,  
n o  m a t t e r  h o w  h i g h  h e  r o s e ,  H a m m a r s k j o l d  r e m a i n e d  
s o m e t h i n g  o f  a  b a b y  b r o t h e r ,  a n d  h i s  f r i e n d s  
a n d  c o l l e a g u e s  d i d  n o t  f a i l  t o  n o t e  i n  h i m  " t h e  
p l a y f u l  l a d . " 3
^ D a g  H a m m a r s k j o l d ,  i b i d . ,  v i i i .
Z i b i d .
3 B n e r y  K e l e n  H a m m a r s k j o l d  ( N e w  Y o r k  * G . P .  P u t n a m ' s  S o n s ,  
1 9 6 6 ), p .  3 7 .
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H i s  t e n d e r  a t t a c h m e n t  t o  h i s  m o t h e r  n e v e r  w e a k e n e d ,  
a n d  e v e n  a s  U n d e r s e c r e t a r y  h e  c o n t i n u e d  t o  l i v e  
w i t h  h i s  f a m i l y  a t  t h e i r  S t o c k h o l m  h o u s e ;  h e  
n e v e r  o m i t t e d  t o  b r i n g i n g  f l o w e r s  t o  h e r  w h e n  h e  w e n t  
h o m e  f o r  l u n c h ;  n o r  d i d  A g n e s  H a m m a r s k j o l d  e v e r  
f o r g e t  t o  a d v i s e  h i m  t o  d r e s s  w a r m l y  w h e n  h e  w e n t  
o n  a  s k i - t o u r ,  o r  e v e r  c e a s e  t o  i m p l o r e  h i s  
c o l l e a g u e s  i n  t h e  T r e a s u r y  D e p a r t m e n t  n o t  t o  l e t  
h i m  w o r k  s o  h a r d .
T h e  S t o c k h o l m  h o u s e  w a s  o n l y  f i f t e e n  m i n u t e s '  
w a l k  a w a y  f r o m  t h e  T r e a s u r y  D e p a r t m e n t ,  h u t  i f  
D a g  w a s  d e l a y e d  i n  t h e  e v e n i n g ,  h e  t o o k  a  t a x i  
r a t h e r  t h a n  k e e p  h i s  m o t h e r  w a i t i n g .  A n d  o n c e ,  
t h e  s t o r y  g o e s ,  h e  w a s  a  q u a r t e r  o f  a n  h o u r  l a t e  
f o r  a  r e n d e z v o u s  w i t h  a  y o u n g  l a d y ,  h i s  o n l y  e x c u s e  
b e i n g  t h a t  h e  h a d  n o t  l i k e d  t o  i n t e r r u p t  a  
c o n v e r s a t i o n  w i t h  h i s  m o t h e r .
I i ' ! ^ y  o f  t h e  H a m m a r s k j o l d  m y s t e r i e s  h a v e  t h e i r  r o o t s  
i n  t h i s  d e e p  r a p p o r t  w i t h  h i s  m o t h e r :  h i s  c e l e b a c y ,  
h i s  a r d e n t  d e s i r e  t o  b e  w a n t e d  a n d  n e e d e d ,  t o  " b e l o n g ” ; 
h i s  w i l l i n g n e s s  t o  s u b m i t  t o  l o v i n g  c a r e  —  a n d  a l s o  
h i s  k n a c k  f o r  g e t t i n g  h i s  o w n  w a y .
A g n e s  H a m m a r s k j o l d  d i e d  i n  1 9 4 0 .  m  h e r  B i b l e  w a s  
f o u n d  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  i n s c r i p t i o n :
T h e  d a y  y o u  w e r e  b o r n ,  e v e r y b o d y  w a s  h a p p y —  
y o u  c r i e d  a l o n e .
H & k e  y o u r  l i f e  s u c h  t h a t  i n  y o u r  l a s t  h o u r ,  
a l l  o t h e r s  w e e p
A n d  y o u  a l o n e  a r e  w i t h o u t  a  t e a r  t o  s h e d .
T h e n  y o u  s h a l l  c a l m l y  f a c e  d e a t h  w h e n e v e r  
i t  c o m e s . 1
A  s e c o n d  c h i l d h o o d  e x p e r i e n c e  d o m i n a t i n g  D a g  H a m m a r s k j o l d * s  
l i f e  v / a s  c o n c e r n e d  w i t h  t h e  p u b l i c  t r e a t m e n t  o f  h i s  f a t h e r  
H j a i m e r  H a m m a r s k j o l d .  L i k e  D a g ' s  c l o s e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  w i t h  h i s  
m o t h e r ,  h i s  f a t h e r ' s  c o n d e m n a t i o n  b y  t h e  S w e d i s h  p e o p l e  
o r i e n t a t e d  t h e  f u t u r e  S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l  t o w a r d s  a  v o c a t i o n  f r e e  
f r o m  d i r e c t  c o n t a c t  w i t h  t h e  p u b l i c .  H a m m a r s k j o l d ' s  c o l l e a g u e
1 Bnery Kelen, ibid., pp. 37-38.
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t r a g e d y  j
H j a l r a a r  H a m m a r s k j o l d ' s  p o l i c y  o f  n e u t r a l i t y  
l e d  t o  t h e  A l l i e d  b l o c k a d e  o f  S w e d i s h  c o m m e r c e ,  
s e m i - s t a r v a t i o n  i n  t h e  c i t i e s  a n d  t h e  
i n f l a m m a t i o n  o f  t h e  t e n s e  p o l i t i c a l  s i t u a t i o n .
T h e  u s u a l l y  s t o l i d  a n d  p a t i e n t  p o p u l a c e  r i o t e d ,  
a n d  t h e  f e a r  o f  r e v o l u t i o n  s p r e a d ,  u n t i l ,  i n  
I V l a r c h ,  1 9 1 7 ,  K i n g  G u s t a f  V  s u d d e n l y  c a p i t u l a t e d ,  
b e f o r e  t h e  d e m o c r a t i c  o n s l a u g h t ,  l e a v i n g  t h e  
o l d  H a m m a r s k j o l d  s t r a n d e d  a s  g o v e r n o r  i n  t h e  
p r o v i n c e  o f  U p p s a l a .  H e  w a s  p o p u l a r l y  k n o w n  a s  
" H u n g e r s k j o l d , " a n d  r e m a i n e d  f o r  y e a r s  a  w e l l -  
h a t e d  f i g u r e  a m o n g  t h e  l i b e r a l s  o f  t h e  n a t i o n . ^
T h e s e  t w o  e x p e r i e n c e s  d i d  n o t  m a k e  D a g  H a m m a r s k j o l d  a
r e c l u s e  t o  t h e  e x t e n t  o f  b e i n g  a  h e r m i t ,  b u t  H a m m a r s k j o l d
s o u g h t  t o  s h e l t e r  h i m s e l f  f r o m  v e r y  p e r s o n a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s
s u c h  a s  t h e  l o v e  o f  a  w o m a n ,  o r  t h e  f r i e n d s h i p  o f  h i s  c o l l e a g u e s .
W h i l e  h i s  m o t h e r  w a s  a l i v e ,  t h e  p e r s o n a l  a t t e n t i o n  A g n e s
H a m m a r s k j o l d  s h o w e r e d  u p o n  h e r  y o u n g e s t  s o n  w a s  s u f f i c i e n t  t o
o f f s e t  w h a t  h e  s u f f e r e d  a s  a  c h i l d  i n  s c h o o l ,  m  f . î a r k i n g s
d a t e d  1956 , J f e m m a r s k j o l d  r e l a t e s ;
I n t o  e m p t y  s p a c e  m y  h o m e  s e n t  m e .
F e w  s e e k  m e .  F e w  h e a r  m e .
C u f f s  t a u g h t  m e  t h a t  f e l l o w s  
h a t e d  m y  f a t h e r ' s  n a m e .
U n w a n t e d  c a m e  I  t o  p l a y  w i t h  t h e m ,  
b u t  w a t c h e d  o t h e r s  play.2
W i t h  A g n e s  H a m m a r s k j o l d ' s  d e a t h  i n  1 9 4 0 ,  a  v e r y  i m p o r t a n t  
h u m a n  o u t l e t  f o r  D a g  H a m m a r s k j o l d ' s  f e e l i n g s  w a s  s t r a n g l e d .  A t  
t h e  a g e  o f  t h i r t y - f i v e ,  D a g  H a m m a r s k j o l d  w a s  c e r t a i n l y  i n  a  p o s i t i o n
I j o h n  L i n d b e r g ,  o p .  c i t . ,  p .  6 6 . 
^ E m e r y  K e l e n ,  o p .  c i t . ,  p .  3 9 »
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t o  f i n d  a  m o r e  n o r m a l  e x i s t e n c e  w i t h  a n o t h e r  w o m a n .  B u t  h e
d i d n ' t .  B n e r y  K e l e n ,  w h o  w a s  a  c o l l e a g u e  o f  H a m m a r s k j o l d ' s  a t
t h e  U n i t e d  l o t i o n s ,  n o t e d  h o w  d e d i c a t e d  t h e  S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l  w a s
t o  h i s  w o r k .  T h i s  w a s  n o t  s o m e t h i n g  n e w .  W h e n  h e  w a s  S w e d e n ' s
U n d e r s e c r e t a r y  o f  t h e  T r e a s u r y ,  H a m m a r s k j o l d  t h o u ^ t  n o t h i n g  o f
w o r k i n g  a l l  d a y ,  a n d  t h e n  a f t e r  d i n n e r  " a b o u t  n i n e  o ' c l o c k ,  h e
w o u l d  r e t u r n  t o  h i s  o f f i c e  t o  w o r k  f o r  a  l o n g  s t r e t c h  u n t i l  f i v e
o r  s i x  i n  t h e  m o r n i n g ,  r e l i e v e d  o n l y  b y  a  v i s i t  t o  t h e  l o c a l
k e l l e r  f o r  t e a  o r  c o f f e e . " ^  T h i s  l e v e l  o f  p h y s i c a l  p e r f o r m a n c e
c o n t i n u e d  i n  t h e  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s .  K e l e n  r e l a t e s *  " L e a v e  i t  t o
D a g " 2  h a d  b e c o m e  D a g ' s  t a g  i n  t h e  S w e d i s h  T r e a s u r y ,  a n d  c o n t i n u e d
n o w  ( S u e z  a n d  H u n g a r y  c r i s i s  1 9 5 6 ) ,  w e  i n  t h e  
S e c r e t a r i a t  g o t  o u r  f i r s t  s p e c t a c u l a r  d i s p l a y  
o f  t h e  S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l ' s  f o r m i d a b l e  s t a y i n g  
p o w e r s .  D a y  a f t e r  d a y  t h e  m e e t i n g s  ( S e c u r i t y  
C o u n c i l )  l a s t e d  u n t i l  f o u r  o r  f i v e  i n  t h e  
m o r n i n g ,  a n d  t h e y  s t a r t e d  a g a i n  a t  t h r e e  i n  
t h e  a f t e r n o o n .  R e g i m e n t s  o f  p e o p l e  g r e w  f a i n t  
w e a r y ,  b u t  H a m m a r s k j o l d  t h r o v e . 3
D a g  H a m m a r s k j o l d  t h r o v e  t o  e s t a b l i s h  c r e d i t a b i l i t y  f o r  
t h e  H a m m a r s k j o l d  n a m e  t h a t  h a d  b e e n  b l e m i s h e d  b y  t h e  S w e d i s h  
p e o p l e ' s  c o n d e m n a t i o n  o f  h i s  f a t h e r ' s  p o l i c y  o f  n e u t r a l i t y  i n  
W o r l d  W a r  I .  H e  w a s  t h e  H a m m a r s k j o l d  k n i g h t  f i g h t i n g  f o r  r e s p e c t  
a n d  t h e  g o o d  n a m e  o f  H a m m a r s k j o l d .  B u t  i t  w a s  p e o p l e ,  w h o  
c o n d e m n e d  H j a l m a r  H a m m a r s k j o l d .  A n d  i t  w a s  p e o p l e  t h a t  i s o l a t e d  
y o u n g  D a g  f r o m  t h e  n o r m a l  i n t e r a c t i o n  o f  c h i l d r e n .  W h i l e  o n e  m a y
1  B n e r y  K e l e n ,  o p .  c i t . ,  p .  3 9 »
2 I b i d . , p .  4 1 .
3Dag Hammarskjold, ibid., p. 79»
177n o t  b e  a b l e  t o  a p p r e c i a t e  i n  a n  e m o t i o n a l  s e n s e  t h e  s c a r  l e f t  
i n  D a g ' s  p e r s o n a l i t y  b y  h i s  f a t h e r ' s  e x p e r i e n c e ,  D a g  m u s t  b e  
c o m m e n d e d  f o r  t r y i n g  t o  r e c t i f y  t h e  î f e m m a r s k j o l d  n a m e  t h r o u g h  
p u b l i c  s e r v i c e  i n s t e a d  o f  r e m o v i n g  h i m s e l f  f r o m  a l l  c o n t a c t  w i t h  
l i f e  a n d  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .
I n  c o n c l u s i o n ,  D a g  H a m m a r s k j o l d  w a s  a n  e f f e c t i v e  S e c r e t a r y -  
G e n e r a l .  m  p a r t ,  H a m m a r s k  j o l d ' s  s u c c e s s  w a s  d u e  t o  t w o  
i m p r e s s i o n s  b a s e d  u p o n  h i s  p e r s o n a l  e x p e r i e n c e .  F i r s t ,  t h e  
f a m i l y  n a m e  m u s t  b e  c l e a r e d  t h r o u g h  a c t i o n  o n  h i s  p a r t  t h a t  i s  o f  
s u c h  a  n o b l e  n a t u r e  a s  t o  b e  a b o v e  c o n d e m n a t i o n .  I n  o t h e r  w o r d s ,  
H a m m a r s k j o l d  s o u g h t  o u t  a  v o c a t i o n  i n  l i f e  t h a t  w o u l d  b e  p u b l i c ,  
b u t  o f  s u c h  a  n a t u r e  t h a t  t h e  c o m p e t i t i o n  i n v o l v e d  w o u l d  r e m o v e  
h i m  f r o m  a  v e r y  p e r s o n a l  h u m a n  s i t u a t i o n ,  m  S w e d e n ,  H a m m a r s k j o l d  
f o u n d  s a t i s f a c t i o n  i n  c a r r y i n g  o u t  t h e  p u b l i c  p o l i c y  w i t h i n  t h e  
M i n i s t r y  o f  F i n a n c e  a n d  F o r e i g n  A f f a i r s ,  m  t h e  u n i t e d  N a t i o n s ,  
h e  a t t a i n e d  f u l f i l l m e n t  c a r r y i n g  o u t  t h e  a c c e p t a b l e  e x c h a n g e  
e s t a b l i s h e d  b y  t h e  p e r m a n e n t  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  o f  n a t i o n - s t a t e s .
I t  w a s  t h e y  a l o n e  w h o  g a v e  h i m  a  m a n d a t e ,  a n d  i t  w a s  w i t h i n  t h i s  
r i g h t  t o  a c t  t h a t  H a m m a r s k j o l d  d e v e l o p e d  n o t  o n l y  p o l i t i c a l  p o w e r  
f o r  t h e  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s ,  b u t  a  c r e d i t a b i l i t y  f o r  t h e  H a m m a r s k j o l d  
n a m e .
S e c o n d ,  h i s  p e r s o n a l  e x p e r i e n c e s  i n v o l v i n g  h u m a n  b e i n g s  
l e f t  a n  i m p r e s s i o n  t h a t  h u m a n  r e l a t i o n s  m i g h t  n o t  b r i n g  a  g r e a t  
d e a l  o f  l a s t i n g  c o m f o r t  t o  h i m .  L i k e  t h e  m e d i e v a l  m y s t i c s ,  
H a m m a r s k j o l d  s o u g h t  r e f u g e  i n  " s e l f - s u r r e n d e r ”  t o  a  f a i t h  c h a r a c ­
t e r i z e d  b y  a  " m a r r i a g e  o f  G o d  a n d  t h e  S o u l . W h a t  h e  s e a r c h e d  f o r
iDag Hammarskjold, ibid., p. 97»
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w a s  a  c r o s s  t o  t e a r .  H a m m a r s k j o l d  c o n c l u d e d :
A t  l e a s t  h e  k n e w  t h i s  m u c h  a b o u t  h i m s e l f -  
I  k n o w  w h a t  m a n  i s - h i s  v u l g a r i t y ,  l u s t ,  
p r i d e ,  e n v y - a n d  l o n g i n g .  L o n g i n g - a m o n g  
o t h e r  t h i n g s ,  f o r  t h e  C r o s s . 1
O n  A p r i l  9 ,  1 9 5 3 »  D a g  f â . m m a r s k j o l d  d e s c e n d e d  f r o m  h i s
p l a n e  i n  N e w  Y o r k .  T h e  s c a r s  f r o m  h i s  p e r s o n a l  e x p e r i e n c e ,
w h i c h  h a d  b e e n  a  h e a v y  c r o s s  t o  b e a r ,  b e c a m e  n o t  o n l y  b e a r a b l e ,
b u t  H a m m a r s k j o l d  f o u n d  i n  t h e  o u t l e t  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  f f e i t i o n s  a  m e a n s
t o  e s t a b l i s h  t h e  f a m i l y  n a m e  a n d  a c q u i r e  s t a t u r e  a t  a  l e v e l
g e n e r a l l y  f r e e  o f  h u m a n  c r i t i c i s m  d i r e c t e d  a g a i n s t  a  H a m m a r s k j o l d .
H a m m a r s k j o l d  n o t e d  t h i s  a s p e c t  o f  b e i n g  S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l ,  w h e n
h e  w r o t e  i n  h i s  p r i v a t e  j o u r n a l  l \ % . r k i n g s  ;
I s n ' t  t h e  v o i d  w h i c h  s u r r o u n d s  y o u  
w h e n  t h e  n o i s e  c e a s e s  y o u r  j u s t  r e w a r d  
f o r  a  d a y  d e v o t e d  t o  p r e v e n t i n g  o t h e r s  
f r o m  n e g l e c t i n g  y o u ?2
T h i r d ,  a n d  l e a s t  i n  i m p o r t a n c e ,  i n  t h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  t h e  
U n i t e d  l o t i o n s '  p r e s e n c e ,  w a s  t h e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l  m a j o r i t y  a n d  
t h e  u t i l i z a t i o n  b y  t h e  w o r l d  o r g a n i z a t i o n  o f  a  p r o c e d u r a l  d e v i c e  
t o  i m p l e m e n t  i t s  p r e s e n c e .  T h i s  b e g a n  w i t h  t h e  S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l  
p r e s e n t i n g  t h e  L a o t i a n  c r i s i s  f o r  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  b y  t h e  S e c u r i t y  
C o u n c i l .
S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l  H a m m a r s k j o l d  b e g a n  h i s  s t a t e m e n t  b e f o r e  
t h e  8 4 7 t h  s e s s i o n  o f  t h e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l  b y  n o t i n g  t h e  j u s t i f i ­
c a t i o n  f o r  h i s  p r e s e n c e .  H e  s a i d :
l l b i d . ,  p .  55 .
^ D a g  H a m m a r s k j o l d ,  i b i d . ,  p .  1 2 .
179J u s t  a s  t h e  S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l  c a n  a s k  f o r ,  
a n d  i s  g r a n t e d  t h e  f l o o r  i n  t h e  C o u n c i l ,
I  f e e l  t h a t  h e  i s  e n t i t l e d  t o  r e q u e s t  a n  
o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  a d d r e s s  t h e  C o u n c i l  p u b l i c l y  
o n  a  m a t t e r  w h i c h  h e  c o n s i d e r s  n e c e s s a r y  
p e r s o n a l l y  t o  p u t  b e f o r e  t h e  C o u n c i l ,  m  
d o i n g  s o  w i t h i n  t h e  f r a m e w o r k  t o  w h i c h  I 
h a v e  j u s t  r e f e r r e d ,  t h e  S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l  
d o e s  n o t  i n t r o d u c e  f o r m a l l y  o n  t h e  a g e n d a  
o f  t h e  C o u n c i l  a n y t h i n g  b e y o n d  h i s  o w n  w i s h  
t o  r e p o r t  t o  t h e  C o u n c i l .  D l a t u r a l l y  t h e  
C o u n c i l  r e t a i n s  t h e  s a m e  r i g h t s  i n  r e l a t i o n  
t o  s u c h  a n  i n i t i a t i v e  o f  t h e  S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l  
a s  i t  h a s  r e g a r d i n g  a n y  r e q u e s t  o f  h i s  t o  
a d d r e s s  t h e  C o u n c i l . 1
T h e  S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l  c o n t i n u e d  t o  b u i l d  h i s  a r g u m e n t  b y  
p o i n t i n g  o u t  " t h a t  t h e  r e q u e s t  w a s  n o t  b a s e d  o n  t h e  e x p l i c i t  
r i g h t s  g r a n t e d  t h e  S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l  u n d e r  A r t i c l e  9 9  o f  t h e  
C h a r t e r .  " 2  T o  m a k e  t h e  r e q u e s t  u n d e r  A r t i c l e  9 9 ,  i f â m m a r s k j o l d  
s t a t e d  w o u l d  h a v e  p l a c e d  t h e  C o u n c i l  i n  t h e  p o s i t i o n  o f  " r e f u s i n g  
t h e  S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l  p e r m i s s i o n  t o  a d d r e s s  i t " 3  a c c o r d i n g  t o  
r u l e  3  o f  t h e  p r o v i s i o n a l  r u l e s  o f  p r o c e d u r e . ^  S i n c e  A r t i c l e  9 9  
i s  n o t  i n v o k e d  h e r e ,  t h e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l  c a n  g r a n t  t h e
llbid. 
Zibid.
T h e  S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l  m a y  b r i n g  t o  t h e  a t t e n t i o n  o f  t h e  
S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l  a n y  m a t t e r  w h i c h  i s  h i s  o p i n i o n  m a y  t h r e a t e n  t h e  
m a i n t e n a n c e  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p e a c e  a n d  s e c u r i t y .  A r t i c l e  99 
" C h a r t e r  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s , "  R u h l  J .  B a r t l e t t ,  o p .  c i t . ,  p .  6 9 3 »
3  I b i d .
^ R u l e  3  : " T h e  P r e s i d e n t  s h a l l  c a l l  a  m e e t i n g  o f  t h e  S e c u r i t y  
C o u n c i l  i f  a  d i s p u t e  o r  s i t u a t i o n  i s  b r o u g h t  t o  t h e  a t t e n t i o n  o f  
t h e  C o u n c i l  u n d e r  A r t i c l e  3 5  o r  u n d e r  A r t i c l e  11 o f  t h e  C h a r t e r ,  
o r  i f  t h e  G e n e r a l  A s s e m b l y  m a k e s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  o r  r e f e r s  a n y  
q u e s t i o n  t o  t h e  C o u n c i l  u n d e r  A r t i c l e  1 1 ,  o r  i f  t h e  S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l  
b r i n g s  t o  t h e  a t t e n t i o n  o f  t h e  C o u n c i l  a n y  m a t t e r  u n d e r  A r t i c l e  9 9 « "  
I b i d .
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S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l  t h e  o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  a d d r e s s  t h e  C o u n c i l  w i t h o u t  
t h e  " i n s c r i p t i o n  o f  o r  b y  t h e  S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l  o f  a  s u b s t a n t i v e  
i s s u e  o n  t h e  a g e n d a .  A n d  t o  h a v e  i n t r o d u c e d  a  s u b s t a n t i v e  i s s u e  
o n  t h e  a g e n d a ,  c o n c l u d e d  l & i m a r s k j o l d ,  w o u l d  h a v e  r e q u i r e d  " a  
j u d g m e n t  a s  t o  f a c t s  f o r  w h i c h ,  i n  t h e  p r e s e n t  s i t u a t i o n ,  I  h a v e  
n o t  a  s u f f i c i e n t  b a s i s . "2
S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l  H a m m a r s k j o l d * s  a n s w e r  s a t i s f i e d  a l l  t h e  
S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l  m e m b e r s ,  e x c e p t  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n ' s  A r k a d y  A .  S o b o l e v .  
T h e  S o v i e t  d e l e g a t e  s t a t e d  t h a t  h e  w i s h e d  t o  q u e s t i o n  t h e  c o n s i s t e n c y  
o f  t h e  p r o c e d u r e  b e i n g  u s e d  i n  t h i s  s e s s i o n  o f  t h e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l . 3  
S o b o l e v  s t a t e d  t h a t  a c c o r d i n g  t o  r u l e  n u m b e r  ?  o f  t h e  
S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l ' s  p r o c e d u r e  " o n l y  i t e m s  w h i c h  h a v e  b e e n  b r o u g h t  
t o  t h e  a t t e n t i o n  o f  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  o n  t h e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l  i n  
a c c o r d a n c e  w i t h  r u l e  6 , i t e m s  c o v e r e d  b y  r u l e  1 0 , o r  m a t t e r s  w h i c h  
t h e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l  h a s  p r e v i o u s l y  d e c i d e d  t o  d e f e r  m a y  b e  
i n c l u d e d  i n  t h e  p r o v i s i o n a l  a g e n d a .  i h  t h e  c a s e  o f  l a o s ,  S o b o l e v  
c o n t i n u e d ,  t h e s e  p r o v i s i o n s  c a n n o t  a p p l y ,  s i n c e t
^ " T h e  P r o c e d u r a l  D e b a t e  o n  l a o s , " i b i d .
2 l b i d .
3 i b i d .
^ I b i d .  R u l e  6 : " T h e  S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l  s h a l l  i m m e d i a t e l y  
b r i n g  t o  t h e  a t t e n t i o n  o f  a l l  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  o n  t h e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l  
a l l  c o m m u n i c a t i o n s  f r o m  s t a t e s ,  o r g a n s  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s ,  o r  t h e  
S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l  c o n c e r n i n g  a n y  m a t t e r  f o r  t h e  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  
t h e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l  i n  a c c o r d a n c e  w i t h  t h e  p r o v i s i o n s  o f  t h e  
C h a r t e r . "  R u l e  1 0 1 " A n y  i t e m  o f  t h e  a g e n d a  o f  a  m e e t i n g  o f  t h e  
S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l ,  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  w h i c h  h a s  n o t  b e e n  c o m p l e t e d  a t  
t h a t  m e e t i n g ,  s h a l l  u n l e s s  t h e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l  o t h e r w i s e  d e c i d e d ,  
a u t o m a t i c a l l y  b e  i n c l u d e d  i n  t h e  a g e n d a  o f  t h e  n e x t  m e e t i n g . "
Ibid.
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it was not the government of laos which 
had brought up the matter of requesting 
the Uhited Nations assistance against 
the invaders of its northeastern borders 
before the Security Council, and the 
Secretary-General, who brought it up, had 
explicitly not done so under the powers 
granted him by Article 99 of the Charter.^
What the Soviet delegate was contending in this case is 
that the Secretary-General in not utilizing Article 99 gave up 
all his rights to bring a matter before the Council, under these 
circumstances, the request from Laos cannot be put on the agenda 
of the Council for consideration. All the Secretary-General can 
do is present his opinion in oral or written form "concerning any 
question under consideration by it.
m  order to clarify his position, the Secretary-General 
pointed out that he fulfilled rule 6 by "requesting that he apply 
to the request of the Government of laos the appropriate procedure. 
That request, together with his own letter requesting the convening 
of the meeting"^ covered rule 6. Hammarskjold addedj "he did not 
request any right to make any statement until after the Security 
Council had decided to take up the matter for consideration.
Following the Secretary-General was the President of the 
Council to explain his procedure in this matter. Lîr. Ortona 
believed there existed two responsibilities for him to fulfill »
l'*The Procedural Debate on Laos," ibid. 
2r b i d .
3 l b i d .
'̂The Procedural Debate on Laos," ibid.
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" F i r s t  t o  c a l l  t h e  m e e t i n g ,  a n d  t h e n  t o  a p p r o v e  t h e  p r o v i s i o n a l  
a g e n d a  i n  c o n s u l t a t i o n  w i t h  t h e  S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l .  " 1  O r t o n a  
c o n t i n u e d  j
R u l e  6 c l e a r l y  a p p l i e d  t o  c o m m u n i c a t i o n s  f r o m  
s t a t e s  a n d  n o t  t o  f o r m a l  r e q u e s t s  b y  s t a t e s  
f o r  t h e  c o n v e n i n g  o f  t h e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l .
T h u s  t h e  p r o v i s i o n s  o f  r u l e  6 . h a d  b e e n  s t r i c t l y  
o b s e r v e d  i n  t h e  p r e s e n t  case.2
B e f o r e  t h e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l  c o u l d  v o t e  o n  w h e t h e r  t o  i n c l u d e  
t h e  L a o t i a n  m a t t e r  o n  t h e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l  a g e n d a ,  t h e  S o v i e t  
d e l e g a t e  r e q u e s t e d  p e r m i s s i o n  t o  r e f u t e  w h a t  t h e  S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l  
a n d  P r e s i d e n t  h a d  s t a t e d .  B u t  i n s t e a d  o f  b a s i n g  h i s  a r g u m e n t  o n  
t h e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  t h e  r u l e s  o f  t h e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l ,  S o b o l e v  
a c c u s e d  t h e  U n i t e d  s t a t e s ,  t h e  u n i t e d  K i n g d o m ,  a n d  F r a n c e  o f  b e i n g  
b e h i n d  t h e  S e e r e t a r y - G e n e r a l  * s  a t t e m p t  t o  i n t r o d u c e  t h e  L a o t i a n  
m a t t e r  a s  o n e  w h i c h  i s  p r o c e d u r a l  a n d  t h u s  s u b j e c t  t o  t h e  p r o c e d u r a l  
r u l e s  o f  v o t i n g . 3
S o b o l e v  t h e n  t u r n e d  t o  t h e  G e n e v a  A g r e e m e n t  o f  1 9 5 ^ *  w h i c h  
h e  c o n s i d e r e d  t o  b e  t h e  f i r s t  m e a n s  t h e  K i n g d o m  o f  L a o s  s h o u l d  
u t i l i z e  t o  s e t t l e  t h e i r  p r o b l e m  w i t h  N o r t h  V i e t n a m . ^  T h e  S o v i e t  
d e l e g a t e ' s  r e q u e s t  w a s  a n s w e r e d  b y  a  10 t o  1 v o t e  f o r  t h e  i n c l u s i o n  
o f  t h e  l a o t i a n  m a t t e r  a s  a  p r o c e d u r a l  q u e s t i o n  o n  t h e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l  
a g e n d a .
W i t h  t h e  a g e n d a  a d o p t e d  t o  i n c l u d e  t h e  l a o t i a n  r e q u e s t .
l l b i d .
Z i b i d .
3 l b i d .
^ " T h e  P r o c e d u r a l  D e b a t e  o n  l a o s , "  i b i d .
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P r e s i d e n t  O r t o n a  c a l l e d  u p o n  t h e  S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l  t o  d e t a i l  
f o r  t h e  C o u n c i l  m e m b e r s  t h e  b a c k g r o u n d  a n d  r e q u e s t  o f  t h e  K i n g d o m  
o f  L a o s .  T h e  S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l  i n f o r m e d  t h e  C o u n c i l  t h a t  t h i s  
r e q u e s t  o f  t h e  K i n g d o m  d a t e d  S e p t e m b e r  4 t h  w a s  t h e  l a s t  o f  a  
l o n g  s e r i e s  o f  c o m m u n i c a t i o n s  a d d r e s s e d  t o  t h e  S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l  
b y  L a o s . ^
A c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l ,  a  n e w  p h a s e  i n  t h e  
c r i s i s  w a s  r e a c h e d ,  w h e n  i n  A u g u s t ,  t h e  l a o t i a n  g o v e r n m e n t  r e q u e s t e d  
t h e  S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l  f o r  a d v i c e  a s  t o  h o w  a  p e a c e f u l  s o l u t i o n  
c o u l d  b e  r e a c h e d . 2  T h i s ,  w h e n  a d d e d  t o  t h e  S e p t e m b e r  4 t h  r e q u e s t  
f o r  " a n  e m e r g e n c y  f o r c e  t o  h a l t  a g g r e s s i o n ,  " 3  w a s  s u f f i c i e n t  
g r o u n d s  f o r  t h e  S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l  t o  a p p e a r  i n  p e r s o n  b e f o r e  t h e  
S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l  i n  o r d e r  t o  g i v e  t h e  C o u n c i l  a  c l e a r  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  
o f  t h e  e x t e n t  o f  t h e  p r o b l e m . 4
^ I b i d .  I t  s h o u l d  b e  n o t e d  t h a t  t h e  S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l  w a s  
w a i t i n g  f o r  t h e  o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  p r e s e n t  t h e  l a o t i a n  m a t t e r  t o  t h e  
S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l .  T h i s  c o n c l u s i o n  s e e m s  v a l i d  i n  l i g h t  o f  w h a t  t h e  
S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l  s t a t e d  i n  h i s  r e v i e w  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s  
d e l i v e r e d  A u g u s t  28, 1959» H e  s a i d t " A l t h o u g h  t h e  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s  
h a s  n o t  b e e n  f o r m a l l y  s e i z e d  o f  t h i s  s i t u a t i o n  ( L a o s ) ,  c o m m u n i ­
c a t i o n s  o n  t h e  m a t t e r  h a v e  b e e n  a d d r e s s e d  t o  t h e  O r g a n i z a t i o n .
T h e  d e v e l o p m e n t s  h a v e  b e e n  f o u n d  t o  c a l l  f o r  i n f o r m a l  s t u d i e s  a n d  
c o n s u l t a t i o n s  r e g a r d i n g  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  o p e n  t o  t h e  O r g a n i z a t i o n  
t o  b e  o f  a s s i s t a n c e ,  o b v i o u s l y  w i t h o u t  i m p a i r i n g  t h e  G e n e v a  
a g r e e m e n t s  o r  i n t e r f e r i n g  w i t h  t h e  a r r a n g e m e n t s  w h i c h  a r e  b a s e d  o n  
t h e m .  " " T h e  D e v e l o p i n g  R o l e  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s , "  o p .  c i t . ,  p .  12.
2 " P r o c e d u r a l  D e b a t e  o n  l a o s , "  o p .  c i t . ,  p .  5 5 *
R e f e r e n c e  h e r e  i s  t o  a n  A u g u s t  30t h  l e t t e r  a d d r e s s e d  t o  
t h e  S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l ,  s/4211.
3  I b i d .
4ibid.
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\ V h i l e  t h e  S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l  w a s  i n f o r m i n g  t h e  C o u n c i l  i t  
s h o u l d  b e  n o t e d  t h a t  t h e  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s  w a s  b e i n g  i n f o r m e d  b y  
l a o s  o n l y  t h r o u g h  t h i s  c h a n n e l  ( S G ) .  O n l y  a f t e r  t h e  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s  
s u b - c o m m i t t e e  o n  l a o s  w a s  s e t  u p  o n  S e p t e m b e r  ? t h  d i d  L a o s  t u r n  
t o  o t h e r  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s  c h a n n e l s ;  n a m e l y ,  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  o f  t h e  
C o u n c i l 0 m  a  m e s s a g e  d a t e d  S e p t e m b e r  8t h ,  a  S p e c i a l  E n v o y  o f  t h e  
G o v e r n m e n t  o f  l a o s ,  % o n  S a n a n i k o n e , i n f o r m e d  O r t o n a  o f  t h e  l a o t i a n  
c r i s i s .  S a n a n i k o n e  s t a t e d t  " I h e  m e s s a g e s  s e n t  b y  t h e  M i n i s t e r  o f  
F o r e i g n  A f f a i r s  t o  t h e  S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l  i n d i c a t e  c l e a r l y  t h e  
g r a v i t y  o f  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  a n d  t h e  d e e p  c o n c e r n  f e l t  b y  t h e  G o v e r n m e n t  
o f  l a o s  a t  t h e  p r e s e n t  t i m e .  T h e  s i t u a t i o n  s e e m s  l i k e l y  t o  b e c o m e  
e v e n  w o r s e  a n d  i s  a  d i r e c t  t h r e a t  t o  p e a c e  i n  t h i s  p a r t  o f  t h e  
w o r l d .  . , . H e r e  i s  a  b r i e f  a c c o u n t  o f  t h e  o r i g i n  o f  t h e  e v e n t s  
l e a d i n g  u p  t o  t h e  p r e s e n t  d i s o r d e r s  i n  o n e  o f  t h e  r e g i o n s  o f  l a o s .  " 
A n d  t h e n  S a n a n i k o n e  c o n c l u d e d s  " I  a m  t h e r e f o r e  i n s t r u c t e d  b y  m y  
g o v e r n m e n t s  t o  b r i n g  t o  y o u r  n o t i c e  i t s  s e r i o u s  c o n c e r n  a s  a l r e a d y  
e x p l a i n e d  i n  t h e  m e s s a g e s  f r o m  o u r  M i n i s t e r  o f  F o r e i g n  A f f a i r s ,  
a n d  t o  a s k  y o u  t o  c o n s i d e r  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  i n v i t i n g  t h e  
S u b - C o m m i t t e e  s e t  u p  t o  c o n d u c t  i n q u i r e s  i n t o  e v e n t s  i n  L a o s  t o  
v i s i t  t h e  c o u n t r y  a s  s o o n  a s  p o s s i b l e  w i t h  a  v i e w  t o  v e r i f y i n g  t h e  
p a r t i c u l a r s  g i v e n . " !
F o l l o w i n g  t h e  S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l ' s  a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  L a o t i a n  
p r o b l e m ,  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  o f  t h e  C o u n c i l  t u r n e d  t h e  m a t t e r  o v e r  t o  t h e
" M a s s a g e  d a t e d  S e p t e m b e r  8 ,  1 9 5 9  t o  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  o f  t h e  
S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l  f r o m  t h e  S p e c i a l  E n v o y  o f  t h e  G o v e r n m e n t  o f  
L a o s . "  U n i t e d  ? & . t i o n s  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l  A n n e x  I  S A 236 d a t e d  
N o v e m b e r  5 »  1 9 5 9 *
185t h e  C o u n c i l  m e m b e r s  f o r  d i s c u s s i o n .  T h e  u n i t e d  S t a t e s  A m b a s s a d o r
t o  t h e  U h i t e d  N a t i o n s ,  H e n r y  C a b o t  L o d g e ,  o p e n e d  t h e  d i s c u s s i o n  b y
s u b m i t t i n g  a  r e s o l u t i o n  t o  t h e  C o u n c i l . 1  L o d g e ’ s  p r o p o s a l  c a l l e d
f o r  t h e  C o u n c i l  t o  a p p o i n t  a  p r o c e d u r a l  s u b - c o m m i t t e e ,  r a t h e r  t h a n
a n  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  g r o u p  w h i c h  w o u l d  b e  s u b s t a n t i v e  a n d  t h u s  s u b j e c t
t o  t h e  v e t o .  L o d g e  s u g g e s t e d  A r g e n t i n e ,  I t a l y ,  J a p a n ,  a n d  T u n i s i a
b e  r e p r e s e n t e d  o n  t h e  s u b - c o m m i t t e e .  L o d g e  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  t h e
s u b - c o m m i t t e e  :
e x a m i n e  t h e  s t a t e m e n t s  m a d e  b e f o r e  t h e  S e c u r i t y  
C o u n c i l  t o  r e c e i v e  f u r t h e r  s t a t e m e n t s  a n d  
d o c u m e n t s  a n d  t o  c o n d u c t  s u c h  i n q u i r i e s  a s  i t  
m i g h t  d e t e r m i n e  n e c e s s a r y ,  a n d  t o  r e p o r t  t o  
t h e  C o u n c i l  a s  s o o n  a s  p o s s i b l e . 2
A m b a s s a d o r  L o d g e  a r g u e d  t h a t  w h i l e  t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  w h e t h e r
o r  n o t  a g g r e s s i o n  h a d  b e e n  c o m m i t t e d  i s  o p e n  t o  d e b a t e ,  t h e  f a c t
t h a t  a  m e m b e r  o f  t h e  U i i t e d  N a t i o n s  s u b m i t t e d  s u c h  t o  b e  a  f a c t
s h o u l d  b e  s u f f i c i e n t  g r o u n d s  f o r  t h e  C o u n c i l  t o  e x a m i n e  w h e t h e r  o r
n o t  t h e  a l l e g e d  a g g r e s s i o n  t o o k  p l a c e .  T h i s ,  L o d g e  s t a t e d ,  i s  i n
a c c o r d a n c e  w i t h  A r t i c l e  2 9  o f  t h e  C h a r t e r .  A r t i c l e  2 9  s t a t e s i
B i e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l  m a y  e s t a b l i s h  s u c h  s u b s i d i a r y  
o r g a n s ,  a s  i t  d e e m s  n e c e s s a r y  f o r  t h e  p e r f o r m a n c e  
o f  i t s  f u n c t i o n s . 3
F i n a l l y ,  t h e  A m e r i c a n  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  p o i n t e d  o u t  t h a t  t h e  
d r a f t  r e s o l u t i o n  p r o p o s e d  " h a d  t h e  g r e a t  a d v a n t a g e  i n  t h a t  i t  
e n a b l e d  t h e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l  t o  r e a c t  w i t h o u t  u n d u e  d e l a y  t o  t h i s
^''Procedural Debate on laos," op. cit., p .  5 5 »
^"Request from laos for Assistance," International 
Organization X I I I  (Autumn, 1 9 5 9 ) ,  P» 5 6 6 ,
3"Charter of the United Nations," op. cit., p. 682.
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a p p e a l . "  A l l  m e m b e r s  s h o u l d  b e  a b l e  t o  a g r e e  t o  t h i s  p r o p o s a l ,  
L o d g e  s u g g e s t e d ;  s i n c e  " i t  d i d  n o t  c l o s e  d o o r s  a n d  d i d  n o t  p u t  
a n y b o d y  a g a i n s t  a  w a l l .
A t  t h e  8 4 8 t h  m e e t i n g  o f  t h e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l ,  t h e  S o v i e t
d e l e g a t e  S o b o l e v  w a s  t h e  f i r s t  C o u n c i l  m e m b e r  r e c o g n i z e d  b y
P r e s i d e n t  O r t o n a .  A g a i n ,  t h e  S o v i e t  d e l e g a t e  r e t u r n e d  t o  t h e
i m p o r t a n c e  o f  t h e  G e n e v a  a g r e e m e n t s .  " T h o s e  a g r e e m e n t s , *  S o b o l e v
s t a t e d ,  ' h a d  b e e n  a n  i m p o r t a n t  c o n t r i b u t i o n  t o  t h e  c a u s e  o f
peace. "2 i t  w a s  o n  t h e  f o u n d a t i o n  o f  t h o s e  a g r e e m e n t s  t h a t  t h e
G o v e r n m e n t  a t  V i e n t i a n e  w a s  a b l e  t o  b r i n g  a b o u t  a  s e t t l e m e n t  w i t h
t h e  P a t h e t  L a o .  S o b o l e v  c o n t i n u e d *
T h e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  t h e  p r e s e n t  s i t u a t i o n ,  
w i t h  i t s  t h r e a t  o f  c i v i l  w a r ,  r e s t e d  s q u a r e l y  
w i t h  t h e  p r e s e n t  G o v e r n m e n t  o f  L a o s .  T h e  l a t t e r  
h a d  d e c l a r e d  t h a t  i t  d i d  n o t  c o n s i d e r  i t s e l f  
b o u n d  b y  t h e  G e n e v a  a g r e e m e n t s ,  a l t h o u g h  t h o s e  
a g r e e m e n t s  e x p r e s s l y  s t i p u l a t e d  t h a t  t h e  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c o m m i s s i o n  m u s t  c o n t i n u e  t o  f u n c t i o n  
u n t i l  i t  p r o c l a i m e d  i t s  o w n  d i s s o l u t i o n .
T h u s  . . . t h e  o b l i g a t i o n s  u n d e r t a k e n  u n d e r  t h e  
G e n e v a  a g r e e m e n t s  w e r e  s t i l l  v a l i d  a n d  t h e i r  
o b s e r v a n c e  w a s  o f  g r e a t  i m p o r t a n c e  f o r  t h e  
m a i n t e n a n c e  o f  p e a c e  a n d  s e c u r i t y  i n  t h e  a r e a . 3
F o l l o w i n g  S o b o l e v  w e r e  t h e  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  o f  P a n a m a  a n d  
t h e  P r e s i d e n t  o f  t h e  C o u n c i l  s p e a k i n g  i n  b e h a l f  o f  I t a l y .  B o t h  
f a v o r e d  t h e  d r a f t  r e s o l u t i o n  o f  L o d g e .  V J h e n  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  o f  
t h e  C o u n c i l  m o v e d  f o r  a  v o t e  o n  t h e  r e s o l u t i o n ,  t h e  S o v i e t
^"Security Council Meets on laos," United Nations Review VI 
(October, 1959)» P» 24.
^ I b i d . , p .  2 6 .
3Ibid., p. 27.
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d e l e g a t e  a g a i n  r e q u e s t e d  p e r m i s s i o n  o f  t h e  c h a i r  f o r  t h e  f l o o r .
S o b o l e v  c o n t e s t e d  t h a t  t h e  s u b - c o m m i t t e e  c o u l d  n o t  b e  
c o n s i d e r e d  p r o c e d u r a l ,  s i n c e  i t  w a s  d o i n g  m o r e  t h a n  s i m p l y  l o o k i n g  
a n d  l i s t e n i n g .  S o b o l e v  r e m i n d e d  t h e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l  t h a t  t h e  p a s t  
h i s t o r y  o f  p r o p o s i n g  s u b s i d i a r y  b o d i e s  h a d  f o u n d  t h e  C o u n c i l  
c o n s i s t e n t l y  h o l d i n g  " t h a t  s u c h  p r o p o s a l s  w e r e  s u b s t a n t i v e  i n  
c h a r a c t e r .
W i t h  S o b o l e v ' s  s t a t e m e n t  c o m p l e t e d ,  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  o f  t h e  
S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l  d e c i d e d  t h a t  t h e  r e s o l u t i o n  b e  c o n s i d e r e d  
p r o c e d u r a l  a n d  t h u s  m u s t  b e  v o t e d  a s  s u c h  u n d e r  A r t i c l e  2 ?  
p a r a g r a p h  3 " a s  a  q u e s t i o n  t h a t  w a s  n o t  s u b  j e c t  t o  t h e  v e t o .
B e f o r e  a  v o t e  w a s  t a k e n  s e v e r a l  o f  t h e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l  m e m b e r s
^ " T h e  P r o c e d u r a l  D e b a t e  o n  L a o s , "  o p .  c i t . ,  p .  55»
A t  t h i s  p o i n t  t h e  S o v i e t  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  r e f e r r e d  t o  t h e  
S e c r e t a r i a t  s t u d y ,  R e p e r t o i r e  o f  t h e  P r a c t i c e s  o f  t h e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l  
1 9 4 6 - 1 9 3 1 . S o b o l e v  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  t h e  p a s t  p r a c t i c e s  o f  t h e  
u n i t e d  N a t i o n s  l e f t  t h e  i m p r e s s i o n  t h a t  f a c t - f i n d i n g  c o m m i t t e e s  
a r e  m a t t e r s  o f  a  s u b s t a n t i v e  n a t u r e .  A s  e x a m p l e s ,  S o b o l e v  p o i n t e d  
t o  t h e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l ' s  i n a b i l i t y  t o  a p p o i n t  a  f a c t - f i n d i n g  
c o m m i t t e e  i n  t h e  I n d o n e s i a n  q u e s t i o n  o f  1 9 4 ?  a n d  t h e  U k r a i n i a n  
c o m p l a i n t  a g a i n s t  G r e e c e  i n  1 9 4 6 ,  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  v e t o  o f  a  
p e r m a n e n t  m e m b e r .  A s  f u r t h e r  e v i d e n c e  o f  t h e  p r e s e n t  p r o p o s a l s  
b r e a k  w i t h  p r e c e d e n t ,  S o b o l e v  r e i t e r a t e d  t h e  s t a t e m e n t  o n  v o t i n g  
b y  t h e  B i g  P o v / e r s  S a n  F r a n c i s c o  J u n e  7 ,  1 9 4 5 ;  " D e c i s i o n s  a n d  
a c t i o n s  b y  t h e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l  m a y  w e l l  h a v e  m a j o r  p o l i t i c a l  
c o n s e q u e n c e s  a n d  m a y  e v e n  i n i t i a t e  a  c h a i n  o f  e v e n t s  b e g i n s  w h e n  
t h e  C o u n c i l  d e c i d e s  t o  m a k e  a n  i n v e s t i g a t i o n .  " W i t h i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  
o f  t h e  c o n c l u s i o n s  r e a c h e d  a t  S a n  F r a n c i s c o ,  S o b o l e v  b e l i e v e d  t h a t  
i n  m a t t e r s  o f  p e a c e  a n d  s e c u r i t y  a l l  t h e  p e r m a n e n t  m e m b e r s  m u s t  b e  
b e y o n d  e v e n  a  f a c t - f i n d i n g  c o m m i t t e e .  l a s t l y ,  t h e  S o v i e t  r e p r e s e n ­
t a t i v e  r e m i n d e d  t h e  C o u n c i l  t h a t  t h e  S a n  F r a n c i s c o  s t a t e m e n t  w a s  v e r y  
c l e a r  o n  t h e  m a t t e r  o f  w h a t  i s  a n d  w h a t  i s  n o t  p r o c e d u r a l .  H e  s a i d ;  
" t h e  d e c i s i o n s  r e g a r d i n g  t h e  p r e l i m i n a r y  q u e s t i o n  a s  t o  w h e t h e r  o r  
n o t  s u c h  a  m a t t e r  i s  p r o c e d u r a l  m u s t  b e  t a k e n  b y  a  v o t e  o f  s e v e n  
m e m b e r s  o f  t h e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l ,  i n c l u d i n g  t h e  c o n c u r r i n g  v o t e s  o f  
t h e  p e r m a n e n t  m e m b e r s . "  " T h e  P r o c e d u r a l  D e b a t e  o n  l a o s , "  I b i d . ,
p. 55*
^"Request from Laos for Assistance," op. cit., p. 567*
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r e q u e s t e d  t h e  f l o o r  t o  r e p l y  t o  t h e  S o v i e t  d e l e g a t e ' s  c h a r g e s .
N o t e w o r t h y  h e r e  w a s  t h e  s t a t e m e n t  b y  t h e  U n i t e d  K i n g d o m ' s
S i r  P i e r s o n  D i x o n .  D i x o n  s t a t e d
T h e  s u g g e s t i o n  h a s  b e e n  m a d e  . . . t h a t  t h e  
p r o p e r  i n s t r u m e n t  f o r  d e a l i n g  w i t h  t h e  
p r e s e n t  s i t u a t i o n  i n  L a o s  w a s  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
c o m m i s s i o n  ( I n t e r n a t i o n a l  C o n t r o l  C o m m i s s i o n  
s e t  u p  u n d e r  G e n e v a  A c c o r d  o f  1 9 5 ^ ) *
T h e  U n i t e d  K i n g d o m  G o v e r n m e n t  c o n s i d e r e d  t h a t  
t h e  c o m m i s s i o n  h a d  p e r f o r m e d  a  u s e f u l  t a s k  i n  
s u p e r v i s i n g  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  c e a s e f i r e  
a g r e e m e n t ,  b u t  i t  w a s  n e c e s s a r y  t o  t a k e  a c c o u n t  
o f  t h e  c h a n g e s  w h i c h  h a d  o c c u r e d  s i n c e  t h e  c e a s e ­
f i r e  w a s  a c h i e v e d .
I t  s h o u l d  b e  r e c a l l e d ,  D i x o n  n o t e d :
T h a t  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c o m m i s s i o n  h a d  a d j o u r n e d  
s i n e  d i e  i n  J u l y  1 9 5 8 .  T h e  G e n e v a  a g r e e m e n t s  
w e r e  s t i l l  i n  f o r c e ,  a n d  i n  t h e  o p i n i o n  o f  h i s  
g o v e r n m e n t ,  l a o s  h a d  f u l l y  c o m p l i e d ,  a n d  
c o n t i n u e d  t o  c o m p l y ,  w i t h  p r o v i s i o n s  o f  t h o s e  
a g r e e m e n t s .  B u t  . . . L a o s  m a i n t a i n e d  t h a t  o n c e  
t h e  p o l i t i c a l  s e t t l e m e n t  w i t h  t h e  P a t h e t  L a o  h a d  
b e e n  a c h i e v e d ,  L a o s  w a s  n o  l o n g e r  o b l i g e d  t o  
s u b m i t  t o  t h e  s u p e r v i s i o n  o f  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
c o m m i s s i o n ,  a n d  t h e  U n i t e d  K i n g d o m  G o v e r n m e n t  
b e l i e v e d  t h a t  L a o s  w a s  e n t i t l e d  t o  t a k e  t h a t  
v i e w .
T h e  r e a l  p o i n t  a t  i s s u e  . . . w a s  t h a t  l a o s  
w a s  a  s o v e r e i g n  s t a t e  a n d  a  m e m b e r  o f  t h e  
u n i t e d  N a t i o n s  e n t i t l e d  u n d e r  t h e  C h a r t e r  t o  
h a v e  r e c o u r s e  t o  t h e  O r g a n i z a t i o n .  I t  w o u l d  
s u r e l y  b e  q u i t e  w r o n g  f o r  t h e  C o u n c i l  t o  d e n y  
L a o s  t h e  r i g h t  o f  r e c o u r s e  t o  t h e  u n i t e d  N a t i o n s  
a n d  t o  i n s i s t  t h a t  s h e  s u b m i t  h e r s e l f  a g a i n  t o  
s u p e r v i s i o n  o f  a n  o r g a n i z a t i o n  e s t a b l i s h e d  b e f o r e  
s h e  b e c a m e  a  m e m b e r  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s  a n d  
w h o s e  p r e s e n c e  o n  h e r  s o i l  s h e  e v i d e n t l y  c o n s i d e r s  
i n c o m p a t i b l e  w i t h  h e r  n e w l y  g a i n e d  s o v e r e i g n t y . 2
A t  t h i s  p o i n t  t h e  B r i t i s h  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  t u r n e d  t o  t h e  t a s k  
o f  r e f r e s h i n g  h i s  c o l l e a g u e s  a s  t o  t h e  c o n t e n t s  o f  t h e  f i n a l
^ ' ' S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l  M e e t s  o n  L a o s , "  o p .  c i t . ,  p p .  2 5 - 2 6 .  
S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l  M e e t s  o n  l a o s , "  I b i d . ,  p .  2 6 .
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d e c l a r a t i o n  o f  t h e  G e n e v a  C o n f e r e n c e  o f  J ü l y  2 1 ,  1 9 5 ^ *  D i x o n  n o t e d  
t h a t  i t  w a s  i n  t h i s  D e c l a r a t i o n  t h a t  e v e r y  m e m b e r  o f  t h e  c o n f e r e n c e  
" u n d e r t o o k  t o  r e s p e c t  t h e  s o v e r e i g n t y ,  i n d e p e n d e n c e ,  u n i t y  a n d  
t e r r i t o r i a l  i n t e g r i t y  o f  l a o s ,  C a m b o d i a ,  a n d  V i e t n a m ,  a n d  t o  
r e f r a i n  f r o m  i n t e r f e r e n c e  i n  t h e i r  i n t e r n a l  a f f a i r s .
W i t h  t h e  d e b a t e  c o m p l e t e d ,  P r e s i d e n t  O r t o n a  m o v e d  f o r  a
v o t e  o n  t h e  d r a f t  r e s o l u t i o n  w h i c h  w a s  a p p r o v e d  1 0  t o  1 .  T h e
resolution adopted by the Security Council at its 8 4 8 t h  meeting
o n  S e p t e m b e r  7 ,  1 9 5 9  s t a t e d  a s  f o l l o w s  :
T h e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l  d e c i d e s  t o  a p p o i n t  a  
s u b - c o m m i t t e e  c o n s i s t i n g  o f  A r g e n t i n a ,  I t a l y ,
J a p a n  a n d  T u n i s i a ,  a n d  i n s t r u c t s  t h i s  
s u b - c o m m i t t e e  t o  e x a m i n e  t h e  s t a t e m e n t s  m a d e  
b e f o r e  t h e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l  c o n c e r n i n g  L a o s ,  
t o  r e c e i v e  f u r t h e r  s t a t e m e n t s  a n d  d o c u m e n t s  
a n d  t o  c o n d u c t  s u c h  I n q u i r i e s  a s  i t  m a y  
d e t e r m i n e  n e c e s s a r y ,  a n d  t o  r e p o r t  t o  t h e  
C o u n c i l  a s  s o o n  a s  p o s s i b l e . 2
T h i s  w a s  t h e  f o u n d a t i o n  f o r  t h e  l e g a l  p r e s e n c e  o f  t h e  
U n i t e d  I f e t i o n s  i n  l a o s  d u r i n g  t h e  f a l l  o f  1 9 5 9  a n d  s p r i n g  o f  i 960 . 
T h e  s u b - c o m m i t t e e  w a s  s a n c t i o n e d  b y  t h e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l ,  b u t  t h e
^In the discussion, the French representative Armand Berard 
noted I "The Geneva agreements . . . sanctioned the independence 
and territorial integrity of Laos. They had in no way established 
permanent trusteeship over Laos. The international commission had 
had the task of verifying the application of the clauses of the 
armistice. There had never been in the mind of the Geneva 
negotiators or in the letter of the agreements any intention of 
conferring on the commission an exclusive monopoly of jurisdiction. 
Koreover, Laos had become a member of the United Nations and as 
such had the right to appeal to the United Nations when it deemed 
it necessary." Ibid.
2 " R e s o l u t i o n  a d o p t e d  b y  t h e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l  a t  i t s  8 4 8 t h  
m e e t i n g  o n  S e p t e m b e r  7 ,  1 9 5 9  c o n c e r n i n g  t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  L a o s , "  
U n i t e d  N a t i o n s  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l  s / 4 2 l 6  d a t e d  S e p t e m b e r  8 , 1 9 5 9 »
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p o l i t i c a l  f o u n d a t i o n  f o r  t h e  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s  p r e s e n c e ,  a n d  t h e  
s u b - c o m m i t t e e ' s  d i p l o m a t i c  s e r v i c e  w a s  u n d e r  t h e  S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l  
o f  t h e  u n i t e d  N a t i o n s ®  T h i s  b e c a m e  o b v i o u s  i n  t h e  w a y  
P r e s i d e n t  O r t o n a  a n d  t h e  m a j o r i t y  i n  t h e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l  t r e a t e d  
t h e  l a o t i a n  r e q u e s t .  A n d  s o o n  a f t e r  t h e  a d o p t i o n  o f  t h e  d r a f t  
r e s o l u t i o n ,  + h e  S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l  b e c a m e  t h e  c e n t r a l  f i g u r e .  T o  
q u o t e  f r o m  t h e  " R e p o r t  o f  t h e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l  S u b - C o m m i t t e e , t h e  
S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l ' s  p r e s e n c e  s t a r t e d  o n  S e p t e m b e r  8 t h  a n d  c o n t i n u e d ,  
u n t i l  t h e  U n i t e d  I ' f e t i o n s  s u b - c o m m i t t e e  d e p a r t e d  f o r  l a o s  
S e p t e m b e r  12, 1959* " I n  t h e  c o u r s e  o f  i t s  f i r s t  f i v e  m e e t i n g s ,  
w h i c h  w e r e  h e l d  i n  N e w  Y o r k .  . . ,  t h e  S u b - C o m m i t t e e  c o n s i d e r e d  t h e  
n a t u r e  a n d  s c o p e  o f  i t s  d u t i e s  a n d  t h e  r e l e v a n t  d o c u m e n t s .  I t  
h e l d  m e e t i n g s  w i t h  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  o f  t h e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l  a n d  t h e  
S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l ,  w h o  i n f o r m e d  i t  o f  t h e  b a c k g r o u n d  o f  t h e  
s i t u a t i o n ®
O n  S e p t e m b e r  1 5 »  1 9 5 9 »  t h e  d a t e  o f  P r e m i e r  K h r u s h c h e v ' s  
v i s i t  t o  t h e  U . S . ,  t h e  U n i t e d  r a t i o n s  s u b - c o m m i t t e e  a r r i v e d  a t  
V i e n t i a n e . 3  T h e  K i n g d o m  o f  L a o s  h a d  e s t a b l i s h e d  a  L i a i s o n  C o m m i t t e e  
t o  a i d  t h e  u n i t e d  N a t i o n s  i n  f u l f i l l i n g  t h e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l
R e p o r t  o f  t h e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l  S u b - C o m m i t t e e  e s t a b l i s h e d  
u n d e r  r e s o l u t i o n  o f  S e p t e m b e r  7 ,  1 9 5 9 , "  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s  S e c u r i t y  
C o u n c i l  S A 236 d a t e d  N o v e m b e r  5 »  1 9 5 9 *
2 " R e p o r t  o f  t h e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l  S u b - C o m m i t t e e  e s t a b l i s h e d  
u n d e r  r e s o l u t i o n  o f  S e p t e m b e r  7 »  1 9 5 9 » "  i b i d .
3 M e m b e r s  o f  t h e  u n i t e d  r a t i o n s  S u b - C o m m i t t e e  w e r e :  
A r g e n t i n a ;  B r i g a d i e r - G e n e r a l  A h r e n s ;  I t a l y  : M i n i s t e r  
P l e n i p o t e n t i a r y  B a r a t t e r i ;  J a p a n :  A m b a s s a d o r  S h i b u s h a w a  ( C h a i r m a n  
o f  S u b - C o m m i t t e e ) ;  T u n i s i a  : A m b a s s a d o r  H a b i b  B o u r g u i b a »  J r .
T 1 9 1r e s o l u t i o n . - ^  W i t h  t h e  c o o p e r a t i o n  o f  t h e  l a o t i a n  G o v e r n m e n t ,  t h e
S u b - C o m m i t t e e  h e l d  c o n s u l t a t i o n s  w i t h  G o v e r n m e n t  o f f i c i a l s ,  a n d  
v i s i t e d  S a m  N e u a  p r o v i n c e ,  w h e r e  t h e  b a s i c  a r e a  o f  a r m e d  c o n f l i c t  
h a d  b e e n  t a k i r g  p l a c e .  O n  O c t o b e r  1 0 t h ,  " t h e  S u b - C o m m i t t e e ,  b e i n g  
o f  t h e  o p i n i o n  t h a t  i t  h a d  r e c e i v e d  t h e  e s s e n t i a l  b a s i c  i n f o r m a t i o n  
f o r  i t s  f a c t - f i n d i n g  m i s s i o n ,  d e c i d e d  . . .  t o  r e t u r n  t o  N e w  Y o r k  
t o  p r e p a r e  a  r e p o r t  t o  t h e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l . " 2  m  o r d e r  t o  m a i n t a i n  
a  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s  p r e s e n c e  i n  l a o s ,  t h e  S u b - C o m m i t t e e  l e f t  b e h i n d  
t w o  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  a n d  a  s e c r e t a r i a t ,  ü j h i s  w a s  d o n e  w i t h  t h e  i d e a  
t h a t  t h e y  " w o u l d  a n s w e r  a n y  r e q u e s t  f o r  c l a r i f i c a t i o n  a n d  s u p p l y  
a n y  a d d i t i o n a l  i n f o r m a t i o n  w h i c h  m i g h t  b e  r e q u i r e d  b y  t h e  S u b ­
c o m m i t t e e  i n  t h e  w r i t i n g  o f  t h e  r e p o r t .  F u r t h e r m o r e ,  t h e y  w o u l d  
g i v e  i n f o r m a t i o n  o f  m a t e r i a l  c h a n g e  i n  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  i f  o c c a s i o n  
a r o s e . " 3
T h e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  t h e  U h i t e d  N a t i o n s  p r e s e n c e  i n  L a o s  
b e c a m e  o b v i o u s  t w o  d a y s  a f t e r  t h e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l  p a s s e d  t h e  d r a f t  
r e s o l u t i o n  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s .  O n  S e p t e m b e r  9 t h ,  t h e  P a t h e t  L a o  
o f f e n s e  i n  S a m  N e u a  p r o v i n c e  s t o p p e d ,  a n d  r a d i o  t f â n o i  b e g a n  a  
p e a c e  o f f e n s i v e . ^  L a o t i a n  P r e m i e r  P h o u i  S a n a n i k o n e  r e p o r t e d  i n  a n
1  M e m b e r s  o f  t h e  l a o t i a n  L i a i s o n  C o m m i t t e e  w e r e :  I n p e n g  S u r y s d h a y ,  
O u d o n e  S a n a n i k o n e ,  N o u p h a t  C h o u n r a m a n y ,  B o u a n y ,  K o u p a s i t h  A b h a y ,  
T i a n e t h o n e  C h a n t h a r a s y .
2 " R e p o r t  o f  t h e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l  S u b - C o m m i t t e e  e s t a b l i s h e d  
u n d e r  r e s o l u t i o n  o f  S e p t e m b e r  7 ,  1 9 5 9 » ' *  i b i d . ,  p .  1 2 .
3ibid.
^ " U n i t e d  S t a t e s  W h i t e  P a p e r  o n  l a o s , "  C u r r e n t  H i s t o r y  X X X X  
( M a r c h ,  1 9 6 1 ) ,  p .  1 7 9 '
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i n t e r v i e w  w i t h  T i m e  c o r r e s p o n d e n t  P a u l  H u r m u s e s  ; “ I t  h a s  b e e n  a  
w e e k  s i n c e  o u r  A r m y  h a s  m a d e  c o n t a c t  w i t h  t h e  V i e t  î.îinh, a n d  o u r  
c o m m a n d e r s  i n  t h e  n o r t h  s a y  t h a t  t h e y  h a v e  w i t h d r a w n  t o  N o r t h  
V i e t n a m . T h i s  s i t u a t i o n  c o n t i n u e d ,  w h i l e  t h e  u n i t e d  l o t i o n s  
p r e s e n c e  w a s  m a i n t a i n e d .
O n  O c t o b e r  1 3 »  1 9 5 9  t h e  S u b - C o m m i t t e e  d e p a r t e d  f r o m  l a o s ,
a n d  r e t u r n e d  t o  N e w  Y o r k  a r r i v i n g  O c t o b e r  2 1 s t .  O n  N o v e m b e r  3 r d »
t h e  S u b - C o m m i t t e e  a p p r o v e d  t h e i r  r e p o r t  a n d  s u b m i t t e d  i t  t o  t h e
S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l .  I n  s u m m a r y ,  t h e  r e p o r t  d i d  n o t  e s t a b l i s h
a g g r e s s i o n  o n  t h e  p a r t  o f  N o r t h  V i e t n a m i  a g a i n s t  t h e  K i n g d o m  o f  L a o s .
I n  t h e i r  r e p o r t ,  t h e  S u b - C o m m i t t e e  c o n c l u d e d :
A f t e r  e x a m i n a t i o n  o f  d o c u m e n t s  a n d  s t a t e m e n t s ,  
i n t e r v i e w s  w i t h  w i t n e s s e s  a n d  v i s i t s  . . . 
t o  l a o s ' s  n o r t h  a n d  n o r t h e a s t  p r o v i n c e s ,  t h e  
f a c t - f i n d i n g  S u b - C o m m i t t e e  o f  t h e  
S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l  h a s  f o u n d  t h a t ,  g e n e r a l l y  
s p e a k i n g ,  a l t h o u g h  t h e r e  w e r e  m i l i t a r y  a c t i o n s  
o f  d i f f e r e n t  s c o p e  a n d  m a g n i t u d e ,  a l l  o f  t h e m  
t h r o u g h o u t  f o u r  p e r i o d s  b e t w e e n  J u l y  1 6  a n d  
O c t o b e r  1 1  w e r e  o f  a  g u e r r i l l a  c h a r a c t e r .
F r o m  t h e  s t a t e m e n t s  o f  t h e  l a o t i a n  a u t h o r i t i e s  
a n d  f r o m  t h o s e  o f  s o m e  w i t n e s s e s ,  i t  a p p e a r e d  
. . . t h a t  c e r t a i n  h o s t i l e  o p e r a t i o n s  m u s t  h a v e  
h a d  c e n t r a l i z e d  c o o r d i n a t i o n .  H o s t i l e  e l e m e n t s  
. . . s e e m e d  c e n t e r e d  o n  f o r m e r  m e m b e r s  o f  t h e  
p a t h e t  L a o  c o m b a t  u n i t s  p r e v i o u s l y  i n t e g r a t e d  
i n  1 9 5 7  s t h e  2 n d  B a t t a l i o n  o f  p a t h e t  l a o ,  w h i c h  
d e s e r t e d  f r o m  t h e  P l a i n e  d e s  J e r r e s  o n  
I / a y  1 1 ,  1 9 5 9 »  a n d  s e c t i o n s  o f  t h e  f r o n t i e r  
m i n o r i t i e s  c o n s i s t i n g  o f  T h a i s ,  M a o ,  a n d  a  f e w  
K h a n .
T h e  e n s e m b l e  o f  t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n  s u b m i t t e d  t o  t h e  
S u b - C o m m i t t e e  d i d  n o t  c l e a r l y  e s t a b l i s h  w h e t h e r  
t h e r e  w e r e  c r o s s i n g s  o f  t h e  f r o n t i e r  b y  r e g u l a r  
t r o o p s  o f  t h e  D e m o c r a t i c  R e p u b l i c  o f  Vietnam. 2
^"laos,“ Time LXXXIV (September 20, 1 9 5 9 ) ,  p. 24.
^•'Report of the Security Council Sub-Committee established 
under resolution of September 7 ,  1 9 5 9 ,  "  op. cit., p. 3̂ »
193A l t h o u g h  t h e  e v i d e n c e  w a s n ' t  c o n s i d e r e d  c o n c l u s i v e  r e g a r d i n g  
a g g r e s s i o n  h y  N o r t h  V i e t n a m ,  t h e  S u b - C o m m i t t e e  l e f t  t w o  m e m b e r s  o f  
t h e  c o m m i t t e e  w i t h  a  s e c r e t a r i a t  b e h i n d  t o  p r o v i d e  f u r t h e r  
i n f o r m a t i o n  t o  t h e  S u b - C o m m i t t e e  i n  N e w  Y o r k .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  t h e  
S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l  s o u g h t  a n o t h e r  w a y  t o  k e e p  t h e  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s  
p r e s e n c e ,  w h e n  t h e  S u b - C o m m i t t e e  r e p o r t  s h o w e d  a  l a c k  o f  
N o r t h  V i e t n a m e s e  p r e s e n c e  i n  L a o s .  O n  N o v e m b e r  9 t h ,  J o r g e  I l l u e c s  
o f  P a n a m a ,  P r e s i d e n t  o f  t h e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l  f o r  N o v e m b e r ,  
a n n o u n c e d  t h a t  t h e  S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l  w a s  g o i n g  t o  v i s i t  l a o s ,  a n d  
t h a t  t h i s  v i s i t  h a d  " n o  l i n k  w i t h  t h e  S u b - C o m m i t t e e  r e p o r t .  I t  i s  
b a s e d  o n  t h e  g e n e r a l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  o f  t h e  S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l  u n d e r  
t h e  C h a r t e r .
S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l  D a g  H a m m a r s k j o l d  a r r i v e d  i n  V i e n t i a n e
N o v e m b e r  1 0 ,  1 9 5 9 »  A f t e r  c o n s u l t a t i o n s  w i t h  P h o u i  S a n a n i k o n e
a n d  K h a m p h a n  P e n a y  f o r  f i v e  d a y s ,  t h e  S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l  r e q u e s t e d
t h e  E x e c u t i v e  S e c r e t a r y  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s  E c o n o m i c  C o m m i s s i o n
i n  E u r o p e ,  S a k a r i  S e v e r i  T u o r a i o j a ,  t o  j o i n  h i m  i n  laos.^ T u o m i o j a
a r r i v e d  o n  N o v e m b e r  1 5 t h .  H e  w a s  t h e r e :
t o  r e v i e w  t h e  e c o n o m i c  s i t u a t i o n  o f  L a o s  a n d  i n  
p a r t i c u l a r  t h e  r o l e  o f  e c o n o m i c  a n d  t e c h n i c a l  
a s s i s t a n c e  r e n d e r e d  b y  t h e  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s  f o r  
t h e  f u r t h e r a n c e  o f  e c o n o m i c  g r o w t h  a n d  s t a b i l i t y . 3
1 " S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l ' s  T r i p , "  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s  R e v i e w  V I  
( D e c e m b e r ,  1 9 5 9 ) .  p .  2 .
former Premier and Finance Minister of Finland,
3  S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l  D a g  H a m m a r s k j o l d  q u o t e d  i n  " T u o m i o j a  R e p o r t ' 
o n  l a o s  R e c o m m e n d s  C o - O r d i n a t e d  A c t i o n  b y  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s  f o r  K i n g d o m ' s  
D e v e l o p m e n t "  w h i c h  w a s  r e c e i v e d  b y  t h e  w r i t e r  f r o m  t h e  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s  
I n f o r m a t i o n  A g e n c y ,  B a n g k o k ,  T h a i l a n d  a s  a n  e n c l o s u r e  t o  a  l e t t e r  
f r o m  t h e  U N I E S  o f f i c e r  i n  C h a r g e ,  P r a y o o n  N a n a k o n ,  d a t e d  A p r i l  2 8 ,  1 9 5 9 »  
S e e  a p p e n d i x  p .  2 6 0  f o r  l e t t e r  a n d  t e x t  o f  t h e  r e p o r t .
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Tuomioja*s arrivai was the signal for the departure of the 
Secretary-General on llovem'ber l6th. With the Secretary-General 
went the remaining members of the Sub-Committee of the Security 
Council. But most important, a United Nations presence was 
maintained.
During Tuomioja*s stay in Laos there was continued a lull 
in the fighting along the North Vietnamese frontier of Laos. 
Within the context of this situation, Tuomioja and his staff 
developed a non-political image of the iMited Nations presence 
by delving into the social and economic problems of Laos. The 
results of this endeavor took the form of a report submitted by 
Tuomioja to the Secretary-General December 17, 1959»^ Tuomioja 
could submit his findings in this manner, since he was in laos as 
the personal representative of the Secretary-General.
With a non-political cover in the form of an economic 
mission in laos, Tuomioja and his successor in Ifarch, i960 
Zellweger, were able to keep both the Secretary-General informed 
about the small scale engagements between the Royal Army and 
Pathet lao.2 During this time, Tuomioja and Zellweger performed 
in a political role.
When an Army coup d'etat took place December 30, 1959» 
Tuomioja informed the Secretary-General of the conflict between 
Premier Phoui Sananikone and the Committee in Defense of the
^"Tuomioja Report on Laos Recommends Co-Ordinated Action 
by United lotions for Kingdom’s Development," ibid.
See appendix p. 260 for text of the report.
^Zellweger was a noted Swiss jurist and diplomat.
195National Interest. \^ile it is true the Royal Army did conduct 
themselves in a manner that is above criticism, the Army may have 
remained in power and thus a necessary lever for the Soviet Union 
to intervene had not }&imnarskjold insisted on the restoration of 
civilian rule.
In a letter dated January 4, i960, the Secretary-General 
reminded King Sri Savan Vathana of his promise to him in November 
that "no change will take place which could raise doubt with regard 
to the basic foundation of the policies of the country and the 
confidence they have created."^ Hammarskjold added that "a 
propitious beginning had been made to give effect to the United Nations 
interest in the country and that to date a favorable result seemed 
to have been achieved by the United Nations presence in laos, in 
granting the Kingdom "independent neutrality and democratic 
progress. "3 The King formed a new government with Kou Abhay as 
Premier.^
With the formation of a coalition government we close the 
chapter of a United Nations presence in laos. While it is true 
the United rations continued in name to be present, its value was 
lessened by Washington's decision in the spring of i960 to back a 
right wing government represented by the Committee in Defense of the
loag Hammarskjold quoted in Edwin P. Stanton, op. cit.,
p. 340.
Zibid.
^Dag Hammarskjold quoted in Thomas E. Ennis, "Operation 
Survival in laos," op. cit., p. 154.
4A member of the King's Council.
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National Interest.1 This effort reached a climax on August 8th,
when Captain Kong Le led his paratroopers in a revolt that resulted
in the CDNI gaining a temporary hold on Laos. With the return of
the rignt-wing government, political confusion resulted in laos.
This would diminish somewhat when Souvanna Phouma announced the
formation of a new government on August l4th. Souvanna Phouma
stated the government would he committed to a policy of "true and
wise neutrality."2 With this accomplished, Souvanna Phouma invited
the Pathet lao to enter into discussions to begin in October, but
they were inhibited by the action of the united States.3
1Arthur J. Dommen, op. cit., p. I36.
^Souvanna Phouma quoted in Arthur J. Dommen, op. cit.,
p. 148.
3"The Crisis in laos," The Department of State Bulletin 
XXXXII, September 26, 1960, p. 499.
CHAPTER X
TO THE BRINK IN LAOS
It is safer as well as more constructive to 
"be involved in the attempt to settle disputes 
than to find ourselves involved in the 
consequences of their notteing settled.1
On r/ay 16, 1961 a Fourteen-Nation International Conference
on the Settlement of the laotian Question convened in Geneva.
Once again a protracted search began to extract the Kingdom of
Laos from the Cold War. After 8? meetings and 14 months of
negotiations, the Conference representatives agreed on a
Declaration and Protocol.^ These Agreements were signed
July 23, 1962.
These Agreements were significant for several reasons.
First, the basis for the Agreements included a combination of
^Hamilton P. Armstrong, "Then and Now," Foreign Affairs 
XXXXI (October, 19&2), p. 5-
^"Declaration on the Neutrality of laos," and "protocol to 
the Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos, " Great Britain; Office 
of Foreign Affairs, International Conference on the Settlement of 
the Laotian Question; Geneva (London: Her Majesty's Stationery 
Office, 1962). The nation-states with representatives at the 
Conference were Burma, Cambodia, Canada, China, France, India, 
Laos, North Vietnam, Poland, South Vietnam, Thailand, the 
Soviet union, the United Kingdom, and the united States.
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international pressure and the laotian quest to terminate conflict. 
Second, the Agreements were achieved in spite of the hitter 
hostility between North Vietnam and the United States, and the 
rivalry of Communist China with the Soviet Union. Third, the 
Declaration and Protocol are significant for they are the only 
international agreements signed hy the United States and Communist 
China. ̂
Prior to these 14 months of protracted negotiations there 
is a history of inconsistent concern to maintain the Kingdom of 
Laos in a neutralized status. For the United States, the incon­
sistent concern for laos emanated from a general distate for Asian 
politics and an inflexible attitude towards communist nation-states. 
In part, the reasons were historical and because of the post- 
V/orld War II experience in Europe, China, and then Korea. Also, 
as Bernard B. Fall remarked in answer to the question: "How did
the united States get interested in laos in the first place?"^
Fall replied : "A simple and not inaccurate answer is : France asked
the united states to step in. "3 And finally, there was the general 
reluctance to underwrite the development of modern nation-states 
in am environment without the competitive political experience 
present in the West.^
1 Arthur Lall, How Communist China Negotiates (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1968), p. v.
^Bernard B. Fall, "Reappraisal in Laos," Current History 
XXXXII (January, I962), p. 9.
3lbid.
^William C. Johnstone, "United States Policy in Southern
Asia," op. cit., p. 66.
199F o r  t h e  C o n m u n i s t - b l c c  n a t i o n - s t a t e s  l e d  b y  t h e  S o v i e t  u n i o n ,  
I n d o c h i n a  w a s  s u f f i c i e n t l y  u n d e r d e v e l o p e d  a n d  a n t i - c o l o n i a l  t o  
p r e s e n t  t h e  b a s i s  f o r  C o m m u n i s t  i n s u r g e n c y  a n d  s u b v e r s i o n .  E u t  
t h e  o p p o r t u n i t y  w a s  c o m p r o m i s e d  b y  t h e  r i v a l r y  b e t w e e n  C o m m u n i s t  
C h i n a  a n d  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n .  S e c o n d ,  t h e  g e n e r a l  f r a g m e n t a t i o n  
w i t h i n  E a s t e r n  E u r o p e  p r e v e n t e d  t h e  u n d i v i d e d  a t t e n t i o n  o f  t h e  
S o v i e t  U n i o n  u p o n  A s i a n  p o l i t i c s .  T h i r d ,  C o m m u n i s t  C h i n a  w a s  
s u f f e r i n g  t h r o u g h  t h e  s t r e s s e s  o f  e c o n o m i c  a n d  p o l i t i c a l  b r e a k d o w n  
d u e  t o  t h e  f a i l u r e  o f  t h e  G r e a t  l e a p  F o r w a r d  a n d  t h e  q u e s t i o n i n g  
o f  I'ia.o T s e - t u n g ' s  l e a d e r s h i p  b y  a  f a c t i o n  l e d  b y  L i u  S h a o - c h ' i . l  
F i n a l l y , a n  i m p o r t a n t  f a c t o r  i n  t h e  i n c o n s i s t e n t  c o n c e r n  
f o r  L a o s  w a s  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  d r a m a t i c  c h a n g e s  t a k i n g  p l a c e  w i t h i n  
t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p o l i t i c a l  s y s t e m .  R e f e r e n c e  h e r e  i s  t o  s u c h  
c h a n g e s  a s  t h e  r e l a t i v e  u n i m p o r t a n c e  o f  i d e o l o g y  i n  t h e  19^ 0 * s ,  
t h e  s c a l e  o f  l i m i t a t i o n  p r e s e n t  i n  t h e  u t i l i z a t i o n  o f  w a r  a s  a  
m e a n s  f o r  e f f e c t i n g  p o l i t i c a l  p o w e r ,  a n d  t h e  f r a g m e n t a t i o n  w i t h i n  
t h e  i n d u s t r i a l i z e d  w o r l d  b e t w e e n  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s ,  J a p a n ,  a n d  
W e s t e r n  E u r o p e ,  a n d  t h e  r e s t  o f  t h e  i n d u s t r i a l i z e d  w o r l d .  T h i s  
b r e a k d o w n  i n  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p o l i t i c a l  s y s t e m  w a s  a l s o  v e r y  
a p p a r e n t  i n  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  o f  t h e  t h i r d  w o r l d  o f  u n d e r d e v e l o p e d  
n a t i o n - s t a t e s  a n d  t h e  i n d u s t r i a l i z e d  n a t i o n - s t a t e s , 2
W h a t e v e r  t h e  r e a s o n s  p r e s e n t e d  t o  i d e n t i f y  t h e  c a u s e s  b e h i n d
^ Y u a n - l i  VAi, " F a r m  C r i s i s  i n  R e d  C h i n a , "  C u r r e n t  H i s t o r y  
XXXXIII ( S e p t e m b e r ,  1962), p p .  l62-l6?, 182.
S h e n - Y u ,  " P a r t y  R u l e  i n  C o m m u n i s t  C h i n a , "  C u r r e n t  H i s t o r y  
XXXXIII ( S e p t e m b e r ,  1962), p p .  168-173i 182-183.
^ S e e  t e x t  p p .  3-6 f o r  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  t h e s e  v a r i a b l e s .
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t h e  i n c o n s i s t e n t  c o n c e r n  f o r  t h e  n e u t r a l i t y  o f  L a o s ,  t h e  t h e m e  
p r e s e n t  i n  t h e  p e r i o d  195^  t h r o u g h  1961 w a s  a  n a t i o n - s t a t e  o n  t h e  
v e r g e  o f  c o l l a p s e  a n d  c o n f i n e m e n t  w i t h i n  t h e  E a s t  o r  W e s t  a l l i a n c e  
s y s t e m .  Y e t ,  w h e n  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  i n  L a o s  m o v e d  t o  t h e  l e v e l  o f  
o v e r t  c o n f r o n t a t i o n  a n d  p o s s i b l e  d e f e a t  f o r  o n e  o f  t h e  p o w e r  
b l o c s ,  a  r e d u c t i o n  i n  t h e  d e g r e e  o f  t e n s i o n  w a s  a c h i e v e d  t h r o u g h  
a n  e x c h a n g e  b y  t h e  C o m m u n i s t  a n d  n o n - C o m m u n i s t  p o w e r  b l o c s .
T h i s  e x c h a n g e  i n v o l v e d  t h e  n e u t r a l i z a t i o n  o f  L a o s  a t  a  
p a r t i c u l a r  t i m e  i n  t h e  C o l d  W a r ,  w h e n  t h e  a d v a n t a g e  s e e m e d  t o  
f a v o r  o n e  o f  t h e  p o w e r  b l o c s ,  m  o t h e r  w o r d s ,  n e u t r a l i z a t i o n  w a s  
e x c h a n g e d  f o r  t h e  l i m i t e d  a d v a n t a g e  o f  e q u i l i b r i u m  i n  I n d o c h i n a  
a n d  t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  t h i s  r e g i o n a l  e q u i l i b r i u m  u p o n  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
b a l a n c e  o f  p o w e r  b e t w e e n  t h e  p o w e r  b l o c s .  T h i s  w a s  m o s t  o b v i o u s  
i n  t h e  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s *  p r e s e n c e .  K h r u s h c h e v  h a d  t h e  a d v a n t a g e  
v i s - a - v i s  C o m m u n i s t  C h i n a  i n  1959» a n d  t o  t h e  S o v i e t  l e a d e r  d e t e n t e  
w a s  t h e  c o r r e c t  p o s t u r e  t o  t a k e  i n  o r d e r  t o  h a v e  e c o n o m i c  d e v e l o p ­
m e n t  a n d  c o m p e t i t i o n  w i t h  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s .  T h u s ,  t h e  C o m m u n i s t  
b l o c  d i d  n o t  p l a c e  a n y  r e a l  m a j o r  b a r r i e r s  b e f o r e  t h e  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s *  
p r e s e n c e  i n  l a o s .
W h e n  t h e  U n i t e d  r a t i o n s '  p r e s e n c e  w a s  r e m o v e d  i n  t h e  s p r i n g  
o f  i960, t h e  r e a s o n s  f o r  t h e  r e m o v a l  h a d  t o  d o  w i t h  t h e  C o l d  W a r .
T h i s  n e w  p h a s e  of t h e  L a o t i a n  c r i s i s  b e g a n  i n  D e c e m b e r ,  1959» w h e n  
a  c o u p  d * é t a i t  r e s u l t e d  i n  t h e  e v e n t u a l  r e t u r n  o f  p r o - u n i t e d  s t a t e s  
r h o u i  S a n a n i k o n e  t o  p o w e r . ^  W i t h  t h e  r i g h t - w i n g  f a c t i o n  b a c k  i n  
p o w e r ,  t h e  P a t h e t  L a o  b e g a n  t o  e s c a l a t e  t h e i r  i n s u r g e n c y  a g a i n s t
^Arthur J. Dommen, op. cit., p. 124.
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t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  i n  V i e n t i a n e .  F r o m  J a n u a r y ,  i 960 t h r o u g h  J u l y ,  i 960 , 
t h e  m i l i t a r y  s i t u a t i o n  i n  L a o s  w a s  c o n f u s e d .  T h e n ,  o n  A u g u s t  9  
C a p t a i n  K o n g  L e  o v e r t h r e w  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  o f  P h o u i  S a n a n i k o n e .  
L e a d e r s h i p  p a s s e d  t o  t h e  n e u t r a l i s t  f a c t i o n  h e a d e d  h y  
S o u v a n n a  H i o u m a .  O n  A u g u s t  1 4 ,  S o u v a n n a  P h o u m a  d e c l a r e d  t h a t  h i s  
g o v e r n m e n t  w a s  " p l e d g e d  t o  n a t i o n a l  r e c o n c i l i a t i o n  a n d  t o  n e u t r a l i t y  
i n  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y .
P r i n c e  S o u v a n n a  P h o u m a  b e g a n  n e g o t i a t i o n s  w i t h  t h e  P a t h e t  l a o  
i n  O c t o b e r ,  i 9 6 0 , i n  o r d e r  t o  b r i n g  t h e  P a t h e t  l a o  a n d  t h e i r  l e a d e r  
P r i n c e  S o u p h a n o u v o n g  b a c k  i n t o  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t .  T h e  d i s c u s s i o n s  
b e t w e e n  S o u v a n n a  P h o u m a  a n d  h i s  h a l f - b r o t h e r  S o u p h a n o u v o n g  w e r e  
f r a g m e n t e d  b y  t h e  d e c i s i o n  o f  P r i n c e  B o u n  C u m  t o  e s t a b l i s h  a  
p r o - u n i t e d  S t a t e s  g o v e r n m e n t . ^
A c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  S t a t e  D e p a r t m e n t  " t h e  u n i t e d  S t a t e s  h a s  n o  
d e s i r e  t o  i n t e r v e n e  i n  t h e  i n t e r n a l  a f f a i r s  o f  L a o s . " -  T h i s  
i s  s u b j e c t  t o  q u e s t i o n ,  i f  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  B n b a s s y  i n  L a o s  o r  
t h e  L e g i s l a t i v e  R e f e r e n c e  S e r v i c e  o f  t h e  L i b r a r y  o f  C o n g r e s s  c a n  
b e  a c c e p t e d  a s  a u t h o r i t a t i v e  s o u r c e s  r e g a r d i n g  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  
f o r e i g n  p o l i c y . ^  B o t h  a g e n c i e s  a g r e e  t h a t  t h e  u n i t e d  S t a t e s  d e s i r e d
1 " i n t e r n a t i o n a l  C o n f e r e n c e  o n  t h e  S e t t l e m e n t  o f  t h e  L a o t i a n  
Q u e s t i o n , "  o p .  c i t . ,  p .  3 »
Z c i y d e  R .  I / ^ r k ,  " T h e  G e n e v a  C o n f e r e n c e  o n  L a o s ,  I 96I - I 962 , " 
T h e  Library o f  C o n g r e s s  L e g i s l a t i v e  R e f e r e n c e  S e r v i c e  D S - 5 5 2 / F - 2 9 3  
W a s h i n g t o n ,  D.C .  p .  5 *
3 " T h e  C r i s i s  i n  L a o s , "  D e p a r t m e n t  o f  S t a t e  B u l l e t i n  X L I I I  
( S e p t e m b e r  2 6 , i 9 6 0 ) ,  p .  4 9 9 .
^ " l a o s , "  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  B n b a s s y  i n  l a o s ,  o p .  c i t . ,  p .  ? .  
C l y d e  R .  M a r k ,  l o c .  c i t .
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t o  s e e  a  c o a l i t i o n  g o v e r n m e n t .  B u t  i t  w a s  t o  i n c l u d e  o n l y  t h e  
n e u t r a l i s t  f a c t i o n  h e a d e d  b y  S o u v a n n a  H i o u m a  a n d  t h e  r i g h t - w i n g  
l e a d e r  B o u n  O u m . ^  W i t h  t h i s  p o l i c y  i n  m i n d ,  t h e  W i i t e d  S t a t e s  
c u r t a i l e d  f u r t h e r  a s s i s t a n c e  t o  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  o f  S o u v a n n a  P h o u m a  
a n d  " T h a i l a n d  e s t a b l i s h e d  a  b l o c k a d e  o n  a l l  s h i p m e n t s  t o  t h e  a r e a s  
u n d e r  S o u v a n n a  P h o u m a ' s  c o n t r o l . N o w ,  S o u v a n n a  P h o u m a  a c c e p t e d  
" a  S o v i e t  o f f e r  o f  a n  a i r l i f t  f r o m  H a n o i .  " 3  T h i s  a i r l i f t  b e g a n  
t o  l a n d  i n  V i e n t i a n e  o n  D e c e m b e r  1 1 . ^
# e n  S o u v a n n a  P h o u m a  t u r n e d  t o  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n  f o r  
a s s i s t a n c e ,  t h e  i n i t i a l  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  r e a c t i o n  w a s  t o  p r o v i d e  
u n l i m i t e d  a s s i s t a n c e  t o  r i g h t - w i n g  G e n e r a l  P h o u m i  N o s a v a n . ^  T h i s  
w a s  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  b r i n g  a b o u t  a  t e m p o r a r y  m i l i t a r y  v i c t o r y  a g a i n s t  
t h e  C o m m u n i s t  f o r c e s ,  a n d  t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  B o u n  O u m  a s  P r i m e  
M i n i s t e r .  S o u v a n n a  R i o u m a  w a s  f o r c e d  t o  l e a v e  L a o s  f o r  C a m b o d i a  
b e t w e e n  D e c e m b e r  9  a n d  1 5 » ^  T h e  S t a t e  D e p a r t m e n t  W h i t e  P a p e r
Ipbid.
2 " l a o s , "  l o c .  c i t . ,  p .  ? .
3 I b i d .
^ A r t h u r  J .  D o m m e n  r e m a r k e d :  " O n  t h e  r u n w a y  a t  t h e  V i e n t i a n e  
a i r p o r t  b y  t h e  a f t e r n o o n  o f  D e c e m b e r  1 1  ( I 96O ) ,  i n  f u l l  v i e w  o f  
A m e r i c a n  o b s e r v e r s ,  o l i v e - d r a b  I l y u s h i n s  w e r e  u n l o a d i n g  s i x  1 0 5 - m m  
h o w i t z e r s  c o m p l e t e  w i t h  a m m u n i t i o n  a n d  N o r t h  V i e t n a m e s e  g u n  c r e w s  
t o  m a n  t h e m  ( n e i t h e r  K o n g  l e  n o r  t h e  P a t h e t  l a o  h a d  a n y  c a n n o n e e r s ) .  
A r t h u r  J .  D o m m e n ,  o p .  c i t . ,  p .  167 .
3 " l a o s , "  u n i t e d  S t a t e s  E m b a s s y  i n  L a o s ,  o p .  c i t . ,  p .  7 .
G e n e r a l  P h o u m i  N o s a v a n  i s  t h e  n e p h e w  o f  P r e m i e r  S a r i t  T h a n a r a t  
o f  T h a i l a n d  a n d  t h e  f o r m e r  L a o t i a n  D e f e n s e  M i n i s t e r  u n d e r  
P h o u i  S a n a n i k o n e .
6»United States White Paper on laos," op. cit., p. 180.
203c o n c l u d e d  t h a t  S o u v a n n a  P h o u m a * s  d e p a r t u r e  w a s  e v i d e n c e  o f  t h e  
f a c t  t h a t  h e  a n d  h i s  C a b i n e t  " t h u s  a b a n d o n e d  a n y  r e a l i s t i c  p r e t e n s e  
o f  f u l f i l l i n g  t h e i r  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  a s  a  G o v e r n m e n t . " ^
O n  D e c e m b e r  12, t h e  l a o t i a n  N a t i o n a l  A s s e m b l y  v o t e d  t h é  
c e n s u r e  o f  a n d  n o  c o n f i d e n c e  i n  t h e  S o u v a n n a  P h o u m a  g o v e r n m e n t ,  
" w h i c h  w a s  t h e r e u p o n  d i s m i s s e d  b y  t h e  K i n g ' s  r o y a l  o r d i n a n c e . " 2  
A  s e c o n d  r o y a l  o r d i n a n c e  a p p o i n t e d  a s  t h e  p r o v i s i o n a l  g o v e r n m e n t ,  
t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  p r e s i d e d  o v e r  b y  P r i n c e  B o u n  O u m .  O n  J a n u a r y  4-, I 96I  
t h e  l a o t i a n  N a t i o n a l  A s s e m b l y  e n d o r s e d  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  o f  B o u n  O u m .  
T h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  r e c o g n i z e d  t h i s  g o v e r n m e n t .  " A t  t h e  s a m e  t i m e ,  
P r i n c e  S o u v a n n a  P h o u m a  a n d  h i s  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  r e t u r n e d  t o  l a o s ,  
a n d ,  s u p p o r t e d  b y  t h e  P a t h e t  l a o ,  c l a i m e d  t o  b e  c o n t i n u i n g  a s  t h e  
l a w f u l  g o v e r n m e n t ,  f r o m  t h e i r  s e a t  i n  t h e  P l a i n  o f  J a r s .
' " D r i i s  l a t t e r  a u t h o r i t y  w a s  r e c o g n i z e d  a s  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  o f  L a o s '  
b y  t h e  S o v i e t  u n i o n *  a n d  c e r t a i n  o t h e r  P o w e r s . " ^
T h i r t e e n  d a y s  b e f o r e  J o h n  F .  K e n n e d y  b e c a m e  P r e s i d e n t  o f  
t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s ,  t h e  E i s e n h o w e r  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  i s s u e d  a  " W h i t e  
Paper" 5  o n  l a o s .  W i t h  t h e  i s s u a n c e  o f  t h e  W h i t e  P a p e r ,  t h e  
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  b r o u g h t  t o  a  c l i m a x  t h e  s t e p s  t a k e n ,  s i n c e  A u g u s t ,  
t o  a l i g n  t h e  K i n g d o m  o f  L a o s  w i t h  t h e  u n i t e d  S t a t e s .
^ I b i d . ,  p .  1 7 9 .
2 Ibid.
^ I n t e r n a t i o n a l  C o n f e r e n c e  o n  t h e  S e t t l e m e n t  o f  t h e  l a o t i a n  
Q u e s t i o n  o p .  c i t . ,  p .  3 »
r̂oid.
^"United States V/hite Paper on Laos," op. cit., pp. 179-181.
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T h e  W h i t e  % p e r  d i s c l o s e d  t h a t  t h e  E i s e n h o w e r  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  
h a d  n e v e r  i n t e n d e d  t o  r e c o g n i z e  o r  a s s i s t  a  n e u t r a l i z e d  L a o s  t h a t  
i n c l u d e d  t h e  p a t h e t  l a o  w i t h i n  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t .  " T h e  h i s t o r y  o f  
i t s  s t r u g g l e s  t o  d a t e  r e v e a l s  t h e  i n c o n t r o v e r t i b l e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e r e  
n e v e r  h a s  b e e n  a n y  t h r e a t  t o  t h e  s e c u r i t y  o f  l a o s  b u t  t h a t  w h i c h  
h a s  c o m e  f r o m  i t s  C o m m u n i s t  n e i g h b o r s .  T h e s e  e f f o r t s  t o  u n d e r ­
m i n e  i t s  n a t i o n a l  i n t e g r i t y  h a v e  b e e n  i n s i d i o u s  a n d  c o n s t a n t .
For L a o s  t o  r e m a i n  i n d e p e n d e n t ,  " n o n - C o m m u n i s t  n a t i o n s  o f  t h e  
w o r l d '  m u s t  ' r e n d e r  t h e  a s s i s t a n c e  i t  h a s  r e q u e s t e d . T h i s  i s  
m o s t  n e c e s s a r y ,  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  s t a t e  D e p a r t m e n t ,  b e c a u s e  " i f  
L a o s  s h o u l d  b e  s e i z e d  b y  t h e  C o m m u n i s t s ,  t h e  e f f e c t s  c o u l d  b e  
f a r - r e a c h i n g  a n d  t h e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  o t h e r  s m a l l  a n d  v u l n e r a b l e  
s t a t e s  a l l  t o o  e v i d e n t . " 3
T h e  S o v i e t  u n i o n ' s  d e c i s i o n  t o  p r o v i d e  d i r e c t  l o g i s t i c a l  
s u p p o r t  t o  K o n g  L e  a n d  t h e  P a t h e t  L a o  w a s  s t r u c t u r e d  a s  a n  a c t i o n  
b y  a  c o - c h a i r m a n  a n d  m e m b e r  o f  t h e  1 9 5 4  G e n e v a  g r o u p  r e s p o n s i b l e  
f o r  t h e  a d h e r e n c e  o f  e v e r y  n a t i o n - s t a t e  t o  t h e  n e u t r a l i z a t i o n  o f  
I n d o c h i n a .  T h i s  c o n c l u s i o n  r e g a r d i n g  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n ' s  i n v o l v e ­
m e n t  i s  a t t a i n e d  f r o m  t h e  S o v i e t  n o t e  t o  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  d a t e d  
D e c e m b e r  1 3 ,  i 9 6 0 . T h e  N o t e  s t a t e d ;
B e i n g  o n e  o f  t h e  p a r t i c i p a n t s  a n d  c h a i r m e n
o f  t h e  G e n e v a  C o n f e r e n c e  o n  I n d o c h i n a ,
t h e  S o v i e t  G o v e r n m e n t  d e c i s i v e l y  p r o t e s t s  t h e
^ I b i d . , p .  1 8 1 .
^ I b i d . ,  p .  1 8 0 .
^ " U n i t e d  S t a t e s  W h i t e  P a p e r  o n  L a o s , "  I b i d . , p .  1 8 1 ,
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united States intervention in the internal 
affairs of laos and condemns this intervention.^
This intervention by the United states, according to the Soviet
note, "undermines the Geneva agreements and is directed against
t h e  f r e e d o m  a n d  i n d e p e n d e n c e  o f  t h e  L a o t i a n  p e o p l e ,  a g a i n s t  i t s
i n a l i e n a b l e  r i g h t  t o  c o n d u c t  a  p o l i c y  o f  p e a c e ,  n e u t r a l i t y ,  a n d
f r i e n d s h i p  w i t h  a l l  p e o p l e s . "2
On December l?th, the United States responded to the Soviet
n o t e .  T h i s  N o t e  e x p r e s s e d  a  " c a t e g o r i c a l  r e j e c t i o n " ^  o f  a l l  t h e
accusations made by the Soviet Union. The Note came within the
time frame of the Laotian crisis, when Souvanna Phouma had fled
Laos for Cambodia and Captain Kong Le joined his paratroopers
with the Pathet lao forces in northeastern laos. ' According to the
United States Embassy in laos "shortly thereafter, the National
Assembly passed a vote of no confidence in the Souvanna Phouma
government and a new cabinet under Prince Boun Oum was legally
invested.
A s  t h e  l a o t i a n  c r i s i s  w a s  e s c a l a t i n g  i n t o  t h e  f i r s t  f r o n t a l  
c o n f r o n t a t i o n  o f  t h e  b i - p o l a r  p o w e r s  i n  I n d o c h i n a ,  a n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
d i a l o g u e  b e g a n  t o  r e c o n s t i t u t e  a  n e u t r a l i z e d  l a o s .  O n  
D e c e m b e r  1 5 ,  I 9 6 0  P r i m e  M i n i s t e r  N e h r u  o f  I n d i a  s e n t  n o t e s  t o  t h e
^ " S o v i e t  N o t e  t o  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s ,  D e c e m b e r  1 5 ,  I 9 6 0 , "  
D e p a r t m e n t  of S t a t e  B u l l e t i n  X L I V  ( J a n u a r y  2 ,  I 96I ) ,  p .  1 ? .
Zibid.
3 "United States Note t o  the U . S . S . R . ,  December 1 7 ,  I 9 6 0 , "  
Department of State Bulletin X L I V  (January 2 ,  I 96I ) ,  p. 1 5 »
^"laos," United States Embassy in Laos, op. cit., p. ?.
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c o - c h a i r m e n  ( S o v i e t  U n i o n  a n d  G r e a t  B r i t a i n )  o f  t h e  1 9 5 ^  C o n f e r e n c e . 1  
N e h r u  r e q u e s t e d  t h a t  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  C o n t r o l  C o m m i s s i o n  h e  
r e c o n v e n e d  a n d  a n o t h e r  c o n f e r e n c e  h e  h e l d .  L o r d  H o m e  o f  G r e a t  B r i t a i n  
r e f e r r e d  t o  N e h r u ' s  n o t e  i n  r e m a r k s  t o  t h e  H o u s e  o f  L o r d s .  H o m e  
a g r e e d  w i t h  N e h r u ' s  s u g g e s t i o n ,  h u t  n o t e d  " t h a t  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n  c o u l d  
o n l y  f u n c t i o n  w i t h  t h e  c o - o p e r a t i o n  o f  t h e  l a o t i a n  g o v e r n m e n t  a n d  
r e b e l s . " 2  " H . M .  A m b a s s a d o r  i n  M o s c o w  w a s  i n s t r u c t e d  t o  e x p r e s s  t o
t h e  S o v i e t  G o v e r n m e n t  t h e  s e r i o u s  c o n c e r n  o f  H e r  M a j e s t y ' s  G o v e r n m e n t  
a t  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  d e v e l o p i n g  i n  L a o s ,  a n d  t o  e x p r e s s  t h e  h o p e  t h a t  
t h e  S o v i e t  G o v e r n m e n t  w o u l d  s h a r e  t h e  v i e w  t h a t  f o r e i g n  a s s i s t a n c e  
t o  t h e  r e b e l s  i n  l a o s  s h o u l d  s t o p . " 3
The Soviet Union replied to Nehru's suggestion on 
December 22. Mbscow agreed that the Geneva Conference should he 
reconvened with the same membership.^ The Soviet Note agreed the 
International Control Commission should be reconstituted to 
supervise a ceasefire. But here a difference arose. The 
Soviet Union desired to see the ICC "contact“3 the government of 
Souvanna Riouma. This would he unacceptable, since Souvanna Phouma's 
government was recognized only by the Communist bloc of nation­
states. "Her M&jesty's Government and many other governments
^"International Conference on the Settlement of the laotian 
Question," o p .  cit., p .  3 »
2 I b i d .
3 l h i d .
^ I b i d . , p .  4 .
3Ibid., p. 4.
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continued to recognize the government of Prince Boun Oum which on
January 5» 19&1 finally completed the formalities required by the
Constitution. They therefore did not accept the Soviet proposal."1
On December 31st, Arthur J. Dommen interviewed the deposed
Prince Souvanna Phouma. Dommen states;
"The Prince immediately declared that 
the National Assembly's censure of him, 
on December 12, was not valid because it 
had been voted during an extraordinary 
session held in neither the royal capital 
nor the administrative capital, but in 
Savannakhet. He regarded the King's 
dealing with the Revolutionary Committee 
as maladroit and beyond the royal authority.
An underlying factor here was the long­
standing personal rivalry between the vice­
regal branch of the royal family and the 
royal family itself, which had lain barely 
beneath the surface since formation of the 
Lao Issara in 19^5*
The Prince said that he had not submitted 
his resignation to the King and made no 
mention of sending to Luang Prabang a 
telegram indicating his willingness to 
resign. He contended that he was still 
Prime Minister, Lie 19^7 Constitution 
offered no guideposts. It did not indicate 
how soon a Prime Minister must resign 
after losing the confidence of the 
National Assembly, but merely stated, in 
Article 22, that the 'vote of a motion of 
censure involves the resignation of the 
entire Government.'
^Ibid., p. 4.
^Arthur J. Dommen, op. cit., p. 174.
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C o m m u n i s t  C h i n a  b e g a n  t o  s h o w  a n  i n t e r e s t  i n  a  d i p l o m a t i c
s e t t l e m e n t  t o  t h e  l a o t i a n  c r i s i s  i n  D e c e m b e r ,  I 96O .  C h i n e s e
F o r e i g n  M i n i s t e r  C h ' e n  Y i  a d d r e s s e d  l e t t e r s  t o  S o v i e t  F o r e i g n
M i n i s t e r  G r o m y k o  a n d  B r i t i s h  F o r e i g n  I V I i n i s t e r  H o m e  d a t e d
D e c e m b e r  2 6 , ^  I n  t h e s e  l e t t e r s ,  C h ' e n  Y i  c a l l e d  u p o n  t h e
c o - c h a i r m e n  o f  t h e  G e n e v a  C o n f e r e n c e  o f  1 9 5 ^  " t o  s t o p  t h e  a c t i o n s
o f  t h e  U . S .  g o v e r n m e n t  a n d  i t s  v a s s a l  t h e  T h a i l a n d  g o v e r n m e n t ,
i n  v i o l a t i o n  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  l a w  a n d  t h e  G e n e v a  a g r e e m e n t s . " ^
C h ' e n  Y i  c o n t i n u e d j
T h e  C h i n e s e  g o v e r n m e n t  f u l l y  e n d o r s e s  t h e  
. p r o p o s a l  p u t  f o r w a r d  b y  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  o f  
t h e  U . S . S . R .  i n  i t s  n o t e  t o  t h e  B r i t i s h  
g o v e r n m e n t  d a t e d  D e c e m b e r  2 2 ,  i 960 a n d  b y  
B i a m  V a n  D o n g ,  m i n i s t e r  o f  f o r e i g n  a f f a i r s  
o f  t h e  D e m o c r a t i c  R e p u b l i c  o f  V i e t  N a m ,  i n  
h i s  l e t t e r  t o  t h e  C o - C h a i r m e n  o f  t h e  G e n e v a  
C o n f e r e n c e  d a t e d  D e c e m b e r  2 4 ,  i 960 , n a m e l y  
t o  c o n v e n e  a  c o n f e r e n c e  o f  t h e  p a r t i c i p a n t s  
o f  t h e  195 ^  G e n e v a  c o n f e r e n c e  a n d  r e s u m e  t h e  
a c t i v i t i e s  o f  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c o m m i s s i o n  
f o r  s u p e r v i s i o n  a n d  c o n t r o l  i n  l a o s  s o  a s  
p r o m p t l y  t o  s t o p  t h e  U . S .  g o v e r n m e n t ' s  
i n t e r v e n t i o n  a n d  a g g r e s s i o n  i n  L a o s  a n d  
r e s t o r e  p e a c e  t h e r e . 3
T h i s  w a s  a  v e r y  d r a m a t i c  t u r n  o f  e v e n t s  i n  t h e  e v e n t u a l  
r e c o n v e n i n g  o f  t h e  G e n e v a  C o n f e r e n c e .  C o m m u n i s t  C h i n a  w a s  i n  
t h e  m i d s t  o f  a  c o n f r o n t a t i o n  w i t h  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n .  A t  t h e  P a r t y  
C o n g r e s s  o f  t h e  C . P . S . U .  i n  O c t o b e r ,  I 96 I ,  t h e  o b v i o u s  d i f f e r e n c e s
^ ' ' F o r e i g n  R î i n i s t e r  C h ' e n  Y i ' s  l e t t e r s  t o  S o v i e t  F o r e i g n  
M i n i s t e r  G r o m y k o  a n d  B r i t i s h  F o r e i g n  M i n i s t e r  H o m e  d a t e d  
D e c e m b e r  2 8 ,  I 96O "  a p p e a r e d  i n  P e k i n g  R e v i e w  I V  ( J a n u a r y  6 , I 96I ) ,
p .  1 9 .
Z i b i d .
5 Ibid.
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r e g a r d i n g  t h e  p a t h  t o  c o m m u n i s m  b e c a m e  c l e a r  t o  t h e  r e s t  o f  t h e  
w o r l d . 1
m  s p i t e  o f  t h e  S i n o - S o v i e t  c o n f l i c t ,  w h i c h  w a s  i n  p a r t  
b a s e d  o n  t h e  m e a n s  f o r  a c h i e v i n g  C o m m u n i s m ,  F o r e i g n  M i n i s t e r  
C h ' e n  Y i  s u g g e s t e d  a  p e a c e f u l  s e t t l e m e n t  t o  t h e  l a o t i a n  c r i s i s .  
H e r e ,  C h i n a  w a s  n o t  a c t i n g  o u t  t h e  r o l e  o f  a  d o c t r a i n a i r e  C o m m u n i s t  
n a t i o n - s t a t e ,  b u t  r a t h e r  a s  a  t y p i c a l  n a t i o n - s t a t e .  T h i s  c a n  b e  
s e e n  i n  C h ' e n  Y i ' s  r e q u e s t  f o r  a  c o n f e r e n c e  b a s e d  u p o n  C h i n a ' s  
c o n c e r n  " t o  s a f e g u a r d  i t s  o w n  s e c u r i t y . " 2  T h i s  s e c u r i t y  w o u l d  b e  
a c h i e v e d ,  a c c o r d i n g  t o  C h ' e n  Y i ,  b y  h a v i n g  a  n e i g h b o r i n g  L a o s  f r e e  
o f  f o r e i g n e r s  f r o m  b o t h  p o w e r  b l o c s .  T o  C h ' e n  Y i  t h i s  c o u l d  b e  
a t t a i n e d  o n l y  b y  a  n e u t r a l i z e d  L a o s .  A n d  a  c o n f e r e n c e  w a s  t h e  
m e a n s  m o s t  a c c e p t a b l e  t o  t h e  C h i n e s e  f o r  t h e  a c h i e v e m e n t  o f  a  
n e u t r a l i z e d  l a o s . 3
C h ' e n  Y i ' s  l e t t e r  w a s  s i g n i f i c a n t  n o t  o n l y  f o r  t h e  f a c t  t h a t
^ A t  t h e  C o n g r e s s e s  a n d  C o n f e r e n c e  d i s c u s s e d ,  P e k i n g  d e n i e d  
K h r u s h c h e v ' s  t h e s i s  o f  p e a c e f u l  r o a d s  t o  c o m m u n i s m ;  i n s t e a d ,  t h e  
C h i n e s e  i n s i s t e d  t h a t  w a r s  a r e  i n e v i t a b l e  a s  l o n g  a s  c a p i t a l i s m  
p e r s i s t s .  C h a r l e s  B .  M e  L a n e  n o t e s ;  A s  t h e  r e s u l t  o f  t h i s  c o n f l i c t  
t h e  g e n e r a l  p o l i c y  o f  P e k i n g  f r o m  i 960 f o r w a r d  v / a s  " t o  o b s t r u c t  
M o s c o w ' s  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  o f  p e a c e f u l  c o e x i s t e n c e . "  C h a r l e s  B .  I ® l a n e ,  
" C h i n a ' s  R o l e  i n  t h e  C o m m u n i s t  B l o c , "  C u r r e n t  H i s t o r y  X X X X I I I  
( S e p t e m b e r ,  I 9 6 2 ), p .  1 3 3 *
T h e  o n l y  r e a l  d i f f e r e n c e  i n  t h e  S i n o - S o v i e t  c o n f l i c t  i n  
i 9 6 0 , a n d  1961 w a s  t h a t  i n  I 96O  t h e  e x c h a n g e s  w e r e  v e i l e d ,  b u t  i n  
1961 t h e  c o n f l i c t  b e c a m e  v e r y  o b v i o u s  t o  t h e  w o r l d .  T h i s  w a s  v e r y  
c l e a r ,  a f t e r  K h r u s h c h e v  a t t a c k e d  C h i n a ' s  a l l y ,  A l b a n i a ,  a t  t h e  
T w e n t y - s e c o n d  C o n g r e s s .  K h r u s h c h e v ' s  a c t i o n  c a u s e s  C h o u  E n - l a i  
t o  l e a v e  t h e  C o n g r e s s .  I b i d .
^ " F o r e i g n  î . l i n i s t e r  C h ' e n  Y i ' s  l e t t e r  t o  S o v i e t  F o r e i g n  
r . I i n i s t e r  G r o m y k o  a n d  B r i t i s h  F o r e i g n  f / I i n i s t e r  H o m e  d a t e d  
D e c e m b e r  2 8 ,  i 9 6 0 , "  o p .  c i t .
3lbid.
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C h i n a  w a s  w i l l i n g  t o  s e e  t h e  r e c o n v e n i n g  o f  a  G e n e v a  C o n f e r e n c e  
t h a t  i n c l u d e d  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n  a n d  s e v e r a l  c a p i t a l i s t  n a t i o n ­
s t a t e s ,  h u t  b e c a u s e  C h i n a  w a n t e d  t o  s e e  a  n e u t r a l i z e d  l a o s  
g u a r a n t e e d  h y  t h e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  C o n t r o l  C o m m i s s i o n  u n d e r  t h e  
c h a i r m a n s h i p  o f  a  r e c e n t  e n e m y ;  n a m e l y ,  I n d i a . ^  C h ' e n  Y i  s t a t e d :
T h e  C h i n e s e  g o v e r n m e n t  f u l l y  e n d o r s e s  t h e  p r o p o s a l
p u t  f o r w a r d  h y  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  o f  U . S . S . R .  i n  i t s
n o t e  t o  t h e  B r i t i s h  g o v e r n m e n t  d a t e d  D e c e m b e r  2 2 ,  i 960
a n d  h y  P h a m  V a n  D o n g ,  m i n i s t e r  o f  f o r e i g n  a f f a i r s  o f
t h e  D e m o c r a t i c  R e p u b l i c  o f  V i e t  N a m ,  i n  h i s  l e t t e r  
t o  t h e  C o - C h a i r m e n  o f  t h e  G e n e v a  C o n f e r e n c e  d a t e d  
D e c e m b e r  2 4 ,  i 9 6 0 , n a m e l y  t o  c o n v e n e  a  c o n f e r e n c e  
o f  t h e  p a r t i c i p a n t s  o f  t h e  1 9 5 4  G e n e v a  c o n f e r e n c e  
a n d  r e s u m e  t h e  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
c o m m i s s i o n  f o r  s u p e r v i s i o n  a n d  c o n t r o l  i n  L a o s  s o  
a s  p r o m p t l y  t o  s t o p  t h e  U . S .  g o v e r n m e n t ' s  i n t e r v e n t i o n  
a n d  a g g r e s s i o n  i n  l a o s  a n d  r e s t o r e  p e a c e  there,2
F i n a l l y ,  w h i l e  C h ' e n  Y i  b l a m e d  t h e  c r i s i s  i n  l a o s  u p o n  t h e  
U n i t e d  S t a t e s ,  h e  r e f r a i n e d  f r o m  u s i n g  t h e  c r i s i s  a s  a  p u r e l y
1  S i n c e  S e p t e m b e r  1 0 ,  1 9 5 6  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  r e l a t i o n s  b e t w e e n  
C h i n a  a n d  m d i a  h a d  b e e n  d e t e r i o r a t i n g ,  m  t h e  t i m e  p e r i o d  u n d e r  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n ,  t h e  S i n o - I n d i a n  c o n f l i c t  c a m e  t o  a  c l i m a x  i n  r ^ y ,  
1 9 6 2 , w h e n  t h e  C h i n a  c o n c l u d e d  w i t h  P a k i s t a n  a n  a g r e e m e n t  r e g a r d i n g  
t h e  b o r d e r  i n  n o r t h w e s t e r n  K a s h m i r .
O n  S e p t e m b e r  1 0 ,  1 9 5 6  a  C h i n e s e  A r m y  p a t r o l  " t h r e w  s t o n e s  
a t  a n  I n d i a n  B o r d e r  S e c u r i t y  F o r c e  u n i t  a n d  t h r e a t e n e d  t o  t h r o w  
h a n d  g r e n a d e s . " . . .  " O n  O c t o b e r  1 8 ,  1 9 5 8 ,  I n d i a  c o m p l a i n e d  t o  
C h i n a  a b o u t  t h e  L a d a k h  h i g h w a y  c o m p l e t e d  b y  t h e  C h i n e s e . " . . .  
" V / n e n  a  u n i t  o f  5 0  C h i n e s e ,  l e d  b y  a n  o f f i c e r  c r o s s e d  t h e  e a s t e r n ­
m o s t  c o r n e r  o f  t h e  N o r t h - E a s t  F r o n t i e r  A g e n c y  i n  t h e  d i r e c t i o n  o f  
B u r m a  o n  S e p t e m b e r  2 8 ,  1 9 5 8 ,  a l l  o f  I n d i a ' s  b o u n d r y  b e c a m e  
i n s e c u r e . "  T h e  T i b e t a n  r e b e l l i o n  i n  I f e r c h ,  1 9 5 9  c a u s e d  f u r t h e r  
e s c a l a t i o n  o f  t h e  c o n f l i c t .  O n  A u g u s t  2 6 ,  1 9 5 9 ,  s e v e r e  f i g h t i n g  
b r o k e  o u t  a t  L o n g j u  ( N E F A )  i n  t h e  c o u r s e  o f  w h i c h  C . P . R .  t r o o p s  
o v e r r a n  t h e  b o r d e r  a n d  c a u s e d  n u m e r o u s  c a s u l a t i e s  t o  t h e  I n d i a n  
g a r r i s o n . "  " A n d  f i n a l l y ,  t h e r e  w a s  t h e  P a k i s t a n - C h i n e s e  s e t t l e m e n t  
o f  t h e  K a s h m i r  b o r d e r  i n  N a y ,  I 962 . B e r n a r d  B .  p a l l ,  " R e d  C h i n a ' s  
A i m s  i n  S o u t h  A s i a , "  C u r r e n t  H i s t o r y  X X X X I I I  ( S e p t e m b e r ,  1 9 6 2 ) ,
p p .  138- 1 39 .
^ " F o r e i g n  M i n i s t e r  C h ' e n  Y i ' s  l e t t e r  t o  S o v i e t  F o r e i g n  
M i n i s t e r  G r o m y k o  a n d  B r i t i s h  F o r e i g n  M i n i s t e r  H o m e  d a t e d  
D e c e m b e r  2 8 ,  I 96 O , "  o p .  c i t .
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p r o p a g a n d a  v e h i c l e .  M e n t i o n  w a s  m a d e  p r e v i o u s l y  t h a t  C h i n a  
e m p h a s i z e d  h e r  c o n c e r n  i n  t e r m s  o f  C h i n a ' s  s e c u r i t y  a n d  t h e  
v i a b i l i t y  o f  n e i g h b o r i n g  l a o s .  T h i s  t h e m e  o f  C h i n a ' s  i n t e r e s t  
a s  a  n a t i o n - s t a t e ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  a  m e m b e r  o f  a  C o m m u n i s t  a l l i a n c e  
s y s t e m ,  w a s  e v i d e n t  i n  t h a t  C h ' e n  Y i  m a d e  n o  p l e a  o n  b e h a l f  o f  
t h e  P a t h e t  L a o .  I n s t e a d ,  C h ' e n  Y i  a d v i s e d  t h a t  t h e  c o - c h a i r m e n  
i n i t i a t e  a c t i o n  f o r  a  c o n f e r e n c e  b y  c o m m u n i c a t i n g  w i t h  t h e  " l e g a l  
g o v e r n m e n t  o f  L a o s  h e a d e d  b y  P r i n c e  S o u v a n n a  p h o u m a . P r i n c e  
S i h a n o u k  o f  C a m b o d i a  a d d e d  t o  t h e  d i p l o m a t i c  d i a l o g u e  r e g a r d i n g  
L a o s  b y  a d d r e s s i n g  l e t t e r s  t o  s e v e r a l  g o v e r n m e n t s  o n  J a n u a r y  1 ,  I 96I .  
m  t h e  l e t t e r  t o  P r i m e  I . I i n i s t e r  l . ' ^ c m i l l a n  o f  G r e a t  B r i t a i n ,
S i h a n o u k  r e c o m m e n d e d  " t h a t  a  C o n f e r e n c e  o n  L a o s  s h o u l d  b e  h e l d  
c o n s i s t i n g  o f  t h e  s i g n a t o r i e s  o f  t h e  G e n e v a  A g r e e m e n t  o f  1 9 5 ^ »  
p l u s  t h e  m e m b e r s  o f  t h e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  C o m m i s s i o n  f o r  S u p e r v i s i o n  
a n d  C o n t r o l  i n  L a o s  ( I n d i a ,  C a n a d a  a n d  P o l a n d ) ,  a n d  a l s o  T h a i l a n d  
a n d  B u r m a ,  w h i c h  b o r d e r  o n  L a o s ,  a n d  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  o f  A m e r i c a . " %  
S o v i e t  P r e m i e r  K h r u s h c h e v  a n d  C h i n e s e  F o r e i g n  I / I i n i s t e r  
C h ' e n  Y i  a g r e e d  t o  S i h a n o u k ' s  s u g g e s t i o n s . 3  C h ' e n  Y i  r e p l i e d  t o  
S i h a n o u k ' s  l e t t e r ,  a n d  t h e n  a d d r e s s e d  a  s e c o n d  l e t t e r  t o  S o v i e t  
F o r e i g n  M i n i s t e r  G r o m y k o  a n d  B r i t i s h  F o r e i g n  I & n i s t e r  H o m e  o n  
J a n u a r y  1 4 .  C h ' e n  Y i  s t a t e d :  " C h i n a  a g r e e s  t o  t h e  p o s i t i v e  p r o p o s a l
^Ibid., p. 235*
^"His Royal Highness Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia 
letter addressed to British Prime finis ter îferold Ivfecmillan, 
January 1, I96I." Appearing in International Conference on the 
Settlement of the Laotian Question. Cp. cit., p. 4.
3Arthur lall, op. cit., p. 4.
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o f  H i s  R o y a l  H i g h n e s s  P r i n c e  S i h a n o u k  a n d  b e l i e v e s  t h a t  s u c h  a  
c o n f e r e n c e ,  i f  i t  c o u l d  b e  c o n v e n e d ,  w i l l  c e r t a i n l y  h e l p  t o  s e e k  
w a y s  t o  s a f e g u a r d  t h e  G e n e v a  A g r e e m e n t s  a n d  r e s t o r e  p e a c e  i n  l a o s . " ^  
B r i t i s h  P r i m e  M i n i s t e r  I & c m i l l a n  a n s w e r e d  P r i n c e  S i h a n o u k ' s  
l e t t e r  o n  J a n u a r y  1 3 .  P r i m e  r Æ i n i s t e r  M a c m i l l a n  a g r e e d  t h a t  a  
c o n f e r e n c e  w a s  t h e  b e s t  w a y  t o  a c h i e v e  n e u t r a l i z a t i o n  a n d  a  
r e l a t i v e  d e g r e e  o f  p e a c e  f o r  l a o s .  B u t  M a c m i l l a n  a d v i s e d  t h a t  a  
c o n f e r e n c e  w a s  i m p o s s i b l e  w i t h o u t  f i r s t  h a v i n g  t h e  f i g h t i n g  
c u r t a i l e d ,  " a n d  t h a t  t h e r e f o r e  t h e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  C o m m i s s i o n  f o r  
S u p e r v i s i o n  a n d  C o n t r o l  s h o u l d  r e t u r n  t h e r e  i m m e d i a t e l y ,  i n  o r d e r  
t o  b r i n g  a b o u t  a  c e a s e - f i r e . "2
O n  M a r c h  2 3 .  1 9 & 1 ,  t h e  I k i i t e d  K i n g d o m  f o l l o w e d  u p  a  p r e v i o u s  
n o t e  t o  P r i n c e  S i h a n o u k  b y  r e p e a t i n g  a  s u g g e s t i o n  t h a t  t h e  I C C  b e  
r e a c t i v a t e d  i n  a  n o t e  a d d r e s s e d  t o  t h e  S o v i e t  l f i i i o n . 3  jjn a d d i t i o n ,  
t h e  B r i t i s h  c a l l e d  u p o n  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n  t o  j o i n  t h e m  a s  c o - c h a i r m e n  
o f  t h e  1 9 5 ^  C o n f e r e n c e  a n d  c a l l  f o r  a  c e a s e - f i r e  t o  b e  i m p l e m e n t e d  
b y  t h e  I C C .  V / i t h  t h e  c e a s e - f i r e  a n  a c c o m p l i s h e d  f a c t ,  t h e  
U n i t e d  K i n g d o m  a d v i s e d  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n  t o  j o i n  t h e  B r i t i s h  i n  
c a l l i n g  f o r  a  G e n e v a  C o n f e r e n c e . ^  T h e  S o v i e t  u n i o n ' s  r e p l y  t o  t h e
1 " F o r e i g n  M i n i s t e r  C h ' e n  Y i ' s  l e t t e r s  t o  S o v i e t  F o r e i g n  
M i n i s t e r  ( S r o m y k o  a n d  B r i t i s h  F o r e i g n  M i n i s t e r  H o m e ,  J a n u a r y  1 4 - ,  I 96I , "  
P e k i n g  R e v i e w  I V  ( J a n u a r y  2 0 ,  I 96 I ) ,  p .  ? •
2 " P r i m e  M i n i s t e r  H a r o l d  M a c m i l l a n ' s  l e t t e r  t o  P r i n c e  N o r o d o m  
S i h a n o u k  o f  J a n u a r y  1 3 .  1 9 ^ 1 "  r e f e r r e d  t o  i n  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
C o n f e r e n c e  o n  t h e  S e t t l e m e n t  o f  t h e  l a o t i a n  q u e s t i o n ,  o p .  c i t .
^ " B r i t i s h  A i d e - M e m o i r e  A d d r e s s e d  t o  S o v i e t  U n i o n ,
M a r c h  23 , 196 I ,  "  D o c u m e n t s  o f  A m e r i c a n  F o r e i g n  R e l a t i o n s  1 9 6 1  
( N e w  Y o r k  I H a r p e r  &  B r o t h e r s .  1 9 6 2 ) ,  p .  307 .
^Ibid.
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B r i t i s h  n o t e  w a s  d a t e d  A p r i l  1 ,  196I .  O v e r a l l  t h e  S o v i e t  u n i o n  
a g r e e d  t o  t h e  m e t h o d s  s u g g e s t e d  h y  t h e  B r i t i s h  f o r  a c h i e v i n g  a  
c e a s e - f i r e  a n d  c o n f e r e n c e  t o  n e u t r a l i z e  l a o s . ^
T h e  l È i i t e d  S t a t e s  r e m a i n e d  o n  t h e  s i d e  l i n e s ,  w h i l e  t h e  
d i p l o m a t i c  o f f i c e s  o f  t h e  c o - c h a i r m e n  w e r e  p r e p a r i n g  t h e  w a y  f o r  
t h e  t h r e e  m e s s a g e s  o f  A p r i l  2 4 ,  w h i c h  l a i d  t h e  g r o u n d w o r k  f o r  t h e  
C o n f e r e n c e .  I n  p a r t ,  a  r e a s o n  f o r  t h i s  p o s i t i o n  c a n  b e  f o u n d  i n  
t h e  S t a t e  D e p a r t m e n t  W h i t e  P a p e r  o n  l a o s  i s s u e d  J a n u a r y  7 ,  I 96I .2  
A  s e c o n d  f a c t o r  o f  i m p o r t a n c e  h a d  t o  d o  w i t h  t h e  t r a n s i t i o n  t h a t  
w a s  t a k i n g  p l a c e  i n  W a s h i n g t o n  f r o m  t h e  p r e s i d e n c y  o f  
D w i g h t  D a v i d  E i s e n h o w e r  t o  J o h n  P „  K e n n e d y .
T h e  V J h i t e  P a p e r  o n  L a o s  c o n t r i b u t e d  n o t h i n g  t o  t h e  w o r l d - w i d e  
d i p l o m a t i c  e f f o r t  b e i n g  m a d e  t o  n e u t r a l i z e  l a o s .  R a t h e r ,  t h e  
S t a t e  D e p a r t m e n t  P a p e r  w a s  a n  e f f o r t  t o  t u r n  b a c k  t h e  c l o c k  o f  
t i m e  t o  a n  u n f r a g m e n t e d  C o m m u n i s t  m o v e m e n t ,  a n d  t o  m a i n t a i n  t h e  
U n i t e d  S t a t e s  a s  t h e  p r i m a r y  b e n e f a c t o r  o f  t h o s e  n a t i o n - s t a t e s  
w i l l i n g  t o  s t o p  C o m m u n i s m .  T h e  S t a t e  D e p a r t m e n t  r e c o m m e n d e d  t h a t  
t h e  o n l y  w a y  l a o s  c o u l d  r e m a i n  i n d e p e n d e n t  w a s  f o r  ' - n o n - C o m m u n i s t  
n a t i o n s  o f  t h e  w o r l d  t o  r e n d e r  t h e  a s s i s t a n c e  i t  h a s  requested." 3  
A c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  s t a t e  D e p a r t m e n t  t o  d o  l e s s  w o u l d  m e a n  L a o s  g o i n g  
C o m m u n i s t .  " I f  l a o s  s h o u l d  b e  s e i z e d  b y  t h e  C o m m u n i s t s ,  t h e  e f f e c t s  
c o u l d  b e  f a r - r e a c h i n g  a n d  t h e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  o t h e r  s m a l l  a n d
^ " T h e  S o v i e t  N o t e  t o  G r e a t  B r i t a i n ,  A p r i l  1 ,  1 9 ^ 1 , "  D e p a r t ­
m e n t  o f  s t a t e  B u l l e t i n  X L I V  ( A p r i l  1 ? ,  I 96I ) ,  p .  3 ^ 4 .
2 S e e  t e x t  p .  203 f o r  r e f e r e n c e  t o  t h e  " U n i t e d  S t a t e s  W h i t e  
P a p e r  o n  l a o s , "  o p .  c i t .
3Ibid., p. 181.
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v u l n e r a b l e  s t a t e s  a l l  t o o  e v i d e n t .
T h i r t e e n  d a y s  a f t e r  t h e  E i s e n h o w e r  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  p u b l i s h e d
t h e  W h i t e  P a p e r  o n  L a o s ,  J o h n  F »  K e n n e d y  b e c a m e  P r e s i d e n t  o f  t h e
united States. At first, the new President maintained the policy
a n n u n c i a t e d  b y  t h e  E i s e n h o w e r  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  i n  t h e  W h i t e  P a p e r .
T h i s  i s  e v i d e n t  i n  t h e  S t a t e  o f  t h e  U n i o n  m e s s a g e  d e l i v e r e d  b y
P r e s i d e n t  K e n n e d y ,  J a n u a r y  JO, 1 9 6 1 . 2
I n  t h e  S t a t e  o f  t h e  U n i o n  m e s s a g e  d e l i v e r e d  J a n u a r y  3 0 ,
P r e s i d e n t  K e n n e d y  m a i n t a i n e d  t h e  t h e s i s  o f  t h e  S t a t e  D e p a r t m e n t
W h i t e  P a p e r  o n  l a o s  d a t e d  J a n u a r y  ? •  P r e s i d e n t  K e n n e d y  n o t e d
t h a t  t h e  m a j o r  p r o b l e m  i n  l a o s  a n d  i n  t h e  r e s t  o f  A s i a  w a s
C o m m u n i s m .  H e  e v e n  w e n t  o n e  s t e p  f u r t h e r  t h a n  t h e  W h i t e  P a p e r
e x c l a i m i n g  t h a t  i t  i s  " t h e  r e l e n t l e s s  p r e s s u r e  o f  t h e  C h i n e s e
C o m m u n i s t  m e n a c e '  t h a t  j e o p a r d i z e s *  t h e  s e c u r i t y  o f  t h e  e n t i r e
a r e a  -  f r o m  t h e  b o r d e r s  o f  I n d i a  a n d  S o u t h  V i e t  N a m  t o  t h e  j u n g l e s
o f  L a o s ,  s t r u g g l i n g  t o  p r o t e c t  i t s  n e w l y  w o n  i n d e p e n d e n c e . " 3
K e n n e d y  c o n t i n u e d  :
W e  s e e k  i n  l a o s  w h a t  w e  s e e k  i n  a l l  A s i a ,  a n d ,  
i n d e e d ,  i n  a l l  o f  t h e  w o r l d - f r e e d o m  f o r  t h e  
p e o p l e  a n d  i n d e p e n d e n c e  f o r  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t .
^ I b i d .
^ " T h e  S t a t e  o f  t h e  u n i o n ;  M e s s a g e  o f  P r e s i d e n t  K e n n e d y  
D e l i v e r e d  t o  t h e  C o n g r e s s ,  J a n u a r y  3 0 ,  196 I , "  D o c u m e n t s  o n  
A m e r i c a n  F o r e i g n  R e l a t i o n s  I 96I  ( N e w  Y o r k  : H a r p e r  a n d  R o w ,  19 6 2 ) ,
p p .  16- 26 .
3 " T h e  S t a t e  o f  t h e  U n i o n  : M e s s a g e  o f  P r e s i d e n t  K e n n e d y  
D e l i v e r e d  t o  t h e  C o n g r e s s ,  J a n u a r y  3 0 »  I 96 I , "  i b i d . ,  p .  1 9 »
215A n d  t h i s  N a t i o n  s h a l l  p e r s e v e r e  i n  o u r  p u r s u i t  
o f  t h e s e  o b j e c t i v e s . ^
P r e s i d e n t  K e n n e d y ' s  i n i t i a l  d i r e c t i o n  t o  u n i t e d  S t a t e s  f o r e i g n  
p o l i c y  a s  e x p r e s s e d  i n  t h e  S t a t e  o f  t h e  U n i o n  m e s s a g e  w a s  b a s e d  u p o n  
t h e  f o l l o w i n g  f a c t s .  I n  t h e  f i r s t  p l a c e ,  t h i s  w a s  a  p e r i o d  o f  
t r a n s i t i o n  i n  w h i c h  t h e  q u e s t  f o r  t h e  " N e w  F r o n t i e r "  w a s  i m p o r t a n t ,  
b u t  a l s o  w a s  t h e  n e e d  f o r  a  s e n s e  o f  c o n t i n u i t y  w i t h  t h e  p r e v i o u s  
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  i n  t h o s e  a r e a s  o f  b a s i c  a g r e e m e n t .  A n d  K e n n e d y  
s e e m e d  t o  b e  i n  a g r e e m e n t  w i t h  t h e  E i s e n h o w e r  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  a b o u t  
t h e  s i t u a t i o n  i n  I n d o c h i n a .  A s  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  s t a t e d  i n  h i s  s t a t e m e n t  
o f  M a r c h  2 3 1 " i n  m y  l a s t  c o n v e r s a t i o n  w i t h  G e n e r a l  E i s e n h o w e r ,  t h e  
d a y  b e f o r e  i n a u g u r a t i o n ,  w e  s p e n t  m o r e  t i m e  o n  t h i s  h a r d  m a t t e r  
t h a n  o n  a n y  o t h e r  o n e  t h i n g .
A  s e c o n d  f a c t o r  i n  t h e  o r i e n t a t i o n  t o  t h e  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  o f  
P r e s i d e n t  K e n n e d y  h a d  t o  d o  w i t h  t h e  r e a l i t i e s  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
p o l i t i c s .  T h e  c o n t e m p o r a r y  s c e n e  u p o n  w h i c h  K e n n e d y  a s s u m e d  t h e  
P r e s i d e n c y ,  w a s  d i r e c t e d  b y  t w o  p r i m a r y  a n d  t w o  s e c o n d a r y  s e t s  o f  
r e a l i t i e s .
S i n c e  t h e  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s  p r e s e n c e  w a s  r e m o v e d  i n  L a o s ,  t h e  
C o l d  W a r  i n  l a o s  w a s  n o t  c o l d  a n y  m o r e .  T h i s  o b v i o u s  p r i m a r y  
r e a l i t y  w a s  a l s o  a  r e f l e c t i o n  o f  a n o t h e r  b a s i c  f a c t  o f  t h e  n e w  
d e c a d e ;  t h a t  i s ,  a  g o v e r n m e n t ' s  p o l i c y  f o u n d e d  u p o n  t h e  t h r e a t  o f  
s t r a t e g i c  d e t e r r e n c e  ( i « e .  m a s s i v e  r e t a l i a t i o n )  w o u l d  n o t  b e  
s u f f i c i e n t  t o  c o n f r o n t  a  r e a l  t h r e a t  t o  t h e  s e c u r i t y  o f  a  p a r t i c u l a r
^ L o c .  c i t .
2president J o h n  F .  Kennedy, " P r e s i d e n t ' s  Statement o f  M h r c h  
2 3 * "  D e p a r t m e n t  o f  S t a t e  B u l l e t i n  X L I V  ( A p r i l  1 ? ,  1 9 & 1 ) #  P »  5 ^ 3 *
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r e g i o n  o f  t h e  w o r l d .
T h e  s e c o n d a r y  s e t  o f  r e a l i t i e s ,  w h i c h  r e f l e c t  t h e  p r i m a r y  
r e a l i t i e s ,  i n c l u d e d  t h e  v e r y  o b v i o u s  f a c t  t h a t  " n e i t h e r  i n  t h e  
f o r m  o f  a  c o m m i t m e n t  t o  t h e  P a n c h  S h i l a ,  t h e  N e h r u - C h o u  E n - I a i  
F i v e  P r i n c i p l e s  o f  P e a c e f u l  C o e x i s t e n c e ,  n o r  S e a t o i s m  h a v e  
c o n t a i n e d  C o m m u n i s t  C h i n a .  I n d i a  a n d  t h e  a r e a  o n  t h e  r i m  o f  t h e  
H i m a l a y a s  -  T i b e t ,  l a d a k h ,  S i k k i m ,  B h u t a n  a n d  N e p a l  -  h a v e  n o t  b e e n  
p r o t e c t e d  b y  n e u t r a l i s t  p o l i c i e s '  a n d  n o w  ' l a o s  . . . a n d ,  t o  a  
l e s s e r  e x t e n t ,  t h e  R e p u b l i c  o f  V i e t n a m  h a v e  s u f f e r e d  e r o s i o n s  o f  
s e c u r i t y  d e s p i t e  t h e i r  i n c l u s i o n  u n d e r  t h e  p r o t e c t i v e  u m b r e l l a  o f  
S E A T O .
A t  a  n e w s  c o n f e r e n c e  o n  T , 5 r c h  2 3 ,  P r e s i d e n t  K e n n e d y
i n d i c a t e d  a  s h i f t  i n  t h e  d i r e c t i o n  o f  t h e  t e c h n i q u e  t o  b e  u t i l i z e d
i n  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y .  R e a d i n g  f r o m  a  p r e p a r e d  s t a t e m e n t
o n  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  i n  l a o s ,  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  s a i d :
W e  s t r o n g l y  a n d  u n r e s e r v e d l y  s u p p o r t  t h e  g o a l  
o f  a  n e u t r a l  a n d  i n d e p e n d e n t  l a o s ,  t i e d  t o  n o  
o u t s i d e  p o w e r  o r  g r o u p  o f  p o w e r s ,  t h r e a t e n i n g  
n o  o n e ,  a n d  f r e e  f r o m  a n y  d o m i n a t i o n . 2
P r e s i d e n t  K e n n e d y  i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  t h e  u n i t e d  S t a t e s '  a s s i s t ­
a n c e  t o  t h e  B o u n  O u m  g o v e r n m e n t  i s  a i m e d  a t  o n l y  o n e  g o a l ,  a n d  
t h a t  i s  " a  t r u l y  n e u t r a l  L a o s . " 3  T o  u n d e r l i n e  U n i t e d  s t a t e s  
i n t e r e s t  i n  a  l a o s  t h a t  i s  " n o t  a  c o l d - w a r  p a w n " ^  t h e  P r e s i d e n t
I p r a n k  N .  T r a g e r ,  " A  U . S .  P r o g r a m  F o r  S o u t h e r n  A s i a , "  
C u r r e n t  H i s t o r y  X X X X  (I'/Sarch, 1 9 & 1 ) ,  P «  1 2 9 .
2 " P r e s ; d e n t ' s  S t a t e m e n t  o f  y a r c h  2 3 , "  o p .  c i t .
3 I b i d . ,  p .  5 4 4 .
^Ibid.
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o f f e r e d  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  e v i d e n c e ;
F i r s t ,  K e n n e d y  a c k n o w l e d g e d  t h a t  t h e  l a o t i a n  c r i s i s  w a s  t h e  
" m o s t  i m m e d i a t e  o f  t h e  p r o b l e m s  w e  f o u n d  o n  t a k i n g  o f f i c e . "
B e c a u s e  o f  i t s  i m p o r t a n c e ,  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  f e l t  i t  n e c e s s a r y  " f o r  
a l l  A m e r i c a n s  t o  u n d e r s t a n d  t h i s  d i f f i c u l t  a n d  p o t e n t i a l l y  d a n g e r o u s  
p r o b l e m . " 1  S e c o n d ,  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  e m p h a s i z e d  t h e  d u r a t i o n  w i t h  
w h i c h  t h e  u n i t e d  S t a t e s  h a s  d e l t  w i t h  t h e  p r o b l e m  i n  l a o s .  T h i r d ,  
i n  d i s c u s s i n g  t h e  L a o t i a n  c r i s i s  g o i n g  b a c k  t o  1 9 5 ^  K e n n e d y  n o t e d  
" r e a l  p r o g r e s s  w a s  m a d e  t o w a r d  a  u n i f i e d  a n d  n e u t r a l  s t a t u s "  u n d e r  
t h e  d i r e c t i o n  o f  a n  a g r e e m e n t  b y  a  l a r g e  g r o u p  o f  n a t i o n - s t a t e s  t o  
n e u t r a l i z e  l a o s .  F o u r t h ,  i n  t h e  c o u r s e  o f  d e t a i l i n g  t h e  p o s i t i o n  
o f  t h e  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  P r e s i d e n t  K e n n e d y  s t a t e d  t h a t  f i r s t  a n d  
f o r e m o s t  " w e  s t r o n g l y  a n d  u n r e s e r v e d l y  s u p p o r t  t h e  g o a l  o f  a  n e u t r a l  
a n d  i n d e p e n d e n t  l a o s ,  t i e d  t o  n o  o u t s i d e  p o w e r  o r  g r o u p  o f  p o w e r s ,  
t h r e a t e n i n g  n o  o n e ,  a n d  f r e e  f r o m  a n y  d o m i n a t i o n . "  F i f t h ,
P r e s i d e n t  K e n n e d y  s t i p u l a t e d  t w o  p o s s i b l e  " r e s p o n s e s "  t o  t h e  " n e w  
d i m e n s i o n "  o f  a  S o v i e t  p r e s e n c e  i n  t h e  l a o t i a n  crisis.2
\ \ > h a t  i s  v e r y  i n t e r e s t i n g  a b o u t  t h e  r e s p o n s e s  s u g g e s t e d  b y  
P r e s i d e n t  K e n n e d y  i s  t h a t  t h e r e  w a s  n o  s p e c i f i c  m e n t i o n  o f  a  
u n i l a t e r a l  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  response. 3  I n s t e a d ,  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  s u g g e s t e d
^ I b i d . , p .  5 ^ 3 »
^"president’s  Statement o f  Ivlarch 2 3 , "  ibid.
3 p r e s i d e n t  K e n n e d y  m a d e  r e f e r e n c e  t o  t h e  U h i t e d  S t a t e s '  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  t o w a r d  l a o s  i n  t e r m s  o f  " o u r  r e s p o n s e  w i l l  b e  i n  
c l o s e  c o o p e r a t i o n  w i t h  o u r  a l l i e s "  a n d  " i f  t h e s e  a t t a c k s  d o  n o t  
s t o p ,  t h o s e  w h o  s u p p o r t  a  g e n u i n e l y  n e u t r a l  L a o s  w i l l  h a v e  t o  
c o n s i d e r  t h e i r  r e s p o n s e . "  H e r e ,  t h e  e m p h a s i s  w a s  u p o n  t h e  m u l t i ­
l a t e r a l ,  a n d  t h e  k i n d s  o f  a c t i o n  o p e n  t o  t h o s e  n a t i o n - s t a t e s  
i n t e r e s t e d  i n  l a o s .  Ibid., p p .
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t w o  p o s s i b l e  m u l t i l a t e r a l  r e s p o n s e s :  t h a t  i s ,  a  G e n e v a  C o n f e r e n c e  
o r  S E A T O .
O f  t h e  t w o  m u l t i l a t e r a l  r e s p o n s e s  m e n t i o n e d  b y  t h e  P r e s i d e n t ,  
t h e  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n *  s  p r e f e r e n c e  w a s  f o r  t h e  r e c o n v e n i n g  o f  t h e  
G e n e v a  C o n f e r e n c e .  T h i s  w a s  t h e  c a s e ,  b e c a u s e  i n  t h e  P r e s i d e n t ' s  
s t a t e m e n t  t h e  e m p h a s i s  w a s  u p o n  t h e  C o n f e r e n c e  i d e a .
V / i t h  r e f e r e n c e  t o  t h e  m u l t i l a t e r a l  d i p l o m a t i c  e f f o r t  u n d e r - w a y  
a m o n g  s e v e r a l  n a t i o n - s t a t e s .  P r e s i d e n t  K e n n e d y  e m p h a s i z e d  h i s  
p r e f e r e n c e  b y  s t a t i n g  " w e  a r e  e a r n e s t l y  i n  f a v o r  o f  c o n s t r u c t i v e  
n e g o t i a t i o n . A l s o ,  t h e  P r e s i a e n t  e n d e d  h i s  w r i t t e n  s t a t e m e n t  b y  
m a k i n g  r e f e r e n c e  o n c e  a g a i n  t o  t h e  m u l t i l a t e r a l  d i p l o m a t i c  e f f o r t s  
b e i n g  m a d e  t o  r e s t o r e  L a o s  t o  a  n e u t r a l i z e d  status.2 F i n a l l y ,  
t h r o u g h o u t  h i s  s t a t e m e n t  t h e  e m p h a s i s  w a s  u p o n  a  n e g o t i a t e d  
s o l u t i o n  t o  t h e  l a o t i a n  c r i s i s .  A s  h e  s a i d  i n  c l o s i n g  t h e  L a r c h  2 3  
s t a t e m e n t  :
C a r e f u l  n e g o t i a t i o n s  a r e  b e i n g  c o n d u c t e d  w i t h  m a n y  
c o u n t r i e s  i n  o r d e r  t o  s e e  t h a t  w e  t a k e  e v e r y  
p o s s i b l e  c o u r s e  t o  i n s u r e  a  p e a c e f u l  s o l u t i o n . 3
I n  t h e  V / h i t e  P a p e r  o f  J a n u a r y  7 »  t h e  p r i m a r y  e m p h a s i s  w a s  
u p o n  t h e  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  t h e  p r e s e n t  u n i l a t e r a l  s u p p o r t  o f  t h e  
B o u n  O u m  g o v e r n m e n t  b y  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s .  F i r s t ,  t h e r e  w a s  a  
d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  t h e  u n f o l d i n g  o f  t h e  C o m m u n i s t  t h r e a t ,  w h i c h  w a s  
f o l l o w e d  b y  a  s t a t e m e n t  t o  t h e  e f f e c t  t h a t  n o n - C o m m u n i s t  n a t i o n ­
s t a t e s  h a v e  a  m o r a l  o b l i g a t i o n  t o  a s s u r e  L a o s  i n d e p e n d e n c e .  N o  
m e n t i o n  w a s  m a d e  o f  a  m u l t i l a t e r a l  a p p r o a c h  i n  t h e  f o r m  o f  S E A T O  
o r  t h e  r e s t o r a t i o n  o f  t h e  G e n e v a  C o n f e r e n c e .  S e e  p a r t i a l  t e x t  o f  
W h i t e  P a p e r  i n  a p p e n d i x  p .
^ " P r e s i d e n t ' s  S t a t e m e n t  o n  L l a r c h  2 3 , "  i b i d . ,  p .  3 ^ 4 .
^ I b i d .
3 Ibid.
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On the other hand, the context in which President Kennedy
r e f e r r e d  t o  S E A T O  w a s  i n  t h e  f o r m  o f  a  d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  t h e
C o m m u n i s t  t h r e a t .  T h i s  r e q u i r e d  " a  n e c e s s a r y  r e s p o n s e . "  V J h e r e a s
the Conference idea was viewed as a "way to help Laos back to the
pathway of independence and genuine neutrality,SEATO was
m e n t i o n e d  i n  t e r m s  o f  w h a t  i t  w a s  d e s i g n e d  t o  d o  : n a m e l y ,  s t o p
a g g r e s s i o n .  K e n n e d y  s a i d  :
S E A T O  ”  t h e  S o u t h e a s t  A s i a  T r e a t y  O r g a n i z a t i o n  -  
w a s  o r g a n i z e d  i n  195 ^  w i t h  s t r o n g  l e a d e r s h i p  
f r o m  o u r  l a s t  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  a n d  a l l  m e m b e r s  
o f  S E A T O  h a v e  u n d e r t a k e n  s p e c i a l  t r e a t y  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  t o w a r d  a n  a g g r e s s i o n  a g a i n s t
laos.2
A l l  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  w a s  r e a l l y  e m p h a s i z i n g  a b o u t  S E A T O  i s  
t h a t  i t  w a s  a n  a l t e r n a t i v e .  E u t  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  n o t e d  t h a t  S E A T O  
w a s  a n  o p t i o n  a c c e p t a b l e  t o  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  o n l y  w i t h i n  t h e  
f r a m e w o r k  o f  " a l l  m e m b e r s '  w o r k i n g  t o g e t h e r  i n  f u l f i l l i n g  t h e i r  
" s p e c i a l  t r e a t y  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  t o w a r d  a n  a g g r e s s i o n  i n  laos."3 
T h i s  w a s  n e v e r  a c h i e v e d  a t  t h e  R ^ a r c h  2 ?  S E A T O  c o n f e r e n c e ,  b e c a u s e  
G r e a t  B r i t a i n ,  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s ,  a n d  t h e  o t h e r  m e m b e r s  o f  S E A T O  
w e r e  a l r e a d y  i n  t h e  p r e p a r a t o r y  p h a s e  o f  r e a l i z i n g  a  c o n f e r e n c e  t o  
d e a l  w i t h  t h e  n e u t r a l i z a t i o n  o f  L a o s .
O n  F a r c h  2 6 ,  a  W h i t e  H o u s e  r e l e a s e  n o t e d  t h a t  P r e s i d e n t  K e n n e d y  
a n d  P r i m e  I & n i s t e r  M & c m i l l a n  h a d  a g r e e d  w i t h  t h e  c o n t e n t s  o f  t h e  
B r i t i s h  n o t e  t o  t h e  S o v i e t  U h i o n  d a t e d  t a r c h  2 3 » ^  T h i s  a g r e e m e n t
^ I b i d . , p .  3 4 4 .
2 l b i d .
3 I b i d .
J o i n t  C o m m u n i q u e  o f  I / a r c h  2 6 , "  D e p a r t m e n t  o f  S t a t e  B u l l e t i n  
X L I V  ( A p r i l  1 7 ,  I 96I ) ,  p .  < 4 4 .  S e e  t e x t  p .  2 2 0  f o r  a  r e f e r e n c e  t o  
t h e  S o v i e t  n o t e .
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s e t  t h e  s t a g e  f o r  t h e  n e x t  s t e p ,  m  t h e  F a r c h  26 r e l e a s e ,  t h e  
A n g l o - A m e r i c a n  l e a d e r s  r e q u e s t e d  " t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n  . . . m a k e  a  
p o s i t i v e  a n d  c o n s t r u c t i v e  r e p l y  t o  t h e s e  p r o p o s a l s , 2 h e  
S o v i e t  U n i o n ' s  r e p l y  t o  t h e  B r i t i s h  n o t e  c a m e  o n  A p r i l  1 . ^  ï h i s  
r e p l y  b r o u g h t  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  t o  r e m a r k  o n  t h e  s a m e  d a y  t h a t  " t h e  
S o v i e t  r e p l y  a p p e a r s  t o  b e  a  u s e f u l  n e x t  s t e p  t o w a r d  a  p e a c e f u l  
s e t t l e m e n t  o f  a  p o t e n t i a l l y  d a n g e r o u s  s i t u a t i o n . " 3  n h e  P r e s i d e n t  
c o n t i n u e d  i
N e g o t i a t i o n s  f o r  a  s e t t l e m e n t  o f  t h e  l a o t i a n  
q u e s t i o n  w i l l  n o t  b e  s i m p l e  a n d  m a y  t a k e  s o m e  
t i m e ,  b u t  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  w i l l  d o  e v e r y t h i n g  
i t  c a n  t o  r e a c h  a  r e s u l t  w h i c h  w i l l  p e r m i t  t h e  
l a o t i a n  p e o p l e  t o  l i v e  i n  p e a c e  a n d  t a k e  c a r e  
o f  t h e i r  o w n  p e o p l e . ^
N e g o t i a t i o n s  r e g a r d i n g  L a o s  a c h i e v e d  a  b a s i s  f o r  s t a r t i n g  
w i t h  t h e  i s s u a n c e  o f  t h r e e  m e s s a g e s  b y  t h e  c o - c h a i r m e n  o f  t h e  
G e n e v a  A g r e e m e n t  o f  1 9 5 ^ . 3  ( T h e s e  m e s s a g e s  w e r e  a s  f o l l o w s  s F i r s t ,  
a  m e s s a g e  r e q u e s t i n g  a  c e a s e  f i r e  o n  t h e  p a r t  o f  t h e  L a o t i a n  f a c t i o n s  
i n v o l v e d  i n  t h e  m i l i t a r y  c o n f l i c t .  T h e  c o - c h a i r m e n  a g r e e d  a  c e a s e  
f i r e  w a s  v e r y  n e c e s s a r y  a s  a  p r e l i m i n a r y  s t e p  t o  a  c o n f e r e n c e .  A s  
a n  a d d e d  n o t e ,  t h e  S o v i e t  u n i o n  a n d  G r e a t  B r i t a i n  c a l l e d  u p o n  a l l  
t h e  L a o t i a n  p e o p l e  t o  c o o p e r a t e  w i t h  t h e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  C o n t r o l  
C o m m i s s i o n  i n  o r d e r  t o  i m p l e m e n t  a  c e a s e  f i r e .  S e c o n d ,  t h e
l l b i d .
^ " T h e  S o v i e t  N o t e  t o  G r e a t  B r i t a i n , "  D e p a r t m e n t  o f  S t a t e  
B u l l e t i n  X L I V  ( A p r i l  1 ? ,  1 9 6 1 ) ,  p .  5 4 4 .
^ " P r e s i d e n t ' s  S t a t e m e n t  o f  A p r i l  1 , "  D e p a r t m e n t  o f  S t a t e  
B u l l e t i n  X L I V  ( A p r i l  1 ? .  1 9 6 1 ) ,  p .  6 4 4 .
4 l b i d .
r  ' I n t e r n a t i o n a l  C o n f e r e n c e  o n  t h e  S e t t l e m e n t  o f  t h e  L a o t i a n  
Q u e s t i o n , "  o p .  c i t . ,  p p .  6 ? ? .
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c o - c h a i r m e n  i n v i t e d  a l l  t h e  n a t i o n - s t a t e s  s u g g e s t e d  b y  P r i n c e  S i h a n o u k  
t o  a n  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  C o n f e r e n c e  a t  G e n e v a  t h a t  w o u l d  b e g i n  o n  y a y  1 2 .  
T h i r d ,  p r i m e  m i n i s t e r  N e h r u  w a s  a s k e d  b y  t h e  c o - c h a i r m e n  t o  r e c o n v e n e  
t h e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  C o n t r o l  C o m m i s s i o n  i n  N e w  D e l h i . ^
T w o  v e r y  s i g n i f i c a n t  t h i n g s  h a d  b e e n  a c c o m p l i s h e d  w h e n  t h e  
c o - c h a i r m e n  o f  t h e  1 9 5 ^  C o n f e r e n c e  a g r e e d  t o  t h e  m e a n s  t o  b e  
u t i l i z e d  i n  o r d e r  t o  a c h i e v e  a  c e a s e  f i r e ,  a n d  t h e  n a t i o n - s t a t e s  
a f f e c t e d  b y  t h e  L a o t i a n  c r i s i s  c o n s e n t e d  t o  a  d i p l o m a t i c  c o n f e r e n c e  
t o  e s t a b l i s h  n e u t r a l i z a t i o n .  F i r s t ,  t h e  p o s i t i o n s  o f  t h e  v a r i o u s  
g o v e r n m e n t s  c o n c e r n e d  a b o u t  l a o s  h a d  b e e n  p u b l i c a l l y  r e p o r t e d .
T h i s  a s s u r e d  a  c e r t a i n  a m o u n t  o f  s t r u c t u r e  t o  t h e  C o n f e r e n c e ,  a n d  
a l s o  i t  g a v e  a n  e x c e l l e n t  s t a r t  t o  t h e  c h a n c e s  o f  s u c c e s s  f o r  t h e  
C o n f e r e n c e .  S e c o n d ,  t h e  d i p l o m a t i c  e x c h a n g e s  a n d  p u b l i c  p r o n o u n c e ­
m e n t s  o f  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t s  i n v o l v e d  i n d i c a t e d  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  t h e  
r e a s o n s  f o r  t h e  c r i s i s .  B u t  a t  t h e  s a m e  t i m e  a  c o m m o n  a g r e e m e n t  
w a s  e v i d e n t  a s  t o  t h e  n e e d  f o r  a n  e x c h a n g e  b y  t h e  p o w e r  b l o c s  t o  
a c h i e v e  a n  e q u i l i b r i u m  i n  l a o s ,  w h i c h  w o u l d  l e a v e  t h e  K i n g d o m  o f  L a o s  
i n  a  n e u t r a l i z e d  p o l i t i c a l  p o s i t i o n  i n  t h e  C o l d  W a r .
T h e  t h r e e  m e s s a g e s  i s s u e d  b y  t h e  c o - c h a i r m e n  b r o u g h t  t o  a  
c l i m a x  a  l e v e l  o f  a g r e e m e n t  a m o n g  t h e  f o u r t e e n  i n t e r e s t e d  n a t i o n ­
s t a t e s  t o  h a v e  a  C o n f e r e n c e .  I n  a d d i t i o n  t o  t h e  c o - c h a i r m e n ' s  
p r e l i m i n a r y  e f f o r t s  i n  A p r i l ,  t h e  o t h e r  p a r t i c i p a t i n g  n a t i o n - s t a t e s
^ " M e s s a g e  f r o m  t h e  C o - C h a i r m e n  d a t e d  A p r i l  2 4 ,  1 9 6 1 ,  a p p e a l i n g  
f o r  a  c e a s e - f i r e .  ""liess a g e  f r o m  t h e  C o - C h a i r m e n  d a t e d  A p r i l  2 4 ,  1 9 6 1 ,  i n v i t i n g  
p a r t i c i p a n t s  t o  a n  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  C o n f e r e n c e . "
" M e s s a g e  f r o m  t h e  C o - C h a i r m e n  d a t e d  A p r i l  2 4 ,  I 96I  r e q u e s t i n g  
t h e  R e c a l l  o f  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  C o m m i s s i o n  f o r  S u p e r v i s i o n  a n d  
C o n t r o l  i n  L a o s , "  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  C o n f e r e n c e  o n  t h e  S e t t l e m e n t  o f  t h e  
L a o t i a n  Q u e s t i o n ,  p p .  6 - 7 ,  I b i d .
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made several significant compromises. For example, the United States 
agreed to have included in the laotian faction, the government of 
Souvanna ?houma. This was accepted by the united States even though 
there did not exist such a government at the time that was accredited 
with the United States.^ The same thing was true of Communist China. 
Peking recognized Souvanna Riouma, yet the Chinese consented to meet 
with the Boun Oum government.2 Finally, the Pathet lao were invited 
to participate, although they did not have a government.3
t'ay 12, 1961 was the day established by the co-chairmen for 
beginning the Conference. The day passed without a Conference. A 
problem arose concerning the implementation of the cease fire in 
laos.^ Communist China demanded that part of the cease fire 
include the curtailment of all united States assistance to the 
Boun Oum government.5 The United States insisted that there should 
be a cease fire verified as completed.& Neither nation-state's
^Arthur J. Dommen, op. cit., p. I50.
2Arthur lall, op. cit., p. 46.
3 George Kodelski International Conference on the Settlement 
of the laotian Question, 1961-62 (Canberra; The Australian National 
University, 1962), p. 9*
As a further concession to the 14 nation-states, the co-chairmen 
agreed to the participation of any Laotian group that had one of the 
14 nation-states involved in the Conference as a sponsor. Ibid.
^On Nay 6, I96I the co-chairmen sent their instructions to 
the ICC, which had been meeting in New Delhi, since April 28.
"Nessage from the Co-Chairmen dated Kay 6, I96I, to the international 
Commission for Supervision and Control in laos," International 
Conference on the Settlement of the laotian Question, op. cit., p.8.
5ciyde R. r/&rk, op. cit., p. ?•
^Arthur lall, op. cit., p. 4?.
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demands were met, "but a conference was convened on May l6. This 
came about, "because of a report received by the co-chairmen and 
delegates at Geneva from the ICC on May 12.
The International Control Commission reported "the commission 
is satisfied that a general de facto cease-fire exists.
Arthur Lall reported that the reference to breaches of the cease 
fire "raised doubts for the United States and the conference was 
not able to convene on May 12. "2 it was not until a further 
message was received from the commission and "backstage persuasions 
convinced various governments that genuine efforts were being made 
to stabilize the cease-fire, that the conference o p e n e d . "3
The Geneva Conference opened on May l6 , I96I. In the first 
and second sessions of the Conference, the participating nation­
states continued to maintain general agreement that the final
First Report of the International Control Commission dated 
May, 1961," quoted in Arthur lall, p. 4?.
2 3Arthur lall, op. cit., p. 4?.
Arthur Lall represented India at the 19^2 Conference. He 
was formerly Ambassador to the United Nations and is now Adjunct 
professor of Government at the School of International Affairs, 
Columbia University.
According to the United States Ambassador at the Conference,
V/. Averell Harriman, the ICC s limited de facto cease fire meant 
"Such breaches as have been informally complained of are either due 
to misunderstandings or to such factors as the terrain, the nature 
and disposition of forces, both regular and irregular, of all 
parties." Harriman concluded; "The clear inference is that despite 
the conclusion that "a general de facto cease-fire exists" all 
was not quiet in laos. Indeed, even at the time of its first report, 
the Commission felt it necessary to suggest to the parties that 
•pending formal cease-fire agreement, there should be renewed orders 
on all troops of all commands to observe the cease-fire except 
when provoked.'"
Ambassador W. Averell Harriman, "Delegation at Geneva 
Repeats Call for Effective Cease-Fire in laos," Department of 
State Bulletin XLIV (June 26, I96I), p. 1024.
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solution involved the neutralization of laos. The main focus of 
attention and basis for conflict at these sessions had to do with 
the United States and Communist Chinese positions regarding the 
cease fire, the role of the ICC in the cease fire, and the future 
neutralization of laos.
What the Chinese wanted from the Conference was a guarantee 
by the participants that laos would be maintained in a state of 
neutrality. In other words, the Chinese saw the ICC as an important 
instrument in the implementation of a cease fire prior to the 
Conference, but as a body with no acceptable role once the 
neutrality was guaranteed by the Conference participants.^ "It 
was known* among the Conference representatives that 'the Chinese 
government is highly suspicious in general of the concept of control 
and supervision by foreign powers.
The United States concern was with the effectiveness of the 
cease fire, and the role to be played by the ICC during the 
Conference and in the future as far as implementing the neutrality 
of Laos. After Ch'en Yi had stated the Chinese position, Secretary 
of state Dean Rusk followed concentrating his remarks on these 
three topics: the importance of an effective cease fire, the 
presence of all Laotian factions at the Conference to assure 
compliance with the neutrality, and how to include the ICC as an 
instrument to implement neutrality without compromising the
^Ibid., pp. 52-55* 
^Arthur l a l l ,  i b i d . ;  p. 5 3 -
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sovereignty of Laos.-*-
After complimenting the Chinese on their desire to "make 
contributions to the peaceful settlement of the laotian question, 
Secretary Rusk turned immediately to what the United States considered 
primary in order to guarantee an independent laos and to assure that
the Conference will have some lasting effect on Indochina. Ivir. Rusk
stated :
An effective cease-fire is a pre-requisite to any
constructive result from our proceedings. A
failure of a cease-fire would result in a highly 
dangerous situation, which it is the purpose of 
the Conference to prevent. I would urge that the 
Co-Chairmen take this up immediately in order that
the situation be clarified, and the ICC given the
necessary authorizations and instructions.^
To achieve this effective cease fire, tîr. Rusk suggested
that the Laotian factions involved in the conflict must be present
at the Conference and the ICC must be given an independent mandate
to supervise the cease fire and neutrality throughout Laos. Rusk's
reference to the need to have all laotian factions present had to
do with the fact that the Boun Cum government was not represented
at Geneva. This problem remained to plague the Conference, until
June 22, I96I, when Prince Boun Gum, Prince Souvanna Phouma, and
Prince Souphannouvong issued a joint communique. The communique
dealt with the political program of the provisional government of
^Secretary of State Dean Rusk, "International Conference for 
the Settlement of the laotian Question: Statement by Secretary of 
State Dean Rusk, r.ay 1?, I96I," Documents on American Foreign 




National Union.^ This joint communique was the key factor in 
bringing about the presence of the three laotian factions at the 
Conference, and for the formation of a coalition government in 
July, 1962.
Secretary Rusk's main thrust in his opening address to the 
Conference was concerned with "insuring a genuinely neutral laos. 
Rusk began his argument for a guaranteed neutrality by noting that 
all nation-states to the Conference agreed to the need for a neutral 
laos. This direction to his eventual argument for a viable ICC 
gave Secretary Rusk a positive thrust tying the United States to 
a general consensus and allowing the United States representative 
a degree of flexibility in specifying a major difference with the 
Chinese.
Having noted the consensus behind neutrality for laos. Rusk 
concentrated on broadening the accepted definition of neutrality. 
VJiereas neutrality in the traditional sense referred to a policy 
of nonalignment. Rusk argued neutrality "must include positive 
assurance of the integrity of national life."3 Here again. Rusk 
showed his diplomatic skill, because Ch’en Yi had emphasized that 
what was being compromised in Laos had to do with its vitality as 
a cultural and political entity, Arthur lall noted: "There appeared
Joint Communique of the Three Princes on the problem of 
Achieving a National Concord by the Formation of a Government of 
National Union," International Conference on the Settlement of 
the laotian Question, op. cit., pp. 13-14. See text p.234 for 
discussion of text.
^Secretary of State Dean Rusk, op. cit.
3Ibid., p. 314.
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■to be enough overlap in the thinking of the Foreign Iv'linisters of 
Washington and Peking on a concept of neutrality for Laos to make 
agreement a probability."!
TO fulfill the challenge of insuring a neutral Laos,
Secretary Rusk called upon the Conference representatives to
provide the means by which laos can be assured that all foreign
assistance has been withdrawn. Me. Rusk advised this could only
be done by the presence of "control machinery* having 'full access
to all parts of the country without the need for the consent of any
civil or military officials, national or local.'"2 Secretary Rusk
suggested this element is most necessary, and it is consistent
with sovereignty. îvïr. Rusk stated;
Neutrality must be consistent with sovereignty.
It involves safeguards against subversion of the
elements of the state, which is organized,
directed, or assisted from beyond its borders.
In the end, we must find a way to let the people 
of Laos live their own lives under conditions of
free choice, and under conditions which permit
the continuing exercise of choice to adapt 
institutions, policies, and objectives to the 
teachings of experience.3
Communist China's representative ch'en Yi had agreed with 
the united States Secretary of State in so far as wanting a neutral 
Laos, the withdrawal of foreign troops, nonalignment for laos, and 
the right of the Laotians to decide their own future. The challenge 
facing the Conference had to do with the very narrow problem of the
!Arthur Lall, op. cit., p. 5^.
‘“Secretary of State Dean Rusk, op. cit., p. 316.
3Ibid., p. 315.
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role to "be played by the ICC in Laos. î.'îr. Rusk's discussion of the 
ICC role "had no parallel in Farshal Ch'en Yi's discourse.
Secretary Rusk's recommendation for a control commission to have 
access and mobility throughout laos without a check by the laotian
government became a major point of contention with the Chinese
throughout the second and third sessions of the Conference. -On 
bay 24, Ch'en Yi made his second address to the Conference. Again, 
like the first session, Ch'en Yi was the first of the major 
participants to address the Conference. Ch'en Yi showed a willing­
ness to negotiate with the united states on the control commission 
problem. He said;
For the present there is a great divergence between
us and the U.S. Delegates on the definition of
neutrality and the question of international 
machinery. However, we are after all sitting 
at the same conference table. Provided that 
there is sincerity for a peaceful settlement 
of the laotian question and earnest discussion 
conducted by seeking for facts and reasoning, 
it is still possible to reach unanimous agreement.^
Ch'en Yi's flexibility on the control commission problem 
illustrates how important two factors were in bringing about the 
eventual neutralization of Laos. There was first of all the basic 
agreement of the participants that Laos's neutrality was important 
for reasons of national security, and self-determination. A most 
obvious evidence of the dedication to neutrality by the Conference 
representatives can be seen in the attitude and manner presented 
by all the other delegates towards the United States and Chinese
^Arthur lall, op. cit., p. 57*
^Ch'en Yi quoted in Ibid., p. 64.
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confrontation. Arthur Lall reports that "most of the major 
delegations virtually ignored i t . M o r e  particular, nation-states 
like France and Camhodia did not mention the differences of the 
major powers in their statements before the Conference. Soviet 
Foreign rÆLnister Gromyko confined his opening address to offering 
a Soviet proposal on neutrality, withdrawal of foreign troops, and 
the role played by the ICC in implementing the cease fire.^ 
Gromyko's only castigation was in reference to Ch'en Yi's insistence 
to speak first on the opening day of the Conference.3 Lord Home 
remained aloof to the conflict, and confined his public role to 
presiding over the proceedings with Gromyko.
The third session of the Conference began on June 12. m  
this session, a number of compromises were achieved including the 
Chinese acceptance of a coalition government that contained the 
Boun Oum faction, and the United States agreed to discuss the 
neutralization of Laos without a complete cease fire being in 
effect. m this trend towards concession that moved the Conference 
discussion on to the issue of neutrality, a significant event 
occurred; that is, the acceptance of neutrality by Soviet Premier
^Arthur lall, op. cit., p. 58.
2 Ibid.
3Gromyko stated: "The Deputy prime Ivîinister and Minister of 
Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, Comrade Ch'en Yi, 
quite rightly mentioned in his very colorful intervention that Laos 
can no longer be in the sphere of activity of SEATO." Ibid.
Reference to Ch'en Yi's colorful intervention has to do with 
the insistence of the Chinese delegate to speak on the first day, 
when the Conference was to confine itself to establishing procedure 
and developing comradee.
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Khrushchev and President Kennedy in their conference in Vienna on 
June 4.^
V/hat is significant about the Vienna meeting of June 3 and 4 
between President Kennedy and Soviet Premier Khrushchev cannot be 
confined to only what was stated. That was important too, but more 
significant was the immediate effect on the Conference’s third 
session beginning on June 12 and in the attainment of a neutralized 
laos in July, 1962.
President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev agreed to "support* 
the efforts being made at the Conference to attain ’ a neutral and 
independent Laos, under a government chosen by the Laotians them­
selves, and of international agreements for insuring that neutrality 
and independence.In this connection, the bi-polar leaders 
"recognized the importance of an effective cease-fire."3
In the Joint statement, Kennedy and Khrushchev brought 
together the political power of the great powers behind an effective 
cease fire. This was the position of the United States throughout 
the Conference meetings.^ To the Chinese, an effective cease fire 
was important as long as the independence of laos wasn’t compromised. 
Ch' en Yi made a distinction in his second address on May 24 concerning
Joint Statement, Vienna, June 4, I96I," Documents of 
American Foreign Relations I96I (New York : Harper & Brothers, 1962)
p p T  136-137.
2Ibid., p. 136.
^Ibid,
^See text pp.226-22? for Secretary of State Rusk's statement 
on the utilization of the ICC.
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the implementation of the cease fire that brought the Chinese in
conflict with the Soviet union and the United States as expressed
by the bi-polar leaders on June 4. Ch'en Yi stated:
The Chinese Delegation is in favor of necessary 
international supervision and control. We deem 
that it is not necessary to reorganize the present 
International Commission. As for the terms of 
reference of the Commission, they should be, of 
course properly readjusted in accordance with the 
new conditions. In readjusting the terms of 
reference of the Commission, a sharp distinction 
must be drawn between the internal and internationl 
aspects of the laotian question, and interference 
in the internal affairs of laos is absolutely 
impermissible, since Laos is a sovereign state.1
Ch'en Yi agreed to the need for international control. VJhat 
bothered the Chinese had to do with the manner with which the ICC 
would be utilized in laos. The Chinese representative left the 
matter of effectiveness open for further discussion, when he stated 
in the r.S.y 24 address that "it is still possible to reach unanimous 
agreement."2 vhat the Chinese did not do at the Conference in the 
meeting on June 12 left no doubt that the Chinese were affected by 
the Kennedy-Khrushchev summit meeting.
Arthur Lall reports "for the meeting of June 12, the Chinese 
Foreign Tvlinister had inscribed his name as the first speaker. "3 
This was consistent with the Chinese practice in the tv/o previous 
sessions to gain respect as a great power vis-a-vis the Uhited states 
and the Soviet Uhion. m a t  was inconsistent with Chinese behavior
Ich'en Yi quoted in Arthur Lall, op. cit., p. 64. 
2roid.
3Arthur Lall, ibid., p. ?1,
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followed the opening statement by United Kingdom's Lord Home.
Lord Home informed the delegates of a communication sent to the 
ICC by the co-chairmen in which the ICC was asked to make the cease 
fire more effective.1 Home asked for comments. Ambassador 
W. Averell Harriman commented.2 ihis initiative by Home brought a 
protest from Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko. Gromyko challenged 
Home on the grounds that no discussion had taken place between the 
co-chairmen regarding Home's statement to the Conference, and 
Harriman's comments that followed.3
For over an hour and a half the Chinese delegation of fifty 
members sat in silence. When Ch'en Yi was given the floor, the 
Chinese delegate emphasized in his remarks the progress being made 
towards the main topic of neutrality.^ Arthur Lall remarked;
"Though he interspersed his plea that the conference should address 
itself in a business-like way to the precise task entrusted to it 
with accusations of United States interference in the affairs of 
Laos, his language, tone, and general presentation were on the whole 
mild."3 Ch'en Yi emphasized:
Iciyde R. Mark, op. cit., p. 8.
^Clyde R. Mark commented; Home's "note appeared to be an 
effort to concede to the United States that the cease-fire 
approach the effectiveness envisioned by the Americans while still 
allowing the Chinese room to discount the note as nothing more than 
a thank you to the ICC." Ibid.




We are in favor of necessary supervision and 
control in laos by the International Commission, 
but in all its activities the International 
Commission should respect and not violate the 
independence and sovereignty of laos.^
What stalemated the Conference at this point was the actual
situation in Laos. W. Averell Harriman reported on June 26 that
•‘no cooperation has been forthcoming from the Pathet Iao"2 pop the
ICC. Harriman hinted that part of the problem must rest on the
shoulders of the Conference members. He said; "Lhe question is
whether the conference is to send instructions which by its own
words, the Commission desires, or whether we are to sit by while
the mission of the ICC in laos is frustrated and that unhappy
country is further overrun by military action,"3
A temporary stalemate in the Conference proceedings v/as
overcome on July 3» when the ICC reported that the cease fire was
working in an effective manner.^ Basic to the cease fire's
effectiveness was the agreement among the three Princes on June 22,
whereby they agreed to a complete cease fire, an absolute neutrality,
and the formation of a coalition government.^
Among the provisions of the joint communique by the three
^Ch'en Yi quoted in Arthur lall, op. cit., p. 74.
^Ambassador W. Averell Harriman, op. cit., p. 1025.
3ibid., p. 1023.
4 Clyde R. Hark, op. cit., p. 10.
5 "Joint Communique of the Three Princes on the problem of 
A c h i e v i n g  National Concord by the Formation of a Government of 
National Union," International Conference on the Settlement of the 
Laotian Question, op. cit., pp. 13-14.
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laotian princes for the establishment of the government of 
National Union were the following elements:
In domestic matters, the Princes agreed:
(1) "To implement the cease-fire agreement 
concluded between the three parties concerned 
in laos and to see that peace is restored in 
the country.
(2) . . .To preserve the unity, neutrality, 
independence and sovereignty of the nation.
(3) To ensure justice and peace for all 
citizens of the Kingdom with a view to 
appeasement and national concord without 
discrimination as to origin or political allegience.
) To bring about the unification of the armed 
forces of the three parties in a single National 
Army in accordance with a programme agreed 
between the parties.^
On foreign policy matters, they agreed:
(1) "Resolutely to apply the five principles of 
peaceful co-existence in foreign relations, to 
establish friendly relations and to develop 
diplomatic relations with all countries, the 
neighboring countries first and foremost, on 
the basis of equality and sovereignty of Laos.
(2) Not to join in any alliance or military 
coalition and not to allow the establishment
of any foreign military bases on laotian territory, 
it being understood that a special study will be 
made of what is provided in the Geneva Agreement 
of 195 ;̂ not to allow any country to use laotian 
territory for military purposes; and not to 
recognize the protection of any alliance or 
military coalition.
(3) Not to allow any foreign interference in 
the internal affairs of laos in any form what­
soever; to require the withdrawal from laos
of all foreign troops and military personnel.
Joint Communique of the Three Princes on the Problem of 
Achieving National Concord by the Formation of a Government of 
National union," op. cit., pp. 13-14.
235and not to allow any foreign troops or military 
personnel to be introduced into laos.
(4) To accept direct and unconditioned aid from 
all countries that wish to help Laos build up 
an independent and autonomous national economy 
on the basis of respect for laotian sovereignty.
(5) To respect the treaties and agreements signed 
in conformity with the interests of the laotian 
people and of the policy of peace and neutrality 
of the Kingdom, in particular the Geneva Agree­
ment of 1954, and to abrogate all treaties and 
agreements which are contrary to those principles.^
Among the "immediate tasks" accepted jointly by Princes Boun
Oum, Souphanouvong, and Souvanna Phouma were;
(1 ) Formation of a Government delegation to take 
part in the International Conference on the 
settlement of the laotian question.
(2) Implementation of the cease-fire and 
restoration of peace throughout the country.
(3) Fulfillment of the undertakings entered into 
on behalf of laos at the International Conference 
on the settlement of the laotian question and 
faithful execution of the agreements concluded 
between the three parties concerned in laos.
(4) Release of all political prisoners and 
detainees.
(5) Holding of general elections to the National 
Assembly for the formation of the definitive 
Government to include representatives from all 
three laotian parties.
(6) During the transitional period, the 
administrative organs set up during the hostilities 
will be provisionally left in being.2
The "Joint Communique" by the three laotian Princes did not




by the Princes represented the start of the Laotian phase of the 
Conference. Now, the three Laotian factions participated in the 
Conference.
With the three Laotian factions represented at the Con­
ference, the Conference delegates were broken down into committees 
and there began restricted sessions regarding the contents in the 
Declaration and the Protocol. This phase continued from July 26 
to December 18, I96I. The main basis for discussion by the 
Conference committees was the "Joint Communique" of the Laotian 
Princes on an Indian proposal dated July 14 and a French proposal
dated July 2?, I96I. All three proposed drafts for the Declaration
and Protocol stipulated ;
• (1) To acknowledge the independence and 
sovereignty of Laos.
(2) Signatories should refrain from direct
or indirect interference in the internal
affairs of Laos.
(3) Laos should not be involved in the inter­
national politics of other nation-states.
(4) To the need of restricting further 
military assistance to laos by other 
nation-states.
(5) The International Control Commission 
should supervise the withdrawal of 
all foreign military forces and 
equipment.
On December 18, I96I, the delegates from the fourteen 
nation-states approved the drafts of a Declaration of Neutrality 
and its attached Protocol. Prom January to July, I962, the three 
Laotian factions organized the coalition government. On 
July 23, 1962, the final Declaration and Protocol were signed at 
Geneva, and thus the Conference came to an end after 8? formal and 
informal meetings over a time span of 14 months. President
237John F. Kennedy noted :
It is a heartening indication that difficult, 
and at times seemingly insoluble, inter­
national problems can in fact be solved by 
patient diplomacy.^
^President John F. Kennedy, "Statement by President 
John F. Kennedy, July 23, 1962," Department of State Bulletin XLV 
(August 13, 1962), p. 259»
CHAPTER XI 
A STEP FORWARD
"the parties to any disputep the continuance of 
which is likely to endanger the maintenance of 
international peace and security, shall first 
of all; seek a solution by negotiations, inquiry, 
mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial 
settlement, resort to regional agencies or 
arrangements, or other peaceful means of their 
own choice."!
The Neutralization of laos 1959-1962; A Case Study in the 
Application of a Theory of Equilibrium is an attempt to orientate 
the formulation of United States foreign policy with a different 
approach to international politics. This is an equilibrium 
approach. Its purpose is to aid in the development of methods 
consistent with the constants and variables as evidenced in the 
realities of change in the international political system, and the 
quest for political power by the nation-states in that system.%
An equilibrium approach begins with the assumption that 
equilibrium is the necessary basis for the functioning of the 
international political system. Equilibrium has been suggested 
as the central reality of international politics today in East Asia.
^Article 33 of the United Nations Charter quoted by 
Dag Hamrnarskjold in "The Developing Role of the united Nations" 
United Nations Review VI (September, 1959)i p* 8 .
^see text pp. I3-IA for description and diagram of the 
constants and variables in the equation of reality.
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239m  an article titled, "An Equilibrium m  East Asia," William P. Bundy 
writes ;
"It is just becoming fashionable among American 
experts on East Asia to discern a nev/ array of 
major powers in the area and to describe it as a 
•four-power balance.* This theme was developed at 
length last week in a speech by A. Doak Barnett 
of the Brookings Institution. It deserves a hard 
look.
But what sort of 'balance* can there be? It would 
take a very sophisticated computer indeed to 
define the common and opposed national interests 
of the four. For example, the United states and 
Japan have very close to a common view and can 
act in parallel on a wide variety of matters.
Yet the differences in what each can or will do in 
Southeast Asia or in its relations with Peking 
are obvious.
On the other hand, though the Soviet Union and 
China are the most opposed pair in terms of 
national and ideological interest, they are 
bound to act together to support North Vietnam.
The real question is whether the complex of 
relationships will work in the direction of peace 
over the next decade. As Barnett has said, what 
the new equilibrium does, in essence, is to impose 
on each of the four powers 'new and complicated 
limitations and restraints.'
This is assumed, because the international political system 
consists of nation-states, or organizations representing and 
reflecting the nation-states, m  this international political 
system of nation-states, the direction to the system is ordered 
by the national interest demands of the participating nation­
states. And among the national interests of these nation-states, 
national security is the most basic concern of governments in 
these nation-states. But since a government can never accept a 
static situation as far as the national security requirement being
^William P. Bundy, "An Equilibrium m  East Asia," The 
Washington Post, April 26, 1970, p. B5»
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fulfilled, peace as a hope of lasting stability does not apply in 
the international political system. Thus, equilibrium is the goal 
sought among contesting nation-states.
Equilibrium assumes a settlement among nation-states. This
settlement takes the form of a balance of relative power between
competing nation-states. Such a settlement is achieved through
an acceptable exchange that does not compromise the national
security of the nation-states. This equilibrium orientation to
international politics is assumed, because:
Politics cannot be extirpated because 
wherever there is interaction there is 
interdependence ; and whenever there is 
interdependence there are adjustments to 
be made that implicate and affect all or 
many of those who are constitutive of the 
context.1
V/hat is implied in equilibrium is that there is no lasting
static state of harmony or tranquility, which might be called
peace. Rather, there can only be adjustments to a relative power
ratio among competing nation-states. Thus, the politics among
nation-states, which are constantly searching for better ways to
remove doubts about national security, is fluid and subject to
change in the balance of national interests among the competing
nation-states. Charles E. Merriam stated the case very well for
equilibrium, when he said :
The functional situation out of which the 
political arises is not the demand for 
force as such, but the need for some form 
of equilibrium.2
^Charles E. Kerriam, op. cit., p. 9*
^Charles E. Ivîerriam, ibid., p. 2.
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Finally, the challenge facing a nation-state interacting 
with other nation-states in the international political system is 
that of having the means for the achievement of equilibrium.
Here, the basic means is an attitude by government decision­
makers, which allows them the flexibility of mind to input into 
the formulation the factors relevant to the equation of reality. 
With this attitude, they shall have the basis of measuring what 
is an acceptable exchange to the nation-state initiating a change 
in the balance of political power with another nation-state, and 
the nation-state affected by the change in its political power. 
George ?. Kennan understood the importance of this attitude factor 
for diplomacy, when he suggested;
The Russian leaders are keen judges of human 
psychology, and as such they are highly 
conscious that loss of temper and self-control 
is never a source of strength in political 
affairs. They are quick to exploit such 
evidences of weakness. For these reasons, 
it is a sine quo non of successfully dealing 
with Russia that the foreign government in 
question should remain at all times cool and 
collected and that its demands on Russian 
policy should be put forward in such a manner 
as to leave the way open for a compliance not 
too detrimental to Russian prestige.^
A foreign policy with an equilibrium approach would begin 
with a very different conceptual framework about international 
politics, then the present containment policy of the United States. 
With equilibrium as the goal, the United States would begin the 
formulation phase with the idea of achieving a relative balance 
of national interests vis-a-vis a competitor, rather than a static
^George F. Kennan, op. cit., pp. 575~57^*
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situation of power that is to be maintained by treaty, a collective 
security arrangement or a preponderance of military might. This 
balance of national interests would be achieved through an acceptable 
exchange by the governments involved in a dispute such as that over 
the status of a nation-state like Laos in the international 
political system.1
The containment policy of the United States is the national 
security policy of this country. It has failed to fulfill the 
national security requirements of this nation-state, because the 
policy has not been able to adapt to the changing situation 
confronting the United States, since 1953* Since the Korean War 
the United States has accepted four main pillars to be the 
foundation of international politics. These pillars are:
(1 ) a state of political and military deadlock 
between the Communist and Western groups, 
reflecting a rough equality or comparability 
in their military power.
(2) the fundamental unity of the Communist bloc, 
whose ingrained hostility to the existing 
world order was assumed to take precedence 
over any ideological or strategic differences 
among its members.
(3) an at least equal solidarity among the Western 
nations composing the NATO, who had their own 
differences on strategy and policy, but were 
accustomed to submerge them when faced with an 
immediate threat to their common existence.
(4) the privileged position of the neutral or 
nonaligned countries in Asia and Africa, whose
^Kans J. Korganthau describes equilibrium within the 
context of a balance of power, which is too viewed "as a 
universal instrument of foreign policy used at all times by all 
nations who wanted to preserve their independence, 'and as' a 
natural and inevitable outgrowth of the struggle of a power." 
Hans J. Morganthau Politics Among Nations (N.Y.: Alfred A. Knopf, 
1959), p. 187.
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supposed immunity from attack by either side 
had seemed to guarantee them a growing 
influence in world affairs as well as an 
opportunity to obtain favors from both competing 
groups.
To put the containment policy within the context of 
equilibrium, the policy does not give the united States the 
means of measuring an acceptable exchange with its competitors, 
nor the necessary flexibility to deal with change. This failure 
of containment emanates from the fact that it is a methodology, 
rather than an approach, for the conduct of foreign policy. As 
a methodology of foreign policy, containment assumes a confronta­
tion with an ideology, when the Communist ideology has been dead 
in terms of directing a world-wide Communist conspiracy led by 
the Soviet Union. l#at was true as far as a monolithic Communist 
endeavor in the post-war period of the 1940's began to show signs 
of fragmentation in 1949, and reached a climatic conclusion in the 
period between Stalin's death in 1953 and the Eastern European 
revolutions of 195 *̂
If the fragmentation within the Communist movement wasn't 
a sufficient basis for a change in the national security policy of 
the united States, then the bi-polar capacity to conduct nuclear 
war should have been an inducement to move away from a policy of 
reactive confrontation. As of 1 9 5 3 »  the Soviet IBiion's nuclear 
capability introduced a scale of limitation to the utilization of 
military might. The United States did not have an approach by which 
to judge the viability of the methodology of containment. As a 
result, the United States response was a continuation of contain­
ment, but at a higher level of confrontation. I,passive retaliation
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implemented through hrinlcmanship reduced the flexibility of the 
national security policy to two alternatives ; an all-out nuclear 
war or nothing. Some writers have suggested that there v/as more 
to our national security in this period; namely, the development 
of regional collective security arrangements. But as the Counselor 
of the Embassy of the Republic of South Vietnam, Mguyen Khan stated 
to the writer: "SEATO is not a true collective security arrangement 
in terms of binding the treaty members to a commitment to use force, 
and it cannot deal with clandestine warfare.
Vfliat SEATO represents raises another question about the 
containment policy as a national security policy for the united States, 
vrnereas NATO was constructed as a reaction to the overt aggression 
by the Soviet Union against Western Europe, SEATO was developed in 
a time period, where the manifestations of aggression were complicated 
by a vacuum in Soviet leadership and a China reduced to following a 
foreign policy of peaceful co-existence with its Asian neighbors.
The aggression evidenced in Indochina was that of nationalistic 
movements utilizing an aspect of Communist methodology developed by 
Nao Tse-tung in order to circumvent the overt military power of a 
colonial nation-state. The united States assistance to France might 
be understandable up through the time period of the Korean War, but 
with Stalin’s death followed by the Korean cease-fire in July, 1953* 
France's interest in maintaining herself in Southeast Asia had little
Counselor Nguyen Nhan of the Embassy of the Republic of 
South Vietnam interviewed at the embassy in Washington, D. 0. on 
August 8, 1967.
See appendix p. 256for text of interview with Counselor 
Nguyen Nhan.
2^5to do with the national security of the United States. At this 
time, France should have been pressured into granting self- 
determination to the lao Issara and the Communist Path et lao and 
Viet Minh. But France wasn't, because the Administration believed 
NATO would be weakened, and we are today suffering from the image 
of being a neo-colonial power in Asia.
SEATO was constructed to maintain a static situation in 
Southeast Asia. Not only is this evidenced in the membership 
within the Treaty, but the Treaty was aimed at preventing further 
penetration of Communism into the underbelly of Asia in a time 
period, when Communism was dead as a unified ideologically led 
movement.
This emphasis in SEATO upon maintaining the status quo is 
another basic characteristic of containment. The collective 
security aspect of the containment policy was designed to perpetuate 
a ratio of political power between East and West in the 1950's, 
when there was no monolithic Communist movement nor a preponderance 
of military might in the hands of the united States, instead, the 
1950’s began to bring to full development the fragmentation of 
military might in the world, and the growing role of the third world 
of underdeveloped nation-states in acting out political roles in 
the confrontation between the industrialized nation-states ox the 
West and the emerging world power of the Soviet Union and 
Communist China,
Finally, the containment policy tends to limit united states 
foreign policy to only one aspect of political power* military 
might. This limitation upon the orientation of United States
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national security policy is a reflection of several factors. These 
are :
First, a natural tendency of the American people to with­
draw from the political aspect of involvement in the world. 
Historically, this has been a reflection of our own economic well­
being, and a distrust of foreigners. Thus, the American people 
have shared with Rudyard Kipling an attitude of superiority towards 
the outside world and a natural reluctance to interact with other 
nation-states in international politics. With Rudyard Kipling, 
they exclaimed in 1?89 and 1969:
The Stranger within ray gate 
He may be true or kind.
But He does not talk my talk- 
I cannot feel his mind.
I see the face and the eyes and the mouth,
But not the soul behind.
The men of my own stock
They may do ill or well.
But they tell the lies I am wanted to.
They are used to the lies I tell;
And we do not need interpreters 
;vhen we go to buy and sell.
The Stranger within my gates.
He may be evil or good.
But I cannot tell what powers control- 
What reasons sv/ay his mood;
Nor when the Gods of his far off land 
î'fey repossess his blood.1
Second, the success of the economic experiment in this country 
reduced the importance of the trinity of beliefs down to what was 
expedient and workable as evidenced in American technology and 
management. As a result, the United States entered upon a regional
^Rudyard Kipling, op. cit., p. 30.
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role in the Pacific theater of international politics at the time 
of the Spanish-American War with an advanced technology, 'but without 
a public philosophy to relate power, prosperity, and freedom to each 
other.
Third, Pearl Harbor represented a watershed in the national 
security policy of the united States. The defeat suffered on 
December ?, 1941 was a lesson for the reluctant Merican about the 
importance of national security vis-a-vis other national interest 
demands. If the United States had been a consistent participant 
in international politics after becoming a Pacific power in 1899, 
the effects of Pearl Harbor on the American people might have been 
different. V/hat happened as the result of the vacuum of partici­
pation on the part of the united States was an identification of 
political power in international politics with military might, m  
other words, the united States entered international politics with 
a direction to its foreign policy that was security orientated, 
rather than trying to achieve equilibrium with its competitors 
through an exchange leading to influence and authority for the 
United States. This was the beginning of containment in so far as 
the emphasis upon the negative aspect of political power - military 
might - and the domination of security in the allocation of human 
and material resources in foreign policy.
V/hile the united States had the technological lead in 
weaponry, there didn't seem to be any need to question the contain­
ment policy. As stated previously, this all changed in 1 9 5 3 »  
most certainly sputnik in 1 9 5 7  left the United States with a vacuum 
of political power vis-a-vis its competitors in the international
248
political system. Iiîilitary might and. collective security, which 
were manifestations of the level of military might, were not 
competitive with peaceful co-existence and protracted war in 
developing influence and authority for the united states. 1958, 
the United States had reached a stalemate in political power, 
because the containment policy had been confining this country to 
the most base kind of political power.
To find an alternative to the present means for formulating 
United States national security policy, a study was made of the 
neutralization of laos by the United Nations in 1959 and the Geneva 
great power group in 1962. Here, evidence was found of political 
power achieved by the interested nation-states without resort to 
military might, m  both instances international politics as applied 
in laos called for an exchange by which equilibrium could be 
maintained. In part, this v;as the case, because laos was repre­
sentative of the movement of international politics from being a 
confrontation of military might between advanced nation-states to 
a conflict in terms of a political power display in the dimensions 
of scaled limitation as dictated by the presence of nuclear weapons, 
yore important, the nation-states involved in the neutralization 
of laos were willing to exchange neutrality for a competitive power 
play by bloc forces. Finally, there was the impressive fact that 
the united States temporarily breached the wall of the containment 
policy in favor of equilibrium in the case of the neutralization 
of laos 1959-1962.
Based upon a study of the containment policy and the two 
case studies, the writer concluded political power doesn't grow out
of the barrel of a gun.i Political power is fashioned in the life 
of human beings acting through social units like the family, the 
church, and the nation-state. It is these institutions that possess 
authority. It is these institutions through which man in decision­
making roles go about the business of maintaining and enhancing 
the authority of the particular institutions by exerting influence
in the social fabric.2 Authority and influence characterize
political power in the fully defined sense in the domestic 
environment of the political system. 3 CJharles E. #rriam described 
this, when he said;
Power does not lie in the guns, or the ships, 
or the walls of stone, or the lines of steel.
Important as these are, the real political 
power lies in a definite common pattern of 
impulse. If the soldiers choose to disobey 
or even shoot their officers, if the guns 
are turned against the government, if the
citizenry connives at disobedience of the
law, and makes of it even a virtue, then 
authority is impotent and may drag its 
bearer dov/n to doom.^
Though Merriam is speaking about political power in relation 
to the internal domestic environment (authority and influence), one 
cannot help to feel this also applies to international politics as 
might and force utilized by nation-states in an international
r̂ilao Tse-tung, “Quotations from Chairman ¥3.0 Tse-tung, " 
Selected Vforks II (Peking: Foreign language Press, 1966), p7 6I.
2See pp. 171-177 discussion of decision-making with regard 
to Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold.
3see p. 116 discussion of the model of the political system 
and its application to the Kingdom of laos.
^Charles E. Kerriam, op. cit., p. 21.
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political system.
m  the Cold War, so far, technology has given the 
united States a military parity with the Soviet Union and superiority 
with the People's Republic of China, but this has not granted the 
United States the ability to meet the psychological and covert 
qualities of Communism. This nation-state has been frustrated by 
its inability to be consistent with a time orientation emanating 
from the determinism of instrumentalism, and deal with Communism 
on a protracted basis in terms of a flexible methodology to meet 
covert as well as overt contingencies.
Therefore, since the period 195^ through 1959 in which the 
development of covert protracted war methodology took place, the 
united States has greatly suffered in its many attempts to project 
its traditional emphasis on a deterministic overt foreign policy 
characterized by treaties and the utilization of military might.
With the experience against the Japanese and French behind them. 
Communist guerrilla tacticans began the exportation of covert 
protracted war methodology to nation-states characterized as being 
underdeveloped. This development in methodology for protracted 
war gave the Communists a flexibility in the means utilized to 
acquire, maintain, and enhance political power in the era of nuclear 
weapons. Secondly, the covert methodology of the Communists gives 
them the ability to disassociate from any one single aspect of 
political power. Cnee the cadre's influence has been acknowledged 
by the people, the cadre have the authority and then the legitimacy 
to use force to maintain or enhance their political power. But this 
is only done with the implementation of the first fifteen stages of
251the covert methodology.With this methodology, the Communist
tacticans fulfill a cardinal rule of political power. ' This rule is:
The functional situation out of which 
the political arises is not the demand 
for force as such, but the need for 
some form of equilibrium.2
The covert nature of Communist methodology gives that power 
bloc the ability to exert political power in this era of nuclear 
deterrence. Containment’s reliance on political power defined as 
only being military might is not sufficiently flexible to act or 
respond to covert efforts of the Communists, The united States 
finds itself reacting to change, and to only the overt manifestations 
of change, m  conclusion, the United States loses international 
political power, but in a greater sense the United States has, since 
195^* jeopardized the equilibrium in international politics. This 
is the case, because this nation-state's formulators of foreign 
policy rely on political power confined to military might and the 
technology present to improve our nuclear weaponry. This is 
political suicide for this nation-state, and the rest of the world.
To solve the dilemma of containment, the writer proposes the 
united States utilize an equilibrium approach for the formulation 
of foreign policy.
Equilibrium assumes a state of relative stability can exist 
among nation-state; if nation-states possessing nuclear weapons 
believe their nuclear development and resulting weaponry are viable 
vis-a-vis their nuclear competitors. The writer makes a second
^See p. 5o for model of covert protracted war methodology. 
^Charles E. Merriara, op. cit., p. 36.
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a s s u m p t i o n .
Today, and since 1952, the parity does not have to be 
completely equal given the fact that they are chiefly symbolic.
T h i s  s e e m s  a n  a c c e p t a b l e  j u d g m e n t  g i v e n  t h e  d e s t r u c t i v e  c a p a b i l i t y  
o f  h y d r o g e n  b o m b s  a n d  t h e  d e l i v e r y  s y s t e m s  p r e s e n t  f o r  t h e s e  b o m b s  
a s  o f  1 9 5 9 *  T h u s ,  s i n c e  1 9 5 9  n u c l e a r  d e v e l o p m e n t  h a s  b e e n  
p r o h i b i t i v e .  T h i s  m e a n s  " o v e r - k i l l "  i s  p r e s e n t ,  [flie r e s u l t  i s  a  
r e l a t i v e l y  f i x e d  s t a t e  o f  e q u i l i b r i u m ,  w h e r e  p o l i t i c a l  p o w e r  d e f i n e d  
a s  o n l y  b e i n g  m i l i t a r y  m i g h t  d o e s  n o t  a s s u r e  i n f l u e n c e  a n d  a u t h o r i t y  
i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p o l i t i c s .  B u t  i t  d o e s  a s s u r e  e q u i l i b r i u m ,  s i n c e  
n u c l e a r  w a r  w o u l d  m e a n  t h e  v i r t u a l  l o s s  o f  h u m a n  l i f e  i n  a  c i v i l i z e d  
w o r l d .  T h i s  i s  u n a c c e p t a b l e  a s  i n p u t  i n  f o r m u l a t i o n  o f  p o l i c y  f o r  
a n y  d e c i s i o n - m a k e r  i n  t h e  E a s t  o r  W e s t .
Third, equilibrium assumes man’s development unfolds in a 
social situation. The social situation involves an exchange 
between participants in this environment. Basic to the exchange 
taking place is man acting, m n  acting in giving up something for 
a mutually acceptable object implies that equilibrium requires a 
man that is more than social. IVbn must be rational in so far as 
being capable of grasping concepts and forming them into a judgment. 
V2Ji acting out his rational capacity does so in terms of power 
defined as the desire to influence the attitudes and behavior of 
others. This attention with power in man's orientation is not power 
for the sake of power, but rather to achieve goals to satisfy values 
defined by his individual personality as conditioned by his 
environment.
Power is natural to man, both in terms of directing man
253towards fulfillment individually and as a social being. Thus, man 
cannot exist without power. Eut to have power, man must be in a 
state of equilibrium with his fellow inhabitants.
Since the nation-state is an expression of man acting out 
his existence to define himself in a group relationship, equilibrium 
and power are to the nation-state in its development what they are 
to man. Thus, they are as natural to the nation-state as to man.
But there is a slight difference.
Equilibrium and power can be viewed by man to be means to 
a higher goal than mere existence. If existence was for all men 
the end desired, then equilibrium would be satisfactory as a goal. 
I.an being capable of rationality sometimes sets goals beyond mere 
existence. With this orientation towards a definition of life, 
equilibrium would not be sufficiently satisfying. The nation­
state differentiates itself from a man, who places existence in a 
secondary position to a higher goal.
The nation-state is the expression of man in a political 
sense; that is, man acting to achieve demand satisfaction through 
political processes. This political sense is the political system 
defined as :
that system of interactions to be found in 
all independent societies which performs 
the functions of integration and adaptation 
(both internally and vis-a-vis other societies) 
by means of the employment, or threat of 
employment, of more or less legitimate physical 
compulsion.
^Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, op. cit., p. 37*
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The political system assures interaction for man in so far 
as man having a means to attain demand satisfaction. Finally, the 
political system attains an orderly development of demand, interaction 
of constituents, interaction of constituents in groups with decision­
makers, and the authoritative allocation of satisfied needs by the 
decision-makers to those constituents making demands. This is a 
political system, because a state of equilibrium has been reached.1
Equilibrium in the political system is a concept expressing 
the fact that the collective called society has reached a structural 
state of political development where men exchange for each other's 
demands without resorting to force. Instead, the exchange is 
confined to the utilization of political power defined as using 
influence to attain, to maintain, a.d to enhance one's ability to 
affect the will of decision-makers with authority in the political 
system.
In conclusion, what is to be sought in the formulation of 
a nation-state's foreign policy is a state of equilibrium much like 
that in a nation-state, where nation-states exchange demands without 
resort to military might and force. Rather, the nation-states 
confine their interaction to gaining influence and achieving authority. 
With this accomplished, the nation-state is operating in the inter­
national political system, because the nation-state is exchanging 
something for a demand being satisfied. At this point influence has 
been exerted by the nation-state. Y7ith this influence the nation­
states attain control, and with control authority is achieved.
^See p. 116 for model of political system and its application 
to the Kingdom of laos.
255Like man in his political system, equilibrium is accomplished when
an exchange has been made without resorting to military might and
force alone. This is, because international, like national
politics, is governed by the basic assumption of this study:
Qhe functional situation out of which 
the political arises is not the demand 
for force as such, but the need for
some form of equilibrium.^
^Charles E. Bferriam, op. cit., p. 2.
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I N T E R V I E W
A N  I N T E R V I E W  w i t h  N g u y e n  N h a n ,  t h e  C o u n s e l o r  o f  t h e  
R e p u b l i c  o f  S o u t h  V i e t n a m  a t  t h e  E m b a s s y  o f  t h e  R e p u b l i c  o f  
S o u t h  V i e t n a m .  I n t e r v i e w  t o o k  p l a c e  a t  t h e  E m b a s s y  i n  
W a s h i n g t o n ,  B . C . ,  o n  A u g u s t  8 ,  1 9 6 ? •
S u m m a r y  o f  I n t e r v i e w
Q u e s t i o n »  W h a t  i s  t h e  g r e a t e s t  c a u s e  o f  i n s t a b i l i t y  
i n  t h e  w o r l d  t o d a y ?
A n s w e r »  T h e  m a i n  c u a s e  o f  i n s t a b i l i t y  i n  t h e  w o r l d  i s
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c o m m u n i s m .
Q u e s t i o n »  I s  H o  C h i  r û n h  a  C o m m u n i s t ,  n a t i o n a l i s t ,  o r  a
n a t i o n a l i s t  u t i l i z i n g  s o m e  a s p e c t s  o f  C o m m u n i s t  
i d e o l o g y  s u c h  a s  p r o t r a c t e d  w a r  w i t h  g u e r r i l l a  
m e t h o d o l o g y ?
A n s w e r ;  H o  C h i  M i n h  i s  a  C o m m u n i s t  f i r s t ,  a n d  V i e t n a m e s e
s e c o n d .  H o  C h i  î.îinh i s  a  R u s s i a n  o r i e n t a t e d  
C o m m u n i s t  i n  t e r m s  o f  h i s  t r a i n i n g  a n d  v i e w s  
w i t h  r e g a r d  t o  t h e  w o r l d .
T h e  b e s t  e v i d e n c e  o f  h i s  l a c k  o f  n a t i o n a l i s m  
w a s  h i s  N a r c h ,  1 9 4 4  s e l l - o u t  o f  n a t i o n a l  g r o u p s  t o
t h e  F r e n c h ,  s o  h e  c o u l d  a s s u m e  t h e  l e a d e r s h i p  o f
t h e  V i e t n a m e s e  n a t i o n a l i s t  m o v e m e n t .
" I Æ L s t a k e  t o  s t r e s s  h a t r e d  o f  V i e t n a m e s e  f o r  C h i n e s e "  
a s  a  r e a s o n  w h y  ' H o  C h i  R l i n h  w o u l d n ' t  g o  o v e r  t o  t h e  
C o m m u n i s t s .  I n s t e a d ,  m o r e  i n  c o m m o n  a m o n g s t  C o m m u n i s t  
p a r t i e s . "
" H o  C h i  L î i n h  n o  T i t o ,  b e c a u s e  h e  i s  a  C o m m u n i s t .  
G e o g r a p h y  w o u l d n ' t  a l l o w  i t ;  C h i n e s e  m o r e  m i l i t a n t  
t h a n  R u s s i a n s . "
Q u e s t i o n »  H o w  e f f e c t i v e  h a s  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  C o n t r o l  C o m m i s s i o n  
b e e n  i n  c o n f i n i n g  t h e  i n f i l t r a t i o n  e t c ?
A n s w e r  » " I t  h a s n ' t ! "  " T h e  P o l i s h  m e m b e r  p r e v e n t s  i t s
e f f e c t i v e n e s s . "  " A l s o  i n f i l t r a t i o n ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  
o p e n  a g g r e s s i o n . "
257Q u e s t i o n :  V / h a t  r o l e  h a s  t h e  S o u t h e a s t  A s i a n  T r e a t y
O r g a n i z a t i o n  p l a y e d  i n  t h e  c o n f l i c t  i n  
I n d o c h i n a ?
A n s w e r :  " S E A T O  i s  n o t  a  t r u e  c o l l e c t i v e  s e c u r i t y  a r r a n g e m e n t
i n  t e r m s  o f  " b i n d i n g  t h e  t r e a t y  m e m b e r s  t o  a  
c o m m i t m e n t  t o  u s e  f o r c e ,  a n d  i t  c a n n o t  d e a l  w i t h  
c l a n d e s t i n e  w a r f a r e . "
" S E A T O  a s  i n d i v i d u a l  m e m " b e r s  i s  a c t i v e l y  i n v o l v e d  
i n  V i e t n a m . "
Q u e s t i o n :  I f  S E A T O  c a n n o t  p e r f o r m  s a t i s f a c t o r i l y  i n
p r o v i d i n g  f o r  t h e  s e c u r i t y  o f  I n d o c h i n a ,  w h y  n o t  
t u r n  t o  t h e  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s ?
A n s w e r :  " T h e  u n i t e d  N a t i o n s  w a s  o n l y  e f f e c t i v e  i n  K o r e a .
T h e  U N  w a s  t h e r e ,  a n d  t h e  a g g r e s s i o n  w a s  o p e n ,  
r a t h e r  t h a n  b e i n g  c l a n d e s t i n e . "
A P P E N D I X  I I
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F O R E I G N  A I D  P R O G R A M  O F  T H E  U N I T E D  S T A T E S ^
I . N e t  F o r e i g n  A i d  ( G r a n t s  a n d  C r e d i t s )  -  ( i n  m i l l i o n s  o f  d o l l a r s ) ; 
" 1 9 ^ 5  194.7 1 9 5 0  1952 1 9 5 5  1 9 5 8  I 9 6 0  1 9 6 5  1 9 6 8
" 1 , 9 7 9  5 . 6 5 8  4 ,0 5 6  5 , 0 4 1  3 . 9 5 8  4 , 7 9 1  3 , 9 6 6  5 .0 3 5  4 , 7 5 5
I I . N e t  F o r e i g n  A i d  b y  A r e a  ( G - C )  -  ( i n  m i l l i o n s  o f  d o l l a r s ) ;
W .  E u r o p e  : 2 ,676  498 - 2 0  1 4 8
F a r  E a s t
a n d  P a c i f i c  606 , 6 2 1  769 1 , 0 4 3
I A m e r . R e p u b l i c s  38 7 2  1 8 4  800I _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ( -  D e n o t e s  l e s s  t h a n  $ 5 0 0 , 0 0 0 . ) _ _ _ _ _
I I I m l N e t  F o r e i g n  A i d  b y  C o u n t r i e s  ( G - C )  -  ( i n  m i l l i o n s  o f  d o l l a r s  ) T
j F r a n c e  a n d
I P o s s e s s i o n s  4 6 4  307 - 4 8  - - - - - - - - - - - -
{Indochina 1 195^ - 69 --- ----;------------------
!P h i l i p p i n e s  2 0 1  1 2  2 3  4 0
i T h a i l a n d  * ( - L e s s  t h a n  $ 5 0 0 , 0 0 0 ) 1 3  4 l  5 4
I * I n  T h a i l a n d  l e s s  t h a n  $ 5 0 0 , 0 0 0  f r o m  1 9 4 5  t h r o u g h  1 9 5 0 .  m  
j 1951  ( 5  m i l l i o n ) ;  1 9 5 3  ( 5  m i l l i o n ) ;  1 9 5 4  ( 4  m i l l i o n ) .
I l a o s  3 7  33 4 4
! V i e t n a m _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 2 0 0 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ I 85 4 3 4
I V . r A l i t a r y  A s s i s t a n c e  P r o g r a m  -  ( i n  m i l l i o n s  o f  d o l l a r s  ) t 
( W o r l d w i d e :  1 9 5 0 - 1 9 6 0 :  2 3 , 5 7 7  ( 2 8 , 678 , 5 5 8 ) *  1 , 7 2 4 . 3 ( 1 , 7 1 9 ) *
A r e a  :
W .  Europe 329 1 ,362 6 8 2
Near East 1 1 8 305 336
Far East 63 500 7 5 9
Amer. Republics 0 29 6 8
Fax East
Countries : 1 9 5 0 - - I 9 6 0 : 5 ,4 3 8 (2 , 774 , 3 1 2 ) * 5 5 7 . 2 ( 5 8 5 , 8 7 2 )
Australia: 29 None 4 . 6 None
Cambodia 5 9 ( 1 9 3 , 9 7 3 ) * 2 .9 (2 3 . ) *
Laos 5 8 (231 , 7 3 6 ) * 1 3 .4 (4 3 . ) *
Thailand 278 (239 , 1 6 1 ) * 1 9 .2 ( 2 4 .  ) *
Vietnam 4 4 2 ( 1 , 3 0 2 , 0 4 2 ) * 69 .6 ( 1 5 8 . )Î.t
I ^ F i g u r e s  i n  ( ) d e n o t e  M u t u a l  S e c u r i t y  A i d  -  i n  t h o u s a n d s
f o f  d o l l a r s )
^ T h e s e  s t a t i s t i c s  t a k e n  f r o m  t h e  S t a t i s t i c a l  A b s t r a c t  o f  t h e  
U n i t e d  S t a t e s  f o r  t h e  y e a r s  1 9 4 5  t h r o u g h  196Ô .  ( W a s h i n g t o n ,  D .  C .  : 
U . S .  G o v e r n m e n t  P r i n t i n g  P r e s s ,  1 9 4 5  t h r o u g h  I 9 6 9 ) .
A P P E N D I X  I I I
U N I T E D  N A T I O N S
W
N A T I O N S  U N I E S
ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR ASIA AND THE FAR EAST
SALA SANTITHAM 
BANGKOK, THAILAND,
TELEPHONE : 2 2 0 5 0  
CABLE 1 EC AFC BANGKOK
INF. 133/2-163 ,28 April 1969
Dear Eddy,
Thank you for your letter of 1 April,
Enclosed you will find our press release No, L/29 of 17 
December 1959, the only paper available, which we hope will serve 
the purpose of your request as mentioned in the above letter.
hr. James H. Eddy 
Winona State College 







T ' T O I â O J A  R E P O R T  OTI W O S  R E G O E I E ' ^ J D S  G O - O R D D I A T Œ  
A C T I O N  B Y  U N I T E D  N A T I O N S  F O R  Î C Ï I Î G D O M ' S  D E Y E I O P E E N
A  p r o p o s a i  h a s  b e e n  m d o  f o r  c o - o r d i n a t e d  a c t i o n  b y  t h e  U i i i t c d  N a t i o n s  
a n d  t h e  s p e c i a l i s e d  a £ ; c n c i c 3  c o n c e r n e d  t o  a s s i s t  t h e  K i n g d o m  o f  L a o s  i n  i t s  
e c o n o m i c  a n d  s o c i a l  d e v e l o p m e n t .
T h e  p r o p o s a l  w a s  m a d e  b y  I-2r. S a î c a r i  T u o m i o j a ,  E x e c u t i v e  S e c r e t a r y  o f  t h e  
U n i t e d  N a t i o n s  E c o n o m i c  C o m m i s s i o n  f o r  E u r o p e  ( E C E ) ,  i n  a  s p e c i a l  r e p o r t  t o  
iîr. D a "  I T a i m r a r s k j o l d .
IIt c  T u o m i o j a  i n d  b e e n  s e n t  t o  L a o s  b y  t h e  S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l  " t o  r e v i c r j  
t h e  e c o n o m i c  s i t u a t i o n  o f  L a o s  aicd i n  p a r t i c u l a r  t h e  r o l e  o f  e c o n o m i c  a n d  t e c h n i c a l  
a s s i t a n c e  r e d c r e d  b y  tlic U n i t e d  N a t i o n s  f o r  t h e  f u r t h e r a n c e  o f  e c o n o m i c  g r o w t h  
a n d  s t a b i l i t y ,  "  I-!r. T u o m i o j a  r e m a i n e d  i n  L a o s  f r o m  1 7  N o v e m b e r  a n d  d r a f t e d  t h e  
s p e c i a l  r e p o r t  o n  t h e  L a o s  s i t u a t i o n ,
T l i c  r e p o r t ,  a f t e r  r e v i e w i n g  t h e  p r o b l e m s  a n d  s h o r t c o m i n g s  o f  t h e  L a o  
e c o n o m y ,  r e c o m m e n d s  t h a t  c o - o r d i n a t e d  a c t i o n  b e  u n d e r t a k e n '  b y  t h e  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s  
a n d  t h e  s p e c i a l i z e d  a g e n c i e s  t o  a s s i t  L a o s  i n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  m a i n  f i e l d s :  t h e  
d c v e l o p : . ; e n t  o f  t h e  n a t u r a l  r e s o u r c e s  o f  t h e  c o u n t r y ;  t h e  c r e a t i o n  o f  a  c o m p r e h e n s i v e  
t r a n s p o r t  a n d  c o m m u n i c a t i o n s  n e t w o r k  a n d  t h e  i m p r o v e m e n t  o f  c o m m u n i c a t i o n s  b e t w e e n  
L a o s  a n d  t h e  o u t s i d e  w o r l d ;  t h e  i m p r o v e m e n t  o f  h e a l t h  c o n d i t i o n s ;  t h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  
o f  a n  e d u c a t i o n a l  s y s t e m  s u i t e d  t o  t h e  n e e d s  o f  t h e  c o u n t l y ;  tlie d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  
. r u r a l  c a r . m . u n i t i c s  p a y i n g  s p e c i a l  a t t e n t i o n  t o  t h e  h i l l  p o p u l a t i o n  a n d  t h e i r  
p r o b l c : . : s  ; a n d  i m p r o v e m e n t  o f  t h e  e n ' t i r o  p u b l i c  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  s y s t e m .
S p e c i f i c a l l y ,  t h e  r e p o r t  o n  L a o s  c a l l s  f o r  t h e  f o l l o w i n g :
1 ,  S u r v e y s  o f  n a t u r a l  a n d  h u m a n  r e s o u r c e s  a n d  t h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  b a s i c  
i n f o r m a t i o n .  I n  t h i s  f i e l d ,  m i n e r a l  p r o s p e c t i o n ,  s o i l  s u r v e y s ,  m a n p o w e r  s u r v e y s  
a n d  t h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  s t a t i s t i c a l  s e r v i c e s  s h o u l d  h a v e  h i g h  p r i o r i t y ,
2 ,  A g r i c u l t u r a l  d e v e l o p m e n t ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  w i t h  a  v i e w  t o  i n c r e a s e d
p r o d u c t i v i t y  a n d  t o  p r o m o t e  d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  a n d  m a r k e t i n g .
3 ,  E a s i c  e d u c a t i o n  a n d  v o c a t i o n a l  a n d  t e c l i n i c a l  t r a i n i n g ,
i;, O i ’g a n i s a t i o n  o f  a  c c m p r e l i c n s i v e  p u b l i c  h e a l t h  s y s t e m ,  e m p l i a s i a i n g
p r c v c n t i T C  m e d i c i n e  a n d  t h e  q u a l i t a t i v e  i m p r o v e m e n t  o f  n u t r i t i o n a l  l e v e l s ,
5 ,  C o ^ r n n u n i t y  d e v e l o p m e n t  i n  o r d e r  t o  i m p r o v e  t h e  u t i l i s a t i o n  o f  l a t e n t  
l o c a l  r e s o u r c e s ,  w i t h  p a r t i c u l a r  a t t e n t i o n  t o  b e  p a i d  t o  e t h n i c  m i n o r i t y  g r o u p s  
a n d  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  o f  m o u n t a i n o u s  r e g i o n s .
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6. The ccutlnz up o2 a. coiUoi’y-;:ldo cyetca ox and coznenicatlons.
The '.:e:.T: oT 'Uic ITiitcd Hâtions and "hlic specialized agencies sh.ovJlcl bc particularly 
goa-'c;'. to t'.'.o %)rob%c:ns of using tlio izost cconcsiical izeans of dcvclopi:;:; inland 
n-ateroayo; secondary and feeder roads, tlie use of cheap transport facilities and 
csone:;icau methods.
7. TIzo pu’olic administration should bo heldpcd by placing trained and 
ezezericnred administrators at the disposal of Laos to work both at tiiO central 
az'zd the prov.incial level and to assist in the training of Lao administrative 
pcrsorzicl.
Tho Tuomioja report says tlzat besides these long-term progi’cnacs, aimed 
at general development, a series of short-term projects should be undertaken in 
Laos in order to obtain quick results and produce a favorable local ci.irate for 
further development efforts. It declares tliat' in addition, current requests made 
by Laos for technical assistance by the United ITations and tiie specialised agencies 
should be favourably considered. In particular, the implementation of the corsiitirents 
of the Special Fund under the yokohg development scheme should be speeded up.
Ur. ?uo:zioja recommends the appointment of a high-level cfficz'al to co- 
ordirato the various development progi'ammos, and the activities of the United Hâtions 
and the Specialised Agencies in the iizzplcmcntation of tl% projects. lie suggests 
that the personnel recruited to assist the Lao administration should, if possible, 
come from Asian or other underdeveloped countries,
Tlio document declares that Laos faces peculiar problems as a small, 
landlocked country which attained independence only five years ago aiid tliat there 
can bo little doubt that the two million lao people ifill require considorablr foreign 
assistance for many years to come Laos had cat out to build a ne:: sta.te ' ne’er the 
most unpropitious conditions and contingcuicies, and was now appealing to the United 
Hâtions for assistance.
Uith inadequate hurzan and material resources at its disposal, the Lao 
ad-.in.'St:'ation had been facing tlic crroi'crzcly difficult task of integrating a 
heterogenous population, setting up a stato machinery, organising tiio economy and 
raising tlic living standards of people.
Indeed, Laos has load to roly heavily on foreign aid whidi, hozzcvcr, 
accoz'd' n- to uie report, had not so far acliicvcd significant results nor strongthcnod 
the productive capacity of the country.
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n e : :  n e e d e d ,  c a j ' s  ttic e p o s l a l  r e p o r t  t o  t h e  Gccrc'*>a:.7,- - G e n e r a l ,
: : e e  t o  h e l p  L a o a  r ; o o t  b a s i c  d c ' v c l c p r . : c n t  n e e d s  . A z o n , ^  t!:o b a s i c  p ' r o b l c n o  ; : c r e  
t o  ra.i.sc t h e  l e v e l  o G  e d u c a t i o n ,  t o  c r e a t e  nei;-: e d u c a t i o n a l  s y s t C T o ;  t o  d e v e l o p  
p u b l i c  h e- 1 t h  e n d  i r : p i ' o v o  h e a l t h  c o n d i t i o n s ;  t o  d e v e l o p  t h e  v i l l a g e s  a n d  r e c e t t l o  
t h e  n c : ; a d i c  p o p u l a t i o n .
T h e  d o c u r . ’c n t  s a y s  t h a t  I f  l a o s  i s  t o  r a i s e  i t s  e c o n o n y  t o  a  l e v e l  c o n d u c i v e  
t o  h c a l ' I i i  a n d  s e l f - s u s t a i n e d  f j r o : r t h ,  a n  i n t e n s i v e  a n d  c o - o r d i n a t e d  e f f o r t  : d l l  
b o  r e q u i r e d .  T h o  a u t h o r i t i e s ,  f o r  o x a a p l o ,  s h o u l d  i n p r o v o  p u b l i c  a à e i n i s t r a t i o n ,  
t r a i n  c o r e  e f f i c i e n t  p e r s o n n e l  a n d  e l i n i n a t o  t h e  c a u s e s  o f  w a s t e .  îiio p r i v a t e  ' 
s e c t o r  s h o u l d  t i u v i  t o  m o r e  p r o d u c t i v e  a c t i v i t y  a n d  a w a y  f r o r .  s p e c u l a t i o n .
Z n t c n c a t i o n a l  t e c h n i c a l  a s s i s t a n c e  f r o m  t h e  U n i t e d  n a t i o n s  an r l  t h o  a g e n c i e s  
t o  T a o s  c o ' o l d  d e v e l o p  t h r o u ^ . h  a d v i s o i v  s e r v i c e s ,  t r a i n i n g  f a c i l i t i e s ,  s i u r v e y s ,  
f e l l o w s h i p s  a n d  t h e  p r o v i s i o n  o f  e s s e n t i a l  e q u i p m e n t  a n d  s u p p l i e s .
C o n e  o f  t l i e  p r o j e c t s  e n v i s a g e d  i n  Ü i e  s p e c i a l  r c p o i ' t  a r e :
-  2:0 d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  i r r i g a t i o n  ‘t o  s t i r r - u l a t c  a g r i c u l t u r a l  p r o d u c t i o n ,  s u c h  
a s  t h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  t h o  Y i e n t i a n o  p l a i n  w i t ’n i n  tJ:o f r a i : e : : o r h  o f  t h e  
h e h o r - g  s c h e m e .
-  2 : c  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  l o c a l ,  s m a l l - s c a l e  i r r i g a t i o n  trarlcs, t h o  c r e a t i o n  o f  
l o c a l  c h a n n e l s  o f  f o o d  d i s t r i b u t i o n  a n d  t h o  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  a  l i v e s t o c k  
i i i d a s  t r y .
-  T h e  c o n t i n u a t i o n  a n d  i m p r o v e m e n t  o f  c u r r e n t  s u r v e y s  c T  t h e  n a t u r a l  r e s o u r c e s  
o f  L a o s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  o f  n i n c r a l ç ,  o i l  a n d  f o r e s t  w c a l t l i .
-  Tl'.e d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  t h e  Ils’c o n g  t r i b u t a r i e s  i n  L a o s  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t!:e 
p r o g r a m m e  r e c o m m e n d e d  b y  t h e  f o u r - c o u n t r y  C o m m i t t e e  f o r  t h o  D e v e l o p m e n t  
o f  t h e  Lcr.rcr M e k o n g  B a s i n .
-  ? l : o  o s t a b l i s l u s c n t  o f  c r a l l - s c a l o  i n d u s t r i e s  t o  m e e t  i n t c n v e l  d e m a n d  i n  
s u c h  f i e l d s  a s  m a t c h e s ,  c a n d l e s ,  s o a p ,  s a l t ,  b c v o r s ( ; o s ,  t c u m i n g ,  c a n n i n g ,  
s u g a r ,  c a v r m i l l s ,  b r i c k s  a n d  t i l e s ,  e a r t h e n w a r e  a n d  c e r a m i c s  a n d  t e x t i l e s .
-  T h e  c o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  a  c o m p r e h e n s i v o  a n d  e f f i c i e n t  c y s t G i a  o f  t r a n s p o r t  
a n d  c o m m u n i c a t i o n s  i n  L a o s .
-  T h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  L a o  e d u c a t i o n ,  a l c z g  t h e  l i n e s  o f  t h e  c u r r e n t  D I I E S C O  
e d u c a t i o n a l  p r o g r a m m e  t h e r e .
" -
T h o  c o t o b l l c h T r c n t  O x  d r^o.oior’a l  c o r . n u i i l t y  d o v o l o r r o z i t  och.cr.vo, c l o o c l y  
co - ' O - .-iO.naucd u i t h  o t h e r  v i l l o ^ o  d c v c l o ? n : G n t  p r c . j c c t a  G ’; s h  a o  i r r i g a t i o n ,  
a j ; r i c i ' . l t n r a l  c : : t o n o i o n ,  r i m d a ; ; ; c n t a i  e d u c a t i o n  a n d  ; ; c a l t h .
T^:o c r c c . t i o n  o f  a  n o ; ;  f i s c a l  p o l i c y  a n d  t h o  s t r c n r ^ t l - . e n i n , ^  o f  L a o s  
r / a h l l c  a d i T i l n x o t r a t i o n .
TIî g  f o r m u l a t i o n  o f  a  s t a t i r . t i o a l  p l a n  f o r  t h e  c o u n t r y ,  tlio t r a i n i n g  o f  
p e r c o n n o l  a n d  t l w  o r g a n i z a t i o n  o f  d e m o g r a p h i c  a n d  a g r i c u l t i r a l  c e n s u s e s .
( U Î I I S )  .
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